G.K.V. Lib. Hardwan

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chemnal and eGangotri-

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri



078648

C-9

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL. XXII NO. 1

JANUARY 1995

1032

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S.S. BARLINGAY (Pune)
CHIEF EDITOR
S.V. BOKIL (Pune)
ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESHPANDE (Pune)
BOOK REVIEW EDITOR
P.P.GOKHALE (Pune)
ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patna)
MRINAL MIRI (Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors

G.N. Mathrani (Bombay)

Daya Krishna (Jaipur)

Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)

R.C. Pandeya (Varanasi)

D.P Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)

G.N. Joshi (Pune)

D.Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)

J. De Marneffe (Pune)

Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)

R.C. Gandhi (Delhi)

J. Khawaja (Aligarh)

S.A. Shaida (kanpur)

Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)

S.K. Sexena (Delhi)

R.A. Sinari (Bombay)

R.K. Gupta (Delhi)

R. Balasubramaniun (Madras)

Ranbir Singh (Imphal)

V.K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)

Ashok Gangadean (U.S.A.)

Articles in the journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire
Bibliographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service,

Gurgaon (Haryana).

Subscription to be sent in the name of:

Indian Philosophical Quaterly, by DD or crossed Cheque.

* LIFE MEMBERSHIP *

Individuals: Rs. 600/- (in India)
U.S. \$ 150/- (outside India)
Institutions: Rs. 2000/- (in India)
U.S. \$ 300/- (outside India)

* ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP *

Individuals: Rs. 75/- (Rs. 85/- by cheque)
U.S. \$ 40.00
Institutions: Rs. 125/- (Rs. 135/- by cheque)
U.S. \$ 50.00
Single Copy: Rs. 40/U.S. \$ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the month of publication.





078648

Indian Philosophical Quarterly



VOL XXII NUMBER 1

CONTENTS

JANUARY 1995

EDITORIAL

N.S.DRAVID	: Anomolies of the Nyaya-Vaisesika Concept of Self	1
KOLAWALE OWOLABI	: Edmund Husserl's Rehablitation of Cartesian Foundationlism : A Critical Analysis	13
A.R. KELKAR	: Language As Empowerment	25
P.P. GOKHALE	: Is their a moral perspective in Patanjali's Yogasutra ?	41
TANDRA PATNAIK	: Purusarthas in Aesthetics	55
PATIRAJ R.	: The Sphota Doctrine of Bhartrhari	67
s.k. ookerjee	: Discussion	75
S.G. NIGAL	: Discussion	77

EDITORIAL

Readers and Subscribers, when they receive this number of *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, will at once notice that it wears a new look, which, we hope, they will like. The new look is an effort in the direction of making the Journal presentable also in its appearance. *IPQ*, which is now solely the Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, has established itself as a respectable journal in India and abroad after its uninterrupted service to the academic community for the last twenty one years. We are, however, actually aware that there is a great scope for improvement in its standard and academic excellence. Our march is on and we hope to serve better and better in the years to come. We are aware that we shall have to address ourselves to various important aspects of the production of the journal but, perhaps more urgently, to the most important question of augmenting the financial resources in view of the current inflationary spirals in the production costs.

We may inform our readers that from January 1995, the new Editorial Board for *IPQ* has been nominated by the Vice Chancellor of the University of Poona for a period of four years to look after its publication. The new Board includes Prof. S.V. Bokil (Pune), Prof. Rajendra Prasad (Patna), Prof. Mrinal Miri (Shimla), Dr. Sharad Deshpande (Pune) and Dr. P.P.Gokhale (Pune). The change in the constitution of the Editorial Board was due for sometime. Although the publication of the present number has been delayed a little, we hope that we shall be able to maintain regularity in the schedule of publication as usual.

We would like to assure our readers that IPQ will continue its policy of welcoming contributions from all the normally recognised areas of human knowledge, experience and action, since it is dedicated to the promotion of decent academic culture imbued with the spirit of resolute inquiry amongst teachers, students and scholars of philosophy and other cognate disciplines. It is interested in developing a critical but constructive vision of human life with its fatalistic past, activistic present and probabilistic future. Fortunately we have a great cultural and intellectual heritage, and though the modern contexts have opened up new avenues and posed new challenges, there is no reason why we cannot pick up the threads from the variegated fabric of our philosophically rich past and carry on philosophising on present issues having new dimensions.

The new Editorial Board looks forward to kind and generous co-operation from our readers, contributors, subscribers and all other well-wishers of the Journal in making it an intellectually powerful organ of philosophical presentation, discussion and debate in diverse fields.

We wish our readers a happy and resourceful new year.

Department of Philosophy University of Poona S.V.BOKIL Chief Editor

31-1-1995.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

	VOL XXII NUMBER 2	CONTENTS APRIL	1995
	RAJNI SRIVASTAV	: Macpherson's Theory of Democracy	81
	R. P. SINGH	: Hegelianism : Post-modernists' Charges Refuted	95
	WARREN A. SHIBLES	: Association Theory of Meaning A Reconstruction of the literature	105
	S. PANNEERSELVAM	: Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory of Discourse	123
	ALBERT W. J. H.	: Art and Ontology	133
	A. B. RANDERIA	: It Is the Judging that Matters	i41
	ARNOLD KRUGER	: Mahatma Gandhi : Hindu Evangelical & Puritan ?	159
1	ABUL KASEM	: Professor Rajendra Prasad on Philosophy, Education and the Quality of Life : Some Observations	169
	N. MALLA	: Value Education	175

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXII NUMBER 3	CONTENTS July	1995
AVINASH VAGH	Aristotle on Magnanimity .	181
N. S. DRAVID :	Negation and Negative Fact in Wsetern and Indian Logic	197
Md. ABDUR RAZZAQUE :	Linguistic Solipsism: a Defense	207
G. C. NAYAK :	Are Jeevanmukta and Bodhisattva Ideals Asymmetrical?	215
D. M. PRAHARAJ :	Speech-Acts: As Linguistic Communicative Function	225
MUHAMMAD KAMAL :	Heidegger's Concept of the World	239
AHMED JAMA ANWER :	Some Approaches to the Problem of Induction	247
	BOOK-REVIEWS	259

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY **PUBLICATIONS**

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs.10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs.10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona,

Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXII NUMBER 4		CONTENTS October	1995
J. K. BARTHAKUR		A Theory of Time	271
BINA GUPTA		Samkara's Notion of Sākṣin: Its Anticipations in Upaniṣads and Gauḍapāda	•291
TIRTHANATH BANDYOPADHYAY	:	Fallibilism and Putnam	313
RAJENDRA PRASAD		Morality to Override Religion Working Out a Lead from Swami Vivekananda	327
MADHU T. V.		Althusser's Conception of Ideology: A Critical Exposition	339
R. SUNDARA RAJAN		Philosophy as Geo-Philia: Towards the Recovery of the Idea of the Earth	353
SHARAD DESHPANDE :		Causation, Explanation and Understanding	373
B. SAMBASIVA PRASAD:		Value Education	395

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1

January, 1995

ANOMALIES OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CONCEPT OF SELF

Nyaya-Vaisesika (to be referred to simply as Nyaya throughout this essay) and Jainism are perhaps the only two Indian philosophical schools which attach great importance to the concept of the embodied or corporeal nature of the individual self called Jiva or Jivatman in Sanskrit. In no other school this aspect of the self has been given due importance. We are going to consider the Nyaya view of the embodied self and the serious consequences which are entailed by it.

Let us start with a brief outline of the basic metaphysical doctrines of Nyaya which are relevant to its conception of self. There are two kinds of selves, viz. the innumerable individual selves and a single universal self, that is God. Both these kinds of selves are substances which are eternal and ubiquitous. Being substances, these are endowed with certain general and certain special qualities. The general qualities are number, dimension, separateness, conjuction and disjunction from other substances. The special qualities that are common to the individual and universal selves are cogniton, emotion or desire, happiness and conation; but those belonging to God are all eternal, while those belonging to the individual selves are transitory. Besides these four, the individual self is endowed with certain other special qualities like aversion, virtue, vice, misery and residual trace. These too are transistory in nature. The relation of these qualities with their substantive locus is inherence. While none of the qualities of God is transitory and therefore God can never be devoid of any of His qualities, this is not the case with the (special) qualities of the individual self. The qualities though inherent in the self can be and are dissipated temporarily or permenantly. The self may be devoid of cognition, desire etc. during sleep and similar states and in the state of release all these qualities disappear for good from the being of the self leaving it in an insentient stone-like condition. These are the basic metaphysical ideas about the individual self and God advocated by Nyaya.

RECEIVED: 11/12/93

The individual self is the embodied self in the sense that most of its special qualities are engendered in it by the contact of the sense organs and the mind with it in certain sensitive portions of the body. The self being ubiqitous it is in contact with the whole body which it inhabits and also all other bodies, but the mind and the senseorgans which are of limited dimensions can come in contact with the self in the sensitive parts of the body only occasionally. This is why the self is not emdowed with its own qualities at all times. In the technical terminology of Nyaya the self is the material cause of its qualities, but their efficient cause is the body-mind-sense-andobject-contact, in the absence of which the self's own qualities cannot emerge in it. Obviously, this is a rather queer view to adopt; but without it Nyaya cannot account for the embodied character of the self. If the self is absolutely different from the body, its embodiedness must serve some purpose and the only purpose that it can be expected to serve is to determine the biopsychological career of the self as a human being. It stands to the credit of Nyaya thinkers that although they regarded the self and the body as radically distinct from each other they did not, like Descartes in the west, treat the distinction as preventive of the mutual contact of the self and the body. Even a material and a non-material entity can quite well come in contact with each other according to the Nyaya view.

Here another peculiarity of the Nyaya view of the self or its qualities needs to be taken note of. Conation, emotion, happiness, misery etc., which are self's qualities, are not conscious qualities. That is, consciousness does not characterise these qualities. They are not conscious because consciousness is not a property common to all these qualities. It is just one of the qualities which is commonly known as cognition and is different from the non-cognitive qualities and may emerge in the self without its being cognisant of their occurence.

So, unless the desire, feeling etc. of the self are followed by their cognition or consciousness, the self would remain totally unaware that it is desirous, emotional etc. even if these changes of state in it are prompted by cognition. The cognition prompting a desire would precede and not follow it, and not have the desire or the self as its object. In fact the self is not the object of any direct cognition by itself. It is always cognised as endowed with one or other of its attributes. Only in an unconscious state like that of sound sleep the self is free of all its states or attributes, but if in such a stark condition the self is supposed to have the cognition of itself, then this very cognition would adversely affect its starkness. So, there is not only no self-awareness in the strict sense in the self even in the

waking state, there is no awareness in it of its own changing states, unless any of these states is followed by reflection of itself (or memory). But just as body-mind-sense-contact is needed to engender cognition, desire, etc. in the self, so it is needed to engender even reflective cognition or memory of these states. The self cannot by itself bring about any such cognition. Even the effort of self is in fact the effort that is induced by the body-sense-contact. Thus, the conscious or sentient life of the self is in reality a somnambulist type of life, which is wholly dependent upon conditions extraneous to it. Even the self-consciousness of self, which is not strictly to be called as such, is at the mercy of the body and what is called the conation or effort of the self is really the result of body-mind-sense-activity. The self does not of itself have or initiate any activity; it only suffers activity and bears the qualities including cognition produced by mind-sense-object-contact.

Such a view naturally raises the question; 'Is a self devoid of the sense of self-identity or wholly dependent upon its association with the body to acquire this sense temporarily, good enough to sustain the felt identity of the individual, which it is supposed to constitute? ' Mere ontological continuity, based upon the eternity of the self, cannot explain how the experiential gap taking place during sound sleep and such other states can be filled by unconnected experiences preceding and succeeding the gap. The self in its absolute pristine condition cannot bridge the gap. Perhaps the impressions called 'Sanskara' in Nyaya's technical terminology, which are supposed to be left behind by an evanescent (in its third moment of existence) experience can connect the past and the present experiences belonging to the same self. The impressions, though as short-lived as the experiences generating them, go on producing similar impressions which, when revived, give rise to experiences similar to the past ones. Thus, a link is established between the frequently-interrupted experiential states of the self. So, even during the intervals, when the self is totally bereft of any its special qualities (excluding the impressions) due to the quiescence of the biopsychical processes (including experiential states in the self), its sense of self-identity is not lost.

There are, however, some difficulties in this answer to the above question. First, the impressions also are the qualities of the self and like the remaining qualities engendered in it they too must be supposed to be engendered mainly by the biopsychical processes. So, when these processes are in abeyance all the impressions are sure to disappear as do the other qualities. If impressions are supposed to give rise to their similars then they may do this either by themselves

or with the help of the biopsychical processes. If the first alternative is true, then there would be no end to the series of impressions one succeeding another so that every experience - even the most trival one - would be indelibly impressed on the mind or what is once remembered would be remembered always. Moreover, it would be rather odd to maintain that the first impression of an experience arises as the result of the biopsychical processes, while the subsequent impressions similar to the first one do not require these processes to generate them. If the second of the foregoing alternatives is upheld, then as in the case of other qualities, in the case of all impressions too the causality of biopsychical processes would have to be admitted. But since during sleep and other sleeplike conditions these processes are in abeyance, the self would then be totally bereft of all its special qualities including the impressions. There would, then, be nothing there to connect cognition, conation etc. preceding and succeeding a sleeplike interruption in the sentience of the self. Secondly, it has to be noted that in Nyaya view impressions, though a quality of the self, are quite unlike cognition, conation etc. of which they happen to be residual effects. Impressions are neither conscious nor subconscious. As explained above, even conation, volition etc. cannot be regarded either as conscious or subconscious in Nyaya view. If this is so, how can impressions constitute a conscious link between the different states of the self which are separated from each other by wide gaps of consciousness? Nyaya cannot slur over the difficulty by treating the bare eternal self itself as such a link. The bare self is a totally unconscious self. Even the concsiousness of its being a particular self is not present in the sleepstate. Even this concsiousness is engendered in it by mind-body-contact of a special kind. So, in sleep and other similar states there is always the possibility of the self of one individual being confused with any other self associated with another body. Impressions are supposed to survive the body by which they are engendered and they are transmitted to the body of the next incarnation of the self. The newborn baby's reflex activity of sucking it's mother's breast is considered to be due to the revival of the baby's impressions of experience of its previous birth by all Indian philosophers. This implies that despite their association with a particular body, the innumerable impressions of experiences engendered by that body are not tied down to that body as the experiences are. This is one more peculiarity of the Nyaya view of self's qualities. Though impressions are just like cognitions, conations etc., yet they are not totally dependent upon the body. What kind of biopsychological causation is this which differs in nature from quality to quality? Can there be such a causation at all? Obviously the self - the material cause of all its qualities is eternal, while the biopsychological process is the non-material cause of the latter. So, just as a clay-pot for example is destroyed if the conjuction of its component parts, which is the nonmaterial cause of the claypot is disrupted, so the impressions associated with a body must be dissipated, if the body is destroyed. It is, therefore, not quite correct to say that the impressions of experiences are transmitted from one body to another in which the self incarnates itself. Destiny is another quality about whose causation also there seems to be some confusion in the Nyaya view. Destiny is built as a result of the conscious, voluntary activities of the embodied self. The body acts due to the conative prompting of the self and the result of the acts of the body accumulates in the self in the form of its destiny. Destiny, too, is transmitted from one body to another, but as in the case of impressions, its causality is not confined to one body. The destiny built up, so to say, in one body gets its supplementation in different bodies which means that, although the bodily activity is needed to produce destiny, yet the activities of one body are not sufficient to produce it. Different bodies at different times help produce the destiny (or perhaps the destinies) of the self transmigrating through those bodies.

Another peculiarity of the Nyaya view of the causation of impressions and destiny needs to be particularly noted here. Bodymind-contact or the biopsychical process is needed for the production and revival or fructification of impressions and destiny, but it is not supposed to be needed for their upkeep or continuity of existence. Such a view is unavoidable for Nyāya because after the death of one body and before incarnation in another body there may be long or short intervals during which the self is supposed to subsist in a disembodied but not a qualitiless state. Cognition, conation etc. are of course absent in the self in this state but impressions and destiny somehow cling to it without getting any accretion because of the absence of the body. The impressions and destiny remain, so to say, in a potential condition during this interim period. Like other schools of philosophy, Nyaya cannot account for the persistence of these two qualities in the disimbodied state by means of the causality of the subtle body as the admission of such a body over and above the physical body and its causation in respect of the two qualities would militate against Nyava's own doctrine of causality. It can never be the case that different kinds of non-material causes are needed for the production, preservation and destruction of the same effect. It would be rather odd to hold that while the physical body is needed to produce destiny and impressions in the self, it is the subtle body succeeding the physical body that is needed for the persistence of these qualities in the latter and the last body preceding the salvation of the self is alone needed for the complete elimination

of the self's destiny. Destiny is the quality which is associated with all different bodies through which the self transmigrates. Moreover it is destiny itself which is supposed to predetermine the incarnation of the self in a particular body after the destruction of a previous body inhabited by it. This is the queer view to talk of destiny. It cannot be both the cause and the effect of the same body. The body that comes into being as a result of the causation of a certain self's destiny cannot also be the cause (or part-cause) of the preservation of the latter. It is true that mere destiny does not bring into being the different bodies of the self. God, space, time etc. are joint causes with destiny of the self's different bodies. But destiny is one of these causes and the main cause at that. So, the inconsistency in the view of the causation of destiny remains.

A more puzzling peculiarity of the Nyāya view of self is related to its view of God. The main proof for the existence of God adduced by Nyāya is based upon its conception of the similarity of divine creatorship with self's creatorship. The human individual creates things by means of his or her effort which is born of the desire to create, which arises as the result of the creator's knowledge of the material causes of the things to be created. God is such a creator of the whole cosmos as He alone has the knowledge of the material cause of the cosmos and the desire and effort capable of producing the cosmos. So, human and divine creativity are-- in Nyāya view--almost parallel with each other. If this is so, how can human creativity be supposed to be so thoroughly dependent upon the body? As we have seen, the dependence upon the body of self's creativity is absolute, while divine creativity is absolutely independent.

As a matter of fact Nyaya seems to have completely botched the conception of divine creativity or causality by regarding it as similar to human creativity or causality. God along with selfs destiny, space, time etc. is supposed to be the common efficient cause of everything. How can such a view of common causation of two such unlike entities be explained, specially so when divine causality is taken to be inferrible from human causality? It is, therefore, quite pertinent on the part of some thinkers to raise objection against the inference of the divine creativity that, since God has no body, He cannot create anything. The Nyaya answer to the objection is not quite convincing. The answer is to the effect that God's knowledge, will and effort are eternal and absolutely unrestricted. Only because of the unrestricted and universal operation of his will and effort, God is supposed to be able to bring about the conjunction of atoms after the periodical annihilation of the world and its consequent disintegration into atoms. The atoms brought together, mainly

by divine effort, give rise, in due course, to the whole composite structure of the world. Thus, the necessity of embodiment for God in his creative activity is denied by Nyaya. In fact, neither body nor anything else can be needed by God's will, effort, knowledge etc. as they are all supposed to be eternal like God. But when it comes to the question of reviving the scriptural lore and its propagation among select sages as of each epoch, Nyaya admits that God reincarnates Himself as a master or teacher and imparts the knowledge of the scriptures to the sages. Teaching is an activity which cannot be carried on without there being an embodied person as teacher and an embodied person as student. In this explanation of its view Nyaya forgets the very obvious fact that if for the omniscient, omnipotent and omnivolent God no physical body is needed for creating the world, then it should not at all be needed for Him to teach the scriptures to the first-born sages. God could directly make the first born enlightened about the scriptures by His infinite power. If despite his infinite power God cannot do without physical incarnation in carrying out the teaching activity, He cannot do so even in the case of the creation of the world.

It may be urged by Nyāya against these arguments that the embodied nature of the individual self is a fact of experience. Also, the limitation of the individual's cognitions, desires, conations etc. is an undeniable fact; God's cognition, conation etc. are, however, not directly known; they are inferred on the basis of their broad similarly to the individual's cognition, conation etc. This similarity between them is only in respect of their co-objectivity, that is to say, the individual's self cognition, conation etc. have identical objects as God's cognition, conation etc. But in respect of their causation there is no similarity between the two groups of qualities.

But if we look closely into this matter, we find that there is not the slightest similarity between the individual self's and God's qualities. The former are noneternal, while the latter is eternal; the former have only a few things as their objects, while the whole world is the object of the latter; there is mutual causation among the former, but all the latter qualities are uncaused; the former depend upon the body of their origination, preservation etc., but the latter depend upon nothing as they are eternal and, lastly, the former are causally-related to specific effects, but the latter have everything as their effects. The only features common to these two types of qualities is their intentionality; but even this differs as limited and the unlimited in the two cases. In view of such radical difference between these, it would not be reasonable to base the inference of God's creativity upon its similarity to individual creativity.

Ubiquity, however, is a feature which the individual self is

supposed to share with God. The reason for regarding the self as ubiquitious is that the destiny of the individual is effective in places where the individual is not physically present. A certain job, for example, is offered to me only by a firm based in a foreign land far away from me, although a number of persons had applied for the job. This cannot happen unless my destiny is connected with the job. Only if the self is present with its destiny at the place from where the offer is made, there can be connection between the destiny and the job. But does the admission of self's ubiquility explain this phenomenon satisfactorily? I get a certain offer while others do not get it despite their best efforts to secure it. Why do not others get the job when their selves too are ubiquitious? If the self alone is the connecting link between destiny and things predestined (for the self). then everything must be predestined for everybody. Moreover, how can the operation of the destiny of a self far away from the body it inhabits be explained? Can destiny-a quality of the self -- be operative in the absence of the body-mind-contact? If it can, then even the goings-on in the body can occur without the operation of its destiny. If body-mind-contact is supposed to be needed only for the origination and not for the operation of destiny, then even divine will and effort would not be needed for the operation. So, God as the common efficient cause of all that happens cannot be inferred at all.

Thus, neither destiny, impression nor any other quality is found to be associated with the self throughout the series of bodily transmigrations it undergoes. If this is so, then there arises the question of the individuation of the self. What is it that distinguishes one self from another? It is not the question how the self is identified as a particular self? The body which the self inhabits in a particular incarnation may help identify it so long as the body exists, but when the body ceases to exist some quality like impression or destiny may help the self's identification. This is an epistemological answer to an epistemological question. But the above question is an ontological one regarding the intrinsic nature of the self. If, apart from its qualities and the various bodies it assumes, one self is exactly like another (in the state of final release, if not in other states), how are they distinct from each other? Nyāya has considered this question, but its answer to it is least satisfactory. It says that a property like 'specificity' characterises each self and that this property differs from self to self. If it is asked: 'what distinguishes one self's specificity from that of another self?' the only answer that is given is that each specificity is self-distinguished from another. Obviously such an answer can be given even in the case of the selves' mutual distinction. Without specifying what this so-called specificity consists in, to say that the selves differ because of their different specificities is

tantamount to saying that the selves differ amongst themselves but this difference is inexplicable. It is also difficult to say that such mutually-distinct selves are characterised even by selfhood. One bare self cannot be said to be either alike or different from another. If it is alike what is the ground of their likeness and if it is different what is the ground of their difference?

Further, can the attainment of bare selfhood dissociated from all the special qualities of the self be upheld as the summum bonum of existence? It is for such an utterly insentient state of self that one is expected to strive by means of his or her cognitive and other faculties. If so, such a striving is sure to defeat its purpose. How can one attain cognitionlessness by means of cognition? It is understandable that an imperfect or hazy cognition leads, when deepened, to perfect and determinate cognition. But no true cognition is known to lead its own complete absence, nor a sensible person can be expected to aspire after the attainment of such a condition of cognitionlessness. Nyaya appears to aggravate the bizarreness of such a view by maintaining that a definite inference to the effect that the self is different in nature from every other thing including the mind-body-complex it inhabits is conducive to the attainment of its bare selfhood. If this inference is the only means of salvation, it must be the most important kind of cognition one can have. Having acquired this cogniton by dint of one's unrelenting spiritual efforts how could one be persuaded to relapse for good in a state which completely excludes the cognition?

A comparison of the Nyaya view of self with that which is upheld by Samkhya is worth attempting here. Nyaya regards the self as the agent, the doer, and the originator of all the voluntary activities in which the body enveloping the self is involved. According to Samkhva, however, the Purusa--the replica of Nyaya's self--is sentient but inactive and it is Prakrti--the material matrix of the whole universe--which is active and the agent of all actions. What, therefore, belongs to Prakṛṭi is wrongly imputed to Purusa. In the Nyaya view, as we have seen above, the self is depicted as just the material repository of all the qualities that are induced in it by the activity of the body-mind-sense-complex. The self only suffers the existence of these qualities. In no sense, therefore, the self can be regarded as the agent of the activities. The ultimate condition of the self is also totally bereft of agency or doership. Thus Nyaya seems to do violence to its own view of self by treating it as the agent of all voluntary activities while Samkhya rightly considers the Purusa as a seeming but not real agent of the activities initiated by the dynamic Prakrti.

If we think carefully we may come to the unpalatable but unavoidable conclusion that the Nyava view of self does not serve the purpose for which it is formulated. If the experiential life of the human individual confined to the organism of the current incarnation alone is to be explained, there is no neccesity to admit the self as the sustainer of the former. The living body itself or its metabolic activity (which is homeostatic and self-regulating) can be treated as the sustaining ground of the individual's experiential existence. We have seen above how body-mind-contact or sense-mind-contact is essential for all bodily activity. The self-feeling also may be supposed to be caused by some special kind of continuous bodily activity. But when the bodily life comes to an end, no sustainer is left for the ongoing astral life of the self surviving the death of the body. So, it is thought, specially by Nyava, that the eternal self carrying the residual traces in its being of all its bodily experiences persists as surrounded by a subtle body during the interval preceding its reincarnation in another body. But if the self's empirical existence, whether terrestrial or astral, always depends upon its being enveloped by some body or another, then Nyaya may as well discard the notion of self as redundant. All that the notion of self seems to explain is very well explained by the notions of the physical body or subtle body, the latter of which has to be postulated any way by all Indian philosophies. It is true that the self-reference involved in the expressions like 'my body' cannot be satisfactorily accounted, if the body is supposed to be the referend of the expressions. The living body cannot refer to itself as 'my body', if the referer and the referend are identical. But a similar difficulty is associated also with the conception of the self as different from the body. The self which is quite different from the body (or body-mind-complex) can refer to it as 'my body' (which means that the body is a possession of but not identical with the self) but it cannot use the expression 'I' while pointing to the body (indicating thereby that it is the same as its body).

In view of the ultimate, ideal nature of self as bereft of all its special qualities postulated by Nyāya, it appears to be uncommonsensical and counterintuitive for this school to hold that the special qualities are related by the inherence-relation with the self. This relation of inherence is defined as one whose relata are inseperable from each other (like conjuncts in the conjunctive relation) and one of them exists only as characterising or as located in the other. Neither of the relata can exist by itself apart from the other. A pot and its colour, smell, or the genus potness are so related with each other. Neither can there be a qualitiless pot, nor one uncharacterised by the genus potness. Also, there cannot be the qualities of a pot or the genus potness in the total absence of points.

But in the case of the self such a possibility is precisely what Nyāya maintains. As we have already seen, the self can subsist after its salvation in a qualitiless state for eternity, despite the inherence of qualities in it prior to salvation from beginingless eternity. Such a qualitiless state of the self is conceived to be its ideal state by Nyāya. This is not how entities related by the inherence-relation are supposed to subsist. Of course, a non-eternal substantive locus of its qualities is admitted to subsist without its qualities during the moment of its origination in order to account for its causality in relation to the latter. A cause has to pre-exist its qualities at least by one moment. But this is not the case with the self which is an eternal substance.

Can Nyāya tide over the above difficulties by holding a different view of the individual self--as for instance the view advocated by a school of Mimāmsā? According to this view the self is itself of the nature of sentience and this sentience is overpowered by mental states like cognition, conation etc. which are engendered by the body-mind-complex associated with the self. When this complex comes to an end permanently, the self is freed from all the mental states and shines out in its true sentient nature.

This view can create more difficulties for Nyaya than those which it is intended to solve. Nyaya cannot hold that the self-substance is identical with sentience which is a quality. Nyaya cannot also make sense of the proposed relation of the self, as sentience and its objective cognition, conation etc. The nature of the sentience that is supposed to be left behind after the cessation of all the so-called mental states, when the self is freed from bondage, is equally difficult for Nyaya to make sense of. Is this sentience eternal? Is it cognitive, conative or emotional or is it all these simultaneously? If the sentience is eternal and cognitive, how can it be distinguished from divine cognition? None of these questions can be answered by Nyaya without compromising one or other of its metaphysical doctrines, which are basic to its view point. By seeking to defend both the embodied as well as the qualitiless nature of the self Nyaya has failed to defend either. If the self is naturally endowed with its special qualities, it cannot wholly depend upon the body for being endowed by the latter. If, however, the self is intrinsically qualitiless then the body-mind-sense-contact cannot induce any qualities in it.

About the nature of self-knowledge that is supposed to result in the self's freedom from bondage, Nyāya's view is no less disputable. Nyāya cannot deny that the common cognition of self is an instance of veridical self-cognition. Even if some quality like cognition or desire or conation etc. appears as characterising the self in this

cognition it is yet the cognition of self and it is quite true. There is neither confusion nor error in it. Why should it not, then, bring about salvation? Nyāya says that the inferential cognition of the self's distinction from all that is not-self is the cause of salvation. But the internal perception of self is, as a direct determinate cognition of self, more potent than the inferential cognition. So, there should never be bondage to any self as introspective self-cognition is always available to every self.

'Affection' 474/A, Professors' Colony Hanuman Nagar Nagpur- 440009 N. S. DRAVID

EDMUND HUSSERL'S REHABILITATION OF CARTESIAN FOUNDATIONALISM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In this paper, I intend to discuss Edmund Husserl's theory of foundationalism. Husserl's foundationalism is purely a rehabilitation of the Cartesian version of the theory. Epistemic Foundationalism, as we know, is the dominant theory of justification in traditional epistemology and Rene Descartes is one of its most consistent advocates. Foundationalism as a theory of justification is the stand that our beliefs can only be justified if they are self - evidently justified or they are related to some beliefs which are themselves self-evidently justified.

Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) is best known as the patriarch of the phenomenological movement. Husserl in his book *Cartesian Meditations* sold his philosophy to Cartesianism and proclaimed that his phenomenology is neo-Cartesianism. The objective of his own philosophy, as he consistently maintained, is to rework the philosophy of Descartes and entrench it as the ideal philosophy. One aspect of Cartesianism that Husserl vigorously reworked is the theory of foundationalism. The essence of this essay is to explicate this Husserlian neo-Cartesian foundationalism and see whether Husserl's revision is adequate enough to withstand the popular criticism that any form of foundationalism is moribund.

Cartesian foundationalism, as we are aware, began with the radical quest of Rene Descartes to attain the apodictic certainty upon which other beliefs can be based. The quest involved the denial of the certainty of all beliefs except such a denial becomes explicitly senseless. The intention of Descartes is to accept as self-evident such beliefs that cannot be questioned and to establish them as the foundation of other beliefs. The conclusion of this quest is apprehension of a self-evident position which is related to the denial process itself. The fact that one is involved in a process of doubt according to Descartes, cannot be logically doubted. The certainty of the doubting and the doubter is, therefore, self-evident. The mind which is effecting this self-evident activity and all beliefs emanating

RECEIVED: 11/12/93

from it, therefore, becomes apodictic and self-evidently justfied.2

Translating Descartes' position into vocabulary of contemporary epistemology, we can see that the basic beliefs are those beliefs which are directly related to our psychological states, while the non-basic beliefs are those that are derived from the former. Those basic beliefs are primary to others because they are apodictic and self-evidently justified. John Kekes, in a discussion of Cartesian Foundationalism, has made a distinction between the basic and non-basic beliefs. The basic beliefs in Cartesian Foundationalism, according to John Kekes, are those beliefs which relate to our sincere first person's present tense reports of perceptual experiences. While the non-basic beliefs are not products of first person's perceptual experiences.³

This foundationalist programme of Réné Déscartes, like other aspects of his philosophy, has been severely criticised by his contemporaries and succeeding philosophers. The Cartesian foundationalism, as William Alston said, has been particularly "branded as unrealistic on more grounds than one." It is not only the Cartesian variant of foundationalism that has been crticised, rather the entire foundationalist enterprise has received damaging attacks in this centaury. Many philosophers have come out with vigorous arguments to challenge the whole quest for basic beliefs which is the essential tenet of the foundationalist programme. Inspite of this unpopularity of foundationalism in this age, Edmund Husserl still believes that the theory and surprisingly the notorious Cartesian version of it can be rehabilitated. It is, therefore, the essence of this essay to see whether Husserl can effectively and convincingly rework the moribund Cartesian theory, despite all arguments to the contrary.

Before we go further in our discussion, let us re-examine the tenets of foundationalism. The theory, as it is being discussed in current epistemological literature, is fundamentally a reaction to the question: How do we justify our beliefs? To the foundationalists, this question will present two problems. The first problem is the traditional problem of certainty. This problem has been posed at the commencement of philosophy by the skeptics. The problem relates to the issue of how to get the indubitable position that will serve as a starting point for justifying other beliefs. The second problem is an offshoot of the first. It is precisely the question of whether our quest for justification of beliefs based on other beliefs will not lead us in an infinite regression.

The reaction of all Foundationalists to the last question is

positive. The ridiculous situation can only be reverted if and only if there are some basic self-justified beliefs, adequate to convince the skeptics and the fallibilists and also terminate the regression by being absolutely self-justified and in no need of external justification.

One of the few philosophers to conform totally with the spirit and letters of classical foundationalism is Rene Descartes. Husserl's programme, in as much as it is a revision of Descartes', is, therefore, another instance of foundationalism in its classic form. Commenting on Husserl's epistemology, Richard Schacht confirmed the above point when he said that the fundamental objective of Husserl's epistemology " is to locate those cognitions that are first in themselves and can support the whole storied edifice of universal knowledge". 5

Husserl's foundationalist programme, as it is presented in his books Cartesians Meditations ⁶ and The Paris Lectures ⁷, is purely a neo-Cartesian theory. Husserl agrees with Descartes that the set of basic beliefs are those directly emanating from the subjective mind of the knower. The evidence that by necessity precedes all others, he agrees with Descartes, is the evidence of the subjective ego. But Husserl believes that the Cartesian enterprise should be revised especially in the light of his own phenomenological philosophy, which is to him the ideal method of philosophy. The phenomenological method, therefore, becomes an instrument of reconstruction of the Cartesian foundationalist theory.

The reconstruction of the Cartesian theory commences with the rejection of the "methodic doubt" in the search for the apodictic. Husserl was aware of the criticism against Descatres' methodic doubt especially the allegation that the method is very destructive and will never attain anything positive. In replacement, Husserl employed the method of *epoche*, which is the act of suspending beliefs. The method of epoche, unlike the Cartesian doubt, will not destroy all beliefs but will only put within bracket for a moment "the observers' mode of experiencing the world".8

The epoche is not only advantageous for this, it is also preferred by Husserl because it will totally purify the subjective ego from its obvious inherent natural hindrances that might disqualify it from being the foundation of all knowledge. Husserl's ego on the basis of this is slightly different from Descartes'. This is the reason why Husserl's ego is referred to as "pure/transcendental ego". The explication of this difference needs to be done, because this essentially is the basis of Husserl's revision of Cartesian foundationalism.

Rene Descartes' discussion of the concept of ego is not as detailed as Husserl's. Rene Descartes, in his writings, talked of the ego merely as the residue of the doubting processes that automatically becomes apodictic by its survival of the doubting exercise. But the Husserlian ego is not only self-evident, because it is the residue of the process of epoche, but also because, as Husserl emphasised, it is pure and transcendental. We must acknowledge the fact that while in Descartes' case, every ego is apodictic, with Husserl not all subjects are. In Husserl's discussion of the concept of the ego, there is the clear indication that the apodictic subjects are those subjects that have been purified and at the same time have become transcendental from the worldly hindrances. This is the reason why Husserl always prefixes his own ego with either the word "Pure" or the word "Transcendental", to distinguish it from the unpurified or intranscendental one, which he called empirical or natural ego.

The Husserlian ego is not merely apodictic because of its ability to survive the epoche, but also it has been purged and purified of the worldly hindrances that can inhibit it from having correct and exact epistemic facts. The ego of Husserl, therefore, is not only pure but transcendental. Transcendental, according to Husserl, because it is no more the worldly ego or the empirical ego that operates with the worldly prejudices. The process which turns the worldly ego to the transcendental ego is the process of transcendental epoche.9 The transcendental epoche is the last stage in the Husserlian series of processes. It involves the act by which the subject bracketing abandons the world and becomes transcendental and completely independent of the worldly limitations. This transcedental ego can perceive the world in an independent manner, devoid of the natural worldly limitations that have hitherto prevented it from having correct and objective knowledge of everything. At this standpoint, according to Husserl, the transcendental ego becomes equidistant to every part of the world. This stage is referred to as the Archimedian point by Husserl. Only when an ego has attained this height can we describe it as self-evident and apodictic.10

The above discussion is exactly the argument of Husserl for the certainty of the basic foundation. As we have said, the incorrigibility and absolute certainty of the basic foundation is one of the fundamental tenets of a theory of foundationalism. This has been satisfied by Husserl. From the above, we can see that the certainty of the basic foundation in Husserl's theory is more established than that of Descartes'. While Descartes ego is certain because it is able to survive the doubt, the ego of Husserl can lay claim to certainty because it is completely purged and purified ego, absolutely free from the limitations of the world by its being transcendental. In the light of this, Husserl feels that whatever beliefs that emanate from the transcendental ego ought to be accepted as justified because of the status of the transcendental ego as a purified and objective source.

Apart from reconstructing the Cartesian presentation of the certainty of the ego, Husserl also discussed the second paramount issue in foundationalism. That is the issue of how to justify the secondary beliefs on the basis of the primary beliefs. Having attained the certainty of the ego, Descartes, in his *Meditations*, went to justify the certainty of the other beliefs by deducing them from the ego. This deduction has been questioned by many observers. Husserl's stand is that the whole attempt is unnecessary. The transcendental ego according to Husserl is not the only self-evident truth:

The bare identity of the I am is not the only thing given as indubitable in transcendental self-experience. Rather there extends through all the particular data of actual and possible self-experience even though they are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single details a universal apodictically experienceceable structure of the ego.

The point that Husserl is making in the above extract is that the ego is not the only apodictic fact, but also the entire world that the ego is experiencing. The certainty of the ego, according to Husserl, will always guarantee the certainty of the world the ego is experiencing, not through the deductive method of Descartes'.

The reason for this claim is because Husserl believes that there is a cord linking the ego with the world. This link that makes the consciousness to be a logical correlate of the world is the intentional link. This theory of intentionality predates Husserl. It is a familiar theory of consciousness that says that every consciousness is consciousness of something outside it. Husserl's argument is simply this: If consciousness is truly consciousness of something, then every consciousness is a logical correlate of the object of consciousness. It is, therefore, a logical conclusion, he maintains, to say that the apodicity of the ego automatically implies the apodicity of its correlate; that is the worldly objects.

The Husserlian argument for the justification of other beliefs is simply that these beliefs are themselves automatically and logically justified immediately as the ego is justified, since they are correlates. This is the explanation for Husserl's change of the Cartesian dictum from "Cogito ego sum" to "Ego cogito cogitatum" which means "I think

the object of thought". Husserl is merely saying that in thinking, which is the apodictic certainty of Descartes, there is also another certainty that is, the object of thought. The intentional theory of consciousness is the Husserlian answer to the dilemma of how to justify the secondary beliefs. With intentionality, the apodicity of the primary beliefs will also confirm apodicity on the secondary beliefs, since the two are interlocked.

Edmund Husserl went ahead to strengthen his argument that the transcendental ego is the ultimate foundation of all beliefs by introducing the concept of constitution. The notion of constitution is an offshoot of the theory of intentionality. By the transcendental ego constituting the world, Husserl is saying that the ego is responsible for ordering and putting in meaningful order the whole epistemic facts in the world. The notion of constitution is an offshoot from the concept of intentionality. Husserl's position is that the ego through its intentional activities of experiencing the world organises the various images and representations that we have in perception to make meaningful whole. It is the ego by its consciousness that structures and organizes the external world.

From this discussion, we can see the essence of Husserl's claim that the ego is pure and transcendental. If the ego is objective and by necessity the constituter of the world, then it is logical to say that the ego is self-evidently justified and primary to other beliefs. Husserl's foundationalism retrospectively is this: the basic foundation of all knowledge is the transcendental ego, since the genuine epistemic claim can only be made via the transcendental ego. Therefore, epistemic claim can be verified if and only if the claim is directly or indirectly derived from the transcendental ego. With Husserl's foundationalism, if an individual makes a claim that; "Mr. A. Owns a Car", the claim can only be justified if and only if we can establish that Mr. A. is a man operating with a pure and transcendental ego. If this can not be established, the only alternative of justifying the epistemic claim is to show that the claim of Mr. A. Comes from another person, who is operating with a pure and transcendental ego. Husserl explicitely stated this foundationalist justification theory, thus:

... Only one fact is evident and guides me, namely that I accept as being only that which presents itself to me as being and that all conceivable justification of it lies within my own self and is deter mined in my immediate and mediate intentionality in which any other meaning of being is also determined.¹¹

At this point in our discussion of Edmund Husserl's neo-Cartesian

foundationalism, the pertitent questions to ask are these: Has Husserl succeeded in developing an adequate foundationalist theory? Has Husserl achieved what was impossible for Descartes and other previous philosophers, that is, sustaining a fool-proof theory of foundationalism? Most especially, has Husserl disproved the contemporary claim that any theory of foundationalism -- being a product of a pseudo assumption -- is moribund?

To answer these questions, we need to examine Husserl's theory and see whether the ideal of transcendental ego can be realised. Husserl's argument is that his own subject is an improvement on Dersartes' because it is not only the residue of the denial process but it is also purified and transcendental. Pure and transcendental in the sense that it is free from worldly prejudices. But is it possible for an ego to seek to delink itself from the natural world? Can any man really succeed in putting the world in abeyance? Is such an attempt not one of the utopian dreams of philosophy? We have heard it many times in Western philosophy of the idea of jettisoning the worldly prejudices, but such attempts have never succeeded. In actual fact, Man is man because of these worldly data that Husserl calls prejudices and presuppositions. To succeed in transcending the world by any individual implies that the individual will completely lose touch with the world. The question of having epistemological relationship with the world by the ego will not come in, if Husserl's transcendence is achieved.

How can an individual who has transcended the world still continue to know the world? How can an ego that is transcendental still claim that the world is an itentional correlate? The fact that the Husserlian ego is transcendental is a clear indication that it has lost any relationship with the world, intentional or otherwise. It has been pointed out that transcendental ego robs intentionality of its genius by relinquishing the immediate world seized through its intentional consciousness". ¹² The essence of this argument is that transcendental ego can no more lay claim to the world as its itentional correlate.

There are two alternatives facing Husserl: it is either that the ego is in the world and possesses the world as its intentional correlate, or the ego will lose the world through its transcendence and equally lose the world as its itentional correlate.

The above position, which has been popularised by Husserl's disciple Jean Paul Sartre, is a devastating criticism of Husserl's foundationalism.¹³ As we know, the entire rehabilitation of Descartes' theory by Husserl rests on the theory of itentionality. But Sartre has argued that Husserl's ego, by being transcendental, cannot lay claim to intentionality. The ego can not logically claim anything in the world,

since it has totally broken relationship with the world through the transcendental *epoche*. Any belief or claim made by the Husserlian transcendental ego is not a belief relating to the world, since by its being transcendental, it has lost the world.

We can even ask this question: Can one even legitimately conceive of a source of knowledge that is pure and transcendental? Is it even logical for Husserl to say that the foundation of his own knowledge and the basis for the justification of knowledge is the pure and transcendental ego? The answer is emphatically negative. Knowledge qua knowledge involves a subject that is active rather passive. In the act of knowing, the subject seeking to know cannot afford to be independent of the object to be known. Knowledge, as Sartre defines it, is a combat and not a peaceful possession. "One does not have knowledge; one bursts out in the act of knowing toward the object known".14 Whether in scientific knowledge or in any other form of knowledge, the activity of knowing demands that the subject should interact with the object to be known. It involves an active participation of both the subject and the object. Husserl's claim that the transcedental subject totally independent of the world to be known - is the ideal road to objective knowledge, is an obvious contradiction of the process of knowledge in the natural setting. The gist of our argument here is that Husserl's position that the detached ego is the foundation of knowledge is an obvious contradiction of the natural acquisition of knowledge which involves interaction between the object and the subject of knowledge. If it is impossible for a transcendental ego to attain any knowledge, it is illogical and outrageous to wish to make it the foundation of the whole epistemological enterprise.

It is in fact imperative that Husserl's foundationalism should be examined in the light of current anti-foundationalist challenge. Contemporary philosophers starting from the beginning of this century have argued that the motivating spirit behind the foundationalist programme, which is the spirit of certainty or the idea of the 'given', is a mis-conception. The assumption that there are some beliefs that are absolutely incorrigible, according to them, is a mis-conception of a man's true nature as a fallible being. W.V.O. Quine, one of the prominent figures in the anti-foundationalist trend, argues that the search for the basic beliefs is unwarranted. The quest for the ultimate foundation, according to him, is a pseudo-quest. The programme of epistemology should be re-formulated, according to Quine, for a more psychologically oriented one. Rather than ask for the foundation of knowledge, Quine advocates for an epistemology that will study the relations between theory and evidence.

The most serious attack of the foundationalist enterprise came from Richard Rorty, who devoted a substantial aspect of his celebrated book. Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature to the issue of foundationalism. The theory of foundationalism, according to him, and in fact most traditional theories of philosophy are pseudo theories. Rorty particularly identified Cartesian foundationalism as a paradigm case of such pseudo theories. Foundationalism, according to him, is the legacy of Descartes to philosophy. To Rorty, it was Descartes who converted the Platonic doctrine of knowledge as representation into the idea of knowledge as inner perception. With Descartes, Rorty argues, knowledge became simply an issue of the consciousness replicating the world.

Rorty severely criticised the whole foundationalist programme arguing that the affair of justification is a simple affair which can be settled when the context of the particular knowledge is examined. Knowledge to him is a social affair and its justification should respect this fact. What a particular society accepts as a knowledge, according to him, is so and the justification of the knowledge must be got within the particular epistemological community. The whole enterprise of foundationalism, to Rorty, is a total misconception of knowledge. Rorty, therefore, advocates that epistemology as a branch of philosophy ought to be dismantled, since it has no genuine pre-occupation.

Although we do not intend to support the extreme position taken by Rorty, yet we agree with him that foundationalism as a theory of justification is a pseudo theory. Our own stand is that foundationalism is a reaction to a false question, that is the question: How can we justify all our epistemic claims? This question does not take into consideration the fact that epistemic claims are relative to situations. The genuine question of epistemology is the question: How do I justify a particular epistemic claim? This is the proper question that should be asked and the answer must be got from the situational origin of the particular epistemic claim.

Edmund Husserl's attempt to rehabilitate Cartesian foundationalism is, therefore, a futile one. It is futile because it fails to properly investigate the essence of the whole foundationalist programme which is to argue against the fallibilists. Since man is fundamentally a fallible being, it can be very difficult to seek to establish that man can have an absolutely infallible idea. As we argued earlier, Husserl's own defence of Cartesian foundationalism is not fool-proof. But this is not the basic reason why we are rejecting his revision exercise. We are rejecting it because Edmund Husserl, a philosopher of this century, should have realised that foundationalism is born out of an error of the

past which should be jettisoned by the present. Foundationalism in whatever form cannot be sustained, because it is a reaction to a misconceived notion of knowledge.

Edmund Husserl's philosophical career, as we know, is divided into two stages. At the earlier stage, Husserl argues for a realistic theory of phenomenology, while at the later stage, he subscribes to an idealistic position. It was at the idealistic stage that Husserl attempts a rehabilitation of Cartesian foundationalism which we are now examining. Husserl is popular, as we know, because of his earlier stage. Most of the disciples he won were converted by his earlier philosophy, while they were disenchanted with his later philosophy. Disciples like Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre feel that the germ of Husserl's phenomenology is at the earlier stage. We also believe that a careful look at the earlier stage will give us a better theory of justification than the moribund foundationalism he vigorously defended at the later part of his career.

At the earlier stage of Husserl's career, he advocated for all issues to be solved at their context. This is the spirit behind his slogan "to the things themselves" which means that we go to the context of problems to solve them. Epistemologically, this slogan can be interpreted to mean that the object of knowledge should be investigated, rather than the subject. This position is without doubt an implicit contextual theory of justification which is said to be the acceptable alternative to the foundationalist enterprise. Husserl would have done a more worthwhile job, if he had concentrated his efforts at making explicit his contextual theory of justification, rather than waste his energy on a defence of foundationalism and the spirit of certainty behind it which his famous disciple, Martin Heidegger, has tagged the "Scandal of philosophy". Our own stand is that the germ of Husserl's epistemology lies more with his earlier stand than with the scandalous attempt to rehabilitate the Cartesian foundationalism.

Department of Philosophy University of Ibadan Ibadan (NIGERIA)

KOLAWOLE OWOLABI

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. Edmund Husserl; Cartesian Meditations. Trans by Dorion Cairns (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 1.
- 2. The entire Cartesian foundationalist programme can be seen in his books.

 Discourse on Method and (1) Meditations on First Philosophy. See Rene Descartes Philosophical Writings, edited and translated by Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Thomas Geach (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1970).
- 3. John Kekes; "Recent Trends and Future Prospects in Epistemology" in *Metaphilosophy* Vol. 8, Nos. 2 and 3, April / July 1977, p. 88.
- 4. William Alston; "Two types of Foundationalism", in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXXIII, No. 7, April 8, 1976, p. 182.
- Richard Schacht; "Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology", in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 23 (1972) p. 295.
- 6. Edmund Husserl; Cartesian Meditations, Op. Cit., p. 2.
- Edmund Husserl; The Paris Lectures, Translated by Peter Kostenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). This book is a smaller version of the Cartesian Meditations. We shall be making reference to the two books in this essay.
- Maurice Natanson; "Phenomenology from the Natural Standpoint: Reply to Van- Ames", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XVII, 1956, p. 242.
- 9. E. Husserl; Cartesian Meditations, Op. Cit., p. 28.
- 10. E. Husserl; The Paris Lectures, Op. Cit., p.12.
- 11. Ibid., p.23.
- 12. Maurice Natanson; Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 30.
- 13. Jean Paul Satre; Transcendence of the Ego (New York: Noonday Press, 1977).
- 14. Quoted by Maurice Natanson; Op. Cit., p. 28.
- See most especially his book: W.V.O.Quine: "Epistemology Naturalised" in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press 1969).
- 16. See Richard Rorty; *Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

24

17 For a detailed discussion of contextual theory of justification, see David Annis. "Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification", in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 3 (July 1978), pp. 218-219.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1 January, 1995

LANGUAGE AS EMPOWERMENT

I propose to raise a set of interrelated questions and look for answers. Even if the answers I offer are not found acceptable, I hope they will at least serve to stimulate further thinking.'

LANGUAGE AS POWER?

The first question is: Is there some kind of power in language? Is language the manifestation of some power?

Let me call in as a witness Desdemona. You will recall how Othello was charged with using the power of witchcraft in order to seduce her. This is what Othello has to say (Othello: Act 1: Scene 3)

Her father lov'd me, oft invited me; Still question'd me the story of my life From year to year... I ran it through... Wherein I spake of most disastrous chances, Of moving accidents by flood and field; Of hairbreadth scapes...

This to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline;...
She'd come again, and with a greedy ear
Devour up my discourse
...often did (I) beguile her of her tears...
She gave me for my pains a world of sighs
...she wish'd

That heaven had made her such a man. She thank'd me.


And bade me, if I had friend that lov'd her, I should but teach him how to tell my story, And that would woo her. Upon this hint I spake; She lov'd me for the dangers I had pass'd; And I lov'd her that she did pity them. This only is the witchcraft I have us'd. Here comes the lady; let her witness it.

On being asked Desdemona confirms that Othello had indeed won her through the power of words.

In our own Indian civilisation we greatly praise prowess with words. In the *bhāṇa* plays of Sanskrit the character of a *viṭa* is known for his advancing the plot by virtue of his linguistic adeptness. The character of *soṇgāḍyā* in marathi *tamāṣā* theatre could easily be a latterday descendent, as also the Bhojpuriya Kakkaji in the Hindi television serials.


One looks for skill in language not only in a speaker or a writer but in a listener or a reader as well. Whether it is the speaker or the listener, the writer or the reader, properly activating the relationship between words and the meanings is a job shared between the communicator and the addressee.

As the listener listens, words (sabda) on the one hand and the power that activates words (sabdasakti) on the other hand conjoin in actual word use (sabdaprayoga). It is from this actual use that meanings (artha) emerge.



It is word power that leads the addressee from words to meanings in the course of word use. Such is the case whether word power takes the form of bare word power (abhidhā) or enriched word power (vyanjanā), whether word power takes form of direct word power (vacyārthasakti) or displaced word power (laksyārthasakti).

When the speaker speaks, just the reverse turns out to be the case. Word power conjoins here with meanings in the course of word use leading the speaker to select words. In this context, word power is called *ukti*, which renders meanings cognizable-by-other (*parasamvedya*) with the help of words.




It is word power as *ukti* that leads the communicator from meanings to words in the course of word use. Such is the case whether word power as *ukti* takes the form of bare *ukti* (*svabhāvokti*) or enriched *ukti* (*atisayokti*), whether word power as *ukti* takes the form of direct *ukti* (*saralokti*) or displaced *ukti*(*vakrokti*).

Whether word power yields meanings for the addressee or words for the communicator, it is certainly the power we have been looking for in language. Language use is the manifestation of this power to activate the bond between words and meanings (sabdarthasambandha). (Please note how I have consistently employed the plural "words" here, since I am not concerned with this or that word as a constituent entering a sentence - that is, word as a pada; sabda here simply refers to the accessible aspect of language whether speech or writing.)

The bond between words and meaning as well as the power that activates it (sabdaśakti) are both inherent in the language system. It is by adopting and assimilating this system that anyone can become a member of a language community. The member of a language community goes from words to meanings or from meanings to words with a certain ease by virtue of the language system. Now the question may be raised as to how anyone attains membership in the first place or maintains the membership once gained. Attaining membership concerns children especially. (Our ancients raised the question - how does the child accomplish word power gain, sabdaśaktigrāha?) Maintaining the membership once attained concerns adults especially. Child or adult, man certainly possesses language power (faculte de langage) -a gift of nature to man. (A parrot or a child readily repeats what it keeps hearing, but a parrot remains a parrot, a child gains membership of a language community.) Once a member of some

language community, man makes use of language as he wishes by virtue of this language power. In the course of this whole activity of attaining and maintaining language community membership, the language system itself is created or rather almost recreated with the entry of a new member. Once language power, a gift of nature, establishes language system in the listener - speaker through word power gain, this language system makes itself felt in word use through word power. This word power, a gift of the language community, is inherent in the language system.



The relationship between language system and language use is essentially a dialectic in Hegel's sense of the term. Language system regulates language use - if there were no regulation of this kind, man would have had to remain content with soliloquy and colloquy would have eluded his grasp. Language use constantly renovates language system - if there were no renovation of this kinds man's colloquy would have remained more a monologue than a dialogue proper. It will be seen that we have just distinguished between three levels of language use:

- 1. soliloquy (or interior monologue) (svasamvada)
- 2. colloquy as monologue (anyasanvada)
- 3. colloquy as dialogue (anyonyasamvāda)

The bidirectionality of the relationship between language system and language use makes this three-level use possible.

The relationship between words and meanings is equally bidirectional, equally a dialectic. People commonly enough assume that meanings are ready-available, one need only to couple them with words. But this is not a correct picture. Why did Desdemona respond so appreciatively to Othello's skill with words? Words do not merely convey meanings, they embody or mould or construct meanings. Language is the *medium of understanding*. Othello presented to Desdemona, even as a poet would, a whole new world mediated by

words. Othello thus moves from soliloquy to monologue and then to a true dialogue with Desdemona. It is as if colloquy as monologue is the passway between soliloquy (or interior monologue) and colloquy as dialogue.

Sometimes this vital bidirectionality gives way. A time came when Sanskrit ceased to be the everyday language--children had no entry to that language community, neither had women or sudras. This by itself was no calamity--for a language to die a natural death is a normal historical event. In spite of this event Sanskrit remained in use; for centuries it was the medium of Indian intellectual life, the medium of learning and teaching. Any Indian thinker wishing to give words to his thoughts had to resort to Sanskrit prose (or verse), while the living languages did not develop any intellectual prose as such. The end result was that Sanskrit remained in suspended animation as it were: the umbilical cord with everyday life (vyavahara) snapped. Some examples are in order. Consider the senses recorded against the word hari: yellow-green, red-brown, Vishnu, Shiva, Indra, Bramha, Yama, Sun, Moon, man, light ray, fire, wind, lion, horse, koel, frog, parrot, snake, peacock, sense organ. Consider, again, the words recorded against the sense 'water' : jala, udaka, apa, vari, salila, payas, madhu, sara, ghrta, paniya, tirtha and dozens of others. Consider, finally, that you are informing somebody that Narayan drinks cold water you could say narayanah sitam jalam pibati, or narayano jalam pibati sitam, or any other out of the total of $4 \times 3 \times 2 \times 1 = 24$ permutations. These are no signs of richness in language but signs of phenomenal bloating. No living language can tolerate polysemy or synonymy of this sort, because it will only obstruct everyday life.

No wonder that, in consequences of a language in suspended animation remaining the sole medium of Indian intellectual life, the relationship between words and meanings ceased to be bidirectional. and there was no recognizable coherence between intellectual life and life at large. In an almanac, candradarsana meant no more than just that with no connection with actually sighting the moon. Indian intellectual life slowly ground to a halt. (The condition of Persian and Arabic in India was not too different.) The coming of the British rule saw the desi languages being put to use in learning and teaching and in expressing one's thoughts, which were now linked to the English language--certainly not to everyday English life. The net result was the emergence of a new version of the language in suspended animation-- one could perhaps call it English in a Sanskrit grab. The intellectual life did not flourish, but constantly slipped into intellectual parroting. Making jokes about sarkari hindi is a favorite pastime of intellectuals, but is intellectual Hindi so very different? Where would the intellectual

find a better means of concealing the absence of thought? Similar observations could be made about other *desi* languages (or about *desi* English, for that matter).

Well, let us not forget our questions. The first question about power in language can now be answered as follow:

- 1. Power is certainly present in language. At the level of language use, word use can be seen as a manifestation of word power. Word power is inherent in the language system. At the level of language system, language system can be seen as a manifestation of language power, which is so natural to man.
- Language is a medium of understanding. Words and meanings shape each other. Language use and language system shape each other.
- 3. The bidirectionality is vital. In certain circumstances the bond between words and meanings gives way at the level of language use, and so the bond between language and life at large give way too, to the detriment of the community.

Now we can move to the second question.

Language in Power?

The second question is: Is language in any way connected with power in society? Can language be the vehicle of any power or the instrument at the disposal of any desire for power?

It is obvious that we are no longer speaking of power in this second question in the same sense in which we spoke of power in the first question. It will be worthwhile to bring out the distinction between power-1 (sakti) and power-2 (sattā, prabhutā).

Power-1 is the natural capacity to do something, to bring about some change. When we notice that someone can do this or that but does not want to or that someone wants to do this or that but cannot, we have a case of power and will being out of tune with each other. In respect of the exercise of human will, human communities present either of two arrangements. Whether someone were indeed to do this or that in accordance with his power and will or not would either be a matter of his right to do so or be a matter of his duty to do so. Notice that, in moving from questions of power-1 and will to questions of right and duty, we move from the plane of mere behavior to the plane of socially defined conduct (ācāradharma). Morals (sādhārandharma), custom (rūdhi),

law, the conventions or restraints enjoyed within some tradition are some examples on this plane. Now we move further on. Power-2 is the capacity to bring about a shift in the definition and range of what counts as right or duty within a certain social framework. It is obvious that, if someone has power-2, there has to be someone over whom he has power-2, someone subject to this power. Power-2 and subjection go together. What plane is this? It is the plane on which socially defined conduct is moulded in accordance with someone's power-1 and will. Sovereignty, sectarian authority, the relationship between the leader and his followers are some examples on this plane of power-2 and subjection. (It is of some interest to note that our ancients used the term nīti to comprehend both the plane of right and duty and the plane of power-2 and subjection. The plane of power -1 and will was the plane of nature or prakṛti. The term dharma comprehends both the plane of nature and the plane of right and duty.)

Every society presents a certain interweaving of power-1 and will and of right and duty with power-2 and subjection. Let us call this the *power space* (sattākāraṇa) of that society. *Power moves* such as resistance, allience, distancing, defiance, subdual, submission constitute the *power play* within the power space and make a difference to the pattern of power-2 and subjection.

When this power is harnessed (or purports to be harnessed) to the cause of human welfare it deserves to be called *polity* ($r\bar{a}jak\bar{a}rana$). Polity is that *power play* which defines the ruler's conduct in terms of right's and duties ($r\bar{a}jan\bar{u}ti$) then turns out to be $r\bar{a}jadharma$). Mob rule or dictatorship or revolt is only power play, but democracy or monarchy or revolution are correspondingly considered worthy of being called forms of polity rather than simple power play. (One could consider the 1857 rebels or the cultural, social, or political rebels of the Indian Awakening of 1820-1920 in the light of this distinction between power space and polity space.)

Let us see whether language power and language use have a part to play in this triple network--on the plane of power-1 and will, the plane of rights and duties, and the plane of power-2 and subjection.

Let me call in as a witness a member of Britain's House of Commons. The debate concerned the fixing of qualifications for a commissioned officer in the armed forces. (Qualifications are the measure of power-1 and will taken in the exercise of power-2 in conferring rights and duties.) The minister argued that the leadership qualities of the person will be assessed. Readily came the ironic comment of a Labour Party member--these leadership qualities will no doubt be judged from the person's pronounciation of vowels. He was

alluding to the prestige of Received Pronounciation or the BBC accent. He could as well have spoken of Nancy Mitford's Upper-Class usage. These used to be the insignia of the British caste system. Members of the Upper class sent their children to public schools and Oxbridge and used to enjoy positions of power in the armed forces, the civil service, industry, and trade. (Recall Bernard Shaw's play Pygmalion.) In this case language use turns out to be vehicle of power-2 in that the rank and the file would indeed identify the commissioned officer's accent with qualities of leadership. (Indeed experiments have shown that listeners associate a recorded speaker's Received Pronounciation not only with education and upper class but also with being male, tall, handsome, young, honest and so on!)

Language use need not to be a vehicle of power, it could well be an instrument of power. The word femme in French or aurat in Urdu or strī in some Indian languages means not only a woman but also a wife. Correspondingly, the word Mann in German or mard in Urdu means not only a man but also a husband. It is not our purpose to go into the historical or conceptual niceties; our purpose is rather to highlight how terms serve to insinuate to the language users what the principal role of a woman or a man is. Language thus often encapsulates the unspoken assumptions shared by those wielding power as well as those subject to power.

We have already seen that language is a medium of understanding life: it embodies the meanings that life confers on reality. We need also to see that language is no less a *means of communication*: it conveys these meanings from one person to another. Every word use calls for a communicator (speaker or writer as the case may be) and an addressee (listener or reader). In every word use inheres a *language act* on the part of the communicator and a *response act* on the part of the addressee. If a word use links up with a certain understanding or reality, it equally links up with a certain social situation. Who can speak what to whom and does is accordingly governed not merely by power-1 and will of the parts concerned but also by the play of rights and duties, power-2 and subjection. Thus, the man (or boy) in the Indian street can ask a stranger for the time of the day or the latest cricket score, provided the stranger too is likewise a man (or a boy).

But it is open for us to go deeper into the matter. The ground of power-2 is either brute force (danda) that is, use of threat or violence, or pecuniary force(dama), that is, offering or withholding money or what money can buy. But the ground of subjection goes beyond these two to reconciliatory force(sama), that is, getting the other to accept subjection through propagating faith or ideas and evincing or eliciting feelings. (The ancients recognized a fourth upaya, namely, bheda that

is, sowing of dissension and treachery. But this can easily be subsumed under the other three for methodological economy's sake.) Language has obviously a place in the deployment of reconciliatory force, which we shall therefore dwell upon.

One need not assume that the propagator of faith or ideas or the expresser of feelings is only the powerwielder or the power-seeker and the subjection-subdued or the subjection-seeker is only at the receiving end of this reconciliatory force. (Consider the function of sycophancy in winning over the power-wielder or a fellow power-subjected or even winning over the power-subjected or a fellow power-wielder.) Language use and language system provide a sturdy underpinning to the propagation of faith and ideas and the evincing and eliciting of feelings. After all myth, ritual, law enforcement, advertising, the dissemination of science and technology, exploiting of the various media -- all get constituted and maintained through the help of language. As long as a Dalit's expression of feelings is limited to 'Chomandudi' it makes very little difference to the power space. But then when the Dalits of Maharashtra resort to language use (be it memoirs, poems, slogans, speeches, or the rest) or to change in language system (a firm rejection of the reconciliatory term harijan and of certain older derogatory idioms and usages), this does make some difference to the on-going power play. There is just no substitute for language. Along with language one need also to reckon the spread of literacy. It was not for nothing that Dr. Ambedkar and Paolo Freire identified the spread of literacy and education as a powerful, if unobtrusive, engine of social change.

We have already made a note of the movement of language power from soliloquy through monologue to dialogue in the modality of understanding. In power play the modality of communication of propagation is the one that counts, and the movement of language power in this modality is in the reverse direction, namely, from dialogue through monologue to soliloquy. Let us say, for instance, we overhear an on-going dialogue between husband and wife on some such lines-

"It's your fault all right !"

"Of course, it's your fault !"

Let's say then somewhat later one of them keeps his or her peace and the other goes on in a monologue --

"You see it's all your fault, because of such and such"

In the course of time the one that has been silent starts speaking to

himself or herself in a silent soliloquy or interior monologue-

"Looks like it's my fault after all."

At the end of such a movement one typically comes round to morally accepting one's power-seeking or one's subjection. What one says to others or what one hears others say to oneself often ends up as what one says to oneself, making the presence of the others redundant. Such a moral acceptance of one's power-wielding or power-seeking or subjection makes it possible for simple power play to graduate to polity proper; then alone power play gets to be socially defined conduct. The distribution of power and subjection acquires an aura of good standing or prestige (supratistha). Brute force and pecuniary force acquire good standing from sustained language use as reconciliatory force, and this reconiliatory force is itself in need of acquiring good standing. (The opposite of prestige is of course poor standing or loss of face.) Acts of propagation and expression also need this support. The weakness of 'Chomana; dudi' is precisely this lack of prestige. When an article of faith suffers loss of face it is deemed to be no more than a piece of popular superstition. Ceremonials and mournings are simply prestigious expressions of feelings. Even the powerful has an occasional need to say 'I am sorry' or 'We seek pardon' in the interests of maintaining prestige. Refusing to call or mention somebody by name or denying the use of prestigious given names are ways of robbing somebody of any vestige of respectability and rubbing in the lack of power. (These are practises still in vogue in Bihar.) Brute force often takes the form of verbal abuse or blame directed against the powerless or even the powerful and thus robbing them of good standing. Some British officers have noted that two quarrelling Indians come to blows much less readily than two quarreling white people; a whole session of abuse, threats, taunts, and curses, verbal violence (vakparusya) in short, has to intervene first.

So much for the play of word power and word use in the power space. Now we could move to language power and language use on the part of man. Knowing a language, that is, having the language at the disposal of one's language power, can well be an instrument of power. The withholding of the knowledge of Sanskrit from women and sudras in ancient and medieval India amounted to keeping them away from the propagation of ideas at the prestigious level. In contemporary India two distinct powermotives may underlie the parental craze for sending one's children to English-medium schools. The power-wielders thereby would hold themselves apart from those bereft of power so that the latter could not attain positions of power or access to prestigious communication channels. On the other hand, the powerless thereby

would seek access to better channels of education, chain of command, mass media, positions of rights, livelihood, or commerce. Such a motive may or may not be linked with power - seeking: it may as well stem from an acceptance of their subjection. The position of Persian in medieval India was fairly analogous. What about the position of the knowledge of Hindi in contemporary India? At a certain historical juncture Hindi was looked upon as a vehicle and instrument of India's unity essentially a political motive. At a later juncture Hindi came to be looked upon as a vehicle and instrument of Hindi imperialism and there is a certain factual basis too for this perception. Harsh criticism has led to a certain weakening of this power-seeking motive, though it still persists in certain spheres. Moving to the international level, one can see the dissemination of the American way of life and thought and its imitation through the medium of language. One can also connect this phenomenon straightway to power-seeking and subjection-acceptance and thus to power play in power space.

So then the second question about language in power-2 can now be answered as follows:

- 1. Power-1 and will, rights and duties, power-2 and subjection (and the moral acceptance of these two) together constitute the fabric of the play of power-2 (and within it polity proper.)
- Language is not merely a medium of understanding meanings but also a means of communicating those meanings. Naturally language has a bond with life in society--and within it life in the power space.
- 3. In the course of language use propagation through language can be an underpinning of the grounds of power-2
- Access or lack of access to language can be a Vehicle or instrument of power-2

Now the two questions raised so far about language in relation to power-1 (language as power?) and to power-2 and powerplay (language in power?) are distinct, yet not wholly unconnected. The connection yields the third and last question in the present series.

Language as empowerment?

The third question is: Is it possible that the proper manifestation of language power should assist the proper sort of moves in power play? Can language help us in promoting power play to the level of polity proper?

In a sense, we have already answered this question in the affirmative by implication.

The withholding of the learning and use of sanskrit from the powerless and the limiting of the intellectual life of the power-wielders to the language Sanskrit (which remained in suspended animation) did considerable harm to the powerless and even much more to the power-wielders. The 17th century bhakti poet Tukaram says he was much better off born in a lower caste. Kabir expresses analogus sentiments. (At this point I am reminded of Virginia Woolf's comment in A Room of One's Own: having related how she was denied access, being a woman to a University library, She wryly points out that it is "unpleasant to be locked out...it is worse, perhaps, to be locked in.")

A similar harm is being done in contemporary India by the use of English in a Sanskrit garb. The rampant spread of English-medium schools is giving rise to a new generation that is linguistically disabled, being neither able to use their own language effectively nor able to draw intellectual sustenance from English. A golden opportunity indeed to the blatant power-seekers!

If the prestigious medium of intellectual life needs to be closely related to the speech of everyday life, it is true as well that the prestigious medium of emotional expression needs to be closely related to the indigenous dest speech forms. This will ensure the health of our thought, our faith, and our feelings. It is no sign of health that Indian symposiasts or seminarians fail to relate to each other, to reality, or to life, That our thoughts, articles of faith, feelings are imprisoned in the tradition rather than nourished by it. That our regional feature films are becoming carbon copies of Hindi cinema. That the whole world is having the rich variety of cultures painted over with American colours. (If this impoverishes the rest of the world, it impoverishes America even by blocking inputs from outside.)

No, we are not by any means raising the slogan of swadeshi. The window on the West should certainly keep open, but the eyes looking out from the window should be our very own. Indeed, not just the Western window but all the windows should be opened. Is it not strange that, while many Indian texts were translated into Chinese, there were no Indian translations of Chinese texts? Our contact with the Arabs in Medieval times yielded analogous results. (Indian self complacency was phenomenal and duly noticed by an Arab traveller al-Biruni) New ideas, new emotional expressions, new turns of verbal expression - from whatever source - are always welcome as revelatory of new possibilities.

If we are raising a slogan, it is one of swaraj in ideas and authenticity in feelings. Just consider the manifold ways in which the present enquiry into power and language has gained through the interplay of Sanskrit, Marathi and English. Translation can nourish

language just as surely as it can debilitate language. (Recall our comments on English in a Sanskrit garb passing for intellectual prose in Hindi.)

Two things become evident if we go deeper into the matter.

The first thing has to do with the propagation of faith and ideas. (Let it not be forgotten, that 'faith' is not quite the same as *raddha*, nor is 'reason' quite the same as *viveka*.) As we have already seen both these processes serve to underpin reconciliatory force which in turn is a ground of power play. As such they assist the movement from bare power play to polity proper. The opposite of faith is certainly not reason-man badly needs reason so that faith may not turn to blind faith. The opposite of faith is doubt or scepticism. In order that doubt may not turn to blind, unthinking doubt, reason is just as badly needed. The opposite of reason is unreason.

Faith confronts doubt and reason confronts unreason. These are two distinct matters. The crucial point is whether faith resorts to reason or unreason for support. Likewise with doubt. The propagation of faith chiefly works towards mysification. When mystification turns unreasonable one has to resort to doubt. Doubt chiefly works towards demystification. When demystification turns unreasonable one has to fall back upon reason. (This even applies to investigative journalism!)

Mystification strengthens the prestige associated with power. while demystification weakens it. When it comes to the purification or refinement of power, mystification. Assists the propagation of faith and demystification assists the propagation of ideas. (It is certainly a piece of excruciating irony that in order to lend prestige to science it is often shrouded in mystery! This is no prestige conferred on science, rather it could be a clever move on the part of power-wielders.) When the propagation of faith has to cope with some unanticipated shift in reality, then mystification can endure only by resorting to 'interpretation, of the text (ijtihad in Islamic parlance). The object of faith may be Aristotle or Panini, Vedas or Quran, Marx or Gandhi-- it makes no difference to the reconciliatory force being exercised in the interests of maintaining subjection to what the text represents. Ambiguity and complexity in meanings and indirection and complication in words favour the maintenance of mystification. The object of mystification may be the justification of socially defined conduct or the policy espoused by popular leadership or the doctrine of accepted thinkers it makes little difference.

The other matter that needs to be gone into has to do with literary language. Literature in the broad sense (vānmaya) is the body of such word uses as are considered fit objects for going over repeatedly: then a single word use is put to use in several language uses

we see the emergence of a *text* (pāthya) in the course of repetition avrttī, abhyāsa, pārāyaṇa), and once such a text emerges. It is open to interpretation (vyākhyā, tikā, bhāṣya). Literature in this broad sense comprises the literature of ideas, religious texts, and of course literature proper, (sāhitya, lalita- vānmaya). (Journalism will count as literature in the broad sense only if it stands repetition and establishes itself as a text.) In the present context we consider together all kinds of literature in the broad sense.

Literary language use assists the propagation of faith and ideas and the evincing and eliciting of feelings. For example, the call of 'Chomana; dudi' may not have been heard by others in real life, but is certainly being heard now thanks to the literary sensibility of Shivaram Karanth and his readers. Naturally, power-seekers, be they in or out of power, are always eyeing literature for its potential as reconciliatory force, conformative or subversive as the case may be. The connection between literature and power play is quite indirect indeed in this context. If we are interested in connecting literary language with power in a more direct fashion, we shall have to look for it elsewhere and at a deeper level.

When language power manifests itself in language use language power exhibits two distinct tendencies. There is the tendency towards diversification and decentralization in the language system in tandem with the various modalities and divisions of social life. Language use comes to vary according to occupation, ethnicity, region, generation. Diversity of languages is maintained like-wise. And there is the opposite tendency towards refinement, standardization, stabilization, uniformity - the impulse to link up various occupations, ethnic groups, regions, generations and to set up a strong centre is active here. The various facets of culture often earn their prestige in conjuction with this latter centripetal tendency. Gautama Buddha asked his followers to propagate the dhamma each in his own speech form and forbade the rendering of his word into Sanskrit, the language of the learned--and yet later Buddhism employed Sanskrit on a large scale. Arabic spread along with the spread of Islam--so much so that many local languages (Berber, Egyptian etc.) were either lost or reduced to being local dialects. In literature proper we see the manifestation of both the centrifugal and the centripetal tendencies. Consider, on the one hand, the use of khicadi dialects in the devotional and the heroic poetry of Medieval North India; or the diversity of idioms (raznorecie) noted by Mikhail Bakhtin in the European bourgeois novel. On the other hand, the use of Braj and Braj-coloured dialects ((Braibuli, for instance) by non-Braj-speaking poets in Krishna-bhakti poetic traditions; or the refinement and stablaization of classical Urdu poetry and its spread among Dakkhini-speakers, or the deep influence

of Chinese language and literature on the greater part of East and South-East Asia. It will be worth examining to what extent such literary events connect with the power spaces concerned. Perhaps the power 1) and the inspiration of Shudrak's *Mrcchakatikam* can be traced in terms of the two tendencies and the power 2) ambience of that play.

The manifestation of language power as language use is mediated through language system, otherwise identified as word power. When word power manifests itself in actual language use, it is subject to either of two movements, as we have seen earlier. To recapitulate, either it is a question of the understanding of meanings from interior monologue through monologue to dialogue or it is a question of propagation through communication in the reverse direction, that is, from dialogue through monologue to interior monologue. In the one the addressee is led through monologue to interior monologue and mystification. Witness the works of Kālidāsa or Tulasīdās, poets who are essentially conformist and traditionalist. In the other the addressee is led through monologue to dialogue and demystification. Witness Bhavabhuti or Kabir, poets who are essentially subversive and iconoclastic. Of course a fuller study and analysis of these two tendencies is called for before we can understand the complex effect of Jifaneshvar or Shakespeare, Ibsen or Brecht.

The foregoing is merely an indication of the kinds of problems that could be raised and investigated, nothing more, should we probe the depths.

The third question about language as empowerment can now be answered as follows:

1) Let the language of ideas remain affiliated to everyday speech so that the swaraj of ideas be maintained.

2) Let the language of feelings not lose its touch with desi speech forms so that the authenticity of feelings be maintained

3) Let the languages of ideas and of feelings be ever in search of new possibilities whether such possibilities are native or borrowed, traditional or innovative.

4) Word power is directly connected with mystification and demystification and indirectly connected with the propagation of faith and ideas.

5) Language use, especially in literature (whether in the broad or the narrow sense), can manifest language power in a centrifugal or centripetal manner--perhaps in a way linked in the power space.

6) Language use, especially in literature (whether in the broad

or the narrow sense,) can manifest word power in a way that leads the addressee either in the direction of interior monologue of propagation with understanding) or in the direction of dialogue of understanding (with propagation) in a way that gets linked in the power space.

So I have kept my promise of offering answers to the three interlinked questions of language as power, language in power, and language as empowerment. It is quite possible that you may not accept them all, but it is, by now, quite probable that you accept the questions as crucially relevant to the understanding of language and its bond with human life - and literature even in the narrow sense is after all included in language use.

7,Dhananjay 753/83 off Bhandarkar Insti. Road PUNE- 411 004 ASHOK R. KELKAR

Colophon

This essay was presented at the workshop on Literary History, Region, and Nation in South Asia at the University of Hyderabad on 28-30 December 1993. It has also benefited from useful comments by Professor K.V. Tirumalesh of Hyderabad.

An intellectual inquiry of this kind naturally puts one in debt to many thinkers of the past. Even so it will be only proper to single out of some of these by name in a chronological order - the political theorist Kautilya, the grammarian - philosopher Bhartthari, the grammarian Nageshbhatta Kale, the historian Vishvanath Kashinath Rajwade, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the American jurist Wesely Newcombe Hohfeld, the English mathematician-philosopher Bertrand Russell, the Russian literary theorist Mikhail Baktin, or the literary theorist-philosopher Dinkar Keshav Bedekar.

The usual disclaimer that the responsibility for the thoughts presented is not theirs is especially appropriate in the present case, as I may have quite possibly distorted their ideas knowingly or unknowingly and added my own by way of interest on the loan.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No.1 January, 1995

IS THERE A MORAL PERSPECTIVE IN PATAÑJALI'S YOGASUTRAS ? *

(I) What is a moral perspective?

The two sorts of questions need to be distinguished at the very outset.

- (i) Is there any systematic discipline called Indian moral philosophy? (A general question.) Does Yoga-system(for instance) have a moral theory? (A more specific question).
- (ii) Are there moral perspectives (approaches, view-points) traceable in Indian philosophical literature? (Ageneral question). Does Patañjali, the author of Yogasūtras present a moral perspective? (A specific question)

It is possible to answer the questions of the sort (i) in nagative and those of sort (ii) in affirmative, But it is not possible to answer them conversely. Construction of the so-called Indian moral philosophy i.e., construction of moral philosophy or philosophies(or rather moral philosophical theories) based on ancient Indian ideas and ideologies, is a task that perhaps we ourselves should undertake; but for this we need not deny the possibility of there already being one or many moral perspectives implicit or explicit in the ancient Indian philosophical literature.

Before directly dealing with the moral perspective of this or that philosophical system or this or that ancient Indian thinker, it is necessary to consider the question as to what we understand by a moral perspective. Answer to this question is necessary in the context of moral philosophy in general and the so-called 'Indian Moral Philosophy' in particular.

We can significantly ask with reference to a philosophical system S or an author A, for instance, "What is the moral perspective in S, if it contains any"? or "What is moral perspective, if he has any?"

RECEIVED: 4/10/93

* This article was presented in an in -house seminar on Indian Moral Philosophy held by the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona, on 3-4 September, 1991, under the D.S.A. Programme. I thank the organisers of the seminar for allowing me to publish the article.

Though significant, the questions are ambiguous because the expression 'moral perspective' in them assumes more than one meaning. Let us consider two senses, one broad and the other narrow, which, I think, are important.

- (I) Moral perspective could mean a perspective (an approach a view-point) concerning issues such as "Which course of actions is good for man? What are the ends or goals that a person ought to try to achieve? What are the proper (right) means to those ends or goals?" Here we are using the terms such as ought, proper, right, good etc. without demarcating clearly between social, moral (in a restricted sense), legal and religious obligations or norms. According to this broad understanding of ought, good etc. and, therefore, that of moral perspective, any normative approach, whether the norms involved are moral or social or religious in character, will be called a moral perspective. A moral perspective in this broad sense need not be concerned with universal or universalisable obligations and values alone, but could itself be a partial and discriminatory approach or a purely relativistic approach with regard to basic obligations and values. A moral perspective in this broad sense could even be immoral in a narrower sense. In this broad sense, I suppose every system of Indian philosophy can be said to contain some moral perspective or the other. But we need not confine ourselves to the consideration of moral perspectives in this broad sense when we are asking questions such as 'What is the moral perspective in S if S contains any or 'what is A' s moral perspective, if A has any'. Given that S contains a moral perspective in this broad sense, we can, legitimately ask whether the system also contains a moral perspective in a narrower sense. A narrower sense of the expression 'moral perspective' can be stated as below.
- (II) I think that there is a restricted sense of 'moral' in which we are justified in saying that basic moral obligations and norms are not supposed to change from person to person, from community to community, from religion to religion or from culture to culture. The obligations and norms which are central to a moral perspective in this sense are supposed to be applicable to all human beings equally. They do not apply to a human being because he has certain distinguishing characteristics or because he belongs to a particular community or a particular culture, but they apply to him because and insofar as he is a human being like any other human being. This is a sense in which we can distinguish between moral values on the one hand and other cultural, religious and legal norms on the other. In this sense morality is universal and not specific to one's cultural, religious or political identity. To use the distinction current in the normative discourse of ancient Indian origin, we can say that a moral perspective in the restricted sense is one in which sādhāraṇadharmas have a central

place or priority as against visesadharmas. On the contrary a perspective in which visesadharmas are central or prior as against sādhārandharmas is not a moral perspective, though it may be a cultural or religious or political perspective, depending upon the nature of visesadharmas predominant in it. A religious or a political perspective could even turn out to be 'immoral' insofar as it allows the violation of sādhāranadharmas as against visesadharmas.

We should be concerned with this sense of a moral perspective, basically, when we take up the task of reconstructing or reformulating a moral philosophy of Indian origin. It is by employing this notion of a moral perspective that we will be able to avoid the odd situation of discussing any kind of normative perspective (whether moral, amoral or immoral) in the name of moral perspective. It is through this that we will be able to identify the problems in Indian moral philosophy which could be most relevant to western moral philosophy and also to bring the moral philosophies of eastern and western origin comparably closer to each other.

Let me mention some such problems which can be raised with reference to a given moral perspective of Indian origin.

- (i) Given that some universalistic values, which may be termed as sādhāranadharms, sīla, yama or vrata, are central in a particular moral prespective the question can arise: what is the sense and what is the way in which these values are centered in that perspective? Are they central because they are intrinsically valuable? Or are they central inspite of their being means to some goals? To put it differently, is the given perspective teleological (purpose oriented or goal oriented) or deonotological (intrinsic-duty-oriented)?
- (ii) If the given perspective is goal-oriented, what is the goal of morality according to that perspective? Is the goal egoistic or universalistic? If it is egoistic, is it morally defensible? If so, in what way? What, for instance, is the conception of liberation(kaivalya, mokṣa, nibbāṇa etc.) as the goal of morality according to the given perspective? In what sense can liberation be understood as a moral goal, if at all it can be so understood?
- (iii) It is possible that the given moral perspective is an aspect of a complex philosophical system which contains many other non-moral view -points as its aspects. How are these different view-points connected together in the given system? Do they conhere or conflict with each other?

(iv) One may go still futher and try to compare and correlate the moral perspective of the given system with the moral (or even nonmoral) perspectives of other systems, and try to see which one is stronger or weaker than the others and in which respects it is so.

In the light of the above problems. I suppose, it is possible to understand and evaluate the moral perspectives inherent in the respective systems of Indian philosophy. I would like to do such an exercise with respect to the Yoga-system of Patanjali. But before I can do that. I have to address myself to the question whether the Yoga-system of Patanjali can be said to contain a moral perspective in the restricted sense explicated above. Because, as I have suggested above, alothough every system of Indian philosophy does seem to contain a moral perspective in broad sense, it can legitimately be asked with reference to every system, whether it contains a moral perspective in a narrower sense as well. I would like to discuss this question with reference to Yoga in the next part.

(II) Moral goal, spiritual goal and ethical egoism:

At the very outset, it may be noted that the Yoga system of Patanjali has a goal-oriented view of ideal life; it recommends the ultimate goal as kaivalya and the penultimate goal as samādhī to human beings. So, the general perspective of Yoga, whether it is moral in the restricted sense or not, is a goal-oriented perspective. So, while inquiring into the moral status of the goal recommended by it. I will discuss this question in the section, A of this part of the paper. In the remaining sections (i.e. B, C and D) I would like to discuss the question whether Yoga can be said to have a moral perspective, with special reference to Prof. V.K. Bharadvaja's argument which answers this question in the negative.

(A) Is the goal of life recommended by Yoga, a moral goal?

As I have already suggested, the goal of life as recommended by Patanjali in his Yogasūtras is a goal having two stages. The ultimate stage is Kaivalya, whereas the penultimate stage is samādhī. Kaivalya is basically a metaphysical state. Strictly speaking it is not a human state. Kaivalya either means the original form of prakṛtī to which it is reduced through the process of reverse generation(prati-prasava)² or it means the pure consciouseness (the Yoga analogue of the puruṣa of Sānkhya) restored to its original nature.³ But it is not the state of human being qua human being. Because the humanhood of a human being is supposed to consist in a particular combination of the object and the subject or the prakṛtī and the puruṣa respectively. In the state of

kaivalya this combination is supposed to be totally disintegrated and destroyed. Therefore, although kaivalya is the goal recommended to human beings, it is not a human state as such. Because kaivalya is not a human state it also cannot be called a moral state. Now, if by a 'moral goal' we mean a goal which is justly prescribed to a moral agent and achieving which also retains the status of the moral agent as a moral agent, then kaivalya cannot be a moral goal.

From kaivalya we come down to samādhī which is supposed to be the penultimate goal. In fact, although kaivalya was supposed to be the ultimate goal, the central or chief concern of Patanjali in his Yogasūtras remained samādhī, which is the same thing for him as Yoga. 4 Samādhī was classified by Patanjali into sabīja and nirbīja and also into samprajnata and asamprajnata. Although the two classifications do not seem to boil down to the same, the distinction between the two classifications need not concern us here. In any case nirbija samādhī is the last step in the eight-fold yoga which a Yogin is supposed to try to achieve. Nirbija samādhī stands for a stable and peaceful state of mind (citta), in which the mind does not undergo any modification (vrtti). In this state one is supposed to have realised clearly the minute distinction between the power of apprehension (buddhi) (which is a manifestation of prakrti, on the one hand, and the purely conscious being namely purusa on the other. The possibility of the confusion between them which was the cause of suffering is now supposed to have ceased for ever. Nirbija samādhī, therefore, signifies a human state in which one has reached the complete cessation of suffering. But the question remains whether it is the state of a moral agent. A human being in the state of nirbija samādhī has realised that he as a person was a combination of active existence (of the intellect. physical body etc.) and the passive awareness(of purusa) which cannot in fact be attributed to the same thing. A moral agent, on the other hand, should have the awareness or belief on his part that he is a unity capable of acting consciously. A human being who lacks an awareness or belief of this kind cannot be regarded as a moral agent. Thus, the state of nirbija samādhi, strictly speaking, cannot be said to be the state of a moral agent.

But if we come to a still lower stage and consider the state of sabīja samādhī, then perhaps we can identify this state as a state of a moral agent, because it is perfectly possible for a person in that state to posses an awareness or a belief that he is an active conscious being 5 Thus, sabīja samādhī can be provisionally treated as a moral goal because the achievement of this goal is not only the result of one's moral pursuit but it also preserves one's identity as a moral agent.

The above discussion reveals that although sabija samādhī could be conceived as a moral goal in an important sense of the term. the 'higher' goals recommended by Patanjali viz; nirbija samādhī and kaivalva cannot be conceived as moral goals in the same sense. The latter goals, however, could be called spiritual goals, Here, by spiritual goal. I understand the goal the achievement of which marks one's identity as a spirit or a soul, as a conscious being that can exist without body. A moral goal, on the other hand, has been understood as a goal the achievement of which marks one's identity as a moral agent. The two kinds of goal, though may not be necessarily inconsistent with each other, are yet conceptually irreducible to each other. That is to say although it is possible in principle that one and the same goal is pursued both as a moral goal and as a spiritual goal, it need not necessariy be so pursued. A spiritual goal is a moral goal only if its achievement by a person preserved his status as a moral agent. And a moral goal is also a spiritual goal only if its achievement preserves one's status as a spirit or a soul which can exist independently of body. Thus sabija samadhī may be moral as well as a spiritual goal, but nirbija samādhī and kaivalya are only spiritual goals, and not moral goals.

In the light of the above considerations we can say that Patanjali's system of Yoga is primarily and ultimately concerned with spirituality, but it could be concerned with morality only in a secondary way. The moral perspective is in this sense subordinated to the spiritual perspetive in this system.

(B) Is Patañjali's Yoga ethical ? Prof. Bharadwaja's argument.

But Prof. V.K. Bharawaja does not seem to be ready to attribute the moral perspective to Patanjali's Yoga even in a secondary way. In this article "A Non-ethical Concept of Ahimsā" he tries to show that the concept of ahimsā as found in Patanjali's aṣṭānga-yoga is not ethical. His argument is important because, if it is sound, it can be extended to other so-called ethical principles expressed in Yogasūtras and will imply that Patanjali's Yoga is not ethical.

The main steps in Prof. Bharadwaja's argument are as follows:

- i) The only property of *ahimsā* conduct which makes it ethical is that it seeks the good of every body. And its corollary: In no case is the *ahimsā*-conduct moral, if it is aimed at the good of the individual himself. For then the action would be called selfish and not moral.
- (ii) Ahimsā is a necessary part of yoganganusthāna (i.e. undertaking the eight-fold path of yoga) But this yoganganusthāna is aimed at

three aims in progressive process (a) purification of mind (aśuddhikṣaya); (b) continuing illumination of self-knowledge (jñānadiptī); (c) the perceptive understanding of reality (viveka-khyātī). This progressive process is supposed to culimnate into kaivalya (aloneness of puruṣa).

(iii) But all these aims, stated above, are supposed to qualify the moral agent himself and they are not concerned with social good. In other words, the aim of *ahimsā* is supposed to be the individual good and no either social or moral good.

Prof. Bharadwaja concludes from these steps that ahimsā of Yoga is not an ethical concept.

Prof. Bharadwaja proposes another argument in his support. It could be summarised as follows:

- (i) In the moral realm, normal human actions alone are evaluated, not the natural events involving causality. A moral judgement is based always upon considerations of responsibility and not of causality.
- (ii) In the system of Yoga, undertaking the eight fold path of Yoga, of which ahimsā is an important aspect, is described as a cause (and that too not a material cause) of asuddhiksaya, jnānadiptī etc. In the case of the yogin, therefore, the notion of responsibility has no place in his scheme of things.

Prof. Bharadwaja concludes: "In such a state of affairs, then, there is no moral judgement, no responsibility but causality only".

Let me try to connect Prof. Bharadwaja's argument with mine. I have suggested that sabīja samādhi could be regarded as a moral goal in an important sense, because in that state the person is still a moral agent. Prof. Bharadwaja goes a step further and suggests that even this sabīja-samādhī cannot be regarded as a moral goal because it is egoistic in nature. Sabījasamādhī and all the higher stages such as asuddhikṣaya. jnānadiptī, vivekakhyātī, nirbīja-samādhī and kaivalya are purely individual achievements and they are in no way concerned with universal good. Now, if yamas in general and ahimsā in particular is prescribad to a yogin because it is instrumental to this egoistic goal, then it cannot be regarded as a form of moral conduct. Consequently, the Yoga. point of view, as exhibited in the prescription of yamas⁷ cannot be regarded as a moral point of view.

This, I think, is the main argument of Prof. Bharadwaja. The second in terms of causality and responsibility, I think, is not as strong

as the first one. Let me however begin with the second argument and then turn to the first one.

(C) A response to Prof. Bharadwaja's argument:

Prof Bharadwaja contends that since ahimsa is described as a link in the causal chain which has kaivalya as its end-point, we get causality of ahimsā, but ahimsā does not get connected with 'responsibility' which is central to a moral point of view. The objection can be answered, I think, as follows:

Prof. Bharadwaja's objection is based on the wrong conception that responsibility and causality are inconsistent with each other. It is true that responsibility implies freedom of will. But does freedom of will contradict with causality? Many philosophers, notably G.E. Moore in his *Ethics*, point out that freedom of will and causal determinism can go together. That they can go together has to be in fact a presupposition of any teleological ethics because it has to contain the notions of freedom and responsibility, on the one hand, and the notion of goodness or rightness of actions judged in terms of their consequences, on the other. And the *Yoga* point of view of conduct, whether it is ethical point of view or not, is a teleological point of view. The followers of *Yoga* school can very well say that the causal connection between *ahimsā* and *kaivalya* does not rule out one's freedom and responsibility involved in choosing *kaivalya* as the goal and the eightfold path of yoga as the means to it.

But Prof, Bharadwaja's first argument cannot be answered, I think, in a staight forward way. I would like to answer it by raising two questions and discussing them.

- (i) Does a pont of view ceases to be moral if, according to it, the prescribed goals of conduct are non-moral in nature?
- (ii) Has every egoistic ethics got to be self-inconsistent?

The first question is relevant to any teleogoical ethics because it is in teleogical ethics that the consequences of action play an important role in the moral estimation of action. But has the consequence of a moral action got to be a 'moral consequence' in any teleogical ethics? Perhaps contrary is the case, if William Frankena is justified in elucidating teleological theory of ethics in following words:

"A Teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate criterion or standard of what is morally right, wrong, obligatory etc. is the non-moral value that is brought into being".

E

d

a

et

e

n

3.

al

ct

e

:-

n

d

e

So, the fact that Yoga prescribes the non-moral goals like kaivalya or nirbīja-samādhī as the goals of moral action does not go contrary to the possibility that Yoga has a moral perspective.

This however, does not rule out Prof. Bharadwaj's main objection because he would say that *ahimsa* is not a moral regulator of action, not simply because it is supposed to lead to a non-moral goal but it is not a moral regulator because the goal that it is supposed to lead to is an egoistic goal. He would claim that an egoistic moral theory cannot be consistently maintained as a moral theory. This brings us to the second question mentioned above. A contextualised version of this second question may be given as follows:

If ahimsā-conduct is supposed to lead to an egoistic goal (such as kaivalya), is it self-inconsistent to regard ahimsā-conduct as moral? (And if it is not self-inconsistent, what makes ahimsa-counduct a moral conduct rather than non-moral?)

I think the follower of the Yoga school of Patanjali could answer these questions on the following lines:

There is not perfect synonym for 'moral' or ethical' used by the author of Yogasutras. But the general characteristics of all the yamas given by him in Y.S.2.31 have a typically moral aspect. Here yamas are understood as the regulations of behaviour (or regulated forms of behaviour) which are to be followed by a yogin with regard to all beings indiscriminately. i.e; irrespectively of caste, location, time or condition. In other words, Yamas are regulated forms of behaviour that are essentially universal(sarvabhauma) and unconditional((anavacchinna). This, Patanjali is suggesting, is the general form of all yamas. Now, ahimsa, which according to Vyasa's commentary on the Yogasūtras is the highest of all the yamas, has been interpreted as abstension from harming others. By introducing ahimsa in this way, the author of Yogasutras is prescribing to Yogin that the abstension from harming others should be practised universally and unconditionally. It is obvious that ahimsa, as conceived in this way, is directly concerned with the well-being of all beings. It is a moral regulation of conduct in a well-recognised sense of the word 'moral' And it is a moral regulation in the sense elucidated by Prof. Bharawaja too.

The direct goal of ahimsa, in this way, is inalienably connected with the well-being of all. It is possible to claim that it is so connected in a negative way because it does not amount to bringing about (or trying to bring about) positively the well being of others, but it only amounts to abstension from involving oneself in any kind of

activities harmful to the well-being of others. But the negative character of *ahimsā* does not go contrary to its moral character.

At this stage Prof. Bharawaja can legitimately raise the following objection. Though the direct aim of ahimsā is concerned with the well being of all, its indirect aim which may be described in terms of asuddhiksaya, jñānadiptī, vivekakhyātī and kaivalya is egoistic in nature. One expects that the aim of a moral act, whether it is the direct aim or indirect aim, should be of the nature of universal good and not reducible to one's own good. Let us deal with this point in the next section.

(D) The question of universalism versus egoism :

Although there is a point in Prof. Bharadwaja's possible argument suggested above, something can still be said for defending the moral character of the *Yoga* perspective. I would like to argue by distinguishing between two views which seem to be very close to each other.

- (i) Kaivalya is a desirable goal, but it cannot be achieved without practising yamas. And yamas are universal and unconditional regulations of conduct.
- (ii) Yamas may be regarded as the right forms of conduct only insofar as they are means to kaivalya. This view (ii) may further assume either of the two forms:
- (a) It would be proper even not to follow yamas, if it can lead to kaivalya.9
- (b) Yamas are by definition those forms of action which are necessary for the achievement of kaivalya.

Although both the above views viz., (i) and (ii) are egoistic, they represent two different forms of egoism. The second view advocates egoism even at the cost of morality. Here, egoism becomes either an oriterion for accepting or rejecting moral mode of conduct or it becomes a 'defining feature' of morality. The first view, on the other hand, does not make egoism either a criterion or a defining feature of morality, although it recommends the egoistic goal called kaivalya and regards morality as an essential means to it.

Now, if we consider Patanjali's system of Yoga, we find that out of the two views stated above. the second view is conspicuously

absent from the yoga-system. But the first one seems to be present there very clearly because Yoga-system clearly asserts the causal connection between Yogāngas and kaivalya. Here, the moral nature of yamas is not defined or regulated by the concept of kaivalya in any way. Kaivalya, which is an egoistic spiritual goal, is, however, supposed to be a natural culmination of the practice of yamas along with the other aspects of the eightfold path of Yoga.¹⁰

We can, therefore, say that the egoistic goal put forth by the system of Yoga does not violate or polute the moral character of ahimsā and the other yamas and hense there is no inconsistency here between egoism and morality.

A general conclusion of the above considerations is that egoism need not necessarily be contrary to morality: that ethical egoism in every form is not a self-inconsistency. Much depends on the nature of the egoistic goal and its relationship with morality that a particular egoistic system prescribes. If it prescribes a goal which can be pursued only by moral means and cannot be pursued by immoral means and if the criterion or the defining feature of morality itself is not egoistic but universalistic, then the egoistic system can still be said to be having a moral perspective in the sense specified earlier.

I grant that even at this stage one can distinguish between at least three kinds of moral perspectives:

- (i) A moral perspective according to which moral action is supposed to be an ultimate goal by itself; that is, morality is intrinsically valuable. This is roughly the Kantain approach, which is regarded as deontological.
- (ii) A moral perspective according to which moral action is supposed to have a (moral or non-moral) goal which is describable in terms of universal / general good (or the greatest good of the greatest number). This is roughly Mill's approach which is regarded as utilitarian.
- (iii) A moral perspective according to which moral action could have a goal which is an individual good. But that individual good should be such that it can be achieved through moral means and never through immoral means. *Yoga* approach belongs to this type.

One can certainly go further and claim that the first two perspectives are to be graded higher as moral perspectives as compared to the third perspective, because the ultimate goal of morality in the latter is not a universalistic goal in any way. I do not think I can make at present any claim for or against such a view. I am satisfied, if the latter

52

perspective is not deprived of its status as a moral perspective.

Department of Philosophy Poona University PUNE- 411 007 PRADEEP P. GOKHALE

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. A normative approach in order to be 'moral' in this sense need not incorporate the expressions' sādhāraṇadhama' as such but it has to contain some notion of 'universalistic' norms according to which the well-being of all human beings without descrimination is given prime importance. These norms in the given system may not be made obligatory for all (and therefore they may not be called 'dharma') but they may still be prescribed for all. So, sometimes the notions like vrata (vow) sīla (good conduct) and yama (controlled conduct) happen to be introduced which have prescriptive or recommendatory character instead of dharma which has obligatory cheracter.
- 2. 'Puruşarthasunyanam gunanam pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarüpapratisthā vā citisāktirīti Yogasūtras of Patanjali (In brief, Y.S.) 4.34.
- 3. Loc. cit.
- 4. 'Yogascittavrttinirodhah' Y.S. 1.2. Vyāsa explicitly equates Yoga with samādhī in Vyāsabhāṣya on Y.S. 1.1.
- 5. 'Asmitā' which marks the form of consciousness exhibited in the highest state of samprajnāta samādhī (a kind of sabīja samādhī) signifies an awareness or belief in which activity and consciousness form a unity. (For the forms exhibited in samprajnāta-samādhī and the order between them see Y.S. 1.17 with Vyāsabhāsya. For the definition of asmitā as the imposed unity of (passive) awareness and (active) intellect, see Y.S.2.6).
- 6. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XI, no. 2, April 1984, pp. 171 to 177.
- 7. The same argument will apply to the Yoga conception of niyamas and four bhavanās viz., maitri, karuṇā, muditā and upeksā.
- 8. G.E. Moore, *Ethics*, Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, London, 1912. The chapter on Free Will.
- 9. In the Mathara-vṛtti of Samikhyakārikā, for instance, a view of this kind is advocated. Mathaya says in his commentary of Sānkhyakārikā No. 69. "In the opinion of Lord Kapila no action is to be performed as obligatory, but the knowledge of the twenty five concepts of Samkhyaites as similar and dissimilar from each other is the cause of the highest good. It is also said that: Laugh, drink, enjoy and be merry, always enjoy the

sensuous objects, do not have any doubt. If you know the view of Kapila, then you will achieve the pleasure of emancipation". Sānkhya-Saptati-Vrtti (V.) Ed. Soloman E.A., Gujarat University. Ahmedabad (1973) p. 125 (Trans. Mine). From the above passage it seems that there might have been at least a subschool of Sānkhya system according to which morality was not essential for Kaivalya.

10. Taimini I.K. seems to support this kind of interpretation of the relation between yamas and kaivalya when he says: "Yama and Niyama, the first two Angas of Yoga are meant to provide an adequate moral foundation for the yogic training. The very fact that they are placed before the other Angas shows their basic character". -The Science of yoga by Taimini I.K. The Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras, 1961, p. 206.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs.10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol, XXII, No. 1 January, 1995

PURUŞĀRTHAS IN AESTHETICS

Dharmārtha kāmamokṣesu vaicakṣaṇyam kalāsu ca/ karoti kīrtim prītim ca sādhukāvyāni sevanam // * Sāhitya Darpana 1.6

I

The concept of purusartha, especially moksa, plays a significant role in Indian theories of aesthetics. In modern context, where 'specialisation' is the key word, aesthetics and the issues regarding human values seem to belong to two separate worlds. But ancient Indian aestheticians found no incongruity in encompassing the idea of human values and goals (purusarthas) within the fold of aesthetics. The purpose of this paper is to examine how and why the Indian aestheticians incorporate the idea of purusarthas within the purview of art.

Natya sastra, the first extant work on Indian aesthetics, presupposes trivarga (threefold purusārthas - dharma, artha and kāma) as the basic purposes of drama, music, poetry, etc. It says: "sometime it (drama, etc.) shows dharma, sometimes play, sometimes material gain and sometimes peace" (Nātyasāstra 1.104 and 1.108 to 1.111). This claim is supported by Agnipurana which states: Trivarga Sadhanam natyam 'i.e. art-forms are meant for the realisation of threefold values of human life. The later aestheticians added one more values, i.e. moksa to the list following its acceptance in general philosophical treatises. But the vital question that bothers modern mind is how can one achieve the wisdom about values through art forms? Apparently there seems to be no valid justification behind this claim. Bharata, (believed to be the author of the Natya Sastra) talks about purusārthas like dharma, etc., but without much elucidation. Most of the later writers go on repeating the claim that the primary purpose of drama, poetry, etc. is attainment of purusarthas. But the claim is not immediately followed by any explanatory notes. It is no

RECEIVED: 27/12/93

^{* &}quot; A study of good poetry leads to the knowledge of dharma, artha, kama and moksa as well as excellence in arts along with fame and happiness."

wonder, then, that some of the modern critics like De¹ and Chari² dismiss the importance of puruṣārthas in ancient aesthetical analysis. According to them, these writers talked about purusarthas to prove the respectability of asethetics as a śāstra. So, it has more or less an ornamental significance. But it will be too hasty on our part to accept the verdict without a proper examination. Did these great scholars of ancient India make this claim just as a matter of formality? An analysis of their treatises convinces us sufficiently of their analytical and logical acumen. Then, why did they prefer to be dogmatic in such an important matter? To find an answer to this question we must explicate their viewpoints from the general as well as specific aesthetical perspective.

Bharat claims that Nātya Sāstra is the fifth veda. He justifies this by showing that a treatise on aesthetics could serve as a means of enlightenment for the illiterate mass and men belonging to the lower strata of the society. These people, by custom, had no access to the four accredited vedas, (Natya Sastra 1.12. na vedavyavahāraryah samśray yah śūdrajātisu tasmāt śrjaparam vedam pancamam sārva varnikam). So, Bramha, Bharata claims, has composed this veda on aesthetics to offer wisdom about dharma etc. to all classes of people. Visvanatha Kaviraja, the 14th century aesthetician, advances some interesting logic about the importance of aesthetics as a form of wisdom. He reasons out that if the same disease can be cured by a bitter pill and also by a sweet pill, people in general will opt for a pleasanter way of getting rid of disease. The vedic methods of knowledge being tough and rigoruos the easier method of obtaining wisdom through drama, epic, poetry, etc. is therefore, preferable (Sahitya Darpana I.10). The idea of aesthetic experience as a form of wisdom gets more fortified when the commentators on Natya Sastra like Bhattanayaka, Abhinavagupta and others include moksa within the fold of aesthetics studies. This proves that the ancient Indian aesthetics viewed art not only as a form of entertainment but also as a form of wisdom. So, the knowledge about values can also be derived from aestheties.

Moreover, the Indian aestheticians considered art as a form of life, though not exactly the imitation of life. Nātya is lokadharmī (based on social and worldly realities) in certain respects. Hence, the issues cannot be totally detached from the science of art-forms. Besides, aesthetics as a branch of study basically deals with man's psychic and emotional dimensions. Unlike the ancient western theories, emotion and intuition as a source of knowledge are never looked with suspicion in Indian tradition. Along with sense - experience and intellect, emotive experience too finds a place in the scheme of

wisdom. In the philosophical tradition (especially the upanisadic tradition), the ultimate Reality, i.e. Brahman has been described as sat (existence) cit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss). Bliss is no doubt a matter of emotive experience. It is also believed, when a man transcends the narrow confines of ego and selfishness, and identifies himself with the universal and ultimate reality (Brahman) his experience is the experience of pure happiness. This is the state of moksa or release from the bondage and sufferings of the worldly life. Aesthetics as a form of wisdom also aims at self-realisation. But its path is the path of emotive experience. At the same time, moksa is not considered to be other-worldly. It is a quest rooted in human life. In Indian tradition, human life is understood as a totality of varied dimensions. Man has physical, psychic, moral as well as spiritual needs. These needs are represented through the four-fold-values, i.e. artha, kama, dharma and moksa. Therefore, aesthetics, while dealing with the aspect of human emotions cannot do away with the cherished values of human life and the quest for realisation of the ultimate truth.

II

We have examined some of the general grounds for inclusion of puruṣārthas within the scope of aesthetics. Let us now direct our attention to some of the basic concepts of aesthetics to see how such concepts are connected with the idea of puruṣārthas.

One of the fundamental concepts of Indian aesthetics is rasa. It is a complex concept and volumes are written on it. For our present purpose we shall discuss it in a straight forward manner without entering into the logical and conceptual complications associated with the term. Rasa, in a very broad sense means" flavour ". But in aesthetic context it signifies the 'aesthetic relish' or 'aesthetic rapture'. Fundamentally the concept has been viewed from two standpoints. Rasa means the relishable quality inherent in a work of art, like drama, poetry, etc. In this sense, rasa stands for the emotive content projected by the artiste/writer/poet. Again, rasa has been understood in the sense of 'the relishable experience' evoked by a work of art, in the spectator/reader. In other words, rasa can be understood as the object of relish as well as the relish itself. Some aestheticians like Bharata seem to emphasise the former implication of the term, whereas Srisankuka and others put emphasis on the latter meaning. But Abhinavagupta and others insist that rasa is achievable when the barrier between the object of relish and the subject that experiences relish is withdrawn. But it will be entirely wrong on our part to say that Bharata, the first profounder of rasa theory, did not take into account

the idea of spectator/reader's aesthetic experience. For, he explains the concept of rasa with the analogy of gourmet who alone can savour the real taste of a food cooked with good spices. However, it was Abhinava who brought out the full implications of the intimacy between the emotive content and spectator/reader's relish by showing that " the experience of the hero, of the poet and of the spectator are one and the same"3. Whatever may be their perspective of analysis, all the later aestheticians unanimously accept Bharata's defination of rasa - otherwise known as rasa sutra. According to this sūtra, rasa emerges out of the combination of three basic components, i.e., vibhava, anubhava and vyabhicari or sancaribhava. These three are also considered to be the determinants (kārana), consequents (kārya) and ancilliary conditions (sahakāri) of rasa. All three taken together is sometimes called bhava which is directly responsible for the production of the rasa. Bharata also refers to another element known as sthayibhava, i.e. the enduring emotional states. There are controversies about the status of sthayibhava i.e. whether it is the same as bhava or just a component like vibhava, etc. But again without entering into the controversy I shall briefly state how Bharata defines each of these concepts. Vibhava refers to the particular emotive situation present in a work of art like drama, poetry etc. This is mainly responsible for the evokation of response in the spectator/reader. Anubhava refers to the manifestations or effects that are presentable through physical gestures, or expressions of such physical conditions through words. These effects of a particular emotive situation are meant for communicating the emotions to the reader/audience. Vyabhicarībhava stands for the ancillary feelings associated with a dominant emotive mood. The dominant emotive mood or state is otherwise known as the sthayibhava. All these factors taken together present the emotive object, which evokes the experience of relish in the reader/spectator.

It is obvious from Bharata's definition of rasa that art is primarily communicative in nature. Its main purpose is to communicate the aesthetic relish through emotive means. For, neither the rasa, nor the sthāyībhāvas (the dominant emotive mood) are experienced by the reader, etc. by perception. They are not directly presentable. Nor the reader/spectator knows through inference. The emotive mood is graspable through direct experience of feeling. Rasa is not something we know but something we feel: rasyāmanataikaprānā hy assau na prameyādiviṣayah. But what is the basis of the relation between the work of art and the spectator? In other words what is the common ground on the basis of which there is the transference of feelings? On the basis of the aestheticians' analysis of rasa and concerning such an experience of rasa we can say that it is the

1

e

ı,

e

S

a)-

7.

h

is

a,

٥.

e

ot a

n

e

ρf

id ie sthayībhavas or enduring and basic emotional states. The aestheticians believe that human beings have the potentiality to experience as well as understand certain primary emotional states, such as sorrow, happiness, fear, etc. They exist in man as latent impressions (vāsanā), which sllows man to experience the emotive content of a dramatic situation, or poetic mood, and have corresponding asthetic enjoyment. Aesthetic enjoyment is not, therefore, a nebulous or vague feeling. It is as varied as human emotions are. But aesthetic emotions should not be confused with real emotive states experienced by man in real life. 'Relish' is the keyword in aesthetic universe. In real life a man avoids the feelings of sorrow, fear, disgust, etc. But when such emotive contents are presented in a work of art, the reader/spectator enjoys them. Otherwise, tragedies would not have been successful as a form of drama. Bharata, therefore, states that the emotive content present in a work of art is not the writer's or artist's utterly private feelings, nor are they projection of reader's or audience's own mental states. Moreover, though man has the potentially to experience varied emotional states, everybody is not universally capable of experiencing the 'relish' from a work of art projecting these emotive contents. The subtle aesthetic pleasure can be experienced only by a sensitive mind (sumana, according to Bharata and sahrdaya, according to the later aestheticians). Inspite of such differences between the world of actual experience and the world of aesthetics, without the presumptions of Sthāyībhāvas the notion of communication of aesthetic plesure is inexplicable. This may be one of the reasons for the aestheticians to draw a parallel between the sthayibhavas and rasas. Corresponding to each category of sthāyībhāva there is rasa.

Bharata enlists eight fundamental sthāyībhāvas. They are delight (rati), laughter (hāsa), sorrow (śoka), anger (krodha), heroism (utsāha), fear (bhaya), disgust (jugupsā), and wonder (vismaya). When these emotional states are projected in a work of art it evokes in the reader/spectator corresponding rasas. Accordingly, there are eight rasas, they are - erotic (śrngāra), comic (hāsya), pathetic (karunā), furious (rudra), heroic (vīra), terrible (bhayānaka), odius (bibhatsa) and marvellous (adbhuta). Out of these eight Sthāyībhāvas and corresponding rasas four are considered to be primary. They arerati and śrngāra, krodha and rudra, utsāha and vīra, jugupsā and bibhatsa. Abhinava in his commentary on the Nātyasāstra states that these four primary rasas and sthayibhavas are connected with the four purusarthas - dharma, artha, kama, and moksa.5 But such a connection between rasas etc. and purusarthas seem to be abrupt unless the connection between the sthayibhavas and rasas, on the one hand, and the purusarthas, on the other, is not indicated. So, let us examine the plausibility of such an explanation.

TANDRA PATNAIK

We have noted earlier that Indian aestheticians show that art in certain respects represents the lokadharma - the realities of life and society. Loka or society, in the Indian tradition, is generally considered to be an order based on human nature and habit. Therefore, man's psychic and moral constraints reflect the nature and form of society. not the vice-versa. In other words individual's psychic and emotional pattern is not determined by the society. Besides, it is also presumed that basic qualities of human nature are more or less universal. These two presuppositions lead to the belief that the Sthayibhavas of a work of art reflect man's social ambitions, goals and values. These values and goals are cherished by man and they are the integral part of human nature. These values are in no way imposed by the society. A work of art aims to reflect man's need for the realisation of values (purusarthas) through the display of fundamental emotive and psychic qualities. Therefore, Indian aestheticians find a link between the sthavibhavas and purusarthas. It is claimed that the four sthayibhavas, rati, rudra, utsāha and jugupsā refer to kāma, artha, dharma and moksa, respectively. These four fundamental emotional states are primary and no human being can exist without the inherent capacity to feel them. Therefore, they are considered to be conducive to the four major values of life

Kāma in broad sense means desire but in narrow sense it signifies love between a man and a woman. Similarly, rati and its corresponding rasas srngara may have a broader as well as a narrower implication. Ordinarily, they stand for erotic love and delight, but they can also lead to the knowledge of artha and dharma. It is evident from Bharata's identification of three kinds of srngara-Kāma singāra, dharma singāra and artha singāra (Nātyasāstra, XVIII. V.27). Here, singar means love and our love may be extended to material gain as well as righteuosness and morality. Here an attempt is made to show that singara is conducive to kama even in its broadest sense, i.e. desire. Anger (krodha) and the corresponding rasa, rudra is conducive to artha. This particular emotive state of rudra is associated with energy, greed, heartlessness, selfishness, cruelty, etc. In Indian tradition artha broadly refers to the material well-being. But it always insisted that too much materialism is bad for the individual as well as the society. So, in its artistic projection the negative elements of artha are highlighted. This may lead the spectator/reader to realise the ill-effects of materialism when artha as a value is represented through cruelty, selfishness, etc. Utsāha and its corresponding rasa, Vīra, on the other hand, is connected with dharma. It is projected in drama, poetry, etc. through the qualities of enthusiasm righteousness, nobility, tendency for self-sacrifice, etc.

These are the characteristics of a hero or a noble person. The hero is taken as a symbol of morality and rightousness. Therefore dharma is represented through vira rasa. The emotional state of jugupsā (disgust) and nirveda (indifference) is connected in moksa. The feeling of indifference and disgust arise out of man's disillusionment with the worldly things. The realisation that all worldly attachments are temporary and all the happiness is but momentary leads a man to seek for liberation (moksa) from the worldly bondage. Buddha's realisation about the suffering and temporariness of the worldly things at the sight of sick man, old man and dead man can be cited to prove this point. So, juguspā and the corresponding rasa bibhatsa can be associated with moksa. According to Abhinava, Bharata had conceived the representation of these four fundamental sthayibhavas and rasas as the right subject for teaching, for they are connected with purusarthas.6 The object of a work of art is to make a man aware of these four-fold goals and values of life. Of course, one should not infer from this that all works of art should represent these four fundamental rasas. One or the other emotive mood and rasa may be predominant in a drama or poem. But as the four-fold goals of human life are not entirely unrelated so also are these four primary rasas.

III

It was, however, Abhinavagupta and his predecessors who undertook the task of writing commentaries on Natyasastra offered a totally new dimension to the concept of aesthetics. Bharata's analysis was closer to life and was empirical. But for these later aestheticians art was no more considered simply to be a form of enjoyment on the empirical level. It was viewed as a means of passing from the empirical level of mundane joy to the transcendental level of pure bliss or ananda. The statement of Taittiriya Upanisad - Raso vai sah, Rasam hy eväyam labdhvanandi bhavati.7 (He (Brahman) truly is the rasa, surely by grasping this rasa individual soul obtains bliss) - finds its fullest explication in Abhinava's analysis of aesthetics. In his works, aesthetic relish is interpreted more in terms of moksa than any other purusarthas. Like all other specialised branches of study, such as religion, epistemology, grammer, etc. aesthetics also claims to culminate in self-realisation or moksa. Prior to Abhinava the writers like Vamaha, Bhattanayaka, Bhatta Tauta, etc. had included moksa within the fold of aesthetics. But Abhinava's contribution consists in carefully chalking out a path of aesthetic experience from the empirical level to the transcendental level. It starts from the level of simple sensual pleasure at the experience of a pleasent object through sight and sound. This preliminary level of empirical enjoyment stimulates the imaginative faculty of man. In the third stage one tries to identify himself with the object of enjoyment, i.e. the emotions presented in a work of art. Then comes the stage of deindividualisation, otherwise known as sādhāranikarana. The concept plays a crucial role in later aesthetic analysis. In case of real aesthetic experience a man forgets all the factors that constitute the limitedness of his 'ego' or individuality, such as space, time, surrounding objects, even the feeling of 'I' ness. All barriers between the experiencer and experienced, I and thou are resolved. In short such factors which contribute to our idea of individual is pushed back. Any work of art which fails to raise man to this emotive height is not a true work of art. However, according to Abhinava, there is a still higher level of aesthetic experience. At the highest level of aesthetic experience it is the experience of the self itself as pure and unmixed bliss. This is the state of maharasa. On this level of experience all the discriminations and objectivities merge into the subconscious and the self rests in pure bliss. It is also identified as the state. of tattvijnana, the realisation of the highest principle. Therefore, in the highest form of aesthetic experience the rasa itself becomes the object of relish. (rasānām rasah). So the aesthetic experience passes through five levels (1) sense-level (2) imaginative level (3) emotive level (4) cathartic level (5) transcendental level. Interestingly enough Abhinava identifies the ultimate emotive and aesthetic experience with Santa rasa. So, the name of this new rasa is added to Bharata's list of eight rasa. Abhinava by no means was the first aesthetician to talk of this ninth rasa. But he definitely offers the ultimate status to Santa rasa. Abhinava insists that Santa is not a new addition to Bharata's list of rasas (which we usually know to be eight in number). He claims to know two recessions of Natya Sastra and one of them mentions about santa rasa. Whether Bharata included santa or not cannot be substantiated. But it can be claimed without doubt that Abhinava, while raising the aesthetic analysis from the empirical and emotive level to the transcedental level transforms santa rasa into the emotive symbol of Moksa. It is regarded as the highest value, the parama purusartha. So, Abhinava identies the ultimate emotive experience with the ultimate state of bliss - an emotive state identical with the aesthetic relish of Santa. Following the pattern of correspondence between sthayibhava and rasa Abhinva conceives that the sthayi of santa is same (tranquillity). Such an emotional state arises when one achieves tattvajnana- the knowledge of the ultimate truth. It is nothing but realisation of one's own self and obliteration of discriminations that surround us in real life. Therefore, Santa rasa is conceived by Abhinava as the primary rasa. It is the state of ultimate delight (anandaghana.) So, according to him the aesthetic experience of santa consists in the experience of self as free from entire set of painful experiences which are due to worldly expectations and therefore a state of identifying with the universal self. Such state of self, when experienced through the work of art, is \tilde{Santa} and it leads to \bar{Ananda} . "In the world of aesthetic experience there is neither pleasure nor the pain of the ordinary world. It arises from the bliss, it manifests in bliss and merges in the bliss from end to end."

IV

It is obvious from the above account that Abhinavagupta gives a metaphysical twist to aesthetic analysis. The theory of rasa originally propounded by Bharata concentrates mostly on empirical and psyschologicl explanation of emotive experience. But Bharata's commentators, especially Abhinava gradually takes it to metaphysical heights. Such an interpretation of aesthetic experience culminates in Rasa Brahman Vāda, i.e. rasa identified with the Brahman in its ānanda aspect.

But in the context of recent development in the area of aesthetics (especially poetics and literary criticism) and philosophy, the Indian aesthetic theory may seem out of place. Some modern critics feel that Abhinava's metaphysical overtone can be detrimental to the critical analysis of aesthetics. Moreover, it is argued that such a metaphysical explanation may provide support to the Westerner's dogma about the mystical overtone of the Indian way of thinking. Both the criticisms are valid to a certain extent. But they seem to stem from the typical way of looking at the scheme and methods of knowledge.

With the truimph of science and positivism in the West any subject dealing with non-empirical or rather supra-empirical is looked with suspicion. The popularity of linguistic analysis in philosophy had provided further strength to anti-metaphysical stance. Moreover, in every field of knowledge holism is replaced by intellectual sectarianism. In the background of such radical developments in the second half of this century a strict line of demarcation is being drawn between the critical analysis, on the one hand, and the metaphysical understanding of concepts, on the other. So, the tag "Critical" is reserved for the logical or else the empirical analysis of concepts. Anything falling short of this standard is branded as "mystical". But can we keep the interest and curiosity of a normal human being confined within the limits of empirical and logical? Is it unwise on our part to discuss and deliberate upon man's quest for the ultimate truth? Is it not paradoxical that science, which has served as a role-model for the modern

craze about critical and analytical thinking, in its ultimate quest often ends in the level of supra-empirical and transcendental? So, it seems that the modern intellectuals have shut their eyes to the fact that in ultimate level of analysis every branch of wisdom points to the direction of the "transcendental" or "supra-empirical.". We notice that this realisation is fully manifested in ancient Indian thinking.

Moreover, moksa as a concept does not imply moving away from the life; rather it is a part of life. It signifies an attempt to understand the true purpose of life. Therefore, alongwith kāma, artha and dharma, moksa has been included within the scheme of human values, ends or goals. Man is just not satisfied with material wellbeing, desire for love and righteousness. He wants to realise the ture purpose and meaning of his life. If "mysticism" means cutting off from the normal quests of life, then the search for true purpose of life and existence cannot be and should not be branded as "mystical". Moksa, in this sense, is a part of man's life.

Coming down to the specific context of aesthetics we note that in recent times the idea "critic" has assumed a greater status. In view of this new development the factor of 'aesthetic enjoyment' and 'delight' is pushed to the backgtound. A work of art is not primarily means for communicating the emotive content. It is considered to be an object of dissection and unemotional objective analysis. A work of art is de-subjectivised and to certain extent 'de-humanised'. In Indian aesthetics, on the contrary, we find that the role of a sensitive reader/ spectator (sumana or sahrdaya) occupies a very important place. He, too, is a critic. The success or failure of a creative work depends on his judgement. But the sahrdaya is seen more or less as participant in the artiste's intention to communicate the emotive content. So, the sahrdaya does not look at the object of art in a dispassionate and unemotive manner. He approaches it with the sensibilities that he is capable of. In Indian aesthetics the key work is 'delight - a concept which includes within its fold the creator, the work of art and the respondent. So, it is not a relationship of "critic versus the creator;" rather it is a relationship of "creator and critic". In this context, Abhinava's remark about 'critic' is very pertinent. He says: poetry is not philosophy. Sahrdaya's heart is said to melt (dravati), wheras the heart of the scholar (in modern terminology, 'critic') has become hardened and encrusted by readings of dry texts of metaphysics". This remark is very crucial. It shows that though the ancient Indian aestheticians were aware of the role of 'critic'. But the 'critic' does not in any way contribute to the aesthetic process. The work of art - be it a drama, piece of music or poetry - its main purpose is to evoke aestetic delight. Aesthetic experience involves emotion and the

reader/spectator approaches it with a feeling of Camatkara (curiosity and wonder). It is not to be approached from the stand-point of scholarship and intellect. For long, modern philosophers have looked down upon 'emotion'as a form of wisdom. The logical positivist's dismissal of aesthetic judgements as 'emotive non-sense' is the culminating point of the modern philosopher's approach to 'emotiveness'. This strong philosophical bias has its ramifications in all the spheres of human activity. Its subtle influence has also permeated to the area of aesthetics. The modern aesthetic analysis drifts more and more towards the 'critic' and his ability for intellectual assessment. Therefore, modern thinkers find Abhinavagupta's theory of asesthetics falling short of the standard. They say that the Indian aestheticians have confused aesthetics with metaphysics and relgion. But such remarks seem unforunate because Abhinava and others were very much aware of the distinction between aesthetics and religion and metaphysics.

As far as the question of bringing of moksa within the fold of aesthetics is concerned, one finds no incongruity. If we come down from the level of abstract theories to the level of practical experience, then we note that work of art can definitely raise us from the level of mundane to the super-mundane. A piece of good music, poem or drama(also cinema) does enthrall us and often our narrow limits of space, time and ego are pushed back, and we are lost in the world of pure bliss. If this state is moksa, even if it is temporary, it is definitely obtainable through aesthetic modes of experience.

Department of Philosophy Utkal University Vani Vihar Bhubaneswar- 751004

Y

2

f

1

n

n

d

e

S

e

n

it

e

e

TANDRA PATNAIK

REFERENCES

- S.K.De., History of Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta: Firma K.L.A, 1988, Pt. I.,p.44
- 2. V.K. Chari, Sanskirit Criticism, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1990, p.p. 10-11.
- Abhinva Gupta, Dhvanyaloka with Locana Pattabhirama Sastri, Haridas sanskrit Serics, p. 92
 Refer. Aesthetic Rapture. J.L.Masson and M.V Patawardhan, Deccan College, Poona, 1970,p.

- 4. Abhinavabhārati I., p. 285. cf. Locana, p. 187. Refer. Aesthetic Rapture, Masson and Patawardhan op. cit 7
- Translation of Abhinvabhārati pt. I, pp. 274-285 by R. Grali, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta, Varanasi, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1985, p. 71
- 6. Ibid., p. 75
- 7. Tattiriya Upanisad, II.7.
- 8. Abhinavabhārati, I., p. 292.
- 9. Locana, p. 455

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 1 January, 1995.

THE SPHOTA DOCTRINE OF BHARTRHARI

INTRODUCTION

The linguistic theory of sphota is chiefly associated with the grammarian Bhartrhari, although he is not the propounder of the doctrine. He gave sphota a metaphysical significance and defended it against its critics.

One can trace the use of the word 'sphota' in the ancient writings, around the time of Pāṇini. It is doubted as to whether Panini himself knew of such a thing as sphota, though the words 'sphotāyana' appears once in his work, Astādhyayī (6.1.123). Anyway we don't know the propunder of the doctrine. It was Patanjali who, (in his Mahābhāśya), for the first time, made a distinction between sphota and dhvani. The sound that is produced when the word is uttered he called dhvani. It is ephemeral. The permanent element in the word, which is not affected by the peculiarities of the individual speaker, he called sphota. The sphota, in Patanjali's system, is an unchanging unit of sound. It may be an isolated letter(Varnasphota), having a normal and fixed size or a series of such letters (Padasphota). This is quite diffferent from Bhartrhari's concept of sphota.

The claim of Bhartrhari is that "a sentence is to be considered not a concatentaion made up of different sound-units arranged in a particular order but mainly as a single meaningful symbol."²

LINGUISTIC UNITS

The fundamental linguistic unit is the sentence, says the grammarian. The sentence is indivisible. It cannot be divided into words and letters. But don't we speak of words and letters as constituting the sentence? For Bharthari, however, letters and words are not real. They are only abstraction from the fundamental linguistic fact, the sentence. Gaurinath Sastri says that the terms into which the sentence is shown to be divided are merely "shadows of similar forms and never identical with them" Bharthari claims that they don't have independent existence apart from the sentence. "By

RECEIVED: 09/08/94

what is called the *apoddhāra* method, i.e., the 'process of constant and progressive extraction, comparison, analysis and abstraction', we extract parts or pieces, and turn them into separate wholes and assign 'metaphorical existence' to them (*Upacāra-sattā*). In other words, we create, 'abstract' entities from the given concrete whole by breaking it into pieces and then we reify them." This is done to facilitate language learning and for other grammatical purposes. In the actual language situation, however, there are no letters in the word and no word in the sentence.

For the sake of convenience, Bhartrhari continues his discussion about *sphota* and meaning, treating the words as wholes.

THE LINGUISTIC PROBLEM

There is this word, 'chair' and there is this object 'chair'. There exists a certain relationship between them that when the word is grasped the other is presented to the mind. This relation between the word and its meaning is called *vrtti* or the designatory function. *Vrtti* is further divided into *sakti* or denotative function or primary meaning which is nothing but the lexical meaning of the word, and *lakṣanā* or the secondary meaning which is the metaphorical meaning of the word.

Let us take the example of the word "gauh". The word "gauh" has its denotative function in the animal which we call 'cow'. The meaning of the word "gauh" will be grasped only if the word "gauh" is perceived or grasped as a whole, in one single perception. But the word "gauh" cannot exist as a whole (the combination of letters is physically impossible) because the letters or the sound units, 'g', 'au' and 'h' are produced in a sequence, one after the other. And likewise, each letter or sound units is destroyed soon after it is produced because the sound units are ephemeral. Thus, there is not a single moment when all the sounds are perceived together. When the speech is in the first sound 'g', it cannot be in 'au' or 'h'. When the speaker pronounces 'au' the preceding sound is destroyed and 'h' is yet to be produced. Similarly at the time of the pronounciation of 'h' the preceding sounds 'g' and 'au' are no more. Thus, we are led to conclude that words can never be grasped as a whole.

In spite of the above mentioned problem, we grasp the meanings of words and sentences. How is this possible? How do we account for this fact? Since the meaning is understood, there must be a cause which accounts for this fact. The grammarians say that it is done through sphota. They posit an indivisible word which is distinct

from the pronounced sounds. This indivisible unit is called sphota.

WHAT IS SPHOTA?

The word sphota is derived from the root sphut which means to burst'. Therefore, sphota is defined as, 'that from which the meaning bursts forth'. It is an entity which reveals the meaning. Bhartrhari defines sphota as the timeless and indivisible meaning bearing symbol, which manifests the meaning, itself being revealed by the letters or sound units uttered sequentially. For Bhartrhari, the 'meaning bearing symbol' is a wrong term. "Sphota is the real substratum proper linguistic unit which is identical also with its meaning' (at the pasyanti stage). It is a metaphysical entity, neither an object of construction nor abstraction" and it lies 'embedded in the intellect."

Sphota is self revealing in nature. In verse 1.55 of the Vākyapadīya, Bhartrhari states that just as fire manifesting itself reveals objects within its range, so also sphota manifesting itself, manifests sounds." And it is only through these letters (sound units), we come to perceive mentally the sphota. Gaurinath Bhattacharyya makes a comparison between the sphota and the Brahman of the Vedantins. ¹² Both are described as self-revealing in nature. But we cannot have a vision of the ultimate reality, Brahman, without the help of the cognitive instruments (Pramāna) that remove the veil of avidyā that shrouds it. Likewise sphota cannot be cognized by us unless sound reveals it.

THREE ASPECTS OF THE LANGUAGE SITUATION:

Bhartrhari identifies three aspects in the language situation, from the point of view of the hearer. They are vaikrtadhvani, prākrtadhvani and sphota.

(i) Vaikrtadhvani

d

n.

y

d

rd

rd n.

rs u'

e,

se

en rst

ıu' ly

ıu'

be

he

we

be

act

Let us take the situation where the speaker utters a sentence to a listener. The sounds produced by the movement of the vocal organs at the time of uterance is called vaikrtadhvani or nāda. Vaikratadhvani is characterised by the intonation, tempo and pitch which are peculiar to each speaker. 13 The sounds 'g', 'au' and 'h' are the vaikrtadhvani-s. It has a time series: words and letters are produced rhythm ically one after another. 'G' comes before 'au' and 'au' comes before 'h'. Those who do not know the language, hear only these sounds.

PATHIRAJ R.

(ii) Prākrtadhvani

A speaker utters 'gauh' and the hearer hears the utterance. But soon, the sounds that were produced by the spearker ('g-au-h') disappear because the sounds are temporal. After the disappearance of the sound the form of the word "gauh" remains in the mind of the hearer. By form we mean the permanent letters that remains in the mind after the sounds disappear. We can take them as the memory impressions (samskāra-s) left behind by each sound unit. Prākrtadhvani still has the time sequence attached to it because we remember "gauh" in the same order it was uttered and heard, although the tempo and pitch and the other peculiarities are no more present.

If we can attempt at an analogy, the *vaikṛtadhvani* can be compared to the sound which arises at the hammer's contact with the nail and the *prākṛtadhvani* can be compared to the hole made by the nail.

(iii) Sphota

Sphota is that changeless and sequenceless integral linguistic symbol manifested by the prākrtadhvani. 14 It has no time sequence and is indivisible. It is this sphota which conveys the meaning, the thing meant by the word.

These three stages leading to comprehension of the meaning of the uttered word can be represented as follows:

Vaikratadhvani ----> Prākrtadhvani ----> Sphota ----> Artha

In the mind of the hearer.

MANIFESTATION OF SPHOTA

In the manifestation of the *sphota*, a process similar to the reversal of the process explained above takes place. *Sphota* manifests itself. It is asserted by Bhartrhari that *sphota* contains "an inner energy (*kratu*) that seeks to burst forth into expression." The manifestation of the sphota passes through the following stages: *pasyanti*, *madhyamā* and *vaikhari*.

(i) Pasyanti

It is the non-verbal stage. At this stage the sphota is identical with

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

70

its meaning. There is no real distinction between the two. The identity of sphota and its meaning conveys is like the yolk of a peahen's egg. In it all the variegated colours of a full grown peacock lie dormant in potential form. 16

(ii) Madhyamā

It is the pre-verbal stage. The *sphota* and *artha* are still one and undifferentiated, but the speaker sees them as differentiable. "It is psychological in its nature and can be comprehended by the intellect. All the elements linguistically relevant to the sentence are present in a latent form at this stage." The speaker is able to recognize the verbal part, which he is about to speak out as distinct and separate from *sphota*.

(iii) Vaikhari

e

ts

í-

th

It is the verbal stage. These are the actual sounds spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener. It is the same as *vaikṛtadhvani*. At this stage *sphota* stands differentiated from *nāda* or words.

Gaurinath Bhattacharyya likens these stages to a sprouting of a seed. "Pasyanti is the seed about to sprout. Madhyamā is the particular stage when the seed has burst open and two small leaves have just appeared, and vaikhari is when the leaves are separated but joined at the root." 18

HOW IS SPHOTA COMPREHENDED FROM A SEQUENTIAL SOUND - STRETCH?

We have seen that *sphota* is revealed by sounds uttered in a certain sequence. A problem arises. *Sphota* is a unity. If it is revealed by the sequential sound-units, at which point is the *sphota*(the indivisible unit) revealed? If by first sound, then rest of the sound-units are unnecessary. If by the second or the last sound unit then the preceding sounds become redundant.

Bhartrhari says that all the letters or sound units are necessary for the manifestation of the *sphota*. It is a unity and is revealed by all the letters. How? Each sound helps in manifesting the same *sphota*. The first one manifests the *sphota* vaguely, the next one a little more clearly, the following one still more distinctly and so on and so forth until the last one, which, aided by the memory impressions of the preceding perceptions, reveal it clearly and distinctly. ¹⁹ Thus even though each letter reveals the same *sphota*, the complete and distinct

manifestation of the *spheta* is effected only at the last sound unit.²⁰ Hence all the letters are necessary.

The comprehension of sphota from sounds passes from the indeterminate cognition to the determinate cognition. It begins from complete ignorance, passes through partial knowledge and ends in complete knowledge. Bharthari explains this with illustrations. A tree may appear as an elephant when seen from afar. But on careful observation it becomes clear that it is a tree, its true identity. Another example he gives is that of a student who is trying to learn a verse by heart by reading it repeatedly. It is the last reading, aided by the memory impressions left behind by the previous readings, that helps the student to know the verse fully.²¹

Sesakrsna in his sphotatattvanirūpana gives an example.²² Let us say that a man begins the utterance by saying "ka.." We know that he is trying to utter a word which begins with "ka". Thus the whole word is vaguely suggested by the first syllable itself, for it gives a clue to the identity of the word. When the speaker utters the next syllable "ma" the field is still narrowed down to those words which begin with "kama" only. But still we are not sure what the word is going to be. It can be "Kamalam" (lotus) or kamanam or a whole lot of words beginning with "kama: When the last syllable "lam" is also uttered, the word is known fully and clearly.

CLASSIFICATION OF SPHOTA

Nagesabhatta in his Paramalaghumanjūsā mentions eight types of sphota: Varnasphota, padasphota, vākyasphota, varnajātisphota, padajatisphota, vākyajātisphota, akhandapadasphota and akhandavākyasphota. Among these eight varieties akhandavākyasphota is the true sphota in the light of Bhartrhari's explanation. The other seven are the creations of grammarians for the purpose of enabling the student to comprehend the nature of akhandavākyasphota. Akhandavākyasphota is the sentence considered as an indivisible and changeless unit.

CRITICS OF SPHOTA

Mimamsakas (Kumārīlabhatta) and the Naiyayikas (Jayantabhatta) were probably the most formidable critics of the *sphota* doctrine. Grammarians asserted that the *sphota* is an entity which is distinct from the letters that reveal them. Naiyayikas, however, say that the word is composed of many letters and hence a composite fact. A composite fact cannot be entirely different from the letters that

Sphota Doctrine of Bhartrhari

n

ıl

22

W

it

e

S

d

e

S

f

t

constitute them (If a composite fact is head to be entirely different from the constituents any word can mean anything. And consequently communication would be impossible). Moreover, it is our linguistic experience that we do not perceive anything apart from the letters (as distinct from the letters). Therefore, Naiyayikas hold that the postulation of sphota as an entity entirely different from the letters, that reveal it cannot be justified.²⁴

Kumarilabhatta posited a power for the memory impressions by which they are related to the other impressions. By this power of cohesion, 25 memory impressions themselves generate one cognition having all the letters are its content. This directly yields the meaning. Hence, there is no necessity for postulating sphota. This he claims is better than the position of the grammarians because sphota theory involves two assumptions (the indivisible sphota and its power to convey meaning) whereas the model presented by him generate a single cognition).

Sankara too rejected the sphota doctrine. He says that the apprehension of the temporal series of sound-units can be explained by the synthesising activity of the mind without having recourse to sphota. He asserted that it is our experience that in all cases of temporal or spatial series, we have knowledge of the whole.²⁶ Therefore, that there is knowledge of the whole from a temporal and spatial series is taken for granted, on the basis of experience. Auditory perception of sound units leaves behind memory impressions which, by the synthesising activity of the mind are combined together. This recollective cognition leads to the comprehension of the meaning.

JNANODAYA SALESIAN COLLEGE THE RETREAT YERCAUD -636601 (T. N.) PATHIRAJ R.

NOTES

- Cf. K. Kunjunnia Raja, Indian Theories of Meaning, (Madras: Adyar Library, 1963), p. 102. (Hence forward this book will be referred to as ITM)
- 2. Ibid., p. 97
- Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of the Word and Meaning, (Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959). p. 87

74 PATHIRAJ R.

- 4. B.K. Matilal, Perception, (Oxford: Clerenden Press, 1986), p. 393
- 5. Cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, ITM., p. 140
- 6. Cf. Ibid., p. 98
- 7. Cf. Ibid., p.124
- 8. B.K. Matilal, *The Word and the World*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 85.
- 9. Ibid., p.90
- Gaurinath Bhattacharyya; "A Study in the Dialectics of sphota," Journal of the Department of Letters, (Calcutta University, 1937), p.17.
- 11. Cf. B.K Matilal, The Word and the World, p. 87.
- See Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, "A Study in the Dialectics of Sphota," pp. 15-16
- 13. K. Kunjunni Raja, ITM, p. 142
- 14. Karl Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. V Philosophy of the Grammarians, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990), p. 68
- 15. Ibid., p.68
- 16. See B.K. Matilal, The Word and the World, p. 68
- 17. K. Kunjunni Raja, ITM, p. 148.
- 18. Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, "A Study in the Dialectics of Sphota," p. 12
- 19. K. Kunjunni Raja, ITM, pp.125-126.
- 20. Ibid., p. 127.
- 21. Ibid., pp.125-127.
- 22. Ibid., p. 129.
- 23. See Gaurinath Bhattacharyya, "A Study in the Dialectics of sphota," p. 90.
- 24. B.K. Matilal, The Word and the World, p. 101.
- 25. Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Bhartrhari, (1991), p. 106.
- 26. K. Kunjunni Raja, ITM, p. 133.

Inditize the love panet Found to 1995 January, 1995

DISCUSSION

I

Education and Quality of life - A Few Comments

I share Professor Rajendra Prasad's concern at the collapse of values in our country and agree with many of the suggestions he makes to retrieve something of what we have been steadily losing. Let me add a few points.

To what Prasad has to say about the desirability of teaching the child to write an elegant hand and to construct linguistic structures with a view to creating 'communicating excellence.' I would add one more 'skill' which we have almost completely lost sight of today. I mean the art of reading. Television and video-vision have cast a spell over the child (and the parents too), which is extremely difficult to shake off. Indeed those who are bewitched by it, do not want to shake it off. Even if we consider immense usefulness of these audio-visual aids in education, art-appreciation and serious recreation, there is absolutely no substitute for reading. I would urge all teachers to do whatever they can to inculcate this habit in their pupils (and even in themselves in many cases) and to dispel the stupid notion that those who read are book-worms. It is true that ninety per cent of what you see on the roadside stalls and even in reputed book-shops is food for worms, but good books do still exist and they remain largely unread.

The art of reading has two components-selecting rightly what one should read and knowing how to read it. In both these areas, the teacher's guidance is exceedingly valuable. I suggest that the curriculum at school and at college should include at every level a weekly reading period. After helping the pupil to select a worthwhile book from the library (how many schools and colleges have good libraries?) the teacher should read the book with the pupils during the reading period. Reading does not mean merely skimming through the pages; it means, firstly, approaching the author with an open mind and a certain degree of humility in order to understand what he is saying; next, if necessary, re-reading a sentence, a paragraph or a page to really absorb what he says;, then, pausing to reflect and

RECEIVED: 27/04/94

weigh critically to see if what he says makes good sense, and, finally, if you think sincerely that it does not, to criticise it relentlessly; be the author or a relatively unknown writer or a famous and revered figure. Good reading-so the pupil should be shown- is, like the Law, no respecter of persons.

I entirely agree with Prasad that, in order to inculcate moral values, one should never resort to sermonising. Like him, I have little faith in moral instruction period. Whatever you want to get across should be done through whatever other subject you are handling. Literature, history, philosophy and certain other subjects offer a particularly rich scope for surreptitiously squeezing in questions about values. And one must not forget that one of the most potent weapons to combat the enemy is a sense of humour. The Devil, it is said, can meet every kind of reaction execpt laughter. One must show the pupils, who are often so fascinated by the spectacular life-styles of the rich, the corrupt and the infamous, how empty, ridiculous and laughable is the existence that our 'dons' and 'big bulls' lead.

In his attempt to inculcate values, perhaps, the toughest obstacle the teacher encounters today is the home-atmosphere of the child. It is quite common to hear little children telling each other how much money their respective parents make and the ways by which they make it. Whatever the teacher may be able to achieve in the classroom with regard to values is often undone by what the child experiences, at home, where corruption, black-marketing, tax-evasion and a score of other dubious practices are not only indulged in but held up to be admired. Children have a congenital affection for and faith in their parents: what chance does a poor teacher have?

Flat no. 121 Pushpak 31, Altamount Road Bombay- 400026

S. K. OOKERJEE

П

This refers to Dr. Rajendra Prasad's lucid and perceptive article entitled: "Philosophy, Education and the Quality of life" in the issue of the Indian Philosophical Quaterly (Vol-XXI No.2, April 1994). The author has expressed his opposition to the exhortationists who advise philosophers to take interest in social and practical affairs of the country. However, the writer's write-up is an excellent piece on what a philosopher can do in respect to the practical problems of the society. The present essay is an exercise on value-orientation in education and professional values internal to the process of education. Philosophers belong to the class of enlightened thinkers. Naturally, they are expected to enlighen the people on varied values of life and throw light on the social reality. In other words, they can play role of public educators. History of both Indian and Western Philosophy shows that several philosophers have participated in the social, political and other affairs of the people. Socrates, Sartre, Russell, Fichte, Shankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, Yajnavalkya, and a host of others have played the role of public teachers or enlighteners, social reformers. In modern India B.G. Tilak, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, R. Tagore have participated in social or practical affairs of India.

Ordinary run of mankind is not interested in technical and academic philosophising. But we cannot overlook the fact that man does not live by bread alone. He lives by certain beliefs. Philosophers can clarify their meanings and point out their implications. Unfortunately some of the professional philosophers and acadmicians are negative in their approach to values, beliefs and other practices. They should, instead, stress the positive aspects of values and beliefs and thus educate the people accordingly.

The author of the present essay has rightly said that there is no need to have a separate curriculum on Values and Morality. But the writer deserves praise for his emphasis on values which are internal to the educational process of imparting and receiving instructions. The educators, the educatees, the parents and the management are the four pillars of educational institutions. Unfortunately, all the four factors are principally interested in monetary considerations. So, the temples of learning have been both commercialized and politicised. The teachers, who were once revered and almost deified, have been treated as mere paid servants by the managers and politicians. The erstwhile noble profession of teaching has been devalued. The preceptors and educators -rightly called the makers of the nation -

have ben reduced to mere employees, who are mainly concerned with the problems of work-load and wage-hike. This is not to be little the economic problems of the teaching communicity in this age of spiralling prices. The political leaders control majority of the educational institutions. Naturally, they interfere with the functioning of schools, colleges, and even universities.

So, unless noble or pious atmosphere is created in the premises of the centres of learning, there is no possibility of inculcating the professional values internal to the educational process.

Experince is said to be the best teacher of values internal to both formal educational process in particular, and life-process in general. Hard work, sense of duty, responsibility, self-control, cooperation, integrity, personal dignity, respect for others etc., are important and essential human values. The teachers' main task is to inculcate self-respect and self-confidence situations such as physical work or exercise, dialogues, debates, field-work etc. Thus, we can get success in imparting excellence - moral, vocal, social, academic - to the young minds.

Merely bookish approach will not do. 'Boys! Open-your-books-approach' is not enough. Educational approach should open the minds of the pupils, liberate them from varied complexes such as inferiority-complex and promote a sense of living with purpose in them. 'Morality can not be taught, it is caught' goes the wise adage. Lecturing on values is not the adequate way of imparting values. But human values can be indirectly taught while teaching any subject including Geography, Mathematics and Physics. What is required is the 'will' to educate the boys and girls in man-making values.

A time was when students rarely thought of indulging in copying and other malpractices in the examination halls. Today it is becoming an order of the day. Some of the students simply laugh at those who sincerely prepare for their exams. Passing the academic tests without any preparation has been glorified by a section of students' community. So, the author is right when he calls it a situation of moral crisis or value-crises. Once it was believed that characterbuilding was the main aim of education.. Today it has been dubbed as indoctrination and therefore neglected. We are reaping the bitter fruits of giving up the idea of character-building education. Good habits are an important aspect of good character. Thinking for ourselves, ability to take decisions and to make rational choices can not be taught in the vacuum. Educators can place different possibilites before the students. But sense of responsibility, regularity, coopera-

Education and Quality of Life

th

ne of

a-

of

ne

ıt-

to

in

p-

Γ-

to

al

et

to

en as

ın

e. ut ct is

in is at ic of on red er od or on

1-

tion, dutifulness, gratefulness, self-respect, respect for others, dignity of labour are such values which ought to be inculcated in the formative minds of the educatees irrespective of their creeds or communities.

Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar once said: Knowledge without character is dangerous and men of Knowledge without character are more dangerous than the wild beasts. So, the heads of educational institutions are leaders in the field of education. So, as far as possible, men of sterling moral character should be the heads of the centres of learning. It is a big problem, But we cannot avoid it, we cannot help it. This is also a very important part of the educational process. Philosophers can throw light on the difference between the standard of living and standard of quality of life. At present only standard of living is given importance. Philosophers also can point out the distinction between success (economic and social i.e, property and position) and life of values. Education is a life-long process and therefore we have to emphasise the place of values in education and life.

Tattvajnana Vidyapeeth Thane - 400 607

S. G. NIGAL

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY **PUBLICATIONS**

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyva, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

101

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor.

> Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Punc - 411 007

ISSN 0376-415X

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

OL. XXII NO. 1

JANUARY 1995

JOURNAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF POONA

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY (Pune)

CHIEF EDITOR S. V. BOKIL (Pune)

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
SHARAD DESPHANDE (Pune)

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR P.P.GOKHALE (Pune)

ADVISORY EDITORS
RAJENDRA PRASAD (Patna)
MRINAL MIRI(Shimla)

Board of Consulting Editors

G.N. Mathrani (Bombay)

Daya Krishna (Jaipur) Shibjeevan Bhattacharya (Calcutta)

R.C. Pandeya (Varanasi)

D.P. Chattopadhyaya (Jadavpur)

G.N. Joshi (Pune)

D.Y. Deshpande (Nagpur)

J. De Marneffe (Pune)

Dharmendra Kumar (Delhi)

R.C. Gandhi (Delhi)

J. Khwaja (Aligarh)

S.A. Shaida (Kanpur)

Roop Rekha Verma (Lucknow)

S.K. Sexena (Delhi)

R.A. Sinari (Bombay)

R.K. Gupta (Delhi)

R. Balasubramanian (Madras)

Ranbir Singh (Imphal)

V.K. Bharadwaja (Delhi)

Ashok Gangadean (U.S.A.)

Articles in the journal are indexed in the Philosopher's Index, U.S.A., Reportoire Biblographique De Philosophie, Belgium, and Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon (Haryana).

Subscription to be sent in the name of:

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, by DD or Crossed Cheque.

* LIFE MEMBERSHIP *

Individuals: Rs.600/- (in India) U.S. \$ 150/- (outside India) Institutions: Rs. 2000/- (in India) U.S. \$ 300/- (outside India)

*ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS *

Individuals: Rs.75/- (Rs.85/- by cheque) U.S. \$ 40.00 Institutions: Rs. 125/- (Rs.135/- by cheque) U.S. \$ 50.00

Single copy: Rs. 40/- US \$ 15.00

Change of Address and / or non-receipt of an issue of the Journal may be intimated within a month of the month of publication

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXII CONTENTS JANUARY 1995 NUMBER 1 (STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT)

S.B. MONDAL : An Evaluation of Karl Popper's Criticism

of Sociology of Knowledge 1

M. SHAFIQUAL ALAM : Bentham's Social and

)

ex,

nal

Political Thoughts: A Brief Account 5

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007 I.P.Q. Students' Supplement, Vol - XXII. No. 1 January, 1995.

AN EVALUATION OF KARL POPPER'S CRITICISM OF SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

In this article we shall consider the objections Popper has raised against sociology of knowledge. Popper's objections stem from his belief that the sociological approach to knowledge jeopardises our fundamental values like truth, rationality, objectivity and progress and at the same time undermines the importance of critical thinking which is facing serious challenges due to the rise of irrationalist tendencies. In our view, Popper, on the one hand, has misconceptions about the nature of sociology of knowledge and, on the other hand, entertains certain view about knowledge and specially scientific knowledge which are questionable.

Popper's major objection against sociology of knowledge is that its adherents wrongly trace objectivity of science to the psychology of the individuals. They infer that all knowledge is determined by class interests, total ideologies etc. They forget that the locus of objectivity of science lies in publicly shared system of norms which makes critical discussion possible. In doing so they set aside the public or social dimension of scientific knowledge as an activity of individual caught in the web of material interests, unexamined assumptions and biases.

Popper's charges are baseless. First of all, it is wrong to say that the sociologists of knowledge are wedded to an individualistic theory of scientific activity. Karl Mannheim himself says, "Strictily speaking it is incorrect to say that the single individual thinks. Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him".1 "Every individual is, therefore, in a two-fold sense pre-determined by the fact of growing up in society: on the other hand, he finds a readymade situation and, on the other hand, he finds in that situation performed patterns of thought and conduct ".2 In his movement from the particular to the total conception of ideology he emphasises the latter because the former is related to the concept of group and society. If, in the case of sociologists of knowledge like Mannheim, the derivative exesistence and role of the individual is quite explicit, it is even more explicit in sociologists of science like Thomas Kuhn in whose scheme the scientific community has an unquestionable primacy over the individual scientists. According to Kuhn it is the scientific community which constitutes the pillar of scientific stability

and locomotive of scientific change. Hence, Popper's charge that Sociology of knowledge is guilty of an individualuistic construal of cognitive activity is baseless.

Popper's second charge that sociology of knowledge is blind to the social dimension of science viz. its method is also unsustainable. The charge is false because sociologists of knowledge do recognise that scientists engage in testing theories, and consciously work out the ideas concerning what better theory in a certain situation would be. But, unlike Popper, they believe that such considerations will hardly give a complete account of scientific knowledge. They consider the description of scientific knowledge in terms of a canonical method (hypothetico - deductive or any other) to be hopelessly incomplete.

We have just mentioned certain logical loopholes in Popper's picture which make it possible for sociological interpretation of science to enter the scene. Apart from these logical loopholes Popper's theory of scientific method faces certain 'factual' difficulties. There are, in the history of science, many instances of science violating the path specified by hypothetico-deductive model. Aristotle's law of falling bodies was experimentally disproved by Joannes at least one thousand years before Galileo is supposed to have done. Even one hundred years before Galileo, Simon Steven, an engineer, had disproved Aristotle's Law of falling bodies. In fact, at the time of Galileo there was not a single law of Aristotle which was not experimentally disproved. Yet, Aristole's laws were not given up. This is because Aristole's physics was a Unitary System with a theory of matter at its core and physics was consistent with the prevailing intellectual and cultural ethos of the time. Where neither Joannes nor Steven nor any other falsifiers could succeed, Galileo succeeded. This is not because Galileo brought forth a damaging experimental evidence but because he sought to replace the whole of Aristotle's physics including its geocentric view and theory of matter. Thus, it is clear that the replacement of scientific theories needs more than mere experimental counter-evidence. The picture of rejection of scientific theories can be many times too complex to be visualised in terms of mere conjectures and refutations.

Same is the case with acceptance of scientific theories. Contrary to the hypothatico-deductive method, many times scientific theories are accepted before attempts at falsification are made and theories prove their capacity to withstand the tests. Taking examples from the recent past, we can mention the case of Pauli who "Postulated the existence of neutrino simply to preserve energy conservation in the theory of radioactive nuclear disintegration long before any test was envisaged or there was any other theoretical basis for it". Similarly, Dirac maintained his theory even in the face of its 'falsification' and was proved right.

Popper's Critisism of Sociology of Knowledge

f

e

s

0

of

y

y i-

on

ct,

ot

18

at

nd

er

eo

to

nd

es

c-

in

ry

re

eir

we

no

ear

ner

the

Thus, science, throughout its history, has many times deviated from the path marked out by hypothectico-deductive method. The deviations are too numerous to be dubbed as mere aberrations. If science cannot be fitted into a model, it is the model which comes into question. The deviations only show the need for a richer theory of science that takes into account factors not recognised by hypothetico-deductive model. There is no reason why at least some of those factors should not be social. Hence, one cannot deny at least an initial plausibility for sociology of scientific knowledge.

Thus, Popper's central argument against sociology of knowledge fails to make any dent. For, what sociology of knowledge is alleged by Popper to have totally neglected (i.e., the inter-subjective testing and critical evaluation of scientific hypothesis) has not always been characteristic of science as Kuhn, more recently Feyerabend and many historions of science have shown. The acceptance, retention and replacement of theories cannot be explained in terms of either inductivistic or hypothetico-deductivistic model.

Popper's objection against sociology of knowledge that it wrongly seeks to explain "mature" science like physics in terms of an immature and underdeveloped discipline like sociology is also hollow. There is no criterion which can decide what is 'mature' science and what is not. Popper presumes not only that such a criterion exists but also that he has given one. In fact one can go ahead and say that there cannot be such a criterion, since the social and natural sciences are inherently of different orientation such that comparing them is as illegitimate as comparing two distinct cultures with their own "Forms of Life" to use Wittgenstin's phrase. In fact, one can say that Popper has a mistaken idea of the meaning of the term "Sociology" in "Sociology of knowledge". The term "Sociology" as used by sociologists of knowledge like Mannheim, Kuhn, Bloor, Barnes etc., does not stand for sociology as an empirical science correlating the belief patterns and Socioeconomic factors and finding out through empirical techniques like interviews, data-collection etc., certain functional relations. The term stands for a theoretical position involving certain commitments concerning the nature of knowledge and certain methodological prescriptions. Sociology of knowledge is fundamentally an epistemological position and not just the name of a Sociological subdiscipline analogous to industrial sociology, rural sociology, etc., as Popper seems to think. In fact, if sociology of knowledge is only an empirical science there is no reason why philosophers should bother about it. For, sociology of knowledge in that case hardly challenges the dominant normative orientation of epistemology. Infact, sociology of knowledge, is sociological theory of knowledge, rather than social science of knowledge.

S. B. MONDAL

4

All this does not mean that sociology of knowledge is philosophically foolproof. Popper's challenge perhaps might help it to enrich itself in terms of theoretical sophistication and methodological sensitivity. No doubt, sociology of knowledge by emphasising the role of the subject, his intentions and existential concerns and situations brought out the active element in knowledge eclipsed by the empiricist epistemology. Secondly, it rejected certain customary dichotomies like objectivism and subjectivism absolutism and relativism etc. More importantly, it implied a richer theory of rationality which related rationality not with certain norms of logic but with social practice and insisted that rationality of a belief must be understood in terms of the praxis and its capacity for illuminating the path. The rationality of a scientific belief, for example, is to be understood not in terms of the methodological norms it is supposed to satisfy but in terms of its capacity to create new possibilities of development of a discipline. Similarly, the rationality of the social and political belief must be understood in terms of the capacity of those beliefs to throw light on the new possibilities of the human activity within a society.

Department of Philosophy Visva - Bharati Santiniketan - 731 235 Birbhum (West Bengal) SUNIL BARAN MONDAL

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. Ideology and Utopia; Routledge And Kegan Paul Ltd., London (1968), P.3
- 2. Ibid, p.3
- 3. Grunbaum, A. (1976); Adhoc'Auxillary Hypothesis And Falsificationism', British Journal For The Philosophy of Science, vol. 27, pp. 329 - 362.
- 4. Agassi, Josef, Science in Flux, p. 195

I.P.Q. Students' Supplement, Vol XXII. No. 1 January, 1995

BENTHAM'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHTS: A BRIEF ACCOUNT

e

it n y ut

n.

in

of

e.

The study aims at a concentration on and exposition of Jeremy Bentham's [1748 - 1832] social and political thoughts. The limitation of the work is that it will not give detail notes on the emergence of his ethical indoctrinations. But it will make a brief discussion on his utilitarian views which were directly connected with his social and political thoughts and ideas. In England, Benthamite philosophy contributed to many social and political reforms. His fame is chiefly based not so much on strictly creative work as on his relative standing on social, political and intellectual movements. He was closely associated with the 'philosophical radicals 'literally called intelleuctual group as an active, influential and notable leader of the movement. He was also involved with legal 'codification' and some related social and political reforms. He predominantly worked for prison reform and a more humanitarian standard of jurisprudence.

Bentham is the founder of British utilitarianism. This theory has been propounded and revived during the period of English renaissance in the seventeenth century by the great social thinkers Thomas Hobbes [1588 - 1679] and John Locke [1632 - 1704]. Since the time of Bentham, utilitarianism has been the chief hedoistic doctrine. Utilitarianism differs from earlier hedonistic theories in that it emphasizes not on seeking one's individual pleasure but on the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" by shifting interest from individual to social group.

British utilitarianism found its consumerate expression directly in the work of Bentham whose primary significance was not in technical philosophy but in jurisprudence. He applied his concept of utility to legal, social, political, and ethical spheres. His fundamental principle "the greatest good for the greatest number", stands for an enlightened standard of social legislation. He was opposed to revolutionary ideas, which he regarded as unscientific. He satirized the declaration of rights of the French, which he believed to be nonsensical. Governments, he declared, cannot be based on momentary passion; for they must have a definite legal structure. Utopia, Bentham wrote, can be achieved only through a better system of laws based on scientific principles, not through direct political action.4

Bentham begins with the utilitarian succession of the nineteenth century, and was the commanding figure of the social and political reform movements. Among the greatest of his followers James Mill [1773 - 1836], John Stuart Mill [1806 - 1873], George Grote and Alexander Bain are important. Besides being philosophers and thinkers, all of them had an aptitude for utilitarian affairs. Bentham himself was trained to the law, but forsook the Bar for the advocacy of practical legislation and reform. The two Mills held positions in the India office; Grote was a banker; and Bain was a university professor. On the judicial side, John Austin, in his book entitled Province of Jurisprudence Determined, developed the utilitarian principles; and David Ricardo [1772 - 1823] upheld them in political economy. As political thinkers, they were all staunch advocates of liberal and progressive measures on a philosophical basis, and belonged to the group usually known as the 'philosophical radicals' who have been deeply committed to socio-ethico-political reforms.5

Among those contemporaries of Bentham who have independent contributions and who, without being directly pledged to follow him, moved along the paths of utilitarian social and political thought, we must mention at least Thomas Malthus [1766 - 1834], Godwin and Ricardo. All the three belong less to the philosophic movement in the proper sense than to the spiritual milieu which draws its nourishment from philosophy and in turn enriches philosophy. William Godwin [1756 - 1836], whose famous and striking book An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice [1793], the chief of his writings to be mentioned here, is a more radical and uncompromising assailant of the existing social order than Bentham himself. He also regarded pleasure and happiness as the motives of human action and like Bentham demanded their maximization in order to obtain the ideal utopian condition of society to which he aspired.⁶

The influence of Bentham is clearly apparent in the career and thought of James Mill and J. S. Mill. Through out their life the two Mills devoted themselves to programmes of social reform, carrying on the utilitarian tradition of the 'philosophical radicals'. J. S. Mill became the recognised leader or at least the exponent of the philosophical radicals after the death of Bentham and James Mill. In estimating the significance of his position in the development of British utilitarianism, it is important to note that his Essay on Bentham [1838] was an independent work in ethics which may be considered as the beginning of a new phase of utilitarian and social theory.⁷

C

S

0

d

e

er

10

n,

J.

10

In

of on

be

ial

Bentham has become best known for his renowned book entitled An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789], in which he discussed utility as the greatest happiness principle, which means to achieve 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' as the proper goal of society. Universal happiness or pleasure is the comman good for all. According to Bentham, utility means that property in any object whereby it tends to produce maximum amount of benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness.⁸

Bentham vigorously applied his ethical theory in the field of social and political areas. His priorities might even be defended on the basis of his socio-ethical theory called utilitarianism. He had suffered philosophical perception, imagination and acuity to allow himself to be driven into and usefully to pursue increasingly 'pure' philosophical questions.⁹ He was the main successor of the nineteenth century British utilitarian movement advocated for the practical legislation. He was the strenous advocate of reforms -constitutional, legal, social and economic. His writings are voluminous, such as, Fragment on Government [1776]; A Defense of Usury [1787]; An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]; Discourse on Civil and Penal Legislation [1802]; A Theory of Punishments and Rewards [1811]; A Treatise on Judicial Evidence [1813]; Papers upon Codification and Public Instruction [1817]; and The Book of fallacies [1824].¹⁰

Bentham's ideal, like that of Epicurus, was security, not liberty. "Wars and storms are best to read of, but peace and calms are better to endure" this is the fundamental basis of his utilitarian radical, social and political movement. His gradual evolution towards 'radicalism' has two sources: (i) a belief in equality, deduced from the calculus of pleasures and pains, and (ii) an inflexible determination to submit everything to the arbitration of reason as he understands it. Bentham's love of equality led him to advocate democracy including suffrage for women. The same factor worked in his mind to oppose monarchy and hereditary aristocracy. He looked upon democracy as a checking device against the abuse of power and ultimately as a means of registering the will of the majority. Throughout the middle portion of the nineteenth century, Bentham's influence on British Legislation and policy is astonishingly great, at least considering absence of emotional appeal. 13

Bentham's work lies exclusively in the field of practical philosophy. His first interest was in ethics and then in all other departments of study which are based on ethics, such as politics,

reforms, legislation, jurisprudence, education and international law. In all these spheres he is a radical innovator and revolutionary and by him the English utilitarian thought has been fertilized more deeply and shaped more intensively than by any other thinker. Bentham continued and revived those liberal-democratic and socio-political utilitarian views which dominated the nineteenth century's England.¹⁴

Bentham is the recognized leader of the 'philosophical radicals' out of which British liberal party later developed. This intellectual group has been deeply committed to socio-political reforms. Bentham as an extreme democrat bequeathed to his followers the theory that any government which represented a class or sectional interest must be opposed to the general good. This became a recurrent theme in the tought philosophic radicals. He set himself in the great task of awakening and modernising Britain's social and political institutions. In this endeavor he was extraordinarily successfull. It is particularly evident in the Reform Bill of 1832.¹⁵

Bentham is always more interested in practical than in purely theoretical issues. He seriously worked for modernising Britain's political and social institutions. His views were in fact highly influential on most of the nineteenth century British legislation aimed at the social and political improvement. He had a considerable influence on the Labour Party. He wrote extensively on multidisciplinary arenas with justification that reform was desirable and possible.

Bentham's writings on social and political questions were against the French and American dogma on the natural rights of man. According to him natural rights are simply nonsense. He felt it to be only the logical outcome of his leading principle of maximum happiness for the maximum number of people. He once for all adopted the formula, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number", as the corner-stone of his system. His idea can be assessed in the way that he used the "greatest happiness" formula because he was a reformer - obviously a fortuitous circumstance from the point of view a theoretical ethics. 16

When Bentham began to write on political questions, it was moment of insistence on the natural rights of man. The revolutionists in France had made this the basis of their claims; and the Americans had done the same, in their declaration of Independence. The doctrine had found staunch upholders in England in Tom Paine and Godwin. It was strenuously opposed by Bentham. He called natural rights 'simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights rhetorical nonsense upon stilts'. His reasoning has been partly put by Sir Leslie

Stephen in this way:

The 'rights of man' doctrine confounds a primary logical canon with a statement of fact. The maxim that all men were, or ought to be, equal, asserts correctly that there must not be arbitary differences. Every inequality should have its justification in a reasonable system. But when this undeniable logical canon is taken to prove that men actually are equal, there is an obvious begging of the question. In point of fact, the theorists immediately proceeded to disfranchise half the race on account of sex, and a third of the remainder on account of infancy.¹⁷

Bentham had a strong faith in the democratic rights of man, but he considered them to be only fictions necessary for the successful conduct of civil life. In his book the *Theory of Fictions* [1832], he asserted that "the word right is a name of a fictitious entity, one of those objects... so necessary that without it human discourse could not be carried on ".18

Anyway, democratic radicalism was not connected with utilitarianism in Bentham's mind until 1808, before he got acquainted with James Mill. The 'corporate spirit', Bentham wrote then, is by definition hostile to the principle of general utility and political aristocracy is a 'closed operation'. Utility is a principle of reform rather than of conservation and the 'falcific calculus' that Bentham recommends will be completely useless if the interests of all people became naturally identical. Consequently, legislation, the penal code, must impose an artificial identity and Bentham thinks that this utilitarian operation can be carried out only by having recourse to universal suffrage, in which all are represented.¹⁹

Starting with the fact of representative government by the majority of representatives duly elected by the people, Bentham set himself to consider how best such government might be carried on, and what reforms would be necessary in the British constitution for that end. For he was far considering 'the matches constitution' as perfect. Three things in particular he councelled with a view to amendment. First, universal manhood suffrage - subject, however, to the condition that the adult exercising the franchise should be able to read. This qualification was in the interest of education, which Bentham greatly valued.²⁰ On the other hand, he eschewed the question of women suffrage. Secondly, annual parliaments. The brief years duration of a parliament appeared to him to give security against self-interest and lethargy on the part of the member's elected. But it also goes far towards securing that the legislator keeps himself in

constant touch with his constituents, and affords an opportunity to the electors to judge their representatives; and should show a tendency to hold and enumerate views opposed to theirs. *Thirdly*, vote for ballot. This is required in the interest of electorial purity - a safeguard against intimidation and bribery. This extreme radicalism may seem surprising to come from one who opposed the doctrine of the 'natural rights' of man. But he felt it to be only the logical outcome of his leading principle of maximum happiness.²¹

Bentham has presented a version of utilitarianism according to which all obligations reduce to the single obligation to maximise good and minimise evil. Good and evil, in turn, are determinable in terms of utility, which he identified with pleasure and pain. ²² He then based his philosophy on two principles, 'the association principle', and the 'greatest happiness principle'. The former has been made as the basic principle of philosophy and the latter, that of the greatest happiness, becomes necessary at this point in order to deal with his hedonistic philosophy.

For Bentham hedonism provides a theorotical basis for social reform. Hedonism is a theory of the good life which has attracted the attention of British moral philosoprers. It dates back at least to Democritus [c.460 B.C.-C.362 B.C.], and to Aristippus [C.435 B.C. -C.356 B.C.], a pupil of Socrates, whose home was in Cyrene, on the northern coast of Africa. According to Aristippus, happiness is the object of our conduct. Pleasure is said to be the one and only good. The most intense pleasure is the highest good and is the aim of life. Epicurus [C. 342 B.C.-270 B.C.], another Greek exponent of the pleasure theory, modified the views of Aristippus. His system of ethics is known as epicureanism. Men should not seek the most intense pleasure but the most lasting and the highest thing for which men should seek. The spiritual pleasures are elevated above the fleeting physical pleasures; and self-control, friendship and wisdom are encouraged to be developed. Thus, utilitarians shifted all types of pleasures from individual to social group and the method extends automatically into politics.23

It is undeniable fact that Bentham's utilitarianism has an important role in British politics. He advocated the necessity of the constitutional reforms. He, more than anyone else, developed utilitarianism as a general theory of evaluation with characteristic consistency. He insisted on rigorous analytical methods in legal theory and revolutionized jurisprudence by carefully distinguishing what law is and what we should like it to be? On the question of jurisprudence he was vigorously concerned with these two questions.²⁴ Thus, Bentham's

name commanded immense respect in the field of jurisprudence and many of his arguments are excellent ammunition in the radical assault on the anomalies of exsisting laws and institutions. But his belief in the single judge, his depreciation of juries, his eulogy of the summary modes of procedure, his contempt for the doctrine of separation of powers, his enormous faith in the potentialities of executive power and his conception of legislation to some extent were all suspiciously un-English amd made his ideas difficult of entire acceptance even to those who counted themselves as the members of advanced radicals.²⁵

Yet Bentham was the great reformer in the history of British utilitarian philosophy. He may be counted as one of the great teachers and permanent intellectual ornaments of the human race. He introduced into morals and politics those habits of thought and modes of investigation, which are essential to the idea of science. He is regarded as the father of English innovation, "the great subversive, or, in the language of continental philosophers, the great critical thinker of his age and coountry -the great questioner of things established."²⁶

Despite the arguments Bentham supplied the radicals, he came to the view that the colonies could not be emancipated. They were possible laboratories for social and political experiment. Even at the end of his life he said that James Mill would be the living executive and would be the dead legislative of British India.²⁷

Bentham has done a lot in diffusing utilitarian thoughts and ideas in Bengal. If we look at his career, we will find that he has been working in Indian administration for some of then important times of his life. He may be regarded as the pioneer of introducing judicial systems in India. He realized that the welfare of people largely depends upon easily understandable laws of the land. The law must, he thinks, be clearly and easily intelligible, simply and readilly available. If law is of such a nature, the monopoly of legal profession, which is the main cause of delay of justice, would cease and the individual conduct would be directed to beneficial courses. To administer this body of law, Bentham also planned framing of a judicial system for India of which the main feature was to be a myriad of local courts.²⁸

Bentham urged every man to be his own lawyer. He, therefore, proposed to bring justice to every man's door and no inhabitant should be farther from a court than a day's return journey on foot. He proposed a summary, non-technical method, in which the suitor would orally state his plea and personally confront the defendant. For reasons

of speed, economy and simplicity, there will be only one judge and only one appeal from his decision to single metropolitan court of appeal. Bentham believed that this scheme was the only solution to the pressing problem of providing an adequate judicial system for India. He laid emphasis on the importance of a survey and recording of landholdings as the basis of an effective judicial system.²⁹

The utilitarian movement, the revival of hedonism in the nineteenth century, led to many practical, social, economic and political reforms. Men were made conscious of unjust and cruel conditions which had been taken largly for granted, and they were more to work for changes which would make possible greater human happiness. Pain and misery were regarded as warnings which it is dangerous to disregard. In England, where utilitarianism arose and took modern shape, the antislavery movement, the new missionary programme and the reform bill of 1832 are all to a considerable extent expressions of a new urge to bring greater happiness for the human community at large.³⁰

It may be said that Bentham is the founder of a new social and political ideology which in many respects is akin to that invented later by Karl Marx and may be said to have anticipated it, although it grew out of very different logical assumptions and is more than Marx's ideology, based upon a popular appeal.³¹

The development of British utilitarian thoughts and ideas which followed, partly in Bentham's lifetime and partly after it, is influenced entirely by the powerful well-established and logical system of utilitarianism. In the moral philosophy Bentham seems to have spoken the last word, and as metaphysical and religious problems are completely set aside by him, the wings of speculations are clipped. The stiff orthodoxy of his school thus comes to form the strongest hindrance to further philosophic progress.

Bentham had his serious critics. Even the mid-nineteenth century radicals felt that the standard of utility of Bentham was an intellectal concept too remote from the sentiment of the mass of people, whose relatives were toiling in overseas territories. At the same time he has been criticised for not going far enough, for not embarking on a more ambitious programme of social reforms and of public works. Further, he has been attacked for his political materialism, for taking in too narrow a view of happiness and being far more concerned with impersonal procedures and institutions than with the desires and dreams of men.³²

Finally, we may say that this discussion of academic theory may seem far removed from the practical questions concerned in this work but it is the distinguishing mark of Bentham to seek out a view of public affairs that is connected logically with a theory of politics and morals related to society. The enduring influence of Bentham's utilitarianism on Bengal must be looked for in the administrative and judicial system. It is true that in 1820s and 1830s a number of liberals had accepted Benthamite doctrines which were inclined to favour some measures of representative government for India, say for Bengal. Bentham has done a lot in diffusing utilitarian thoughts and ideas in Bengal. He may be regarded as the pioneer of introducing various judicial systems in India who realised that the welfare of people largely depends upon easily understandable laws of the land. The main point at which the utilitarian theory touched the Indian question is the land revenue system. It was the heart of the British administrative system and the one subject which has brought British rule into intimate contact with the lives of the Indian peasantry. Bentham was interested in introducing various public utility reforms into British India in line with utilitarian principle by maximization of land and judicial reforms facilities to all. He advocated the utilitarian theory in a modified way as the greatest principle which itself is concerned with the happiness, pleasure and pain as well. This theory was later developed with the familiar slogan 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number¹³³ emphasizing its utmost implication in the individual and society which ultimately entered into the field of Bengal politics.

In the history of British utilitarianism Bentham deserves more grateful appreciation than others for the application of this theory to the socio-political development of nineteenth century's Britain. Upon him rests the chief burden of the movement and embodies the inheritance of the British tradition in its best and most penetrating form. Credit further goes to him in diffusing utilitarian social thought and political ideas in nineteenth century Bengal.

Institution of Bangladesh Studies Rajshai University Rajshai - 6205 (BANGLADESH)

M. SHAFIQUL ALAM

NOTES

- David Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham's Philosophy of Utility and Law. (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1973), pp. 5-6.
- Harold H. Titus, Ethics for Today [New Delhi : Eurasia Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 3rd edition, 1966], p. 139.
- 3. Ibidp. 138.
- 4. Frederick Mayer, A History of Modern Phiolosophy [New Delhi : Eurasia Publishing House (P) Ltd., 1976], pp. 415-16.
- 5. William Leslie Davidson, Political Thought in England: The Utilitarians from Bentham to Mill. [London: Oxford University Press, 8th imp, 1947], p. 17.
- Rudolf Metz, A Hundred Years of British Philosophy [London: Novollo and Company Ltd., 2nd imp., 1950], pp.55-56.
- 7. Earnest Albee, History of England Utilitarianism [New York : Collin Books, 1962], p. 242.
- 8. Bentham has taken these words as synonymous applicable either to individuals or to the community as a whole. He advocated application of a democratic principle, expressed in the motto, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one". Qouted in William S. Sahakian, History of Philosophy [New York: Barnes and Nobles Inc., 1968], p. 216
- 9. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed, 1973, pp. 7-8.
- 10. Davidson, Political Thought in England, 1947, p. 17-19.
- Quoted in Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy [London George Allen Unwin Ltd., New edition, 8th impression, 1961], p.443.
- Utilitarianism, Benthamism and philosophic radicalism are used as synonymous terms. Davidson, The Political Thought in England, 1947. p. 4.
- 13. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 1961, pp. 442-43.
- 14. Mertz, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 1950, p. 52.
- 15. Oliver A. Johnson, Ethics: Selections from Classical and Contemporary Writers [California: Holt, Rineheart and Winston, Inc., 4th edition, 1978], p. 250.

- 16. Albee, History of English Utilitarianism, 1962, p. 174.
- 17. Davidson, Political Thought in England, 1947, p. 46.
- 18. Quoted in Sahakian, History of Philosophy, 1968, p. 216.
- 19. Emile Brehier, The Nineteenth Century: Period of Systems 1800-1850, trans. by Wadi Baskin [London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968], p. 102.
- 20. Davidson, Political Thought in England, 1947, p. 47.
- 21. Ibid., pp. 48-50.

1se

IT-

np.,

ollo

llier

)

n of

t for His

216.

on:

13.

947.

orur:

on.

- 22. W. T. Jones, Frederick Sontag, Morton O. Beckner; and Robert J. Fogelin [eds.], Approaches To Ethics [New York: MacGrow Hill Book Company, 1962], p. 251.
- 23. Titus, Ethics for Today, 1966, p. 139.
- 24. Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed, pp. 1-2.
- 25. Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963], pp. 62-63.
- Please see Raghvan Iyer, Utilitarianism and All That [London: Concord Grove Press, 1983],p. 40. Also Albee, History of English Utilitari – anism, 1962, p. 194.
- 27. Iyer, Utilitarianism and All That, 1983, p. 40.
- Abdul Hai Dhali, "British Utilitarianism and its Diffusion in the Nineteenth Century Bengal", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh*, Vol. 35, no. 2, Dhaka, December, 1990, p.27.
- 29. Stokes, The English Utilitarian and India, 1963, pp. 71-79.
- 30. Titus, Ethics for Today, 1966, p. 145.
- 31. Please see, Arthur Kenyon Rogers, English and American Philosophy Since 1800 [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922], p. 50 and Metz, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, 1950, p. 52.
- 32. Iyer, Utilitarianism and All That, 1983, p. 46.
- Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation [New York: Hafner Publishing and Company Inc., 1948], p. 2.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY FORMAT AND STYLE REQUIREMENTS

- * Papers previously not published elsewhere can be considered for IP.Q. Two clear copies of the MS should be submitted.
- * An Additional copy should be retained by the author.
- * The first page of the MS should contain author's name, article title and folio heading. The author's institutional affiliation should appear at the end of the article.
- * A brief abstract of paper in duplicate must accompany each MS.
- * The suggested length of the article is about 10 to 20 typed pages (double space), including notes, references, etc. leaving a sufficient margin on all sides.
- * Footnotes or References should be used sparingly, and typed serially in double space on a separate sheet at the end of the article.

 Footnotes and References will be printed at the end of the article.
- * Diagrams, figures, etc., can be used provided they are a must. Unusual symbols should be identified in the margin and a alternative or equivalent symbol or sign should be provided if the one required is rare. Care should be taken to distinguish between the letter O and zero, the letter I and the number one, Kappa and K, mu and u, nu and v, eta and n. The use of italics is to be indicated by single underlining, bold face by wavy underlining.
- * The words and/or citations from Sanskrit or any language other than English should be in Roman Script, fully italicized and with accurate standard diacritical marks.
- * Generally the Editors are able to reach a decision about the publication within Six months, which is communicated to the author subsequently. Authors are requested to Avoid needless correspondence.
- * The author will receive 20 off-prints free of charge.
- * It is not necessary that Editors should agree with the views expressed in the articles.
- * Copy-right to articles published in the journal shall remain vested with the journal.

Articles for publication, Books for Review, and other communications pertaining to publication, Book-rewiews, subscriptions, I.P.Q. Publications, etc. may be sent to:

Chief Editor, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Department of Philosophy, Poona University, Pune 411 007, India.

Edited and published by S.V. Bokil, Department of Philosophy
University of Poona, Pune 411 007.
Printed at Print Art Enterprises, 847 Kasba Peth, Pune 411 011.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

FOUNDER EDITOR
S. S. BARLINGAY

S. V. BOKIL
RAJENDRA PRASAD
MRINAL MIRI
SHARAD DESHPANDE
P. P. GOKHALE

Indian Philosophical Quarterly welcomes papers in all areas Philosophy, History of Philosophy and Philosophy of India Origin. It is interested in persistent, resolute inquiries in basic questions regardless of writer's affiliations.



Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2
April, 1995

MACPHERSON'S THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

Macpherson is one of the most important political thinkers to write on democracy in recent time. His aim was not only to construct the conception of democracy but to provide a moral foundation to it. He has presented his democratic theory after examining the condition of contemporary world. He has examined the liberal concept of democracy, and finding out its inadequates he has propounded his own theory of democracy, by which he has tried to resolve the problem of liberal democracy. Many philosophers treat him as a Marxist, but this is only half truth. Though he was too much impressed by Marxian concept of equality, yet he cannot be called a blind follower of Marx and a mere translator of Marx' view into his own framework. He has sought out the relevant views of Marx for contemporary world, and mentioned them also in his concept of democracy. Macpherson has acknowledged that no political theory can remain relevant to all types of society. "Every political theory is a product of its age and has a timebound quality. Since its basic premises and assumptions are 'drawn from' and 'opt for' a particular kind of society, its value is relative to that kind of society. When men and society change, its premises no longer apply to them and it turns out to be no longer as accurate as it was." Macpherson has given a systematic mechanism for analyzing any theory. He argued that "any clear inconsistency is to be treated as a clue to inadequately stated assumption."2

He has observed that today, democracy does not mean the same thing as it was meant previously. The meaning of democracy is quite changed as "until about a hundred years ago democracy was a bad thing, that in the next fifty years it has become a good thing and that in the last fifty years it has become an ambiguous thing." It has become an ambiguous thing today because: now it does not mean a mechanism for choosing a government. It is not necessary for

asi

in in

democracy that there would be periodical elections and various political leaders, whom people choose as their representatives, and people would have voting power. Macpherson argued that this is also a type of democracy, but not essential nature of democracy. He made a distinction between strict and broader concepts of democracy.

According to strict concept, 'Democracy is merely a mechanism for choicing and authorizing governments, or in some other way getting laws and political decisions made in which majority is supreme; it not only controls the rulers but the actually ruling power is itself majority decision and broader aspect of democracy has generally been taken to mean something more than a system of government. Democracy in this broader sense has always contained an ideal of human equality, not just equality, as could only be fully realized in a society where no class was able to dominate or live at the expense of others." and this type of equality requires "not only one man one vote but also one man one equal effective right to live as fully humanly as he may wish." This right requires man to make best use of himself. So to Macpherson political theory of democracy is a social theory that is itself desirable.

He emphasized that in a democratic system government should be 'by and for the people' and by 'people' he means 'common people' 'a large numberous oppressed people.' Though many previous liberal thinkers (as Mill) realized that real majority is of the oppressed class people. So they should have a political voice, yet they were afraid of achieving majority voice for this oppressed class people. Macpherson was bold enough to admit that "democracy originally meant rule by the common people, the plebeians. It was very much a class affair, it meant the way of the lowest and largest class."

The essence of democracy is that all the members of society have right to develop their essential human capacities fully and freely. It is necessary to promote, the moral and intellectual worth of all individuals. But now the problem is, what are the essential human capacities of which full and free development is needed for democracy. Macpherson says that the most important capacity of man is 'self direction' to choose one's goals and try to realize them.

15

ıd

SO

de

m

ay

ег

as

of

ed

lly

dy

ve

ke

CY

ent

ns

gh

ity

cal

uis

at

he

he

ety

nd

rth

ial

for

of

m.

Man is not a passive consumer of utilities. He is active exerter and developer of his capacities and uniquely human attributes are "seen as ends in themselves, not simply a means to consumer satisfaction."

But man does not have only good qualities, he has some bad also, but Macpherson argues that bad qualities are not essential to human nature, these are developed by the situation of society, but there certain qualities as poetry and painting are also developed by society. He gives another criteria for deciding what are essential human capacities. He says "which can be harmoniously developed by all - this implies that in order to be fully human a man needs only those capacities that are destructively contentions and concersity that essentially human capacities are fundamentally harmonious."

The human capacities are fully "developed under his own conscious control for his own human purposes."9 and he agrees with Mill in believing that each should follow his own way of life, because one can know better what is good for one self. So a man should design and direct his own plan of life. Macpherson agrees that this essential nature is an ethical nature. Man does not behave in this way, but through this behaviour his essence can be fully realized. Several capacities, that a man has can be developed by exercise. So it is his moral duty to develop all his essential human capacities, and any society that gives the freedom to develop all essential human capacities can be called democratic and (but to realize these capacities man needs power) "powers are his potential for realizing the essential human attributes said to have been implanted in him by Nature or God (as with Hobbes) his present means however, acquired to ensure further gratification of his appetites. 10 Sopower here means 'ability to exercise one's capacities and to use 'capacities' for what is there to be exercised. "11

Macpherson distinguished the two concepts of power, the developmental power and extractive power. These are not the two categories of power, rather these are the two different ways in which the same power can be exercised - the ability to develop his own capacities and ability to extract others' capacities for his own purpose. For democratic theory the exercise of developmental

power is essential and this is defined as his "ability to use and develop his essential human capacities." It is called an ethical capacity because it decides what the human essence is. It requires a concept of man as doer and exerter than merely receiver and consumer. Macpherson does not point out what man does but what is needed for the development of human essence, and extractive power means - 'ability to use other's power capacities.' It is a capacity to power over others, the ability to extract benefits from others. It is illegitimate because it hinders the development of 'developmental power' and a society is democratic can be decided only on the basis whether people are free to develop their essential human capacities but in the way of exercising 'developmental power' there are some impediments. Macpherson has categorised these impediments in two categories:

- 1. Physical impediments this is the natural impediment, so political theory does not pay any attention to it.
- 2. Social variable impediment. Political theory tries to remove This type of impediment. These are of the three types:
 - Lack of adequate means of life Every man has the energy to exercise his capacities. So inspite of energy he requires maintainence of material for taking part in the life of community.
 - ii) Lack of access to the means of labour Every exercise of human labour requires materials to work on, with it requires access of materials.
 - iii)Lack of protection against invasion of labour While exercising his capacities man should be free from the invasion of others.

Macpherson says that the third impediment can be removed by giving civil liberties to citizen and by providing protection for person, but the two former impediments cannot be checked in a capitalist market society. A few people accumulate all the capital and most of the people have to depend on them for their livelihood. This is not due to scarcity of the means of life, but it is because of the class division of the capitalist and labour. Increase in productivity cannot check this scarcity because this society sees man as infinite consumer of utilities though he is not a bundle of appetites seeking satisfaction but a bundle of conscious energies seeking to be exerted. If he would see himself as doer, enjoyer and

ld

al

es

ıd

ve

ty

al

is

es ne

in

/e

gy

es

of

es

ile

he

red

for

in

tal

od.

of

in

es

of

ies

ind

appetites seeking satisfaction but a bundle of conscious energies seeking to be exerted. If he would see himself as doer, enjoyer and exerter of human capacities, this scarcity would be ended. This is not a natural scarcity but a human constructed scarcity.

Liberal democrats believe in the maximization of aggregate utilities, but the measurements of utilities are subjective and each person's idea of satisfaction is different from others and "it involves estimating whether change in the distribution of different goods between persons would add more satisfaction for some person than it would substract from them and from others." 13

Macpherson says that this is not true for maximization of So the goal of any democratic society should be maximization of powers, and in this process we would count not the satisfaction which can be got by the exercise of any capacities but the ability to exercise these capacities and if one increases his power, this does not diminish other power, but the power should be taken as developmental power. Extractive power is inconsistent with it, because if one increases ones extractive power, it decreases the developmental power of others. So the increase in extractive power does not increase the aggregate amount of power but "increase in the ability of any persons to use and develop their capacities would not be accompained for any others."14 extractive power is not essential capacity of human being. Only some have this power, so it encourages great inequality in power also, as if 'A' has both extractive power and developmental power and 'B' has only developmental power, then 'A' s exercise of extractive power extracts benefits from B and uses 'B's abilities for his own purpose and it minimizes B's developmental power, but Minogue in his essay 'Humanist Democracy' argued that in every act man exercises his extractive power over others because in purchasing a thing from producer, we have benefitted from others capacities for example, in buying a bar of chocolate, one exerts extractive power over the workers of the chocolate factory but this is a wrong interpretation of the concept of extractive power, because in purchasing a thing one benefitted from the capacities of others yet not compelling others to work for one self. This is just a simple exchange, we purchase a thing from producer and pay him wages.

We are not ruling over others capacities. Macpherson says "when he pays a man to fix his television and he is an independent repairmant then there is no extraction. He has simply exchanged his skilled labour and working capital for his payment, but if he is an employee then his employer exercises extractive power over him, not customer. The very few people have the capacity of extractive power and the increase in extractive power decreases developmental power but "increase in the ability of any person to use and develop their capacities would not be accompained by a decrease for any others." 15

Equality and freedom both are central to Macpherson's democratic theory, but his main emphasis is on equality. He believe that all human beings are equal, so they must have an equal rightto live as fully humanly as they wish but Macpherson has argued that this equality should be real equality, not as liberalists argue for equality, because if men do not have equal resources of living or sell development then what is meant by saying that all have equal right to live as fully as they wish. Liberalist's equality is illusionary equality, because in this concept of society, capitalist would accumulate all of the capital and most of the people live without any capital, they do not have sufficient resources to develop their capacities, they have to pay for the access of the capital, then wha is meant by saying that both property owner and non owners have equal right to develop their capacities. To a non property owner is impossible, so the right to do an impossible thing is useless Minogue in his essay "Humanistic Democracy" critises Macpherson for his essential equality by arguing that he has confused equal right with equal right of things but Macpherson believed, the without equal resources of living notion of equality is only conceptual, because if one has not sufficient materials to maintain one's life, is it meaningful to say that he has an equal right to live as fully humanly as he may wish. He can wish, he can wish everything but cannot live according to his wish. Equality is mean and end in itself. Equality in democracy is not only "one man vote but also one man one equal effective right to live as fully humanly he may wish."16 and to effect this type of equality in a capitalis society, only redistribution of material wealth services is no sufficient because division of class is embodied in this very concept hen

nan Iled

Yee

not

tive

ses

use y a

on's

eves

it to

that

for

self

ight

ary

ould

any

heir

vhat

ave

eril

less

rson

qua

tha

only

tain

live

wish

eans

vote.

1 y 2 !

alist

nd

cep

of capitalistic society, which diminishes equality. Equality must be seen in this way that each and every individual shares in the products as well as the power directing society's productive forces. Everyone then only has right to enter into the true realm of freedom. Though one can argue that it would create sameness and dullness in the society where there are differences that are culturally rich but Macpherson says that it would not create sameness because same result is neither necessary nor needed for it.

Freedom or self direction is the main human quality which distinguishes him from animal being. "Man is unique in the world in having both the capacity for choice and ability his activity is human only so far as it is directed by his own design and not undertaken "at the dictate of another. "17 But the freedom should be equal, Macpherson criticised capitalist system, because in this system though all are but some are freer than others, because here some accumulate most of the capital and some live without any capital, they pay for the access of capital. Though freedom is necessary for human beings yet freedom cannot be maintained at the cost of equality, and where there is conflict between freedom and equality freedom should be sacrified for the sake of equality and for the future freedom. "Equality within a community were traditionally rated more highly than individual freedom."18 Macpherson has given priority to equality than freedom because he argued that democratic society would be classless and for so a single party system also can be said to be democratic where people have general will for national unity and economic development. This system can be seen emerged in underdeveloping countries where the goal of people is not only to attain independence but there after to modernize their society and to rapidly raise the material productivity. Human beings can attain full freedom and humanity by the expression of general will. Communist society is also democratic in the sense that its goal is the fullest self realization of its members, though it cannot be said to be democratic in strict sense. It requires the revolution by working class people, so this would be a class society at first because working class liberate themselves by taking political power. It was "needed to transform the capitalist economy to a socialist economy. transformation was completed and abundance for all was attained

there would be no more need for class rule. "19 Macpherson argues that though communist societies are democratic, because their aim is "humanization of the whole society " yet the communist states are not democratic. Communist state would be democratic if and only if it would fulfil the three conditions: (i) there should a full intra party democracy and (ii) openness that party membership should be open for all (iii) the price of the participation should not be above from the realm of average men's participation. These requirements are necessary for any communist states to be democratic.

Macpherson analyses the liberal concept of democracy too. In the first sense he equates liberalism with individualism as liberalism insists upon each individual's right to choose his own purposes, beliefs, religion, marriage partner, way of life, occupation form of government and so on. In its second sense it is related with possessive individualism which means man's essential nature is constituted by the freedom from the dependence on others. Man is proprietor of his own person. He is necessarily linked with ownership of property. Human society is series of market relations. Each individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules necessary to secure the same freedom for others and human society is a place for exchange between individuals and in the third sense liberalism treats human beings as consumer of utilities and a bundle of appetites.

But these three senses are not interrelated with each other. One can be maintained without accepting the others. For if one accepts the principle of freedom of choice it is not necessary that he would trace human being as possessive individual and passive consumer.

Macpherson argues that in liberal democratic state, democracy was liberalised. Democracy was introduced in these states for the maintenance of liberal state. By the addition of democracy, liberal state has provided its ideals democratic base, and its aim was to promote liberal society which was not essentially democratic or an equal society. The job of competitive party system was to uphold the competitive market society by keeping

1

ues

aim

ates

and

full

hip

not

ese

be

. In

ism

ses,

vith

e is

n is

vith

ons.

uch

for

een

s as

ner.

one

t he

ate,

ese

of

ase,

ally

arty

ing

based on freedom of choice and they justified themselves on the equality of individuals. So it was unfair for them to exclude any one from market competition but the non property owner is generally excluded from market competition because he has no political power and who has no political power has no purchasing power and has no voice in market competition. So the demand for franchise was raised for equal political weight, but equality here does not mean the social and economic equality but equal right to compete with others. Liberalists take democracy as a mechanism for ensuring fair competition in market system. "By admitting the mass of the people into the competitive party system the liberal state didn't abandon its fundamental nature, it simply opened the competitive political system to all individuals that has been created by the competitive market society."

Macpherson criticises capitalism because it depresses self development of most of the persons and it creates great inequality because unlimited right over property and capital leaves many people with no capital for the means of their labour and capitalism encourages the continuous net transfer of powers. "What is transferred from non owner to the owner of the means of labour (i.e., of the land and capital) is the non-owner's ability to labour i.e., his ability to use his own capacities productivity during the time contracted for. The owner purchases that ability for a certain time and puts it to work. The ability, the labour power is transferred. The actual work is performed by the non owner. But in a very real sense the actual work is owned by the owner of the capital. He, having purchased the ability to labour, has the right of ownership in the labour that is actually performed."

Capitalist controls both the performance and production. So both the ability to work and the ownership of the work itself and consequently the value added by the work is transferred to capitalist. He decides how much and who will enjoy the access to the means of labour. So it is a power relation between owner and nonowner. The nonowners have to pay for the excess to the means of labour. The unlimited right over property is for owner a right to accumulate, what he has gained by his own labour but to work, it is an exploitative right of owner on the non - owner. Capitalist compels

non - owners to work under his supervision, not according to their own designed plan of life.

Macpherson distinguised between productive and extra productive power. "Man's productive power is his ability to use his energies and capacities in the production of material good. His extra production power is his ability to use his energies and capacities for all other purposes, that is his ability to engage in activities which are simply a direct source of enjoyment and not a means of material productive and capitalism diminishes both the productive and extra productive power. Though the labour transfers all his productive capacities to the capitalist yet he cannot transfer all the values. Only his labour capacities on materials are transferred and rest is lost because if labour works for his own purposes its value would be the satisfaction value plus value which its application added to the materials on which it was applied. "22 But in selling his labour the satisfaction value is lost. A man whose productive power is out of his control cannot exercise his developmental power, his labour can be said as a mindless work. The distinction between developmental power and extractive power is simply spontaneous work and compelled labour. Macpherson says that developmental power is absent from the working hours of the man who has to sell his labour to that extent which differs from the way he might have chosen to do. Man exercises his developmental power only when he is working under his own control, according to his own design and for his own purpose and men are fully human if left to leisure and non-compulsive labour, but in a capitalistic system labour have to engage in compulsive labour.

Capitalism's distribution of wealth is not just because it rewards not only to labour but to ownership also. Some argue that ownership also should be rewarded because the owner of the capital trained the workers in new techniques, purchases good machines. He gives wages to the workers for their labour, he works hard to decide what type of production is needed in market and how much, he makes plan for it, advertises for it and so after that what benefit is gained must belong to owner also. He does not compel labours to work for him. Workers are free to work or not to work for owner, but this explains only half truth, because labour's freedom

to work or not to work for bourgeois is not a real freedom, the capital is accumulated by capitalist and if labours want to survive, they must have to work for capitalist. So the capitalist compels labours to work for him, though indirectly.

Macpherson argued that capitalism confused between ownership of the means of life and ownership of the means of producing means of life. Ownership of the means of life is justified because it is necessary for developing capacities but ownership of the means of producing the means of life is neigher necessary nor justified because it leaves out most of the men underdeveloped. They have no sufficient material resources to develop their essential human capacities.

In a capitalistic system though labour sells his labour and gets wages yet this should not be confused with the simple exchange. In a simple exchange every one has land or capital to exert his energies and he is independent producer and has the control over his energies and skill and is free to make best advantageous exchange but in this he sells the product of his labour not his labour itself. In capitalist economy, some people accumulate most of the capital and others have to sell their labour to servive. In a capitalist system labour can be brought and sold and there is distinction between labour and capital. Property is taken as right to exclude others but it should be an obligation not to exclude others. "There is amongst the pressure diminishing the extent of private property, the markedly increasingly public awareness of the menances of air and water and earth pollution which are seen as denial of a human right to a decent environment, a denial directly attributable to the hitherto accepted idea of the sanctity of private (including corporate) property. Air and water which are scarcely regarded as property at all are now being thought of as common property - a right to clean air and water is now coming to be regarded as a property from which nobody should be excluded."23 Though previously these things are not regarded as property because people are being aware to the value of these things and trying to exclude it from pollutants all are free to utilise it.

Macpherson says that now the concept of property is changing and property is no longer to be considered to consist solely of private

property. The demand for public property is now increasing "in the most capitalist countries the market is no longer expected to do the whole work of allocation. We have moved from market society to quasi market society." ²⁴

Macpherson takes this change as a forwarding step towards the achievement of his participatory democracy because he says that the pre-requisite of participatory democracy is the reduction of social inequalities and man's image as exerter and developer of his capacities. People are now realising that their political apathy encourages the concentration of corporate power to dominate them, and capitalist system is increasing the great inequality in the society and people's demand for public property is a step to end the capitalistic market system.

For Macpherson the simplest model for participatory democracy is of pyramidal system in which direct democracy would be at the base level and delegate democracy at every above level. Democracy should be started on industrial basis where people can choose their delegates by direct discussions and consensous of the majority and after that those delegates can choose some above level delegates by direct discussion and consensous and they can choose some another above level delegates and at the end there would be only one the top-most representative, the supreme controller, though he was not chosen by the people themselves yet also he is their representative, because he is chosen by their chosen representatives. Delegates should be subject to recall. "The delegates would have to be sufficiently instructed by, and accountable to those who elected them to make decisions at the council level reasonably democrat."

Macpherson appreciates the existence of different political parties in any system of government and he says that in a non class divided society also the competitive political party system is desirable. But he was worried that these parties would have monopoly of political power. So he tried to combine the competitive political party system with pyramidal, direct/indirect democratic system. Macpherson realised that the participatory democracy can be sustained only when people are active and when social and

economic inequalities are reduced. Both the conditions are related with each other, for the fulfilment of former latter is necessary and for the fulfilment of the latter former is necessary. Macpherson says that people are now being active, and criticising the capitalistic market system.

Sometimes it is said that Macpherson has confused the political theory of democracy with social theory. He is quite right in emphasising that political theory has to work on society. So for its success it is required that it should be consistent with the structure of the society but at all these two are different. Macpherson has treated social and political theory as the same thing.

He has collapsed the distinction between politics and economics by treating wealth as merely political and he believes that in a real democracy every one has "right to live as fully humanly as one may wish". This principle allows one to have an unlimited right over property. But he has criticised the concept of private property. He believes that a demand for public property is an optimistic sign for the change in the concept of property but this is not a change in the concept of property, but only a new type of ownership.

The another confusion of his democratic theory is his belief that complete harmony would be achieved only when the exercise of the extractive power would be restricted but it is not true, because disharmony is not only due to exercise of extractive power but there are some other factors also responsible for it.

Dept. of Philosophy Lucknow University, Lucknow - U. P. **RAJNI SRIVASTAV**

REFERENCES

- Macpherson, C. B. (1982) Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. In B. Parekh, Contemporary Political Thinkers. Oxford: Martin Roberston, p. 50.
- Macpherson, C. B. (1983) Political Theory of Possessive Individualism.
 Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 8.

- 3. Macpherson, C. B. (1966) Real World of Democracy. London: Oxford University Press, p. 4.
- 4. Ibid., p 22.
- Macpherson, C. B. (1975) Democratic Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 51.
- 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1966) op. cit., p. 5.
- 7. Macpherson, C. B. (1975), op. cit., p.57.
- 8. Parekh, B. (1982) op. cit., p. 54.
- 9. Macpherson, C. B. (1975) op. cit., p. 41.
- 10. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
- 11. Ibid., p. 53.
- 12. Ibid., p. 40.
- 13. Ibid., p. 70.
- 14. Ibid., p. 74.
- 15. Ibid., p. 74.
- 16. Ibid., p. 51.
- 17. Parekh, B. (1982) op. cit., p. 53.
- 18. Macpherson, C. B. (1966) op. cit., p. 25.
- 19. Ibid., p. 15.
- 20. Ibid., p. 11.
- 21. Macpherson, C. B. (1975) op. cit., pp. 64-65.
- 22. Ibid., p. 60.
- 23. Ibid., p. 135.
- 24. Ibid., p. 24.
- Macpherson, C. B. (1979) Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press., p. 108.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2 April, 1995

HEGELIANISM: POSTMODERNISTS' CHARGES REFUTED

In the last three decades or so, postmodernists have emerged as controversial writers in philosophy. There is a strong reaction aimed not at a single philosopher but at the entire modern European movement in philosophy. Its advocates dubbed this reaction "Postmodernism" which means essentially the reaction against Descartes, Sartre and the German thinkers between them. From the current vantage point of view, I have chosen some of the main figures in this rebellion - Richard Rotry, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. German Idealism occupies an important but ambiguous role in postmodernism. They have occasioned considerable confusion and misunderstanding, among enthusiasts and detractors alike, as well as some sound criticism.

The objective of this paper is to examine critically and to refute the charges levelled by postmodernists against Hegelianism. It is proposed to be achieved in the following manner; Part I: An exposition of the basic features of modernism and Hegeliaism and its criticism by Rorty and Lyotard; Part II: A critical examiniation of Foucault-Derrida charges on Hegelianism. In my attempt to defend Hegelianism, I would like to present some clarifications, annotations and summations which may be useful for the limited end of a preliminary acquaintance with the Hegelianism on the one hand and postmodernism on the other.

T

G. E. More, in the *Principia Ethica*, says, 'What I think, namely that something is true, is always quite distinct from the fact that I think it That 'to be true' means to be thought in a certain way is, therefore, certainly false. Yet this assertion plays the most essential part in Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' of philosophy, and renders

96 R. P. SINGH

worthless the whole mass of modern literature, to which that revolution has given rise, and which is called Epistemology. '1

This is, however, not the occassion to explain salient features of Kant's Copernican Revolution nor the related ideas of the necessary conditions of knowledge and of the transcendental. What I am primarily concerned with in quoting the above passage from Moore is that when a particular philosophical system, say, postmodernism, is criticising Kant, there is a definite method involved in it. Things viewed from one method may not be the same if they are viewed from a different method. Between modernism and postmodernism, there is a methodological gap. But the basic preoccupations of postmodernism are the basic presuppositions of modernism. It is therefore necessary to raise those presuppositions of modernism and discuss how the same issues are reinterpreted through a different method and the consequences are entirely different.

It is often thought that postmodern philosophy arises, at least in part, from a reaction against Descartes, Sartre and the German thinkers between them.² To a great extent this is correct. The philosophies of Rorty, Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, and others, in the last three decades or so of this century which were enormously influential in the subsequent postmodern philosophy, were developed in conscious reaction to idealist views that owed much to Hegel. This fact, however, does not settle the question of the influence of Hegel, either on Foucault and Derrida or on postmodern philosophy more generally, all that it does is to give us a way of posing the question. And the question is a complex one. Besides the general difficulties involved in tracing the influence of a view as complex as Hegel's, there is also a particular problem arisiing from the relation between Descartes, Kant and Hegel. The philosophical views against which Rorty, Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida were reacting and which they grouped under the rubric "Modernism", were Cartesian, Kantian and Hegelian. Richard Rorty says, "In order to interpret this problem of the three spheres as a problem only for an increasingly 'isolated order of priests', one has to see the 'principle of the modern' as something other than that famous 'subjectivity' which post-Kantian historians of philosophy, anxious to link Kant with

Descartes, took as their guiding thread. One can instead attribute Descartes" role as "founder of modern philosophy' to its development of what I earlier called an 'overzealous philosophy of science' - the sort of philosophy of science which saw Galilean mechanics, analytic geometry, mathematical optics, and the like, as having more spiritual significance than they infact have. By taking the ability to do such science as a mark of something deep and essential to human nature, as the place where we have got closest to our true selves, Descartes presented just those themes in ancient thought which Bacon had tried to obliterate. The preservation of the Platonic idea that our most distinctively human faculty was our ability to manipulate 'clear and distinct ideas' was Descartes' most important and most unfortunate contribution to what we now think of as 'modern philosophy.'3

Besides identifying subjectivity as the central theme of modernity, Lyotard proceeds towards the rejection of Kantian transcendental pretence and Hegelian philosophizing of it. There is a complete rejection of rationality in knowledge. 'A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work.4 The contrast between Kant and Hegel cannot be pressed too far: Kantian transcendental deduction could be taken as the direct line to Hegelian themes, although, modified or transposed to a great extent, and Kant himself can be interpreted as being, to a greater or lesser extent, a precursor of Hegelian ideas. Let us elaborate these points. In the Science of Logic, Hegel has this to say. 'It is to be remembered that I frequently take the Kantian philosophy into consideration it still remains the basis and begining of modern German philosophy' 5 It may be pointed out that Hegel's criticism of Kant does not amount to the denial of the latter. Instead, Hegel's attempt has always been to incorporate Kant's dectrines into his own. Hegel explains this process with reference to the Philosophy of History. 'The relation of the earlier to the later systems of philosophy is much like the relation of the coresponding stages of the logical Idea: in other words, the earlier are preserved in the later"6

98 R. P. SINGH

In the context of Kant's epistemological situation, Hegel go on to note three points that worry him: (a) Kant's theory of sensations undialectical; (b) Kant's goal to know our categories before have any knowledge is wrong; (c) Kant's attempt to deny knowledge of transcendental consciousness cannot be accepted. However, cannot go into the details of all these objections except the (b) in Kant's transcendental ambitions in philosophy and Hegelia philosophizing of them. This is extremely important to assess to postmodernists charges on the transcendental pretence.

At the centre of Kant's epistemology, there lies Transcendental Deduction of Categories and Hegel, in his ear work, commends Kant that, 'it was the argument of Kan Transcendental Deduction that first came close to and made possill the speculative identity theory he ultimately created." Heg appreciates Kant's refusal to go along the lines of Hume. There is much in the things which is not given in sensations. It requires use of 'understanding' and 'reason.' These views, rooted in Kar philosophy, represent one of the most important aspects of Hegel own epistemology. Kant, according to Hegel, is right to set out prove that human mind possesses universal and necessary 'form and 'categories' that are used to organize the manifold of sensible intuitions. Human congnition presents universality and necessi only by virtue of the a priori activity of the mind which preceives things and events in the form of space and time and comprehend them under the categories of unity, reality, substantiality, causalt etc. The constitution of knowledge by the categories is regarded Kant as the transcendental activity of human mind, because, '....ii after all, we ourselves who are responsible for the formation general concepts. Conceptions are something which the mi produces actively and it is precisely in this respect that they difference from perceptions. In so far, therefore, as we exercise our power entertaining general ideas, we must be said to have gone beyond state of mere acceptance of the given. Or to put it in another way ability to render the given intelligible to ourselves, and to describe under the guidance of general works, is an expression of genui intellectual activity. ' 8 Hegel accepted Kantian transcendent claims in philsophy. However, in Kant the categories are in manner as done in the formal logic and Hegel adds dialectic into

GH

el go

ore p

wled.

ever

(b), it

gelia

ess (

es w

s ear

Kan

ossil

Heg

ereli

rest

Kan

Hegel

t out

'font

ensib

cessi

ivest

eheni usali

dedt

tion

min diffe

ond b

vay of

cribe

enui

adenty

in to the

logic. 'Thinking and its categories,' Hegel tells us, 'are at once both object and the activity which examines it. They must criticise themselves. Thinking is a self critical, self-developing dialectic...'9

The other charge that postmodernists have levelled on Kant and Hegel is to outdo the concept of unity or totality or rationality in knowledge and even our ability to know the world as it really is and to supplant it with fragmentation, discontinuity, pluralism and irrationalism. As a matter of fact, Hegel writes about the Absolute Truth, 'The true is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development '10 Things do not remain in their finite state of existence. There lies a unity between finite and its negativity. To restore this unity is the objective of 'reason'. Whereas 'sense-certainty' and 'understanding' present isolated entities, 'reason' appreciates the 'unity of opposites'. 'Reason' does not produce the unity by a process of connecting and combining the opposites, but transforms them so that they cease to exist as opposites, although their content is preserved in a higher and more real form. 'The process of unifying opposites touches every part of reality and comes to an end only when reason has organized the whole so that every part exists only in relation to the whole and every individual entity has meaning and significance only in its relation to the totality. '11 In the process of unifying the opposites, 'reason' negates the finite and its negation, and binds them together on mutual dependence, so that they are revealed as moments of a more inclusive whole. The rationally systematized whole is what Hegel calls reality. Hegelian contention that 'the true is the whole' is allegedly criticised by Lyotard as a 'terror' and the 'nostalgia of the whole and the one' in philosophy. Lyotard's answer to Hegel's concept of reason as the unifying agency is, 'Let us wage a war on totality....'12

Taking a clue from Hegel's own terms that the speculative philosophy if applied on physical sciences will lead to a 'Road of doubt road of despair skepticism' 13 Lyotard gives a final blow to Hegelianism. '.... the speculative apparatus maintains an ambiguous relation to knowledge. It shows that knowledge is only worthy of that name to the extent that it reduplicates itself ('lifts itself up', bebt sich auf, is sublated) by citing its own statements in a second - level

100 R. P. SINGH

discourse (autonomy) that functions to legitimate them. This is as much as to say that, in its - immediacy, denotative discourse bearing on a certain referent (a living organism, a chemical property, a physical phenomenon, etc.) does not really know what it thinks it knows. Positive science is not a form of knowledge. And speculation feeds on its suppression. The Hegelian speculative narrative thus harbors a certain skepticism toward positive learning as Hegel himself admits. 14

We might summarize the basic charges levelled by postmodernists on the presuppositions of modernism, the Cartesian-Kantian - Hegelian tradition, in this manner: it indeed rejects almost all the presuppositions of modern philosophy, "the celebration of self and subjectivity, the new appreciation of history, most of all the already flagging philosophical confidence in our ability to know the world as it really is. It was, in a phrase, the wholesale rejection of the transcendental pretence. ' 15 Foucault and Derrida, despite their mutual differences, attack not only on the pretensions but also on the premises and presuppositions of modernism: its confidence in our knowledge, its assurance that all people everywhere are alike, and above all, its doctrine of freedom and human subjectivity.

II

What exactly is Foucault's project in philosophy as an alternative to Hegelianism or modernism as such? In an interview of 1983, he summed up his work in this way, 'Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents. '16

Hence genealogy has three axes. It will, however, not be possible to go into the details of these axes. I shall, therefore dwell upon the general implications which these axes have in Foucault.

Foucault is a holist in his insistence that an element can be identified only by its place in a system and has no identity outside it.

as

ng

, a

s it

on

lus

gel

by

an-

ost

elf

the

the

the

eir

the

our

ınd

ive

he

are

uth

ge;

of on

ich

be

rell

lt.

be

it.

In this formulation what is rejected is the role of the self which identifies and unifies the system. And it is tantamount to the rejection of human freedom of any kind and to any extent. Foucault's method known as 'archaeology' has two features, '... first, it does not concern itself with the possible permutations of a system but only with its actual, historical instances; and secondly, there is no attempt to eliminate meanings from discussion.'17 Indeed, language ('discourse') is much of Foucault's doctrines and it can describe actual situations and the changing transformations of meaning. Generally, in the transcendental idealism of Kant as well as in Hegel's absolute idealism, there has always been an attempt to present an all embracing concept with the help of which knowledge can be derived and freedom can be realized. To satisfy these requirements, Kant creates two spheres - a sphere of knowledge in which understanding with all its categories holds away and a sphere of morality in which reason imposes maxims of categorical imperatives. In both the spheres, Kant's basic thrust has been to present the world of knowledge and the world of morality in a unified and orderly manner. And for this unification what is presupposed is the existence of the self. Hegel too has the same philosophical preoccupation. But he overcomes the dualism between knowledge and morality created by Kant. Hegel's project is therefore wider and more comprehensive than that of Kant. Foucault has been extremely skeptical about such possibilities from his earliest works and, as his work has proceeded, this doubt has become something very strong. The tradition of German idealism with its doctrine of self as the locus of knowledge and morality is expansive with the pregnant sense of humanity within itself; Foucault is indignant at the very thought of humanity's invasion of self, and has no faith in human freedom and reason.

Derrida's work is often highly critical of Foucault. However, I cannot go into the details of the differences between Foucault and Derrida. What I am primarily concerned with is the way Derrida too like Foucault launches offensive against the basic doctrines of German idealism and modernism as such. Derrida summarizes as 'the myth of the presence', 'whether this takes the form of the immanent presence of God, or of the world as a determinate entity, or of the self as an inner certainty. This 'theo-ontological tradition' refuses to consider the possibility that there are no such certainties

102 R. P. SINGH

and even the language we used to talk about philosophy is riddled with distinctions and words that make this myth avoidable. 118

P

p

To develop Derrida's basic contention behind this position we have to clarify his basic philosophical position. In an interview in Paris in 1981, Derrida has said, 'My philosophical formation owes much to the thought of Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger." Derrida hails originally from the phenomenological movement of Husserl. Heidegger and Levina's; and it is within and around this particular framework, more than anything else, that his thinking has evolved. His method is known as 'deconstruction'. Richard Kearney, in a Prefatory Note on Derrida, says, 'Derrida was working out his central notion of the irreducible structure of difference as it operates in human consciousness, temporality, history and above all in the fundamental and overriding activity of writing (L'e' criture). By means of this concept of difference - a neologism meaning both to 'defer' and to 'differ' - Derrida proposed to show how the major mataphysical definitions of Being as sometime less self-identity or presence (e.g., Logos ...), which dominated Western philosophy from Plato to the present day, could ultimately be "deconstructed." Such a deconstruction would show that in each instance difference precedes presence rather than the contrary"20

Derrida's work of rigorous 'deconstruction' attempts to pose a radical challenge to such logocentric notions as the Eternal Idea of Plato, the Self-Thinking - Thought of Aristotle, the Cogito of Descartes, the transcendental consciousness of Kant and the Geist of Hegel.

In rejecting the presuppositions of modern philosophy, Derrida fails to offer a serious and constructive counter-hypothesis to supplant the doctrines which lies at the roots of the German idealism. Derrida's method of deconstruction means, like in guerrilla warfare, to attack quickly and run back, to puncture and parody, and to defuse through refusing to take a thesis seriously. Derrida has an intense distrust of metaphysics. For Derrida, the job of philosophy is not to defend or account for this system, but to deconstruct it.

To bring the paper to a close, one may point out that the postmodernist's reaction on the basic premises of Hegelianism in postilicular and modernism in general is a story which is yet to be settled, for the story is far from over. However, the rejection of self implies the rejection of man's creative activity, his capability to transcend the given limitations and hence the realizations of freedom. The concepts evolved by Kant and Hegel, with respect to their specific philosophical system, play the most important role. These concepts are not mere possessions of a definite language and are not confined to the discription of a definite situation alone. Rather, these are universal concepts which help us in understanding the objective reality as such. A particular situation does not possess an authority of its own. Every situation has a reference to the whole process of reality through which it undergoes. All this is possible if we have universal concepts to appreciate reality in its totality. An attempt to reject totality by Rorty, Lyotard, Foucault or Derrida will not solve that problem.

Group of Philosophy School of Languages, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi - 110 067. R. P. SINGH

FOOT NOTE S

- Moore, G. . Principia Ethica (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1903), pp. 132-33.
- Solomon, R. C., Continental Philosophy Since 1750 (New York, Oxford University Press), p. 194.
- Rorty, Richard, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity" in Habermas and Modernity, (ed) Richard J. Bernstein, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985), p. 170.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Post Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. from Fench Geoff Benniengton and Brian Massumi, vol. 10, of Theory and History of Literature, (ed) by Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte Sasse, (Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 81.

104 R. P. SINGH

 Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. Johnston & Struthers, vol. I, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 73.

- Hegel, Philosophy of History, quotation from David Macgregor, The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 134-5.
- 7. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, trans H. Harris and W. Cerf Albany, (New York, Sunny Press, 1977), p. 80.
- 8. Cassiver, H. W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Permanent Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1961), p. 55.
- Harris, Errol E., An Introduction of the Logic of Hegel, (New York, University Press of America, 1983), p. 64.
- Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 11.
- Marcuse, Herbart, Reason and Revolution, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 47.
- 12. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, etc., pp. 81-82.
- 13. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, etc., Preface.
- 14. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, etc., p. 38.
- 15. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750, etc. p. 194.
- 16. Gane, Mike, "Introduction: Michel Foucault", in Towards a Critique of Foucault, (ed) by Mike Gane, (London and New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 4. All three axes were present, albeit in a somewhat confused fashion in Madness and Civilization, The Truth axis was studied in Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things, The power axis was studied in Discipline and Punish. and ethical axis in The History of Sexuality.
- 17. Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750, etc., p 198.
- 18. Ibid., p. 200.
- Kearney, Richard, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers The Phenomenological Heritage, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 109.
- 20. Ibid., pp. 105-106.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2 April, 1995

I

win,

n&

don

gan

of

d

hat

ied

ied y.

rs

ASSOCIATION THEORY OF MEANING: A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LITERATURE

Music is, by its very nature powerless to express anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, a psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. (Stravinsky in Cooke 1959: 11)

There is virtually unanimous agreement that C major is a cheerful key. (Young 1991: 240)

The controversy continues: Does art have meaning? Is there a language of art? Is music a language of feeling? Does art express meaning like language expresses meaning? Can music represent objects?

Scruton (1983: 62) wrote that music has no power to represent anything. Furthermore, Nobody has yet shown that ordinary musical understanding is linguistic in form and it is doubtful that it could be shown. (Scruton 1980: 333) And Hanslick (1982) holds that music expresses nothing at all beyond itself. An attempt will be made here to show that art, including music, can represent, and does have meaning in a way similar to the way in which language has meaning. This first requires a brief analysis of meaning.

The traditional and common view is that Words have meaning. Words possess meaning, and, The meaning is in the word. We look for meaning in words. We look, but we do not find meaning as such there. Words do not have meanings as people have books. They do not own them. Nor would we wish to say they possess them or are possessed. We must look elsewhere. Words, marks and sounds are thought ideas. Meaning is the representation of ideas by means of words, so the meaning is not in the word, but in us.

Meaning becomes a synonym of idea. But ideas, thoughts. concepts, etc. are rejected in contemporary philosophical psychology as being pseudo-psychological terms (Shibles 1974a, Wittgenstein 1968). In place of thought we may put self-talk and utterances. Thought reduces to language. If idea is mentalistic, then so also is meaning. The common view of meaning as the representation of ideas is, then, rejected. Quine (1964: 77, 160) wrote, The notion of there being a fixed, explicable, and as yet unexplained meaning in the speaker's mind is gratuitous. On these views, neither language nor art can express ideas, because there are none (cf., Lyons 1968: 401, 408, 474). Dewey (1965: 189) states, It is heresy to conceive meanings to be private, a property of ghostly psychic existences. Our task becomes that of finding a nonmentalistic theory of meaning. Contextualist theories such as that of the pragmatist, and Wittgenstein's view of meaning as the use of a word in a languagegame, satisfy this criterion.

How does "chalk" mean chalk? The quotation marks around "chalk" mean that it is to be treated as a word, that is, as marks or sounds (Shibles 1970). As such, it is an object. We nonmentalistically associate this word with the object, chalk. How this is done need not concern us. That it is done does. We learn the meaning of words in this way. The meanings of a word are the associations between the word, one object, and another object. Meaning is associations of objects. In terms of language-game theory, it is associations of words with words, and words with contexts (games).

The association theory is not new, but the nonmentalistic theory is. David Hartley (1966/1749:416) wrote, Particular kinds of air and harmony are associated with particular words, affections, and passions, and so are made to express them. Passions are simple ideas united by association (p. 368). Kivy (1980:77) speaks of music which conventionally expresses emotion, such as the minor key with dark emotions, as customary associations. He and Charles Arison (in 1752), present the view that music arouses emotion by association with past ideas. Behrend (1988:206) speaks of musically suggested feeling. Gombrich's (1960) equivalence response reduces to association.

Deryck Cooke (1959: 174-175) develops a language of music whereby elements of music are associated with human emotions. He gives the following terms of what he calls the basic meanings of the musical vocabulary of emotion: tone - color depends on the warmly passionate strings, the pastoral flute and oboe, the querulous or comic bassoon, the heroic trumpet, or the solemn trombone or on such individual discoveries as Berlioz's shrilly vulgar E flat clarinet, Strauss's spiteful oboes, Mahler's viciously sardonic trombones, and Vaughn William's lachrymose saxophone. (p.112) The musical vocabulary itself includes, for example, that minor second renders spiritless anguish; minor third, stoic acceptance or tragedy; major third, joy; sharp fourth, devilish and inimical forces. (p.90) Rising pitch is an outgoing emotion; the ascending major third gives a positive, bright emotion or joy (p. 115). In general, the major interval is said to yield pleasure, the minor - pain, and the contrast between them provides tension and contrast.

In this way, we can associate music with emotion. Although Cooke rejects congnitive (linguistic) associations with music, it is clear that music by association with language connotation can also express cognition. This view gives meaning to Leahy's (1976: 153) view that music evokes emotion, but does not express it. In any piece of art or music, we need only specify the cognitive and emotive associations we make with the work to see what the art means. Art expresses y, means. We associate art with y. We do not express or press out ideas into words as we might pour water into a glass. If meaning were the expression of the ideas of a person, it is not clear what would be meant by the expression, the meaning of painting. It is to personify. We say, Language has meaning, but objects, including art objects, are not languages and so would not have meaning. However, on the new paradigm, music has meaning in the sense that any object is rich in associations. Understanding art involves becoming aware of these associations. The formalist view that the meaning is only in the object, and the expressionist view that the meaning is only in the subject, is resolved. It is an either-or fallacy. Music has internal associations with other sounds and it also has external associations with every other known object including human language and emotion. Young (1991: 235) says, I hold that the character of a key is due to its suitability for the writing of music

which resembles aspects of human expressiveness. Both the formalist and the expressionist are correct. In music, we find tension, expectation, counterpoint, contrast, rage, and gentleness. We find the same in spring and winter and the weather, but in a different way. Each subject matter, as each art, has its own unique associatons. Each language, each artist, each perceiver is in this sense unique. Human emotion can never be the same as musical emotion or architectural emotion. Each of the arts renders emotion in its own way to create metaphorical insight into emotion itself.

We may now ask, What does this painting tell us about the painter, the society, the culture, morality, our humanity? Art can tell us about all of these. In everyday life, we read off endless things from observing a person's face. We can say, This musical performance has no heart. What music and art can say and express is no longer a mystery. But there is more to association than we are aware of, something akin to subliminal perception.

Ivan Fónagy (1963) has shown by behavioral research that people regard front vowels as light, and back vowels as dark. The r-sound is more wild, rough, swirling, less smooth, more masculine, than the l-sound. M and l are sweeter than t or k. R is more read than k. The associations reach beyond each sense to other senses (synaesthesia) (cf., tone-poems). It is shown that books on phonetics and linguistics and books for singers are rich in metaphors. Every sound has its own color, pitch is high or low. The voice is neutral, white, hard, trailing, broken, or wet. Vowels are light, dark, sharp, thin, wide, feminine, masculine, hard, strong, fine, high, deep. Poetry is usually only understood because of such subtle or secondary associations or connotations. A language requires general agreement of associations. There is a dictionary and relatively fixed vocabulary. We can look up a word. Nonlinguistic objects also have associations and connotations, but these are not so fixed or agreed upon. We do not have a connotation dictionary. We cannot look up poetic meanings because the meanings deviate from the usual communicative associations. The connotations of trees and sky do not form a language. The gloss for stone will not be found to be security or masculinity.

list

on,

In

ich

ich

an

ral

ate

he

an

igs

cal

ess

are

hat

he ne,

an

ses ics

al,

rp,

ep.

ary

ent

ry.

ons do

tic

ıal

ky

be

Fónagy is a Freudian, but that theory is found unacceptable in view of such books as MacIntyre (1958), and more recent work in philosophical psychology. Instead, we may explain such concepts as the unconscious by suggesting that what we mean by them is the subtle associations and connotations we make, which we are aware of only by experiment, or when they are pointed out to us. We need not ask, Where are the associations when we are not thinking of them? The unconscious mind is not an invisible, mystical entity behind the scenes, but rather it may be regarded as nonmentalistic associations we do make. It is in this respect that, Art is an expression of the unconscious, may be clarified.

As a test to show that we make associations of which we are not aware, two figures may be presented, one of the bean shaped object, the other of a star shaped object. The viewer is asked to associate two nonsense words, krick and boang with each object. The results in nearly every case tested, revealed that nearly one hundred percent of the students labeled the bean-shaped object, boang. We need not ask why. What is significant is that its association is almost universal. We could similarly determine the associations one makes with various kinds of lines: straight = rational, curved = emotional, ascending = optimistic, wavy = active, etc. Each color has similar associations.

The more we can learn about the associations we make we can understand about how we think and what art can teach us. Art can give us knowledge in the sense that by our becoming more aware of our sensual associations, the subtle connotations hidden in words and objects, we become more aware of our thinking generally. We become less captivated by implicit suggestions. Therapy and dream analysis involve just such concerns. In therapy and argument we need all the associations available in order to understand and see what is and what is not relevant to problem solving.

Some things are central. If we know a person's root metaphors, their basic permeating belief systems (religion, political beliefs, etc.) we know a lot about their associations. We want to know the self-talk and perceptions of the artist and appreciator of art. We cannot know all of this, yet such knowledge is crucial for understanding human

behavior and art.

One paradigm of association is preference and normality, ask for association is to ask for usual, or primary, as opposed remote, or farfetched associations. That is, we can ask, What do not closely associate with x? Another is to ask for rules or law of association. MacGill (1838) gave four laws of association ask basis of the figures of speech, thus making a connection with metaphor which is a fundamental basis of the arts. Association by cause and effect (metonymy), b) by contguity (synecdoche), resemblance (metaphor, analogy and simile), d) by contrain (irony and anithesis).

We may examine associations by means of paradigms. It ask for all the associations possible would be a misconcein demand for evidence, New paradigms can always be constructed. Art itself contributes to the possibilities and evaluations of meassociations.

By association we may sometimes mean evaluation Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1967) used this in their Semant differential measure of meaning. One may scale any term! follows: good 1)-2)-3)-4)-5)- bad. For example, one may associate jazz with #1, or very good. The scale need not be constructed in ter of polar opposites as they have done. It would also have to include terms which are most relevant to the topic of concern. But one m also use the scale to ask regarding: intentional - accidental, clear ambiguous, positive emotion - negative emotion, insight - lack insight, harmonious - chaotic, unified-disorderly, common-farfetche sincere - insincere, practical - impractical, rational - irrational, mo - immoral, etc. One may be asked also to simply describe the object as one experiences it. Kahans & Calford (1982) used semantic differential to show that music may produce a positi change of attitude of the patient towards the therapist. Music thera association constitutes a laboratory or microcosm for the client's and problems; and rational lyrics have been used to induce clients be more adjustive (Bryant 1987).

Music has connotations which create tone-poems. The emission the musical, Cabaret, supposedly connotes and symbolic

BLES

lity. 7

HOSed |

t doy

or la

n ast

on wi

tion:

itrarie

ms. 7

nceive structe

of ne

uatio!

emant

term !

SSOCIE

in tem

inclu

one m

I, clear

- lack

fetche

al, mor

e the s

used t

positi

thera

ent's li

clients

e ema

nboliz

decadence. He is gaunt. His knees jangle in his sharp movements as if he were a skeleton. His face is painted white, giving a surreal and unusual grotesque appearance, as well as suggesting death personified. He takes on the role of a female dancer only to reveal his male identity at the end of the dance. He paints his lips in a bizarre manner perhaps mockingly suggesting the lips of women, yet unlike lipstick any women or even any clown would wear. His voice is shrill and mocks as he introduces and welcomes people to the life and tragedy of the decadent Cabaret.

This seems to be what we want in an explanation of meaning. We seek a) perceptual, b) cognitive, and c) emotive associations. We translate our perceptions into a story. We wish to learn the various ways in which we may understand the art object - or anything at all. As a consequence of the above theory, some additional questions final answers:

- a) Art does not have to be intended to have emotive and cognitive meaning.
- b) Nature and any object whatever can have such meaning as well.
- c) Asethetic meaning depends on value and emotive associations.
- d) All if the emotions may be associated with any object, for ex., suggestions of a sunset may be: hope, death; of clouds: freedom or fear of rain.
- e) Associations which do not conform to reality or consistency, result in fallacies such as: Personification, pathetic fallacy, anthropomorphism, and empathy (understood as identity with the object). Schizophrenic thinking is a breakdown of the self.
- f) The more we know about association (and metaphor), the better we can understand and express cognition and emotion in art.
- g) Art is like a puzzle requiring solution, putting clues together.
- h) Does art give knowledge? Yes, in the sense of new associations.

 If it is nonverbal art, it may be limited or largely perceptual pleasure, such as the taste of ice-cream.
- i) Can music make us moral? This has been a controversial question at least since Plato's attempt to connect music and morality. On the association theory, music can suggest and encourage the disirable and undesirable through its associations

of the presence or lack of: balance, harmony, gentleness, order, etc. Gentle intonation gives a different message than harsh, belligerent tones of voice or music. By association art and music can, within their limitations, express an ethos. For example, music can have and mirror (imitate) gentleness or it can bring about calmness. It can restructure our thinking.

One theory of expression is generated by a pun, by taking emotion literally: Meidner's (1985) article is entitled, "Motion and E-Motion in Music." The thesis is that because emotion is a kind of motion, it is associated somehow with motion in music or the other arts. Kivy (1980:35), for example, presents Webb's view that music is movement, and emotion is movement, thus the movement of music causes movement (e-motion) in us (cf., Budd 1987). The gait and bearing of a person is associated with the movement of music. Budd (1983) presents the view that words which describe music, such as excited, and calm, also describe bodily movement. Movement is also a musical term and generates the idea that the movement (musical) is moving (in the sense of emotional).

The classical formalist position is that of Hanslick (1982:74) who holds that music is tonally moving*forms (tonend bewegte Formen). For him, only the motion of music is like the motion of emotion (p. 53). By reducing music to motion, it supposedly makes it more objective, places it within music itself rather than in the subject. It is an attempt to reduce congnitive emotion to bodily feeling. The German word, Regung, refers to both emotion as well as to movement (quick tempo, rapid scales, falling intervals, vibrating bass, etc.) of music which causes emotion. Movement is heard in music. (Davies 1983: 232)

It is controversial as to whether or not the movement is in the music (formalist view), or in us (expressionist view). Hanslick (1982) says the beauty is in the music, the expressionist says it is in us. Scruton (1983:94) says the movement is not literally in the music at all, but in us. The attempt to reduce e-motion to motion is a semantic attempt to resolve the controversy. However, on the congnitive theory of emotion, emotion is not movement (Shibles 1974). It is cognition which causes bodily feelings. The bodily

der,

rsh

and For

or it

cing

and

dof

the

that

The

t of

ribe

ent.

the

74)

egte

n of

the

dily

well ting

d in

the

lick

is in

usic

is a

the

bles

dily

.

feelings are themselves often disturbances, or deviations (movements) from our usual emotional state. But emotion itself is not mere movement, nor is it based solely on the perception of movement.

Rather, it is the case that we may associate motion in music with human bodily movement. A slow movement may be assessed with slow gait, a quick tempo with running, or even joy. We may relate musical movement to each emotion in this way without controversy. Along these lines, Callen (1982: 386) asserts that music can fictionally express our emotive life because of the dynamism and other qualities in the music.

Is art (painting, music etc.) a language? This depends upon what is meant by language. It is typical that when art is regarded aslanguage, no definition or meaning is given. Our common language is everyday language. There are also the various languages of each discipline. Each universe of discourse such as physics, music, painting etc. has its own terminology, techniques and methods. But all are based on or presuppose ordinary language. Even mathematics is based on ordinary language. We do not speak mathematics or geometry. Without ordinary language they would be unintelligible, and furthermore, without language we do not know what any thinking would be like. The various arts are also based on ordinary language. The painter speaks about blue, lines, texture, etc.and reads, talks, or teaches about art. The arts are not nonverbal disciplines, not pure sensuous involvement as is so often claimed.

Attempts have been made to reduce one discipline to another, to reduce, for example, music to mathematics or physics, to reduce experience to physiology, to reduce quality to quantity, to reduce anything to whatever it is not. Transformational grammarians are notorious for having attempted to reduce ordinary language to structure and formal syntax. The result has been the failure to account for the way in which ordinary language works. Poetry, metaphor, emotion have not been able to be accounted for by such methods. Linguists are increasingly going beyond mere syntax and structure to concern themselves with pragmatics, semantics and ordinary language (cf., Kövecses 1990, Lakoff & Johnson 1980.)

Attempts have also been made to reduce ordinary language in symbolic logic, a quantitative system based on the mathematical model. Philosophers and numerous philosophical journals presuppose that symbolic logic is an acceptable problem-solving tool. They are as it were, captivated by a model or paradigm. The attempt was most recently made by Wittgenstein (1961) himself in the Tractatus, to reduce language to symbolic logic, a calculus of sentences. But his Philosophical Investigations (1968), perhaps the most significant and influential philosophical work of the Twentieth Century, argues that the attempt must fail due to a faulty view of meaning and language. On this basis, he returns us to a more full and adequate analysis of ordinary language, thereby establishing the well-known ordinary - language philosophy which caused a permanent change in the way in which philosophy is done. He wrote, It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard of ways. (#133, p.51) John Dewey (1964) and F. Schiller (1912, 1930, 1932) had long ago attacked symbolic logic and formal logic as being philosophically unsound, and unacceptable as methods of solving practical problems as well. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche (1954: 481) had long ago entered the debate: In logic reality is not encountered at all, not even as a problem. Langacker (1988:13) states, I opt for a congnitively and linguistically realistic conception of language over one that achieves formal neatness al the expense of drastically distoring and impoverishing its subject matter. F. Waismann (1968: 22-23) wrote, I am not letting out a secret when I say that the ordinary rules of logic often break down in natural speech - a fact usually hushed up by logic books! logicians had their way, language would become as clear and transparent as glass, but also as brittle as glass: and what would be the good of making an axe of glass that breaks the moment you use it?

Because symbolic logic is so entrenched, as Freudianism had been until recently, a few recent statements may be added to the controversy at least for the purpose of showing that it is a controversial method of analysis. Seale Doss (1985: 129) calls for an outright acknowledgment that the theory of formal logic is quite simply and quite fundamentally wrong.

Robert Fogelin (1985: 1) speaks of the need to learn to present and understand

S

ge to

tical Pose

are.

most

s, to

it his

icant

gues

and

luate lown

gein

im to

ds in

niller

rma

hods

dols.

logic

acker listic

ess at

bject

out a

down

..... lj

- and

ould

t you

n had

to the

is a

Is for

gic is

1985

stand

arguments and that Formal logic ... has not fulfilled this function. (cf., Shibles 1985:185 - 210).

Among aestheticians, Croce (1917: 147) said, As the science of thought, logistic is a laughable thing. Collingwood (1938) attacks logic for, among other things, omitting intonation and thereby omitting much of the meaning which argument and understanding depend. He argued that the logician is an alienist. Logic erroneously excludes emotion as well. The 'proposition' understood as a form of words expressing thought and not emotion, as constitution and unit of scientific discourse, is a fictitious entity. (p. 266)

It is not mathematics nor formal logic, but informal logic, rhetoric, metaphor and the analysis of ordinary language which we mean by language. This is a language all theories, including skepticism, must ultimately use and return to. This is what is meant here by language in its full-blooded sense. It is language that is adequate to the task of understanding poetry, literature, music, and the other arts. It includes syntax and formal structure, but does not exclude semantics and pragmatics. Thus a reduction of art to a formal language is bound to fail.

It was argued that language has meaning by means of associations. Expression and meaning encompass a word-field of realated terms: For express in, x expresses y, we may substitute: causes, correlates, effects, imitates, characterizes, releases (e.g. emotion), explains, clarifies, communicates, symbolizes and renders metaphorically. These may be seen as different kinds of associations. Art is language in the sense that it can perform each of these tasks. For the above reasons, we may reject Scruton's (1981: 327) statement, "Expression" must not be confused with 'association.'

The language of the arts performs many of these tasks, but in one fundamental sense they are not languages. Language is a set of traditional and agreed upon associations of words (marks and sounds). There are restrictive rules of grammar and fixed dictionary definitions. The arts typically have neither fixed rules nor dictionary definitions. A music dictonary is language about music, not musical language. In this sense, one may also speak of the language of clouds.

Musical notes are not linguistic vocabulary. They are only a vocabulary of music. Tones in music do not, in general, have the purpose to refer to objects by means of agreed upon associations. Music... is... an abstract art, with no power to represent the world. (Scruton 1983: 62). This is only partially true. Tones may only suggest objects, as in a tone - poem. They cannot, but do not clearly denote. Program music gives the listener suggestive instructions as to what to listen for. Examples are found in the symphonic poems of Liszt, Beethoven's Pastoral Symphony, Strauss's Don Juan and Don Quixote, or Debussy's La mer. The title of a painting may give similar clues. It is to preserve the uniqueness of a painting to merely number it, or to name a jazz piece, Sky Train. or Chasing the Bird.

Any object may connote, but to be a language it must have agreed upon denotation. Nor are tastes language, though there may be a language of taste. One major difference between art and spoken language is that between perception and conception (language-use). A taste is not a word though what taste would be for us if we had never learned a language is speculative. A melody is not a sentence, though we speak of a musical phrase. A symphony is not a speech.

While recognizing that art is not a language, it may nevertheless have some of the functions of language and expression. The concept of association reveals what these functions are. We can paraphrase in language the associations a specific line, melody, or combination or colors have for us. Kivy (1980:77) calls traditional associations conventional associations, and contour refers to the congruence of musical 'contour' with human emotion. For example, rapid tempo, major key, etc. refer to happiness. The classical and romantic periods each developed characteristic symbols, meanings. Individual artists, e.g., Chagall, may develop symbolisms of their own making. Compared to the richness of language the nonverbal arts cannot expect to develop more than illustrative or primitive language. They cannot alone produce argument or conceptual clarification. They stand closer to sensual experience and enjoyment, or cryptic or unasserted thought symbolism, than to intellectual understanding. For those who give epistemological primacy to language, what non-sensual insight is given, is given because perception (seeing-as) and the subject matter are verbalized. Words are set to music, painting is described. And as Scruton (1983:93) points out, a chord may be given different and even conflicting descriptions.

Art in fact destroys our language and our usual associations, and in so doing, shows both the limits, and possibilities of our language. It is a strange-making, and astonishing, and so restructures our lives. Here association becomes rhetoric where rhetoric is metaphor, using such techniques as oxymoron, reversal, juxtaposition, substitution - and deviations from the traditional, normal, expected, practical, desirable, etc. We discover new ways of seeing, hearing and moving (cf., "Metaphor as association." Shibles 1971a: 373, 1971b).

Leonard Bernstein (1976: 181) holds a formalist view of expression according to which music has only musical meaning. We may first hear sounds in everyday life, but then learn to dissociate them in order to create abstract music: Meaning is not in terms of jonquils and daisies, but of notes and rhythms. He illustrates by means of Beethoven's Symphony Number 6 in F which clearly is meant to have nonmusical meanings. The first movement even has the subtitle, The Awakening of Cheerful Feeling on Arriving in the Country. There are even onomatopoeic references such as bird calls and pipes of shepherds. But Bernstein points out that we can also listen to this without the extramusical imagery and references, and that it still makes good sense musically. We may then hear music alternately as related to everyday sounds, as dissociated from them, and as abstract musical metaphor. A standsrd photograph is to abstract art as the sound of a brook is to music.

Putman (1987: 57) asks, Why is there sad and joyous music, but no 'shameful' or 'embarrassing' music? We see that there can be shameful and embarrassing music by means of associations. Embarrassment means awkward, stumbling; shame meams guilt and disgrace, and certainly music can render these. It is the special skill of the artist to do so. Heroism as well as cowardice and retreat have been artistically portrayed.

y a the ons.

only arly as as as of and

give rely lird.

here and tion e for ly is

ony

The can y, or ional the

nple,

and ings. their erbal utive

ptual nent, ctual

ause

A significant paradigm of association is intonation. By means of intonation, we may express anger, love, irritation, impatience, deceit and an unlimited number of cognitions and emotions. It is like a second language. It is a folk truism that how something is said can be more important than what is said. It may possess more credibility. It is always surprising to see how captivated we are by the myth that a sentence does, or even can, mean only one thing. Each sentence can mean an unlimited number of things. Collingwood (1938: 264ff). stresses this importance of one's tone of voice. Without it one cannot speak of understanding an argument or discourse. Intonation in everyday language may be more aesthetic than a symphony. Any language can be spoken beautifully. Language can be a symphony.

Speakers are able to detect the meanings of thousands of intonations. These sounds take on the status of a language. There is, given careful attention, much agreement about their meanings. The loudness, tempo, etc. tell us things like, I do not approve, You irritate me, I am depressed, You are charging too much, etc. Our ears are attuned to this.

It is not then surprising to find that many base the expressivity of music on the expressivity of the intonation of language. Sparshott (1980: 126) held that music imitates the voice. He calls this phenomenon, musica humana (p. 123). Hoaglund (1980: 347) wrote, The expressive power of some instrumental music may derive from its appropriating and reproducing such features of a spoken natural language as phrasing, cadences, intonation pattem. Music is even personified and heard as an utterance, according to Kivy (1980: 28 ff., 57, 77). Baroque music conforms to the accents of the human voice (Palisca 1980: 173). Budd (1985: 175), on the other hand, holds that expression in music cannot be based on expression in the human voice. Langer holds a similar view (Hoaglund 1980: 345). One of the reasons one may propose for this diversity of views is that little research has been done on meaning and emotion in speech intonation. Couper-Kuhlen (1986: 180) wrote, Virtually all past studies of intonation and attitude have been unsatisfactory. And Rischel (1990: 400) stated, Prosodic categories are ill-defined in phonetics. Price (1988:215) and Levinson (1982 :335) take the narrow formalist position that it is only the object, the tones which produce meaning, nothing extramusical or subjective. It is difficult to understand how any object can have meaning in itself without humans to give it meaning.

Wittgenstein (1968) gave epistemological primacy to language. Among others holding a similar view are: Barthes, Derrida, Dewey, Chomsky, Hartnack, Heidegger, Muller, Peirce, Ryle, Sapir, Shibles, Waismann, Whorf, and Winch. This means that the scientific method is not based on observation (naive empiricism), but on language. The concept of 'seeing as' shows that sensation is always conceptualized, that we never have pure sensation. Cognition or language-use is bound up with all perception. Perception comes classified and evaluated.

Similarly, Collingwood (1938: 249) holds that expression is language; there is an identification of art with language. If there is no language, there is no expression. Without it there are just crude feelings. Language is needed to reach the level of emotion, to correct the impressions into ideas by means of language. The English tongue will only express 'English emotions.' (p. 245) Emotion as expressed in German, for example, is different semantically and lexically, but also syntactically. In German, like French, emotions primarily make use of reflexives, for example, I am angry, becomes, I anger myself (Ich argere mich.) (Cf. Shibles 1990 ab).

Art is by its very nature cognitive. The music we hear which seems like pure sensation would not be music without language. Kivy (1980) says that dogs cannot hear sounds as music. This is the reason why. If language has epistemological primacy, we cannot get outside of language. We cannot base it on seeing or hearing. We are caught in a linguo - centric predicament, We can only use the language-games of explanation, description, etc., but none will get us outside of language (Shibles 1972: 82 - 102). I cannot with language get outside of language. (Ich Kann mit der Sprache nicht aus der Sprache heraus.) [My translation. Wittgenstein, 1964: 54] There are no real explanations of language. To explain is to play one among many language-games. To find out what language is we can only look and see. But what it is will be determined by the language we see it as.

23

ence, It is

ng is more

re by Each wood

oice.

nt or

hetic

uage

ds of ere is, The

You

sivity shott this 347)

may of a stem.

ng to cents

n the
d on
view
r this

g and rote, been

ories 1982 This may be applied to art. Inasmuch as art presupposes language, language is a given and cannot be transcended. Music, for example, as a universe of discourse has epistemological primacy in its seeings as and metaphors, and we cannot transcend or get outside of it. I can with music not get outside of music. I can play the language-game of explaining it or relating it to mathematics or the language of cognition and emotion, but that does not provide the true, essential or absolute explanation. It does not explain away the language-game of music. Language is bound up with perception and perception is bound up with language. Alone each is an artificial construct. Music is linguistic and language is musical.

Philosophy University of Wisconsin, Whitewater, Wisconsin, 53190 U. S. A. WARREN A. SHIBLES

REFERENCES

Behrend, Ann. "Expression and Emotion in Music." Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1988.

Bryant, David. "A Cognitive Approach to Therapy Through Music." *Journal of Music Therapy* 24, no. 1 (1987): 27-34.

Budd, Malcolm. "Motion and Emotion in Music: How Music Sounds." BJA 23, No. 3 (1983): 209 - 221.

Budd, Malcolm. Music and the Emotions. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. Budd, Malcolm. "Motion and Emotion in Music: A Reply." BJA 27, No.1 (1987): 51 - 54.

Callen, Donald. "The Sentiment in Musical Sensibility." JAAC 40, No.4 (1982):381 - 392.

Collingwood, R. G. The Principles of Art. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938. (See esp. 109-119, 308-318, 323-324).

Cooke, Deryck. The Language of Music. London: Oxford University Press, 1959. Couper - Kuhlen, Elizabeth. An Introduction to English Prosody. London: Edward Arnold, 1986.

Croce, Benedetto. Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept. D. Ainslie, tr. London Macmillan. 1917.

Davies, Stephen. "Is Music a Language of the Emotions?" BJA 23, No.2 (1983): 222 - 233.

oses

, for

y in side

the

the

rue, the

and

Cial

LES

f

of

, No.

985.

87):

:381

esp.

959.

ward

don:

: 222

Dewey, John. Experience and Nature. 2nd. ed. Orig. 1929. Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1965.

Dewey, John. Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Orig. 1938. NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964.

Doss, Seale. "Three Steps Toward a Theory of Formal Logic." *Informal Logic* 7, No. 33 (1985): 127-135.

Fogelin, Robert. "The Logic of Deep Disagreements. "Informal Logic 7, No. 1 (1985): 1-8.

Fonagy, Ivan. Die Metaphern in der Phonetic. The Hague: Mouton, 1963.

Gombrich, Ernst. Art and Illusion. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Hanslick, Eduard. Vom Musikalisch-Schonen: Aufsatza Musikkritiken. Rev. edition. Leipzig: Reclam, 1982.

Hartley, David. Observations of Man. Orig. 1749. Gainesville, FL: Scholars Facsimiles & Reprints, 1966.

Hoaglund, John. "Music as Expressive." BJA 20, No. 4 (1980):340-348.

Kahans, Daniel, and M. Calford. "The Influence of Music on Psychiatric Patients' Immediate Attitude Change Toward Therapists." *Journal of Music Theoraphy* 19, No. 3 (1982): 179 - 187.

Kivy, Peter. The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Kövecses, Zoltan. Emotion Concepts. " NY: Springer, 1990.

Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson. Metaphors We Live By. University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Langacker, Ronald. 1988. "An Overview of Cognitive Grammar." In B. Rudzka-Ostyn, ed. Topics in Cognitive Linguistics. Philadelpha, PA: John Benjamins.

Leahy, M.P. "The Vacuity of Musical Expressionism." *British Journal of Asesthertics* 16, No. 1 (1976): 144 - 156.

Levinson, Jerrold. "Music and Negative Emotion." *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (1982): 327 - 346.

Lyons, John. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

MacGill, Stevenson. Lectures on Rhetoric and Criticism. Edinburgh, 1838.

MacIntyre, A. The Unconscious. NY: Humanities, 1958.

Meidner, Olga. "Motion and E-Motion in Music." BJA 25, No. 4 (1985): 349-356.

Nietzsche, F. The Portable Nietzsche. W. Kaufmann, ed. NY: Viking, 1954.

Osgood, C., G. Suci, G. Tannenbaum. The Measurement of Meaning. Orig. 1957. University of Illinois Press, 1967.

Palisca, Claude. "Baroque." New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. S. Sadie, ed. Vol.2,pp.172-198. NY: Macmillan 1980.

Price, Kingsley. "Does Music Have Meaning?" BJA 28, No. 3 (1988): 203-215.

Putman, Daniel. "Why Instrumental Music Has No Shame." BJP 27, No. 1 (1987): 55-61.

Quine, W. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1964.

Rischel, Jorgen. What is Phonetic Representation? Journal of Phonetics 18 (1990): 395-410.

Schiller, F. Logic for Use. NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1930.

Schiller, F. Formal Logic. NY: MacMillan, 1912.

Schiller, F. "The Value of Formal Logic." Mind 41 (1932): 53-71.

Scruton, Roger. The Aesthetic Understanding. London: Methuen, 1983.

Scruton, Roger. "The Nature of Musical Expression." New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. S. Sadie, ed. 20 vols. Vol. 6. NY: MacMillan, 1980.

Shibles, Warren. Emotion: The Method of Philosophical Therapy. Whitewater, WI: The Language Press, 1974.

Shibles, Warren. Lying: A Critical Analysis. Whitewater, WI: The Language Press, 1985.

Shibles, Warren. An Analysis of Metaphor. The Hague: Mouton, 1971 b.

Shibles, Warren. Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History. Whitewater, WI: Language Press, 1971 a.

Shibles, Warren. Philosophical Pictures. Orig. 1969. Dubuque, Iowa: William C. Brown, 1972. [Philosophische Bilder: Wege zu Radikalem Denken. (Bouvier disputanda). Susanne Mackiewicz, trans. Bonn: Bouvier, 1973]

Shibles, Warren. "German Emotive Reflexives." Papiere zur Linguistic 43, No. 2 (1990 a): 159-165.

Shibles, Warren. "An Analysis of German Emotive Reflexives." Grazer Linguistische Studien 33/34 (1990 b): 297-311.

Shibles, Warren. "Meaning as Patterns of Marks." University of South Florida Language Quarterly 8 (1970): 20-24.

Shibles, Warren. Wittgenstein, Language and Philosophy. rev., Orig. 1969. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall-Hunt, 1974 a. [Wittgenstein, Sprache and Philosophie. (Bouvier disputanda) Susanne Mackiewicz, trans. Bonn: Bouvier, 1973]

Sparshott, F. "Aesthetics of Music." New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians. S. Sadie, ed. 20 vols. Vol. 1, pp. 120-134. NY: MacMillan, 1980.

Waismann, F. 1968. How I See Philosophy. R. Harre, ed. London: MacMillan.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed. Orig. ed. 1953. NY: MacMillan, 1968.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus. D. Pears & B. McGuinness, tr. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophische Bermerkungen. Oxford: Blackwell, 1964.

Young, James. "Key, Temperament and Musical Expression." JAAC 49, no. 3 (1991): 235-242.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2 April, 1995

PAUL RICOEUR'S HERMENEUTICAL THEORY OF DISCOURSE

In this paper, I propose to discuss Ricoeur's theory of discourse which fits into his philosophical search and shapes his theory of language. First, I will examine his confrontation with structuralism and how structuralists exclude some important aspects of language and also how they are transcended in Ricoeur's theory of discourse. Secondly, I will also examine how he develops this theory of discourse on the basis of: (a) the relation between discourse and reference, (b) symbol and its interpretation, and (c) hermeneutics of distanciation. This examination will prove that he has produced one of the finest theories of discourse in which all the aspects of language are taken into account.

1:

T,

s.

I

In Ricoeur's theory of discourse, we find a stronger influence of structuralism. His confrontation with structuralism on number of points, but at the same time, not rejecting the role of structural analysis in different modes of signification proves that he was aware of the need for structural analysis in the understanding of discourse. He undertakes the study of the structuralists like Roland Barthes, Levi-Strauss, Althusser and also analyses how structuralism proceeds by applying a linguistic model to Saussure, Trubetskay, Jakobson and others. The structuralists, according to Ricoeur, starts with some operational and foundational presuppositions. First, in structuralism, language is an object for an empirical science. This notion that language can be investigated scientifically was introduced by Saussure in his distinction between language (langue) and speech (parole). It is the distinction between "what is social from what is individual" and "What is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental." For Saussure, language is homogenous whereas speech is heterogeneous.² Secondly, in structuralism, there is always a distinction between a science of states of the system or synchronic linguistics and a science of changes or diachronic linguistics. This distinction according to Saussure, is absolute and allows no compromise. Only synchrony allows us to grasp the nature of language, whereas diachrony operates on the level of the event, of the modifications of language brought about through speaking. Thirdly, in a state of system, there are no absolute terms, but only relations of mutual dependence according to structuralism. "In language, the identity of linguistic units depend on the difference or opposites that separate them from one another" says Saussure.3 Finally, in structuralism, the collection of signs must be maintained as a closed system in order to submit it to analysis.4 Signs as closed and autonomous system of internal dependence, have no relation to the external. presuppositions of the structuralists imply that a language is a system of signs and a sign must be defined not in terms of some object for which it stands, but rather in terms of its relation to all other signs of the same level with the system of which it is a part.

Ricoeur points out that the above approach of the structuralists have limitations and excludes number of aspects. For example, the act of speaking is excluded not only as an individual performance, but as the free creation of new expressions. Similarly, history is also excluded and "not simply the change from one state of system to another but the production of culture and of man in the production of his language." The primary intention of language, which is to say something about something, is also excluded in structuralism. Both speaker and hearer must understand the intention immediately. Language has a double direction: an ideal direction (to say something) and a real reference (to say about something).

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that for the structuralists signs are the basic unit of a language. Against this, Ricoeur emphasises the need to think language as discourse where sentences are the basic unit. For him a sentence is a new reality. Though it is made up of words, it is not a derivative function of the words. A sentence is made up of signs, but it is not itself a sign. In short, language as discourse creates the possibility of a genuine semantics of the sentence as distinct from a semiotics of the sign.

of of

to

ny

ny

ge

ere

ce.

tic

om

on

nit

nal

se

a

me

all rt.5

sts

the

ce,

lso to

on

to

m.

ly.

ay

the

us,

ere

ty.

the

In ine

gn.

II

In The Rule of Metaphor, (1975), Ricoeur develops a theory of discourse. Though the seed for it was already contained in some of his articles like "Structure, Word, Event", (1967). "What is a Text" (1970), "Metaphor and the main problem of Hermeneutics" (1972), it took a definite shape in The Rule of Methphor. For a theory of discourse, the sentence is important rather than words because discourse is a manifestation of language in textual form. It is only at the level of the sentence that language can refer to something. The sentence is no longer the unit of a language (or system), but of speech or discourse.9 Ricoeur's theory of discourse rests upon: (a) the relation between discourse and reference, (b) symbol and its interpretation and (c) the hermeneutics of distanciation. Discourse always occurs as an event and at the same time can be understood as meaning.10 Because of this aspect (i.e., the event being meaningful), one can talk about it, learn from it, evaluate it and also interpret it. Discourse allows all these. Language exists only when a speaker takes it in his possession and actualises it whereas, as the event of discourse, it can be identified and reidentified as "the same." There is meaning because there is a sameness of meaning.11

The referential relation is the characteristic of discourse. Discourse has both identifying as well as predicative function.¹² For Ricoeur, correctness and error belong to discourse alone. He quotes Plato's Cratylus, Theaetetus and Sophist, to show how the "interlacing" of the noun and the verb is important and also how at the level of the word "there is no solution."13 In the Sophist, for example, Plato maintains that there are two kinds of words that are expressions of reality, i.e. nouns and verbs; the latter expressing the action and inaction and the former, the agent or what is and what is not so - and - so. A statement cannot consist of nouns alone or verbs alone; the very simplest must have one of each. And also, every statement must be "of someone or something."14 Discourse as a structured act has both locutionary as well as illocutionary aspects.15 Discourse is realised as a statement and at the same time as a doing. By showing Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary aspects, Ricoeur argues that in the act of saying, we bring both the predicative and identifying function together.

The distinction between sense and reference is a necessary and pervasive characteristic of discourse.16 Discourse has sense as This distinction says Ricoeur, marks the well as reference. fundamental difference between semantics and semiotics.17 He fully utilises the distinction between the sense and reference made by Frege to explain the opposition between the semantics and semiotics and further argues that the semantics of discourse is irreducible to semiotics of lexical entities. By showing the limitations of semiotics, Ricoeur argues that it is aware only of intra-linguistic relationships whereas semantics takes up the relationship between the sign and the things denoted, i.e., the relationship between the language and world. 18 Ricoeur's claim that reference is linked up with the notion of the intended by discourse has certain advantages. For example, the intended goes outside the language. It points to an extra-linguistic reality which is its referent. In the words of Ricoeur:

What is intended by discourse, the correlate of the entire sentence is irreducible to what semiotics calls the signified which is nothing but the counterpart of the signifier of a sign within language code. ¹⁹

For Ricoeur, hermeneutics is the "art of deciphering indirect meaning." It is committed to the primacy of the symbol. Through symbol, myth, text and narrative, he deals with the interpretation of the multiple "mediation" of meaning. Starting from The Symbolism of Evil (1960), to the Time and Narrative (1984), one can see the role of symbols as cultural-religious phenomena, standing for the expression of multiple meaning. It is the symbols which invite thought, says Ricoeur. The most general delineation of the symbol is that it is a sign. A symbol is a sign but not vice-versa. Ricoeur makes it clear that what makes a sign as a symbol is the "double meaning or the double intentionality." While every sign aims at something beyond itself, it is only in symbols that the first literal, patent meaning analogically intends a second meaning which is not given otherwise than in the first.²⁰ Intentionality is very much

Ty

as he He

de

nd

is

ns

tic en

he

up

es.

an

of

ct

gh

of

m he

he

te

ol

ш

le

at

al,

ot

ch

essential to explain his theory of interpretation. The literal or first intentionality serves as the basis for second and the relation between the first and the second cannot be neglected. The symbolic meaning is constituted in and through the literal meaning and there is always a movement from the first to the second. Ricoeur writes:

I define "symbol" as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first.²¹

The symbol opens onto a domain of experience that transcends the boundaries of language. "It testifies to the primordial rootedness of Discourse in Life," says Ricoeur.²² For him, interpretation belonging to the symbol and it is because symbol allows interpretation. This means that interpretation of the double sense of the symbol is very much there in the nature of the symbol. A symbol requires an interpretation because it is based on a specific semantic structure, i.e., structure of double meaning expressions. Ricoeur says:

The field of symbolic expressions and the field of the operations of interpretation have in fact been defined in terms of each other. The problems posed by the symbol are consequently reflected in the methodology of interpretation each interpretation "translates" the symbol according to its own frame of reference. ²³

Ricoeur undertakes the study of common structure of symbols and its double meaning in his book on Freud. In the Freud and Philosophy: An Essay of Interpretation (1965), he explains how the double intentionality manifests itself in three domains: The three domains wherein the symbols emerge are: (1) the cosmic, (2) the oneiric and (3) the poetic. These three domains are closely connected in a unified symbolic structure. The first manifestation is the phenomenology of religion such as van der Leeuw, Leenhardt and Mircea Eliade. The symbols that are spoken here are heaven, earth,

128

water, life etc., which explain man's relation to the sacred.

The second manifestation of the symbol is that the oneiric, i.e., the dreams of our days and of nights. The dream symbolism revealed by psychoanalysis is interpreted with its double sense. The hidden sense is made explicit after being awakened. The third manifestation of the symbol is that of the poetic imagination. This is best understood by way of a "detour" through cosmic and oneiric symbols. It refers to a word-image instead of a representation-image. Here, language does not have hieratic stability under the protection of rites and myths," but "it puts language in a state of emergence." In all the three zones of emergence, the double meaning is the common structure because of the symbols. For Ricoeur all these symbolism find their expression in the element of language.

There is no symbolism before man speaks, even if the power of the symbol is grounded much deeper. It is in language that the cosmos, desire, and the imaginary reach expression; speech is always necessary if the world is to be recovered and made hierophany.²⁵

Discourse as event is a necessary movement from language to discourse. For Ricoeur, there should be a movement from linguistics of language to discourse. It has been already shown that for him, discourse as event is realized temporally and is in the present, i.e., it is not outside of time. It is self-referential also. All messages are exchanged only in discourse. There is always another person, a hearer to whom it is addressed. Speaking and writing are the legitimate modes of the realization of this discourse. This Ricoeur calls "distanciation." Distanciation is the dialectical counterpart of "belonging." The realization of discourse in writing distance the text from the conditions of spoken discourse. A text becomes the model for a belonging to communication in and through distance. "Distanciation" says Ricoeur, "is a constitutive phenomenon of the text as written."26 A text, according to him, is much more than a particular case of interhuman communication; it is the paradigm of the distanciation in all communication. Thus it reveals a fundamental

n

ie

is

ic

of

or

of

to

CS

n,

2.,

re

ш

of

ne

10

e.

10

of al character of the historicity of human experience, communication within and by means of distance.

Ricoeur's essay "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation" elaborately deals with the notion of the text and the distinction between speaking and writing. Writing, he says, is the first problem posed by the notion of the text. "Writing only makes explicit some traits that are already present in oral discourse."27 Ricoeur speaks of four forms of distanciation. The first is the distanciation of the "saying" in the said. Language in actualizing itself in discourse goes beyond itself in the speech event. Similarly, speech in entering into the process of understanding goes beyond itself in the meaning. Ricoeur notes that this surpassing of the event in the meaning is a characteristic of speech. In order to explain this, he makes use of the speech act theory of Austin and Searle. The propositional act, the illocutionary force and the perlocutionary action are necessary for "intentional exterior station." The locutionary act exteriorises itself in the propositional content. Similarly, the illocutionary act is also exteriorised due to grammatical devices like, indicative mood, imperatives etc., and the perlocutionary act is exteriorised by the emotive and affective dispositions.

The second form of distanciation is about the relation between the inscribed expression and the original speaker. In the case of the spoken discourse, there is always overlapping of the meaning of what is said and the intention of the speaker, whereas in writing, it is not so. Writing, according to Ricoeur, makes the text autonomous in relation to the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author wanted to say.28 The third form of distanciation which is similar to that of the second form is about the relation between the incribed expression and the original audience. In the spoken discourse, the hearer is specified in advance by the dialogical situation whereas writing is open to an audience virtually understood as made up of whoever knows how to read.29 A text transcends the psycho-sociological conditions of production and opens itself to an unlimited series of readings. The text decontextualizes itself from its social and historical conditions and allows the possibility to "recontextualize" itself in new contexts.

130

The fourth and the final form of distanciation is about the emancipation of the text from the limits of reference. In the case of spoken discourse, there is a reality common to the interlocutors and also there is ostensive reference, but in writing, there is no common situation between the writer and the reader. A text frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference, Ricoeur makes a distinction between a situational reference to an actual world (Umwelt) and non-situational reference to a symbolic world (Welt). "It is this enlarging of the Umwelt into the Welt which permits us to speak of the references opened up by the text," says Ricoeur.³⁰

III

Let me repeat some of the observations I have made so far-(1) The presuppositions of the structuralists which exclude important aspects of language, are avoided in Ricoeur's theory of discourse (2) The basic distinction between the semiotics and semantics has to be maintained in order to understand the role of discourse is language. (3) What is intended by discourse always points to a extra-linguistic reality. All these explain that for Ricoeur, a theory of discourse provides a foundation for a general theory of interpretation. This implies that the meaning of a text is to k interpreted and every text of meaning refers to an historical content Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory of discourse shows how the multiple meaning of words derives not just from the world of text itself but from a double historical reference both to the original conditions of utterance and to the conditions of interpretation. Interpretation the becomes, "a process by which, the interlocutors collective" determine the contextual values which structure their conversation

Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras Madras 600 005. S. PANNEERSELVAN

REFERENCES

Ferdinand de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics, trans.
 Wade Baskin, McGraw Hill, New York, 1966, p. 14.

131

2. Ibid., p. 15.

M

it the

s and

mon

rence

ction

) and

s this ak of

far:

ortan

es has

rse in

to an

ry of

to be

iltipk

ons of

n thus

tively tion.

VAN

rans.

- 3. Ibid., p. 120.
- Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde and trans. Denis Savage, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974, p. 82.
- Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 1981, p. 9.
- 6. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 84.
- 7. Ibid.
- 8. Paul Ricoeur, Interpretations Theory, Texas Christian University Press, Texas, 1976, p. 7.
- 9. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 86.
- Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978, p. 70.
- 11. Ibid.
- 12. Ibid.
- 13. Ibid.
- 14. Plato, The Sophist, 261 d 263 d.
- 15. The Rule of Metaphor, p. 72.
- 16. Ibid., p. 74.
- 17. Ibid.
- 18. Ibid.
- 19. Ibid., p. 216.
- 20. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 290.
- 21. Ibid., pp. 12 13.
- 22. Interpretations Theory, p. 59.
- 23. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 14

- 24. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil trans. Emerson Buchanan, Harper & Row, New York, 1967. p. 14.
- 25. The Conflict of Interpretations, p. 13.
- Paul Ricoeur. "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation.", trans. David Pellauer, *Philosophy Today* vol. xvii, No. 2/4, Summer 1973, p. 133.
- 27. Ibid., p. 130.
- 28. Ibid.
- 29. Ibid.
- 30. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, p. 202.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2 April, 1995

ART AND ONTOLOGY

nan,

At the outset it must be made clear that the science of Ontology is understood as the science of Being as Being, as Being as such which is dealt with, for example, by Aristotle in his treatise on 'Meta-physics'.¹ The science of metaphysics inclusive with Ontology, treats universally of Being as Being and is strikingly different from studies carried out by the special (empirical) sciences. Being is that which simply, unalterably and unilaterally is. That which is corporeal has Being, but Being as such and in itself is not corporeal in existence. Ontology (the science of the philosopher) approaches Being qua Being always universally.²

To turn now to Plato, Plato's theory of art is based upon and is contingent with his doctrine of eternal and timeless Forms (or Ideas). Art concerns that which is manifest in appearances such that art may be said not to be an imitation of nature as Being in itself, but art dwells only with and upon the imitation of the appearance(s) of nature. Where there is to be found an excess in artistic expression, and among artists there is very likely to be such extravagance because of their striving to excel, proportion and symmerty are violated and the result can only be instances of art production badly formed and badly turned out. Rather than endeavoring to carry on an aimless search for what we only desire we must, in the fashioning of works of art, take our departure as closely as possible from that which is in true reality. An artist even in pretending to produce art forms must be gifted in order to discern in close judgement the true nature of that which is considered to be a work of beauty in accordance with the dictates of reason.

In Plato's philosophy (and throughout the Dialogues he is quite consistent in his basic position) we assume the existence, or

rather the Being, of the Form of absolute Beauty as one among the other Forms or Ideas, but in our search for this ultimate and supreme Beauty we are never able to behold it directly by means of earthly vision. Basically, the things of this earth are made beautiful because absolute Beauty is somehow and in some measure imparted to them and is in them not only because we imitate whatever we consider to be beautiful in our contact with the world of appearances. Whatever we see and take to be beautiful is perfect and beautiful in the highest degree only because it partakes of absolute Beauty.³

From the various instances of beautiful things that may be visually seen we ascend to the perception of Beauty itself, no existing in any earthly thing, but Beauty as it exists (or should we say subsists) absolute, pure, everlasting and changeless. It is the Beauty that is unseen and timeless that is eternally of importance Starting from individual instances of beauty, we mount a ladder, a it were, until we arrive at the contemplation of universal Beauty and come to appreciate and know the truth of what Beauty is. Only is this way do we come upon the open sea of Beauty and attain a vision of the very soul of Beauty, making of our life an existence that is no longer a plaintive supplication of despair, but one that is capable of a still more worthy existence than it already enjoys. In a final revelation the Beauty that is universal waits to dawn upon our inward sight. We may reach toward Beauty itself and by so doing gradually come to be convinced of what Beauty is in full reality. The Beauty that is innate and inspirational within us, the Beauty that is intuited, is not born of thought, Plato would say, although it may be declared for and proclaimed in some kind of reflective thinking which goes to make up an account of the theory of art, that is, is science of aesthetics insofar as aesthetics may be said to lend itself to any form of strict and deliberative scientific endeavor.4

We as human beings are accustomed to take delight in the beauty that is apprehended through the senses, that confronts us the form of beautiful shapes and colors as given largely by nature (or by art) without attempting to take thought of the beautiful itself, which in any case it may be noted, takes its rise in the absence of thought. Very few of us contemplate, let alone try to analyst Beauty as such, or aspire to consider Beauty in or by or for itself it

J.

g the

reme

rthly

ause them

ler to

tever

ghes

ly be

, not

d we

s the

ance.

er, as

y and

ıly in

is no

ole of

fina

1 OU

loing

ality.

y that

may

aking

s. the

itself

n the

ature

ful in

sence

alyse

elfin

135

the rarified atmosphere of the Absolute or the Spiritual. For Plato worldly beauty, to reiterate, is only a resemblance to the appearance of all the experience or experiences of Beauty to be found in this world, illusory like a dream, a phenomenon, an epiphanous manifestation, something akin to a falsely held opinion or belief in place of the certainty that comes with full and complete knowledge of absolute Beauty. Spiritual beauty remains immutable and in no way subject to change either in kind or degree as is the case with worldly beauty which tends to shift to the more or less beautiful, now spectacular and breathtaking, now disappearing and disappointing. Beauty in itself, which, in the Dialogues, is the Idea or Form of Beauty, cannot possess more or less than the pure Beauty which it has and is, never degenerating into a fading beauty characteristic of the multitude of individual beautiful things readily encountered in the usual course of experienced things and events. Absolute beauty is seen as an absolute norm beside which all earthly beauty is subject to some degree of failure, is here for a season and is temporary, or is the victim of an interpretation that is subjectively given by the beholder of beauty.5

Beauty as it is found in the multitude of wordly things may be readily apprehended in some form or other, while the beauty of Reality itself, which is spiritual, can only be intuited, Plato would agree. The layman could hardly be expected wholeheartedly to believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself rather than the beauty that is readily apparent in a multiplicity of beautiful objects. What Plato calls the 'real nature of any given thing' is approached by means of the inner reaches of the mind alone, by the unaided intellect and not by means of the senses or even by common knowledge. We already innately possess the knowledge of absolute Beauty (or Godness of Equality or whatever) before we came into earthly existence, that is to say, before birth.6

Absolute Beauty is a unique and independent and indispensable entity which has its being in Reality. Its being is indisputable. It is forever uniform, constant and invariable, admitting of no alteration in any sense or in any respect. It is eternal, and all other beauty of particular things in worldly existence participates in (or might we say partakes of) absolute Beauty in Being so that by association

with absolute Beauty as a kind of sine qua non to absurdity, if you like, all beautiful things may be said to be beautiful. By largeness are large things large and by tallness in Being are tall men tall. It is the beauty of unchanging and unchangeable Reality that is the cause by which beautiful objects of the world are made to be and to appear beautiful in existence as they participate in and are infused with the supreme Idea of the beautiful, an independent entity, invisible and enduring. By absolute Beauty are things that are declared to be beautiful made to be beautiful.

We strive toward and seek to attain unto absolute Beauty, that which does not appear even in an existence declared to be true. The beauty that we forever seek is never in flux but rather is ever and always beautiful without further proof. If, as the poet John Keats has written, Beauty itself is Truth, there is no need for further articulation or verification. Platonic Ideas, inclusive of the Idea of Beauty, are unknown to the human intellect in contradistinction to ordinary knowledge that may be garnered in the sciences, which is subject to transition and change. Even the words by which we attempt to delineate absolute Reality vary considerably according to language, circumstances and context, and also with the individuals who make use of certain terms in trying to express themselves adequately. The names by themselves are never quite adequate and are not always the same in their failed attempt, often in figurative language, to convey accurate meaning in a communicative and believable context concerning that which basically is nameless. What we are here saying, therefore, is that we can never completely express in words, in language, the true nature of Beauty in Plato's ideal world of Forms. Pure Beauty, unqualified and unblemished, undefiled and without defacement and in fact devoid of properties of any sort, is contained alone within the realm of Being, although such may be suggested to us through an awareness of the mystical, not in the factuality of determinate law, but only as a felt, subliminal or aesthestic appreciation, intuited rather than fully apprehended, not in any way arising out of or through thought.8

There exists in unseen splendor a pure Form of Beauty, of Goodness of Unity among others, apart from the (relative) likeness of these things which we possess in perceptive experience. The

likenesses, however, in their relative individuality may only momentarily share in and so possess these Forms. It is by sharing or partaking in the Form of Beauty itself that things in the world of existence may be directed upon the path of becoming more beautiful, or may aspire to be better than they already find themselves to be. Plato, in the course of the *Dialogues* is quite consistent in his assumptions of a world of Ideas, a realm of supersensible Forms apart, over and above the world of sensibility and the world of experience with which we are in everyday contact.⁹

'Ou

ess

t is

1se

car

the

und

be

hat

he

und

ats

ner of

to

we

ng

als

res

ind

ve

ınd

SS.

ely

o's

ed,

ies

gh al,

nal

ed,

ot

:55

he

There is believed to be passion for Beauty that is hidden and abides in the spiritual domain beyond that which is readily observable. By this token there is presumed to be a standard of correctness in art which lies ahead of and antecedent to whatever is only sensually pleasureable. The unobserved Beauty by which all other things are ordered in loveliness makes these things appear to be beautiful because the Form of Beauty first inheres in them, and no earthly beauty can compare with the Beauty that is eternally beauriful, in and by itself. It is Beauty and not necessarily its name that is beautiful, for Beauty as such, the Form of Beauty in and by itself requires no special delineation or declaration in terms of language symbols. For example, it is the Grecian urn itself rather than the word 'urn' that is proclaimed to be beautiful. From Beauty itself is born the power by which things of this world grow into beauty, by which they are caused to be beautiful, yielding the property of being beautiful to that of which in existence beauty may be said to be added. What we are asking is not what things are beautiful, that is, the things that are observable, but what Beauty is in itself, the Beauty that is changeless and universal always and for everyone, Beauty that is assured and indispensable, Beauty that is not irrelevant for all future time.

Beauty in existence is never so perfect that it entertains no possibility also of beign added to, be it ever so slightly. As well, beauty in the world of existence certainly suffers the distinct possibility of being diminished with time, that is, the possibility of substitution of loss. But eternal Beauty can never be argmented even slightly in space or time or in any worldly sense, nor can it be placed elsewhere or broken apart or caused to gradually fade or

decrease or grow dim. That which is experienced possesses beauty because it is conditioned by something else, but unless that something is eventually absolute Beauty, the Idea of Beauty, the Form of Beauty which has an existence (subsistence) that can only be indwelling in Reality, the Form which makes and causes all things to be and to exist, the beauty of the phenomenal world stands in jeopardy at the threshold of some form of subjective interpretation, of modification, of controversy or even of denial.¹⁰

In the Phaedrus, said to be one of Plato's most important dialogues, beauty of this world available through sense perception serves only as a reminder of an absolutely true Beauty which can only be contemplated but not seen. We visualize in experience some likenesses among beautiful objects which may be said to act as a stimulus not furnished by Beauty in itself in any direct fashion. but simply offering a suggestion that we might care to search for the Ideal and to aspire to it. Not that the Forms themselves, for example the Form of Beauty itself, is manifest to the senses, but that we possess something of a yearning to approach closer to the Ideal and strive toward it. It makes good sense, all in all, to say that the first stimulus to beauty, the first impulse to seek a higher form of beauty, even the highest Form of Beauty, comes from an appreciation of physical beauty which is visible and apparent to us in the world of that which is phenomenal. The things that are unseen are of eternal importance, whereas in experience it is easier to distinguish beauty in some more or less degree of disappointment, or in its outright collision with ugliness. From the contemplation of beautiful things where perceived art forms are the stimulus to reflective aesthetic judgement, we move upward to come closer to the perception, but only in a figurative sense, of Beauty itself, simple, alone, absolute, eternal, enduring and everlasting in the realm of the Spirit.11

As is well known, Plato tended to derogate the merits of what we in later centuries have come to recognize as creative art. Nature is given a place of prime importance in the scheme of things, with art playing a secondary and imitative role. Art ideally (and therefore rather paradoxically) would have to be naturally given without any show of artificiality. But is is the artificer who produces art, and art is to be classified as only a late - born product of nature, shadowy

n

t

e

e

t

f

f

d y it

S

ıt

e

and lacking in real substance. Art forms such as music and painting would be categorized by Plato as crafts and not necessarily the products of nature at all. However, the practice of medicine and the performance of gymnastics may be said to render a service in that they aid and supplement nature. The production of all art forms must strive for excellence even in their imitative capacity; they must be supervised and even censured in order to prevent the representation of that which could turn out to be licentious or evil. 12

Plato has undeniably, unrelentingly maintained that the creation of art forms is but an art of imitation, the making of likenesses or copies, and that the artist is an illusionist creating only that which is in some degree deceptive rather than the ontologically free-standing Real in itself. The artist does not create strictly that which is real, the original or the truely beutiful, but an artifact, as it were, what appears to be beautiful, that which is only a semblance of the beautiful. Plato's considered opinion concerning art, therefore, may be summed up by saying that art does not dwell with the ontological Real in itself, but that art is primarily something of a fantasy and misleading. It is reluctantly conceded, however, that upon close investigation and scrutiny, even that which is false to Reality, that which appears to human sensibility only as an appearance, has a right to find a place, and its rightful place, among those things we experience in time and space in our dwelling place here on earth.

59, Victor Street, London, Ontario, Canada. N6C, 1B9.

ALBERT W. J.

NOTES

- Cf. Richard McKeon, The Basic Wroks of Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941, Metaphysica, Book IV, Chapter 1, 1001a 19-24.
- Ibid., Metaphysica III, Ch. 4, 1001b110; Metaphysica XI, Ch. 3, 1060b3.

- Cf. Huntington and Cairns, Plato, The Collected Dialogues, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1971, Phaedo, 65d, 99e, 100c-d.
- 4. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Symposium, 210d-211c.
- 5. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Republic, Book V, 476b 479a.
- 6. Plato, Ibid., Book VI, 494, 507; Phaedo, 65d, 75a.
- 7. Plato, Ibid., Cratylus, 78d, 100e 101a.
- 8. Plato, Ibid., Cratylus, 439e ff.
- 9. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Parmenides, 130b ff.
- 10. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Hippias Major, 302b c.
- 11. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Phaedrus, 249 50.
- 12. Cf. Plato, Ibid., Republic, Book III. 401b, Book VII, 522b; Laws, Book X, 889-90.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 2 April, 1995

IT IS THE JUDGING THAT MATTERS *

Comparison, they say, is odious. If, however, it is intellectually stimulating, if it leads to a philosophical progress and if one does not confuse the issues, then engaging in it is not academically harmful. But the mode in which many textbook writers on Nyāya-Vaišeṣika compare and contrast various concepts involved in Anumānakhanda with those of Western logic is not only intellectually unconvincing to a reflective mind but also the resultant piece of work is, upon analysis, seen to have some serious factual inaccuracies, and hence academically unacceptable. Accordingly, Jagat Pal's article Nyāya Inference: Deductive or Inductive' (Indian Philosophical Quarterly', Vol. XX, No. 3) in which he disagrees with Sharma, Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanna, is, although belated, welcome. Had he thrashed this topic earlier, many students of elementary logic and philosophy would have been on their guard while liberally attaching labels like 'deductive' and 'inductive' to an instance of Nyāya anumāna.

The purpose of my paper is to support the general idea involved in Jagat Pal's article. viz., The Nyāya inference cannot be lebelled as "Deductive" or "Inductive". But I have done so in the light of a few theoretical discussions involved in mathematical logic.

I have divided this paper into seven small parts. Part I has concentrated on the notion of syntactic relation involved in a formal

Some of the ideas expressed in this paper follow the trends of thought developed by Elliott Mandelson, Geoffrey Hunter, Gottlob Frege, B. Skyrms, Susan Haack and Dharmendranath Shastri. The Sanskrit Sutras are quotations from Gautama's 'Nyayasutram' and Annambhatta's Tarkasangraha' and 'Tarkadipika'.

^{*} Acknowledgements :

logical system. In Part II, the focus of attention is the concept of semantic relation and its connection with the syntax. In Parts III, IV and V, I have discussed the development of the Anumānakhanda of Nyāya-Vaisesikas. And finally in Parts VI and VII, I have tried to make the reader realise that there are no good grounds to compare the predominantly epistemological system of the Nyāya-Vaisesikas with the formal systems of Western logic and hence comparison is odious.

I

Surely there are many logics. They all deal with arguments. But even a commoner in his day-to-day states of affairs takes recourse to arguments. All arguments, however, do not explicitly leap to the eye wearing neat little tags "premises" and "conclusion". Many a time one is required to extract arguments from discourses used by persons. And here what matters is how one judges an argument - whether it be a logician who does the judging or a person who is innocent of all logic. There are many different ways in which arguments may be judged. To elucidate this point, I will at once begin with the notion of formal language.

A natural language is an interpreted one. On the other hand, a formal language is capable of being completely defined or specified without reference to any interpretation in spite of the fact that it may be given an interpretation. If it is not capable of being defined without any reference to interpretation, then the language is not a formal language. What I mean to say is illustrated below: Suppose the alphabet of the system S' (read: "S Prime") is constituted by the following marks: A, B, C, >, <, (and). They are merely marks. They do not carry any meaning: they are uniterpreted. (I could have used □, o, △, @, ▽, ★ and \angle as constituting the alphabet. They too are marks.) A finite sequence of these marks is called a formula, or an expression, of S', By this definition, AB~ is a formula of S'; and so are B~A, (AB), A~)AB(and the like. However, there is a proper subset of the formulae of S called the set of well-formed formulae (wffe) of S' and this we now determine by laying down a recursive definition of "wff":

(a) Mark 'A' standing by itself is a wff of S'; so is 'B'.

(b) If 'A' is a wff of S', so is ~(A) (Note that I am here using a metalogical symbol - script letter 'A' - to talk about the object language symbols.)

(c) If'A' is wff of S' and if' B' is a wff of S', then (A) = (B) also

is a wff of S'.

ly

es

m

h

d,

ct

ge /:

is

re d.

çe

is

W

(d) The formulae which are well-formed according to the above (a), (b) and (c) alone are well formed formulae of S'. (Extremal Clause)

(Again note that the notion of wff is system-relative.) Here is an effective procedure which would enable one to decide whather or not a formula is a wff of S'.

Problem: Are A >A, B > -- B, B J(A > B), A and (A > B) wffe of S'? While answering for the first three in the affirmative and for the last two in the negative, a slight reflection on to the problem and its solution would make one realise that what one judges is merely a certain type of relation among the marks of S'. No meaning is involved here. No interpretation has yet gone into the picture. Bo (ADB) is merely a sequence of seven marks of S'. These marks stand in a particular relation. This relation is called SYNTACTIC relation, and the language of S' is a FORMAL LANGUAGE. Let us call this language L' (read : 'L prime'). L' and L" (read : 'L double prime') would be two different formal languages if the set of wffe of L" is not exactly the same as the set of wffe of L'. Inversely, if they are same, then L' and L" are not two different formal languages. Thus logicians tend to identify a formal language with the set of its wffe. (Note that strictly speaking, a formula is an abstract object; a mark or a set of marks is a token of a formula.)

We move a step forward. A proper subset of the set of wffe may be chosen by the logician as the set of axioms of S'. Here is a tendency to build an axiomatic theory. Suppose one of the axioms chosen of S' is $(A \supset (B \supset C)) \supset ((A \supset B) \supset (A \supset C))$. What is significant to note is that we are still at the syntactic level. (One may have an axiom schemata set instead of an axiom set. e.g.,

(A) (B) C)) > ((A) B) > (A) C)) is an axiom schema which would generate infinite number of axioms.)

Then, n number (n > 1) of rules of inference are introduced as

merely a finite set of relations among the wffe of S'. Thus what is specified is a deductive apparatus for L' and what we now have in hand is a formal system. See the summary in the table below:

Table 1:

- 1. $L' = \{ all wffe of L' \}$
- 2. {wffe of L'} determined by specifying the alphabet of L'] and [recursive df. of 'wff']
- [{Axioms} + {Transformation Rules}] = Deductive Apparatus
- 4. [L' + Deductive Apparatus] = Formal System S'

Once having got clear the notion of a formal system, one should comprehend the notion of proof in/within a formal system. A proof in a formal (axiom) system is a sequence of wffe of formal language of that formal system which would satisfy purely syntactic requirements and which would not involve any meaning. To be more specific, a proof in S' is a finite (but non-empty) string or sequence of wffe of S' such that each formula of that sequence is (a): an axiom of S' or (b): an immediate consequence of the preceding formulae in the sequence by the rule of inference of S'. The proof is a proof of the last formula in the string. Let me illustrate it as follows:

Suppose S' has $B\supset (A\supset B)$ and $(A\supset (B\supset C))\supset ((A\supset B)\supset (A\supset C))$ as axiom schemata AS1 and AS2, respectively. Suppose further that the transformation rule of S' is: "B is the direct consequence of $A\supset B$ and A." Now consider the proof of wff $A\supset A$:

- 1): $(A \supset (A \supset A) \supset A)) \supset ((A \supset (A \supset A)) \supset (A \supset A))$ [Instance of AS2)
- 2): $A \supset ((A \supset A) \supset A)$ [Instance of AS1]
- 3): $(A \supset (A \supset A)) \supset (A \supset A)$ [1, 2, by Transformation Rule]

ic

K

1)

()

4): $A \supset (A \supset A)$ [Instance of AS1]

5): A > A [3, 4, by Transformation Rule]

Thus **s** A Reading: A A is a syntactic consequence in S', or is deducible in S', from zero hypothesis.)

(Note: The numerals in parentheses and the "justifications" in the box brackets do not form any part of the proof.)

(Note: S' in | indicates that the notion of proof is systemrelative.) And as there exists a proof of A A in S', A A is a theorem in S'. A theorem of (in/within) a formal system is a wff of the formal language of that system that would satisfy certain purely syntactic requirements and would not involve any meaning. To be more precise, a wff F is a theorem of S' if and only if (iff) there is some proof (as defined above) in S' whose last formula is F. (The above notion of proof is labelled by some logicians as Categorical Proof to distinguish it from the notion of a Hypothetical Proof/Derivation. Ahypothetical proof is a finite (but non-empty) sequence / string of wffe of S' such that each one of which is either an axiom of S' or an immediate consequence of the two preceding formulae in the sequence by the rule of inference of S' or a wff of S' which is a hypothesis. Thus when we say that wff F is a theorem of S' if there is some proof in S' whose last formula is F, what we have in mind is a Categorical Proof and not a Hypothetical Proof.)

Not all formal systems, however, are axiomatic. Logicians now a days prefer aximoless systems (Natural Deduction Systems) and which involve only transformation rules satisfying purely syntactic requirements. Suppose S" (read: 'S double prime') is a formal system and p, q, r, , v and constitute its alphabet. The logician lays down a recursive definition of 'wff of S" and has two transformation rules:

R1: "q is a direct consequence of p > q and p."

R2: "q is a direct consequence of p v q and ~p."

Problem: "Is r a syntactic consequence in S" of the formulae

~ p, ~ p > (q v r) and ~q?"

Solution: Yes, it is; the proof is as follows:

~ p ⊃(q v r)

qvr

_

Thus, $\sim p$, $\sim p \supset (q \vee r)$, $\sim q \mid S^* \mid r$ (I could have written the proof as:

TT

From $\mathcal{A} \mid_{\mathcal{S}''} \mathcal{B}$, we now turn our attention to $\mathcal{A} \mid_{\mathcal{S}'} \mathcal{B}$. While the former reads as "B is a syntactic consequence is S' of A' the reading of the latter is "B is a SEMANTIC consequence in S' of A". Meaning of $\mathcal{A} \mid_{\mathcal{S}'} \mathcal{B}$: "For every interpretation of the language of S' which makes A true, also makes B true; i.e., there is no interpretation in the language of S' which makes 'A' true and 'B' false.

Explanation: While syntactic relation is concerned with formal languages or formal systems without essential regard to their interpretation, semantic relation is concerned with the interpretation of formal languages. While syntactic relation is the relation among different symbols / marks of the formal language, semantic relation is the relation between a symbol / mark and what that mark stands for or designates. Let us augment our list of marks of L' by adding

and v, and also modify the recursive definition of wff so as to make A v ~A and ~ (A, ~A) wffe of L'.

The reading of A $\vee \sim A = (A \cdot \sim A)$

would be: "~(A.~A) is a semantic consequence in so of A v ~A". Now judge the logician's interpretation; call it (Reading: "I prime.")

B.

of A' S' of

Lage

s no

d'B

with

their on

ong

tion

ands

ding as to

in S'

it f

Table 2: Interpretation I'

Mark 'A' is a propositional letter of S'.

A proposition is either true or false, but not both.

~ is the sign of negation; it is a propositional operator.

The negation of a true proposition is false.

The negation of a false proposition is true.

is the sign of conjuction; it is a propositional operator.

v is the sign of disjunction; it is a propositional operator.

A conjunction is true if all its conjuncts are true; otherwise, false.

A disjunction is true even if one of its disjuncts is true; otherwise, false.

On I', A \vee A turns out to be true; and I' also makes \sim (A \sim A) true. Therefore, A \vee A \sim A \sim (A \sim A).

Let us be more specific about the definition of 'Interpretation of L': 'Definition: 'Interpretation of L': may be defined as an assignment of one or other of the truth values - truth, falsity - to each propositional symbol of L' and an assignment to the connectives / operators of L' of their conventional truth-functional meanings.

Thus we have introduced semantics for L' which relates each symbol or a group of symbols to the abstract entities - Truth and Falsity. (Note: Truth and Falsity are abstract objects. They are not linguistic symbols but objects denoted by symbols.)

Thus given L', either we may specify a deductive apparatus for it or we may define the concept of an interpretation of L' or we may do both. That is, we may delve into the Proof Theory or the Model Theory or develop both. ("An interpretation I is a model of a formula of L iff the formula is true for I.") A logician my deal with either its syntactic relations or its semantic relations or both. And it desirable that the syntax of a system coincides with its semantics. A logician does aspire for a formal system in which the wffe which

Let us now consider what I had stated earlier: "There are man different ways in which arguments may be judged". The earlier approach among logicians was to talk about "types" of argument - Deductive and Inductive. Given an argument A / B, they would raise the question: "Is this argument deductive or inductive?" The tendency was to have water-tight compartments. Some of the modern logicians, however, prefer to say not that there are two types of arguments, deductive and inductive, but that the arguments ca be judged by deductive or inductive criteria / standards. Given a argument A / : B, it may be assessed as deductively valid α deductively invalid but inductively strong or neither. As noted, the notion of validity is system-relative, and within a system, validly can be defined both syntactically and semantically. If A 50 and if \$\overline{\mathbb{F}_5} \overline{\mathbb{G}}\$, then the argument is deductively valid in S' both syntactically and semantically. In assessing the argument by deductive standard, what we judge is whether or not 'B' follows d necessity from 'A' and while judging the inductive strength of $A / \cdot \cdot \cdot B$, we judge whether 'A' gives a certain degree of support to 'B'. It may be less than conclusive support. An argument is inductively strong if it is improbable that its premises should be true and its conclusion false. Judged in this way, it would follow that if Al. B is deductively valid, then it is also inductively strong. are judging its deductive validity, we would say that 'B' follows of necessity from 'A' in S' and that there is no I' in S' which would make 'A' true and 'B' false. If we are judging the inductive strength of this very argument, we would say that here the probability of 'A' being true and 'B' false is zero.

Argument: 'If Sucharita was travelling in the Ladies' Special train.

She jumped out while seeing the smoke in the

Ą

Do

O

Sd

) is

Og,

() if

lany

rlie

ents

ould The

/pes can

da

, the

dity

03

ooth

by

sol

1 di

port

it is

true atil

We

s of

ake

this

ing

ain

compartment; and as she was travelling in the said train, she jumped out while seeing that smoke.'

The specific argument form, viz., poq, p/.q, of is valid in as much as it does not have a single substitution instance having true premises and false conclusion. A finite truth table for it would represent all possible (infinite) substitution instances of it and would enable us to "see" that d is valid. The reductio ad absurdum approach would, on the other hand, enable us to "see" that accepting the premises of as true and rejecting the conclusion as false would yield an inconsistency / contradiction.

Also SJJ, S J in accordance with the rule of inference which is accepted by many propositional Axiom Systems and many Axiomless (Natural Deduction) Systems too, and which is labelled usually as Modus Ponens or Detachment, the reading of which is "q is a syntactic consequence in system x of p 2q and p". Thus while judging by deductive standard, we would say that it is deductively valid both syntactically as well as semantically. But while judging the same argument by employing the inductive standard, we would say that the probability of its premises being true and its conclusion false is zero, and hence it is inductively strong.

Argument: "If Rehana was one of the five ladies in the First Class compartment of that train, then she jumped out while seeing the smoke. So did Arnavaz, Tehmina and Meenakshi, if they were the co-travellers. Therefore if Sucharita is the fifth lady of the group, then she too jumped out."

FIF FIF FIF FIF TFF.

By employing the deductive standard, we would say that the conclusion does not follow of necessity from the premises. Accepting the premises as true and rejecting the conclusion as false does not yield any contradiction. But while judging the same argument by employing the inductive standard, we would say that the probability of the premises being true and the conclusion being false is low. The premises give "high degree" of support to the conclusion Accordingly, is inductively strong.

Argument: "Sucharita had once reacted with fear five years back
Therefore if she jumped out of the compartment today,
then she is said to have phobic reactions."

Not only is I deductively invalid, it is also inductively weak.

The premise gives a low degree of support to the conclusion.

WHERE DO THE NYAYA-VAISESIKAS STAND N THIS NETWORK?

DO THEY FIND A PLACE TO STAND ON THIS PLATFORM?

We need to examine their theory closely.

Ш

A good way to judge the Nyāya-Vaisesika system (as some scholars have rightly done) is to study it in three stages: The predignaga period, the conflict period and the post-Dignaga period. The first is the period of origin (c.300 B.C. to 5th Century A.D.) which may include Kaṇada, Gautama, Vatsyāyana and Prasastapāda. The second period (5th C. A.D. to 11th Century A.D.) is the period in which the system grew dynamically while defending its realistic standpoint against the attacks of the rivals, especially the Buddhist Dignaga school. Very many concepts introduced by the sūtrakāri Gautama (C. 200 B.C.) evolved and took different shapes when they were discussed by Uddyotakāra (end of the 6th Century A.D.) This evolution went on through Jayantabhaṭṭa (begining of the 9th Century A.D.), Bhāsarvajña, the Ekadesin Naiyāyika (close of the

IA

ging

at the

pting

s not

nt by

bility

low

usion

back

oday,

weak

DN

THIS

some

ie pre

period

A. D.

apada

period

alistic iddhist

rakars

when A.D.)

the 9th


ı.

9th Century), Vyomasiva, Vāchaspatimisra (flourished 841 A.D.), Sridhara and Udayanāchārya (both belonging to the close of the 10th century.) The picture again changed when Sivaditya (10th Century) officially united the Nyaya and the Vaikesika to form the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika system. And then with the introduction of the Nyaya in the 12th century A. D. through 'Tattvachintamani' of Gangesa, there was a shift of attention; methodology became the focus. The Bauddhas had already disappeared from India during 11th century A.D. They were not here to keep the Nyaya-Vaisesikas on their toes; and therefore the methaphysics of the system decayed. From 11th century to about 17th century, we have the third period, the post-Dignaga period. Vardhamana (12th Century), Jayadeva Paksadhara (15th Century), Raghunath Siromani (beginning of the 16th Century). Gadadhara (middle of the 17th Century) and others carried on the Navya Nyaya tradition. "How to discuss Philosophy, what approach one should take in philosophising activity" development in this area was their major contribution. But, side by side, the syncretic manuals like 'Tarkasangraha' of Annambhatta 'Bhasaparichchheda' and Century) 'Nyayasiddhantamuktavali' of Visvanatha (17th Century) did continue to present the old epistemology and metaphysics without much progress. The old content was presented through the new methodology. No doubt the Naiyayikas and even those who were on the threshold of the 2nd and 3rd periods of the system were astute thinkers. Even the staunch rivals of the school borrowed the tool to philosophising from these Naiyayikas. BUT in this paper I am not concerned with all the areas of their philosophy. I am interested only in the analysis of the structure of the anumana and the philosophical theory working behind it so that we can judge whether or not they are comparable to that area of the Western logic which I have presented in Parts I and II of this paper. From Gautama to Annambhatta - here is a span of about one thousand eight hundred years. How much development has taken place in our area of interest during this span? Let us judge that.

IV

Gautama introduces Anumāna in the third sūtra of adhyāya one and āhnika one as one of the four pramanas:

"Pratyakṣānumānopamānasabdahpramāṇani." (1/1/3) He regards anumāna as a pramāṇa. This is a very significant statement in our context. The word Pramāna is understood as a means to true knowledge. (Unlike many thinkers, the Nyāya philosophers do admit the distinction between true and false instances of knowledge.) And once anumāna is regarded as a pramāṇa, it would follow on their ground that there is no such thing like "false inferential knowledge"! If anumāna (or any other pramāṇa) operates, the result has to be true knowledge; and if error arises, then we would be forced to say that no pramāṇa has operated. On the Nyāya ground, one can talk about false knowledge but one cannot talk about false inferential knowledge. This is because, ex-hypothese, anumāna falls under pramā while Viparyaya (error) falls under Apramā. See Table III below:



A

ards

UO I

true

s do

lge.)

v on

ntial

the

ould

yaya

talk

lese,

nder

)

tha

1/1/3 as quoted above is the beginning of the analysis of the sixteen epistemological topics enumerated in the very first sūtra: "Pramāna, Prameya, Sansaya Prayojana, Drstānta, Siddhānta, Avayava, Tarka, Nirnaya, Vāda, Jalpa, Vitandā, Hetvābhāsa, Chhala, Jāti, Nigrahasthanānām tattvajnānāt niśreyasa adhigamah." (1/1/1) Judge the context. Gautama says: "It is through the correct understanding of the nature of these sixteen epistemological "categories" (Pramana, etc.) that one attains the Highest Good / Moksa / Liberation." See the ulterior motive. The fifth sutra mentions three kinds of anumana: ". . . trividham anumanam Pūrvavat Sesavat Sāmānyatodrstam cha" (1/1/5). And it is only in the 32nd sutra that Gautama introduces the constituents of reasoning: "Pratijňa, Hetu, Udaharana, Upanaya Nigamanani avayavah" (1/ 1/32). Analysis of these is in the sūtras 33 through 39. The 33rd sūtra reads as: "Sādhya nirdesah pratijnā" - "Pratijnā is the declaration of the sadhya". As an example of their we may have the assertion: "Parvato Vahniman". Vahni (fire) the extension of which is to be demonstrated on the parvatah (mountain), is the sadhya. The 34th sutra defines 'hetu', the second avavava; "Udaharana sādharmyātsādhyasādhanam hetuh" (1/1/34). "Hetu is the sādhana (which makes known) the sadhya through its similarity to the udharana." Notice an important point. Gautaa says: "Hetu is the sadhana". He does not say that vyapti is the sadhana; he does not consider parāmarsa as the sādhana; he says "Hetu is the sādhana". Glimpses of vyapti can be seen much later - in 'Vatsyayana bhasya'. There is a span of about 500 yaers between Gautama and Vatsyayana. Anumana in 'Nyayasutra' is still in its infancy. As an example of this second avayava, we may have the assertion: "Dhoomat". We assert the existence of fire on the mountain because of the presence of smoke there. But how does the hetu (the presence of smoke on the mountain) work as the sādhana or sādhya? The sūtra answers: "Udaharana sādharmyāt" - "through its similarity to the udharana". The 35th sutra continues the point. "Tathā vaidharmyāt" (1/1/35) - "And also through dissimilarity". A lake is an instance which is dissimilar (because of the absence of smoke). Thus the kitchen hearth has been observed to have smoke and fire; but the lake has been observed to have the absence of both. In this way, it is reasoned that the mountain like the kitchen hearth has the presence of fire as there is the presence of smoke. Again, unlike the lake, the

mountain has the presence of fire as there is no absence of smokel

As the second avayava, hetu, is defined in terms of udharana, the onus to define 'udharana' itself is very much there on Gautama And this leads us to his 36th sutra: "Sādhyā sādharmyāt tat dharma bhavah drstanta udaharanam." (1/1/36) "Udharana isthat drstanta which possesses a property of the sadhya, by similarity." As a concrete instance of udaharana, we may take the assertion: "Yatha mahanaseh". Thus the kitchen hearth (udāharana) is the drstānta which possesses smoke, a property of fire (sadhya), as on parvatah Notice what Gautama says: "Udāharana IS a drstānta; he does not say that Udāharana is the combination of vyāpti vākya and a drstanta! He identifies udaharana with drstanta. And what is a drstanta? His definition in the 25th sutra reads as follows: "Laukika parīksānām yasminārthe buddhi sāmyam sa drstānta" (1/1/25) "Drstanta is that instance about which an ordinary man and an expert entertain the same views." Thus the vadin and the prativadin both agree that mahanasah is an instance where smoke and fire both are found.

After udāharaņa comes upanaya, the fourth avayava, andthis is defined in the 38th sūtra: "Udharaṇa apeks ah tathā iti upas anhāra na tathā iti vā sādhyasya upanayah" (1/1/38) - "With reference to the udāharaṇa of the sādhya when we sum up (our assertions in the form) "Like it" or "Unlike it", it is Upanaya." To illustrate: If "Yathā mahānasah" is the udāharaṇa under consideration, then the upanaya will be: "Tathā chayam parvatah" - (So like the kitchen hearth) there is smoke on this mountain.

And as regards the fifth avayava; nigamana, Gautama says. Hetu apadesāt pratijnāyāh punarvachanam nigamanam. (1/1/39). "Nigamana is the re-statement of the pratijnā as a result of adducing hetu as the cause." "Tasmāt vahnimān asal parvatah" - "Therefore, in this way, there is fire on the mountain states the conclusion in our example.

Putting now together the fragments in order, let us see how a concrete example of an argument gets structured, as conceived by Gautama, (c.200 years B.C.).

It Is The Judging That Matters

"Parvato vahnimān" (Pratijnā)
"Dhoomāt" (Hetu)
"Yathā mahānasah" (Udāharaṇa)
"Tathā chāyam parvatah" (Upanaya)
"Tasmāt vahnimān asau parvatah" (Nigamana)

This is the starting point of all anumana in the Nyaya system. Of course Gautama needs to be appreciated for having made a distinction between an instance of knowledge which is direct (i.e., without an element of any inference) viz. Pratyaksa Jñan and an instance of knowledge which is not sāksāt pratitih viz. anumiti. However, surely this cannot be regarded as a fully developed anumana. It is a kalikā, a bud, a growing anumana.

V

How much progress (in our present area of interest) have the Naiyāyikas made while going through the Conflict Period and the Post-Dignāga period? Let us judge that. So far as the structure of anumāna is concerned, Annambhatta's 'Tarkadīpikā' represents the spirit of the syncretic school.

"Pratijna hetu udaharana upanaya nigamanani panchavayavah. Parvato vahniman iti pratijna

Dhoomavattvāt iti hetu

la

ta

ıā

ta

h.

ot

ka (5)

an

lin

oth

his

ira

to

the

: If

the

1en

ys:

m.°

sult

sall

ain"

Wa

1 by

Yoyodhoomavān sa sa agnimān, yathā mahānasaḥ iti udāharaṇam Tathā chāyam iti upanaya

Tasmāt tathā iti nigamanam."

This is how the 46th sūtra of 'Tarkasangraha' reads after in a distinction between Svarthānumāna and Parārthanumāna having made in the previous sūtra. While commenting on it, the 'Dīpikā' defines 'pratijñā' as "Sādhyavattāyā pakṣavachanam" - "Speaking of pakṣa as possessing sādhya is pratijñā." Its job is to make the listener mentally set for nigmana. The 'Dīpikā' continues: "... lingapratipādakam vachanam hetuh" - "Hetu is the statement which declares the linga (the charecteristic mark of sādhya)." Then comes the definition of 'udāharana': "Vyāpti pratipādakam udāharanam." - "Udāharana (avayava) is that which declares the vyāpti". Another definition in one of the later editions of the 'Dīpikā' with the commentary of Nīlakantha, printed at Benares in 1875 (which possibly is a later interpolation) includes even drstānta. It

155

reads thus: "Vyāptipratipādakam drstānta vachanam udāharaṇam"
- "Udāharaṇa avayava is that which declares the vyāpti and drstānta." And the same later edition puts forth a very accurate definition of 'upanaya': "Vyāpti višista linga pratipādakam vachanam upanaya." - "Upanaya (avayava) is the statement which declares the linga as qualified by vyāpti." Accordingly, "Tathā chāyam" gets a detailed analysis so as to read as: "Vahni vyāpya dhoomavānāyam parvatah" - "Dhoom which is the vyāpya of vahni is on the mountain." Finally, the 'Dīpikā' defines 'the purpose of nigamana as follows: Abādhitatvādikam nigamana prayojanam" The purpose of nigamana is to exclude the possibility of any contradiction as to the existence of sādhya." This last statement is very significant in our context. It represents the Naiyāyikas' claim to the certainty of the conclusion!

In the light of what has been discussed so far, part I through Part V, I believe I have cleared the ground for the reader to judge whether one can liberally attach labels like "deductive" and "inductive" to a Nyaya argument.

VI

The label "deductive", as defined above, cannot be tagged to a Nyāya argument. Syntactic validity and semantic validity are system-relative and apply only to formal arguments. The Nyāya system lacks a formal language. Naiyāyikas did not develop any formal system. Perhaps they did not feel the necessity of developing one. The whole platform on which the Naiyāyikas stand, the whole context in which their Anumānakhanda was developed, is altogether different from the one in which the Western logic has got developed. Is it then a wise move to attach Western labels of formal logic to an epistemological theory of an Indian system?

Further, if the Naiyāyikas claim the certainty of the conclusion of their inference, as noted above, then while judging their arguments by the inductive standard it would turn out that for each and every argument of theirs, the probability of the premises being true and the conclusion false would be zero. Their system will not be able to permit a range of degrees of probability. We will not be able to say (in their system) that here is an argument with low degree of

probability or moderately high degree of probability or very high degree of probability. Therefore how can one apply even the label "induction" to Nyaya argument?

Sometimes it is suggested that induction gets involved (in the Nyāya system) in the process of the formation of a vyāpti. No doubt, in the six-fold procedure, they begin with specific experiences. The first four steps - Anvaya, Vyatireka, Vyabhichārajñānavirah and Upādhinirasah - are discussed by the Naiyāyikas as sets of specific experiences to be gone through by an individual before making a universal statement (vyāpti). This makes us think that they are now about to take an inductive leap. But they disappoint us by bringing Sāmānyalakṣaṇapratyakṣa as the sixth step. (Of course, the fifth step viz., Tarka, is a kind of hypothetical argument which they have introduced in the procedure but, mind well, it, by itself, falls under Apramā. (See Table III above.)

VII

But is there nothing in Western logic with which the Nyaya anumana can have some affinity?

Formal arguments do not cover the whole of the domain. There are informal arguments too. And while judging this latter kind of arguments, ordinarilly, we "somehow" separate "good" from "bad", "correct" from "incorrect" ones. When pressed upon for the details of this "somehow", we realize that we, in judging an argument as "good" / "sound", intuit that its conclusion follows from its premises, that its premises couldn't be true and conclusion false. If this be the case, if this is what is judged in an informal argument, then is not the concept of validity again brought into the picture? When we judge an informal argument to be "valid", it is NOT the same as the notion of "System-relative validity" as discussed above. Syntactic relations are not judged. The concept of validity here, in the domain of informal arguments, is labelled by some logicians as extra systematic validity". When we merely judge relations among the symbols of a formal language, we are said to have judged the syntax. When we relate the sets of symbols to the things/objects which are symbolized (Note: Truth and Falsity are abstract objects, as discussed above), then we are said to have

brought in semantics into the system. But when, in a universe of discourse which is not a formal system, the symbols get related to the person who uses them, we are said to have brought in the notion of "semiotic". Perhaps the Naiyāyikas' *Anumānakhanda* comes nearer to this last-mentioned area of logic I, as *pramātr*, take recourse to an instance of *svārthānumāna* to yeild true knowledge. Again, I, as a *vādin*, take recourse to an instance of *parāthānīmāna* to convince my opponent about an instance of *pramā*.

However, the fact that an epistemological system like that of Nyāya-Vaiseska is charecterised by this concept of extra-systematic validity is, by itself, not a very great achievement in the area of logic. This is because the connections between the concepts of system-relative validity (syntactic and semantic) and the concept of extra-systematic validity cannot be brushed aside. The two should not stand completely unrelated. Let me elucidate this point. Surely a reflective thinker often begins with ordinary experiences, informal conception of arguments, extra - systematic validity, in formal notion of tautologyhood and the like. But he, as a logician, does not stop here, 'He refines these informal conceptions. He tries to formalise informal arguments and aims at representing them in very rigorous terms.. He develops a formal system through the development of a formal language and a deductive apparatus (see table 1 in part I). Once a logical system carries the label of being "formal" then it ought to satisfy the formal properties of Soundness, Consistency and Completeness. Thus given an informal argument which is valid in extra-systematic sense will, when formalised, be valid in the system. Inversely, an informal argument which is valid in the extra-systematic sense, when formalised, will be invalid in the system. Of course there are challenges to certain parts of this explanation coming from the thinkers who advocate Relevance Logic but any detailed discussion on that, I believe, would be beyond the scope of this paper and hence I would be content to leave the matter here while resounding my initial opinion that where there is no good ground for comparison, comparison is odious.

Department of Philosophy Wilson College, Bombay-400 007.

A.B. RANDERIA

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No.2 April, 1995

MAHATMA GANDHI: HINDU EVANGELICAL AND PURITAN?

Chandran Devanesen is moved to state that, as a young man, Gandhi had become a "Hindu evangelical and Puritan" (Hunt 142). This rather startling statement --surprising in that it describes the 'Great Soul' of modern India, and an almost deified Hindu religious leader in seemingly Christian terms ---caught my eye, and occasioned the writing of this article.

of

of

of of

y

al

al

ot

0

y

e

g

s,

ıt

e

n

S

e

e

In order to unpack Devanesen's short phrase, I had to define for myself what an 'evangelical' was, and what a 'puritan' was. To this end, I consulted the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, edited by James Hastings, and my various assertions as to what constitutes evangelicalism, evangelism, and puritanism, are from that source.

However odd it may seem to describe the Mahatma as a Puritan, the very word itself rings with Gandhian overtones of both self-purification of the social order in India. It was first applied to those Protestants who sought to further purify the Church in England under Elizabeth I; and was extended to those "who attempted a greater sobriety of life than was customary" (Wood 507). Both of these aspects of Puritanism describe Gandhi's practises quite well: he sought to purify the Hinduism of his day from untouchability; and as to a puritan 'sobriety of life', he went so far as to condemn even the pleasure gained from eating: the food we eat is to sustain the body, never to satisfy the palate" (Fischer 243).

The "reproving of Drunkards and Swearers" (Wood 507), is a prototypical Puritan program, and this Gandhi did too, as he excoriated "the curse of intoxicating drinks and drugs" (Fischer 196), and called the "Trade in them ... demonstrably sinful" (Fischer 244). In same fashion, "Puritanism cut men off from wasteful

d

r

f

SI

E

to

to

to

is

hi

G

18

he

C

ha

--(

yo 17

ev

go

als

Up

expenditure and worldly pleasure. Forms of indulgence which dissipated both wealth and energy were sternly denounced and repressed. Time and talents were not to be wasted" (Wood 514). Gandhi, I think, was an early master of time management --- he had to be, to accomplish all he did --- as S.K. George says, "There is no man on earth who can give a better account of his minutes and his seconds than Gandhi" (15).

Gandhi's lifelong campaign against untouchability finds a specific echo in Puritan efforts to reform the Church in England from superstitious practices and patronage. Hereditary parish ministry positions, the open selling of advowsons, and the very concept of hierarchical episcopal control of the church, resulted in the Puritans becoming the 'untouchables' of seventeenth-century England -- in many cases excommunicated, and commonly barred from communion in the traditional church. The dead hand of received religion had oppressed the pariahs of India in the same way for centuries --- the Hindu caste system had the backing of religious sanctions that rested on the bedrock of reincarnation, wherein blame was actually placed upon the pariahs themselves, for having performed bad actions in a previous life, thus landing themselves in their present fix. In much the same way, the Puritans had willfully separated themselves from the Church, and become outcast in the society of their time.

The Puritans also stood for education and the life of reasoneven for the primacy of reason over emotion --- as seen in the importance attached to the teaching sermon in religious life. And what did Gandhi do for most of his public life, but travel the whole of India giving sermons; he used public platforms to inspire and educate the masses, to carry on his campaigns against Hindu/ Muslim sectarianism, untouchability, and for spinning.

Also, compare the Puritan's "Idleness was a sure sign that one's standing in grace was doubtful. No one should be unemployed, even the man of leisure should find some occupation which would be of service to the commonweal" (Wood 514), with Gandhi's "Why should I, who have no need to work for food, spin? ... Because I am eating what does not belong to me. I am living on the spoilation

?

rich

and

14). had

s no

his

ls a

and

rish

ery d in

ury

Ted

of

way

ous

ein

ing

sin

ılly

the

n-

the

and

ole

and

dul

hat ed;

uld

hi's

ise

ion

of my countrymen Swaraj has no meaning for the millions, if they do not know how to employ their enforced idleness" (Andrews 263).

Gandhi carried on his sermonizing and his efforts at reform in a true evangelical spirit. He spread the 'good news' of social and religious reform wherever he went in India. In fact, his proselytizing for a free India, for an end to untouchability, and for spinning, coupled with his religious tolerance for people of all faiths, bears a strong resemblance to the platform and the philosophy of the Evangelical Alliance movement.

This Christian group's main principles are "to give expression to the substantial unity existing between Evangelical believers, and to cultivate brotherly love", and to "spread the principles of religious toleration.... disavowing all thought of interfering with the loyalty of members to their respective denominations" (Schaff 601). This is all very Gandhian: he is celebrated for his religious tolerance, and his words to the effect that 'I am a Muslim, a Hindu, a Christian' are a case in point; even the daily prayer services in Gandhi's own ashram normally included hymns, and readings from the Koran, as well as Hindu observances like readings from the Gita.

A case might be made for the influence of this group on Gandhi's thought, during an early period in his life when his religious and spiritual understandings were not yet fully formed. In 1890 Gandhi was in London, and that period corresponded with the height of influence of the Evangelical Alliance. The Congregationalist church was a member, and Gandhi is known to have enthusiastically attended their services under Joseph Parker-Gandhi is quoted as saying "It was his appeal to the thoughts of young men that laid hold of me, and I went again and again" (Hunt 17).

This was a formative period for the young Gandhi, and the evangelical principles of religious tolerence and a duty to spread the gospel would have sunk deeply into his consciousness. They would also have agreed nicely with the religious tolerance of Gandhi's upbringing in Porbandar, but I think that the proselytizing fervor of

i

e

a

k

th

it

Je

lı

aı

fi

fr

id

st

to

la

CC

G

hi

162

evangelical Christianity is something that touched Gandhi here in London for the first time, and that it is a dynamic that influenced the rest of his life and his mission in a very important way.

He was constantly on the receiving end of Christian evangelism, and I think simply in the interest of conversational survival, he would have had to acquire some techniques of argument and challenge, if only in self defence. Remember it was at this period (1894), that the young Gandhi wrote home to India for spiritual advice, including a list of soul-searching questions like:

What is God? Is he the Creator of the Universe? If a claim is put forward that a particular religion is the best, may we not ask the claimant for proof? The Christians hold that the Bible is divinely inspired, and that Christ was an incarnation of God, being his Son. Was He? (Hunt 39)

The confrontational tactics of the evangelists were having an effect. And Gandhi would have noted and remembered the techniques, for use in all the public and private and contexts of his own proselytizing career. As Nehru says of Gandhi's committee work, "Very often his proposals seemed novel to our committee, and it did not approve of them. But almost always he argued his way to their acceptance" (Nehru 15).

The public commitment and the confrontational tactics of Christian evangelism may even be seen echoing in Gandhi's satyagraha campaigns. For the satyagrahi, like the active Christian missionary, puts his own self, his own body out there on the line-he is his own witness, for love and for truth. "Gandhi's method makes its appeal in the sure confidence that the suffering of the innocent victim will convince the wrong-doer of the enormity of his wickedness, and will work a change in his heart" (George 16). That is the same change of heart that the Christian evangelist seeks to obtain. And the technique is similar: especially in foreign mission fields, the evangelist is placing his innocent self in the path of suffering --- defenceless against harm from the populace -- while he seeks to convince people of the enormity of the sin and ignorance.

they labour under without the saving knowledge of Christ. People are delivered from wickedness in both cases, and active selfless intervention is also the technique in both.

I think that the case for Gandhi's evangelistic tendencies, and their probable Christian origins, cannot be too strongly made. Spiritual revival for instance, is characteristic of evangelism and 'Gandhiism' both. Gandhi sought to revive his country's Hinduism, in relation to its treatment of the untouchables and this entailed an examination of the roots of Hindu caste prejudice, and concomitantly the bases of Hinduism itself: is brotherly love a higher value than arid fatalism?; should Hindus oppress and exploit their own fellow men? And this did cause religious revival in India --- temples were opened to the Harijans (Fischer 280), and people were inspired to look upon one another differently, more lovingly.

Gandhi sought also to revive India's pride as a nation. He knew that an India that saw itself as free, proud, and strong, would in fact be worthy of Swaraj. It would have received its self-sufficiency and its capacity for self-rule, and he knew that his vision of the New Jerusalem of Indian society would at least be potentially real: "If India adopted the doctrine of love as an active part or her religion, and introduced it in her politics, Swaraj would descend upon India from heaven" (Fischer 119).

ıĉ

is

ij

of

15

he us

00

of

ile

His attempts to revive the village economies of India, through proselytizing for the spinning wheel, are universally known. He thought that this revival movement would save millions of villagers from starvation (Fischer 160), and their humanity from the curse of idleness. He also sought to save the Indian economy as a whole, by staunching at its source the outflow of capital that went from India to England for the purchase of imported cloth.

Gandhi was even aware of the dangers of 'revivalism': in the late nineteenth-century in America, it had become clear that influences that conduced to crowd emotions, to mass hysteria, could actually manufacture religious conversions (Stalker 606). Gandhi was moved to instruct the crowds that came together to hear his messages against those very tendencies: a "pledge must not be

gra

wh

col

sat

is

Ch

of

pri

ne

unl

the we

and

eva

ma

exa

lon

soc

inti

PUL

his

ind

Wit

con

of t

clos

SOC

sinc

tem

164

taken with a view to produce an effect on outsiders Everyone should fully realize his responsibility, then pledge himself only independently of others, and understand that he himself must be true to his pledge, even unto death, no matter what others do" (Fischer 95). Gandhi wanted no spiritual groupies, who would fall by the wayside in the face of opposition.

That Gandhi thought to 'save' all these multitudinous peoples, economies, and industries, is a direct reflection of Christian evangelical influences on his thought. It is the evangelicals whose very lifeblood is the active outreach among people; and it is from that source that Gandhi, very likely, gained the evangelizing purpose and structure that he filled and energized with his own great personhood throughout his whole life.

Evangelicals promoted their faith through personal testimony, and through corporate action in the world--as did Gandhi. Evangelicals--in both England and America ---led the crusade against the Slave Trade during the nineteenth century. One could drew a direct parallel between that and Gandhi's crusade against untouchability; untouchability is, in fact, a good analogue of America's slave trade, and Gandhi tried to be India's Lincoln, in respect of freeing the untouchables.

Evangelicals are noted for their sensitivity to the Holy Spirit of God, especially the Pentecostals. They are commonly thought to be imbued with the indwelling Spirit, and certainly seek to do His bidding in their lives, to follow His teachings. Gandhi too: "I do not know what you mean by the living Christ But if you mean a spirit guiding me, a presence nearer to me than hands and feet, than the very breath in me, then I do feel such a presence" (George 8)

The evangelical is concerned to convert the unbeliever to a saving knowledge of Christ, and Gandhi was all his life similarly concerned to convert people to a saving knowledge of the place and power of love in human affairs. He engaged with the poorest villager, to convert him towards loving his Muslim brother, and towards self-sufficiency through spinning; and he engaged with the Viceroy of India to convert him to loving the whole of India and

CC-0. In Public Domain. Gurukul Kangri Collection, Haridwar

granting its independence. He founded newspapers and magazines wherever he went, in order to propagandize for his ideas, and to convert the masses of the people towards his ideals of ahimsa, and satyagraha, and Indian independence: "conversion of the opponent is the real intent of satyagraha" (Easwaran 163).

This is another parallel with Evangelical practice, since the Christian Evangelicals are famous for spreading the gospel through publications, as witness the very many Religious Tract societies of the nineteenth century, and the Bible Societies with their endless printings of pamphlets, books, sermons, magazines, and newspapers - all with the avowed purpose of converting the imbeliever. There even arose a new occupation to distribute all these new publications: that of colportage, in which the colporteur went door to door, and village to village, carrying all the latest tracts and sermons. In the same way, and for the same purposes (albeit the evangelism was also political), Gandhi founded newspapers and magazines wherever he went, Indian Opinion and Harijan being examples, although Young India was the most noteworthy and longlasting.

That Gandhi could so far raise himself out of this communal social background, as to stand alone as the leader of a new spiritual and political movement, may owe its raison d'etre to his longterm intimacy with Christian evangelism too. There is in protestant puritanism an emphasis on the individual as both the final arbiter of his own fate, and as repository of ultimate value. It is for each of us individually that Christ died, and we make individual decisions for Christ, and perhaps most importantly, we each have only one life within which to be ourselves. This is in direct contrast to the communal nature of Indian social and religious life, where in individual is merged into the larger whole—he is a member, or unit of the family, village, caste, or occupation, because "Centuries of close communal life have caused the individual to be merged in the social environment" (Andrews 263).

The Hindu is even in himself a kind of a member of a crowd, since believing in reincarnation, he sees himself as merely one lemporary manifestation of his own continuing self--a long line of

past and possible selves. This viewpoint even further vitiates his sense of independent personhood, and makes it even more remarkable that Gandhi should stand so tall and so alone in his missionary efforts on behalf of India and all Indians. His bravely individual stature may be in part a tribute to all those early experiences of lone Christian ministers, up on the pulpit energizing their many parishoners.

It should be remembered that during Gandhi's years of young manhood, Christianity in England and South Africa was undergoing a series of revivals, and that contact with it would have been exciting and inspiring for the young Gandhi, whether he was able to accept some of the basic tenets, or not. As Gandhi himself said of his Christian friends in Pretoria," I have remained forever indebted to them for the religious quest that they awakened in me" (Devanesen 262).

But the parallelism of individualities is distinct: just as evangelical Christianity demanded a personal experience of Christ, and an individual commitment to leading a Christian life, so too Gandhi demanded of his satyagrahi a personal vision of the truth and love implicit in his method, and an individual commitment to both Hind Swarāj and to personal purity of life.

So having come this far, was Gandhi in fact a kind of Christian missionary in a loincloth? Clearly not. He himself denied that he was a Christian on many occasions (Fischer 41), and indeed, as a born and practicing Hindu, Gandhi found it impossible to embrace Christianity fully, for at least three reasons. One stumbling block was the singular and unique divinity of Christ---even in his early years in London, when his religious understandings were tentative at best, he denied himself membership in the Congregationalist church he attended (Hunt 17), on the basis of this fundamental disagreement with Christian teachings. For the Hindu, Christ is acceptable as one of the divine avatars of the Godhead, but certainly not as the only one.

Similarly, the acceptance of Christ's once and for all sacrifice of Himself--the atonement that redeems us all from our sins, is unacceptable to the thinking Hindu. This is related to the third major

is

İs

es

ly

ig

lg

ıg

pt

is

to

'n

as

st,

M

th

to

ļĈ

k

ly

1¢

st

al

ly

parting of the ways between Hinduism and Christianity, the belief in reincarnation and a concomitant gradual self-cleansing from sin.

For the Christian, man in his fallen earthly state is inescapably sinful--he needs Christ's intercession as the only possible means to redemption, in this one and only life. For the Hindu, on the contrary, perfection and freedom from sin are possible through his own efforts although it may take untold thousands of lifetimes, sin may be overcome, and the oneness of being atman and Brahman may be realized in the joy of moksha in life on earth. The two systems are mutually incompatible--- either you have reincarnation, or you have Christ; and Gandhi's understanding of the differences between the two faiths would have been heightened and illuminated by the many meetings and discussions he had with evangelical Christians of many persuasions over the years.

I think that ultimately, what evangelical puritan Christianity did to Gandhi was, in Devanesen's words, to convert him "into a vig rous Evangelical Hindu" (emphasis added) (258). This in itself, although unintended by Gandhi's Christian friends, was a great and glorious accomplishment. It gave to India, and to the world the Gandhiji that we know and love: the Mahātmā.

The purifying of Gandhi's religious knowledge and practice that occurred in the fire of dialogue with his Christian friends found expression in his great life of renunciation and service; it formed a part of the motive force that has done so much to end untouchability in India, and to give India independence; and it shines as a beacon to all men who value love and truth in life. And perhaps even Gandhiji himself might not object to being called a follower of Christ, were it to be couched in Christ's own terms: "For whoever does the will of my father in heaven is my brother, and sister, and mother" (Matt. 12:50).

Green College, 6201 Cecil Green Park Road, Vancouver, British Columbia, V6T IZI. Canada.

ARNOLD KRUGER

NOTES

Andrews C.F. Mahatma Gandhi: His Life and Ideas. Delhi: Anmol, 1987.

--- . The Renaissance in India: Its Missionary Aspect. London: United Council for Missionary Education, 1914.

Devanesen, Chandran D.S. The Making of the Mahatma. Madras: orient Longmans, 1969.

Easwaran, Eknath. Gandhi the Man. Petaluma: Nilgiri, 1983. Fischer, Louis, ed. The Essential Gandhi: His Life, work, and Ideas. New York: Vintage-Random, 1983.

George, S.K. Gandhi's Challenge to Christianity. Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960.

The Holy Bible. Revised Standard Version. New York: Nelson, 1952. Hunt, James D. Gandhi and the Nonconformists: Encounters in South Africa. New Delhi: Promilla, 1986.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. Mahatma Gandhi. Bombay: Asia, 1966. Schaff, David S. "Evangelical Alliance." Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. James Hastings et al. 13 vols. New York: Scribner's, n.d. 5: 601-602.

Stalker, James. "Evangelicalism." Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. James Hastings et al. 13 vols. New York: Scribner's, n.d. 5: 602-607.

Wood, H.G. "Puritanism." Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Ed. James Hastings et al. 13 vols. New York: Scribner's, n.d. 10: 507-515.

ANNOUNCEMENT

No separate Students' Supplement will be issued with every number of the IPQ hereafter. However contributions are welcome from the Students and they will be included in the October Issue of every year hereafter in the form of a separate section.

- Chief Editor

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No.2 April, 1995

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR RAJENDRA PRASAD ON PHILOSOPHY, EDUCATION AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE: SOME OBSERVATIONS*

This submission consists of two sections. In the first section I shall try to understand the position of the author and in the second section an attempt will be made to put forward certain observations on the problems raised in the paper. Before entering into the main content, I take the opportunity to convey my deep sense of gratitude to Professor Prasad for writing such a thought-provoking and excellent paper. This paper may plausibly attract a lot of comments and observations for its pragmatic nature. IPQ (XXI: 2) April 1994.

T

The author has very rightly identified certain problems relating to educational system and in turn the quality of life which is intimately related with the former. He also tries to provide a clue towards the solution of this problem. I agree with Professor Prasad about the degenerate state of education and the quality of life determined by such education. But I am not convinced about the feasibility of the solution proposed by him. This conviction is borne out of the prevalent social reality through experience.

Professor Prasad has very appropriately noted the task of the philosopher in social context where he says, "Philosophy being a predominantly cognitive inquiry, his concern with social affairs or problems has to be predominantly cognitive etc. etc." (P. 101).

^{*} The Editors of the IPQ, very deeply regret the untimely death of Prof. Abul Kasem which occurred recently. He was only 42. Prof. Kasem was Reader in Philosophy at North Bengal University, and was a frequent contributor to IPQ.

170

ABUL KASEM

He unhesitatingly points out the failure of the philosophical community in India. It is also true, he maintains, that sometimes philosophers are unduly accused of for not taking active part in social affairs. However, the exhortationists are not at all clear as to what role a philosopher can play in social context. Does he play the role like a politician or a chairman of a flood-relief committee? Plato once said "Philosopher must be king". But now-a-days philosophy and philosophical community in India are becoming good for nothing in social context. In fact I cannot resist myself to note that one Vice-Chancellor (a leading expert in Bengali language and literature) has commented sometimes back that students of Bengali and philosophy will deal in potato fry. This reflects the attitude of the academics in India towards the state of philosophy. What to say about the common people? I am no less concerned about the Question of survivality of philosophy. One thing strikes to my mind that perhaps we have not yet succeeded to resolve the questions 'What philosophy is' and 'What philosophy is for' in our socio-political context. On the contrary, we are simply engrossed in assessing and reassessing some stale philosophical theories already propounded either in the East or in the West as purely intellectual exercise for name, fame and fortune. Here too lies the failure of the philosophical community of our country. In this context I mean to say that our philosophical activity does not reflect our life. Rather it is totally divorced from social reality and has become the monopoly of a group of so-called intellectuals. The author with his vast experience has properly diagnosed the degeneration of social values in every sphere of life. But this is nothing new. Many educationists in the past also lamented about social degradation. However, recently in academic field it has become very rampant. Dr. Prasad has cited a lot of examples in favour of his position. I can also supplement another set of causes from my experience e.g., Ph.D. degrees are sold in lieu of cash or kind, dictating notes in the class room without discussion, discriminatory marking, supplying answers in the examination hall, research scholars are sometimes used for personal comfort of the supervisor. As a result students are reluctant to read text book, they are interested for notes and even abhorrent to read those notes, rather prefer to adopt unfair means in the examination. Research scholars, on the otherhand, are expecting their dissertation to be written by

the incompetent, dishonest supervisors who in turn advising to copy from books and managing to find out examiners of the same category for the dissertations to be approved. This is however not the whole story. There are indeed a few who have been constantly endeavouring to resist this dishonesty but they are outnumbered and even sometimes the authority is siding with the corrupt majority on the pretext of democracy.

But the crux of this discussion is that the author has suggested some way out of this total chaos and degeneration. He has introduced the concept of internal value that can help surviving this dismayed educational situation. By internal value the author intends to mean generation of some kind of value through imparting/receiving process in the normal way. These values are basic, indigenous or internal to any worth-while, well-conducted formal system. They are built into the very concept of formal education. The author emphasized that these values should not be tampered with. They are processional i.e., inclucated in the normal process of education. It appears to me here that the author is mainly concerned with the educatees and he has not taken into account the role of the educators and helping staff in running a formal educational system that can generate internal values.

Most importantly, the author attempts to establish a relation between internal value of education and quality of life. Although in section IV he proclaims that at least a working conception of the worthy life is to be reinforced through a sensible education and in section V he tries to show that internal values of education can improve quality and standard of social life to greater extent. He was very much emphatic to hold that whatever other factors there are, without proper education and educational system the dream of value-based worthy life and society cannot be realized. This in fact a truism.

A most important and pertinent question that the author does not miss to highlight is educational system inculcating internal value must function unobstructedly in a normal situation. Besides, the educatee, educator and the helping staff must work hand in hand with commitment and accountability.

ABUL KASEM

II

What has been said above is my understanding about the problem of education and quality of life pragmatically discussed by an eminent scholar and academician. I do not know whether I have been able to understand him properly. As mentioned before, I am inclined to make some observations which may appear unorganized in the face of such a well-articulated, well-organized paper of Professor Prasad. However, before that I shall try to make a very brief theoretical prefatory note of my observations.

Education is no doubt a social phenomenon. To understand this phenomenon properly some other social conditions are required to be understood. It is palpable that every social phenomenon is intimately connected with its economic condition. This is no exception in India also. Hence it is clear that in our social context we have to understand the methodology of cognition of the social process, by which we are guided in the analysis of philosophical and sociological ideas. Lenin wrote, "Just as man's knowledge reflects matter which exists independently of him, so man's social knowledge reflects the economic system of society". Political institutions are known as a superstructure of the economic foundation. We are quite aware of the economic situation of our society. Inequality is one of the burning problems of this economic system. More than 67% of people live below the poverty line and more than 50% of them are illiterate. With the concentration of national wealth education is also getting confined within a particular section of people as saleable commodity.

Now let me clarify my position noted above. The system of education generating internal values demands commitment of educatees, educators and non-teaching staff as maintained by Dr. Prasad. But in reality we discern that lack of commitment of all the three sections is one of the important factors for debacle of educational system culminating in degeneration of social life. Professor Prasad further maintains that educational system in order to generate internal value must function unobstructedly without any extraneous interference of whatever nature. But this condition is hardly fulfilled.

We are all aware that India had been under British rule for two hundred years. The main intention of the British rule was exploitation. Naturally they have constructed and executed everything in India keeping in mind their class interest. Economy and education are no exception. They were out to destroy the economic self-dependence of this country. As a result the educational system they executed suited them and helped to serve their economic interest. The present educational system does not have its root in the soil of our society. It is not framed considering the needs and aspirations of our social reality. Rather it is superimposed and inherited which has enormous oddity, infirmity and inconformity. These loopholes can hardly be corrected with temporary measure.

Some historians raised a very tricky question whether India has achieved freedom in the true sense of the term or it is mere transfer of power. If the latter is the case then only rulers have changed but the machine of exploitation and the socio-economic condition of the large majority of the ruled have remained unchanged. It again implies that power was captured by the then leaders in order to satisfy their personal ambition and aspiration. They had no ideology or philosophy for future India. The British rulers transferred power to the Indian affluent elites who were supposed to act as their representatives. Naturally, since then there has been no fundamental changes in the social systems-be it economy or education-in conformity with the social reality of our country. It may not be irrelevant to note that some great men like Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore have tried to formulate and execute certain indigenous economic and educational systems but those are not widely accepted. Therefore, we are still within an educational system advocated by the colonial rulers. However, at times certain minor changes and adjustments are made within the given system.

I have mentioned that educational system was never free from extraneous interference both in the pre-independence and post-independence period. To illustrate, it may be recalled that during post-independence India there has been a number of commissions on education headed by eminent educationists. But how many recommendations are accepted and implemented? Besides, after

174 ABUL KASEM

independence education was included in the state list of the Constitution but later on it has been brought back under the concurrent list. And the reason is simply to keep political control over the educational affairs. Hence education has not till now operated unobstructedly and I believe will never within this system without radical shift in orientation and approach.

Further I would like to point out that lack of commitment among the participating parties in academic system cannot be achieved unless rules framed are uniformly executed. Now-a-days in most of the academic institutions it has become the practice to implement rules in a discriminatory way resulting in frustration and lack of commitment among a large section of staff. This discriminatory attitude of the authorities in most cases is due to their personal benefit-direct or indirect.

To conclude my submission I would suggest that value oriented educational system may be evolved depending upon the personal integrity and honesty of the individual which is inherent or genetical in nature and can flower in the congenial atmosphere. Besides, collective effort for uniform execution of formal rules must be ensured for smooth functioning of a system generating internal values. This in turn necessitates political will of the ruling class. In order to achieve our goal of value-oriented education and quality of life it is necessary to arrange indigenous educational system for all people. Necessary measures should be initiated for eradication of illiteracy and compulsory free primary education. These programmes no doubt require certain effective economic steps to be taken for their meaningful implementation. I believe there may be other considerations but these are no less important for a value-based educational system that can improve the quality of social life to a greater extent.

Department of Philosophy University of North Bengal Darjeeling-734 430.

ABUL KASEM

Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No.2 April, 1995

DISCUSSION

VALUE EDUCATION

The purpose of this paper is to offer some comments on Prof. R. Prasad's article, "Philosophy, Education and the Quality of life" published in the I.P.Q. Volume XXI, (No.2) April 1994.

Some of Prasad's observations are highly insightful. They are as follows: (i) Compulsory introduction of value education in educational institutions is not going to eliminate the ills affecting the Indian Society today. (ii) In the contemporary period, in India the 'Internal Values' of the entire educational process have been thrown overboard. (iii) If we wish to save the institution of education and improve upon the quality of life we have to reinstate and inculcate the internal or the processional values. In short, Prasad's concern at total collapse of values in the sphere of education and his call to return to internal values are highly appreciable.

But at the same time, Prof. Prasad has not distinguished between the values which are internal to educational process and values which are general in nature. Truthfulness, tolerance, honesty and integrity, co-operation, mutual love and affection etc. are general values which are necessary for the smooth running of a society and unfortunately these values have almost vanished from the Indian society today. That is to say, public morality is shrinking very fast and consequently, there is degeneration in every walk of life; - be it politics, bureaucracy or education. The cry for value education is symptomatic of genuine feeling of a section of sensible people to save the Indian society from total collapse. Prof. Prasad has not offered any solution as to how the broad and general values are to be inculcated in society so that public morality can be saved from utter ruination.

Of course Prasad is right in arguing that education is one of the

176 N. MALLA

effective instruments of social change and if it is conducted in a disciplined manner as per its intrinsic norms and values, gradually it will have its impact felt in other sectors of society and things are likely to change for the better. There is truth in the statement, Educational institutions not only aim at creation and propagation of knowledge and thereby achieve what is known as academic excellence but they are supposed to instill a sense of general discipline so that it percolates to other spheres of life. Imagine a hypothetical educational institution where all the members of the faculty are highly competent and all the students are exceptionally brilliant. But all of them are habitual thieves and invaringly indulge in corrupt practices. In short, the inmates are highly disciplined in matters of academic pursuit but highly indisciplined in conduct of their day to day commerce of life. In such a situation, in absence of general discipline, the so-called academic excellence will be meaningless and counterproductive. This is to show that academic discipline is not a sure guarantee for general discipline.

In fact, there is no dearth of cases in Indian universities today where very brilliant teachers and otherwise sound and disciplined academicians indulge in corrupt practices. Even some Vice-Chancellors have not been able to distance them from such an evil. How to eradicate such maladies affecting the society in general and educational institutions in particular? There is no single solution to it! Prof. Prasad rightly points out that no amount of sermonization on the so called spiritual values is going to save the situation. Rather, in the process, it may be counter productive.

This argument is based on the presupposition that values and morality cannot be inculcated through lectures in the class rooms but by setting examples. This can be done in two ways: (i) The elders or the seniors in the society have to lead a virtuous life i.e., socially desirable and acceptable one and those indulging in corrupt practices have to be awarded exemplary punishment. When the comman man and the sensible politicians look to the teachers for guidance it is not without reason or basis. Traditionally, teaching or imparting of instruction has been regarded as a value-based and value-oriented activity. Consequently, it is believed that those in charge of educating the youth must not only be torch bearers of

Value Education 177

knowledge but also act as the protectors and preservers of values. But they do not know that there is a near shell-out of all values in the so called educational institutions. What we need at this juncture is a very strong and enlightened political will so that the situation can be saved without allowing further erosion of social and academic atmosphere.

Teachers have to play a very significant role in this respect. To begin with, enforcement of discipline is, by and large, the task of the teachers. It is true that indiscipline inside the class room is a part of the general indiscipline in the society and the former can be checked only when the latter is brought to a check. But somewhere the break-through has to be made and it is desirable and convenient that it begins in the class room. To wait for the *Messiah* to descend upon the earth and solve our problem with a magic wand is to defer the problem. Further, as a part of value-education the present day degenerate condition of the Indian society may be discussed in detail in higher classes so as to acquaint the future citizen of the country with the actual situation. In this respect, the philosopher can play a very significant role.

Right action presupposes right knowledge or understanding. It is the philosophers along with other intellectuals who owe a debt to society in this respect. Their task is not only to contribute to enrichment of the respective fields of knowledge but also to help in bringing about desirable change in society. This is otherwise known as the commitment of the intellectuals to the society. The desired change can be brought about in two ways: (i) By presenting a critical analysis of the corrupt practices prevalent in the society and (ii) by raising a voice of protest wherever necessary and Possible. Say, for instance, many of the evils relating to examination, evaluation, recruitment and promotion of undesired and undeserving persons in the centres or higher learning can come to a stop if some sensible teachers take up the cudgels in earnestness. Prof. Prasad seems not to be appreciating the reformative role of the intellectuals along with the philosopher. He gives an impression that if teaching is done in a disciplined manner, things will automatically change. But I beg to differ from him on this point. Yes, under normal conditions, his proposal can go on very well. But N. MALLA

today in India, the entire society is degenerate and corrupt and to change it, the intellectuals have to perform the role of the activist along with performance of their normal academic duties. The concept 'activism' stands in need of explication. In one of its senses, activism stands for direct and violent act of interference and interruption.

In another sense, 'activism' stands for non-violent act of protest against injustice, corruption and malpractices. When we say that the intellectuals, apart from performing their assigned duties, must play the role of an activist, we mean it in the second sense. Things will not change unless teachers raise their voice of protest. But this is equally true that the teaching community, by an large in India today is corrupt and dishonest. How to get rid of it? In other words, who will bell the cat?. There is no clear cut answer to this question. Either we leave every-thing to take its natural course or we consciously and with deliberation interfere with the social process and give it a new and desired direction. However, the decision is ours.

Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy NEHU, Shillong - 793 014.

N. MALLA

1. P

2. P

3. F

4. I

5. 1

F

Statement Concerning Ownership and other Particulars about the journal

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Form IV (RULE 8)

l. Place of Publication

Philosophy Department University of Pune,

Pune 411007.

2. Periodiocity of its Publication Quarterly

3. Printer's Name and

Shri, Sudhir S. Jadhay

address

Print Art Enterprises 847 Kasba Peth, Pune 411011.

Whether Citizen of India

Yes

4. Publisher's Name and Address

Dr. Shrinivas Vyankatesh Bokil Philosophy Department, University of Pune,

Pune 411007.

Whether Citizen of India

Yes

5. Editors' Names and Addresses

- Dr. Shrinivas Vyankatesh Bokil
 Philosophy Department,
 University of Pune,
 Pune 411007.
- ii) Dr. Rajendra Prasad,
 Opp. Stadium Main Gate
 Premchand Path,
 Rajendra Nagar,
 Patna 800016.

- iii) Dr. Mrinal Miri
 Director, Indian Institute of
 Advanced Studies,
 Rashtrapati Niwas,
 Summer Hill, Shimla 171005.
- iv) Dr. Sharad Deshpande
 Philosophy Department,
 University of Pune,
 Pune 411007.
- v) Dr. Pradeep P. Gokhale Philosophy Department, University of Pune, Pune 411007.

Whether Citizen of India

Yes

6. Name and Address of the Institution which owns the Journal

Department of Philosophy University of Pune, Pune 411007.

I, Shrinivas Vyankantesh Bokil, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SHRINIVAS VYANKATESH BOKIL

ARISTOTLE ON MAGNANIMITY

Aristotle's modern commentators have had difficulty in coming to terms with how the virtue of magnanimity, or in Greek megalopsuchia, which literally means "greatness of soul", is to be understood in terms of the Aristotleian framework of virtue. Critics of Aristotle's megalopsuchos, or magnanimous person, claim that he is somehow lacking in a given virtue on the basis of the portrait of the megalopsuchos offered in the Nicomachean Ethics, (hereafter NE.) The Eudemian Ethics, (hereafter EE), does not contain, to a large extent, this portrait, rich in detail, and hence is largely spared the disparaging critical remarks reserved for the NE portrait. To be sure, criticism regarding the issue of whether magnanimity, which is defined as the combination of greatness and self-knowledge, is even a virtue, is directed toward both the ethical works.

The critics claim, according to commentator Howard Curzer, that the megalopsuchos is (1) conceited, (2) snobbish, (3) ungrateful and manipulative, (4) inactive and remote, (5) oblivious and immoral, (6) insufficiently concerned with honor, (7) self-absorbed. (8) unable to form perfect friendships, (9) unneighborly, and (10) obsessed with and motivated by honor². Clearly, this is a less than flattering view of an allegedly magnanimous person. It is, however, outside the scope of my paper to attempt to rehearse Curzer's persuasive point by point refutation of the above mentioned criticisms of the megalopsuchos. Nonetheless, it is evident that in the aforementioned character defects of the megalopsuchos, numbers 6 and 10 appear to be diametrically opposed. This fundamental tension in the critical interpretation of the Aristotelian megalopsuchos' relation to honor is the basis upon which a scholarly debate between Curzer and commentator Neil Cooper³ has developed.

In particular, they disagree on the issue of how Aristotle resolves the apparent tension between the megalopsuchos being on the one hand, overly concerned with honor and, on the other hand, not being

sufficiently concerned with honor. Cooper takes the view that the tension "in Aristotle's thought" between the megalopsuchos valuing honor as the "greatest of external goods", and considering honor to be a "small thing" is explicit in the EE and "underneath the surface" in the NE⁴. Curzer⁵, on the other hand, maintains that whereas the tension is evident in the EE, there is no such tension in the NE⁵. Although they both think Aristotle offers a clear solution to the problem in the EE, the difference is that Cooper takes the fact that Aristotle resolves the issue in the EE to be "further evidence" that Anthony Kenny is correct in suggesting, in his The Aristotelian Ethics, that the EE is the later work. Curzer takes the same fact to be evidence that the EE is the earlier work, insofar as he does not see the EE problem in the NE⁸. Certainly, Curzer considers the phenomenon of problem loss from one work to another to be indicative of philosophical maturity.

For my part, I am sympathetic with Cooper's contention that Aristotle's explicit resolution of the difficulty in the EE seems to indicate that it is the later work. Unlike Cooper, though, I attempt to suggest why the tension is not nearly as obvious in the NE as in the EE. Furthermore, I question his criticism of Aristotle's attempt to provide a unitary account of magnanimity. If my view is correct, then we are in a position to see how Curzer seems to be in error in arguing that upon having formulated the solution to the problem in the EE. Aristotle retains the formulated solution, which is a distinction between honor from ordinary people and honor from good people, inasmuch as it seems to be "intrinsically important", but simply rejects the view that the megalopsuchos has "great desires for external goods." Moreover, I should like to suggest that the relative lack of detail on the "state of the magnanimous person", as Terry Irwin puts it on p.99 of his NE translation, in the EE indicates its relative lack of concern with politics and, hence, may corroborate the view that the EE and the NE are intended for different audiences.

Before examining the view of Curzer and Cooper on Aristotle's treatment of the megalopsuchos apparently being obsessed with honor on the one hand and being insufficiently sensitive to honor on the other hand, let us recall Aristotle's discussion of magnanimity in the EE and the NE. In the NE IV, 3, Aristotle offers a definition of the virtue of magnanimity and tries to place it in the context of his scheme of

ıt

1

d

regarding virtues as means between extremes. Curzer points out that in the NE, Aristotle offers a "portrait" of the megalopsuchos, between 1123b26 and 1125a16, "embedded in a frame (1123a34-1123b26, 1125a16-1125a35)." In the frame, Aristotle, according to Curzer, "formally defines" megalopsuchia and tries to "fit it into his virtue-is-a-mean architectonic by contrasting the megalopsychos with the chaunos [or the "vain" person in Irwin's translation], the mikropsychos [or the "pusillanimous" person in Irwin's translation], and the temperate man who lacks megalopsychia." Aristotle begins, as Curzer mentions, by defining the megalopsuchos, the temperate person, the vain person, and the pusillanimous person "in terms of external goods (wealth, power, beauty, honour, etc.)" and self-knowledge.

Aristotle notes at NE 1123a34-1123b2 that magnanimity is "concerned with great things", and the magnanimous person seems to be "one who really thinks himself worthy of great things and is really worthy of them." In contrast, the temperate person is one who is "worthy of little and thinks so" (1123b5-6), the vain person is one who "thinks he is worthy of great things when he is not" (1123b8-9), and the pusillanimous person is one who "thinks he is worthy of less than he is worthy of, whether "he is worthy of great or moderate things; and even if he is worthy of little, he thinks he is worthy of still less than that" (1123b10-12). Curzer contends that these contrasts "emphasize the two components of" megalopsuchia, and they show that the megalopsuchos and the temperate person "share a sort of self-knowledge" which the vain person and the pusillanimous person lack. But Curzer further maintains that since the megalopsuchos "also has greatness while the temperate man lacking" megalopsuchia "does not," Aristotle locates, "in the chapter's frame," megalopsuchia "in a mean with respect to only one of its components." Aristotle claims at 1123b13-17 that the

magnanimous person, then, is at the extreme in so far as he makes great claims. But in so far as he makes them rightly, he is intermediate; for what he thinks he is worthy of reflects his real worth, while the others are excessive or deficient. The pusillanimous person is deficient both in relation to himself [i.e., his worth] and in relation to the magnanimous person's estimate of his own worth, while the vain person makes claims that are excessive for himself, but not for the magnanimous person.

Aristotle returns to the vices of excess and deficiency, or vanity and pusillanimity respectively, at 1125a17-35, and fleshes out what he claims in the above mentioned passage.

Between the above passage and the concluding examination of vanity and pusillanimity, though, Aristotle offers his portrait of the megalopsuchia, in which he, according to Curzer, elaborates upon the definition of megalopsuchia. For instance, Aristotle claims, at 1123b21-23, that magnanimous people "are concerned with honour", which is "the greatest of the external goods". As Curzer notes, honour is the "sphere (peri ho)" of megalopsuchia, and the megalopsuchia "deserves great honour by being more virtuous than others." Indeed, Aristotle mentions at 1123b26-1123b29 that since the magnanimous person is

worthy of the greatest things, he is the best person. For in every case the better person is worthy of something greater, and the best person is worthy of the greatest things; and hence the truly magnanimous person must be good.

The megalopsuchos, as Curzer points out, is "more virtuous than others not only because he has the full compliment of virtues, but also because each of his virtues is greater". For example, he is "more courageous, more just, more temperate, etc". Aristotle relates, at 1123b30-1124a, that greatness

in each virtue also seems proper to the magnanimous person, Magnanimity, then, looks like a sort of adornment of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them. Hence it is hard to be truly magnanimous, since it is not possible without being fine and good.

Furthermore, Aristotle claims at 1124a-5-11 that the megalopsuchos, being "concerned especially with honours and dishonous" discriminates between great and small honours conferred respectively by "excellent" and ordinary people. In particular, the megalopsuchos is "moderately pleased' when he "receives great honours from excellent people", insofar as he thinks he is "getting what is proper to him, or even less." The megalopsuchos adopts this attitude because

H

lý

of

he on

al

W

us

ry

be

ly

us

S,

M.

le

js,

ly

05

M

us

there can be no honour worthy of complete virtue; but still he will accept [excellent people's] honours, since they have nothing greater to award him.

But if he is honoured by just anyone, or for something small, he will entirely disdain it; for that is not what he is worthy of. And similarly he will disdain honour, for it will not be justly attached to him.

Moreover, Aristotle argues at 1124a12-26 that although the magnanimous person is "concerned especially with honours", he will "also have a moderate attitude to riches and power and every sort of good fortune, however it turns out." Indeed, he will be "neither excessively pleased by good fortune nor excessively distressed by ill fortune, since he does not even regard honour as the greatest good." Aristotle concedes that this appartent discounting of honour and other goods makes the megalopsuchos seem "arrogant". To be sure, Aristotle's point seems to be that the magnanimous person's attitude toward honor and other external goods is a mean between he extremes of excessively desiring them and insufficiently desiring them. The "results of good fortune, however, seem to contribute to magnanimity." Thus, even though "only the good person" is honourable, "anyone who has both virtue and these goods is more readily thought worthy of honour." Certainly, as Aristotle noets at 1123a27-1124b6, it is this combination of virtue and the result of good fortune that distinguishes the megalopsuchos from those who lack virtue, but have good fortune and try to "imitate" the magnanimous person. The megalopsuchos, then, as Curzer indicates, "not only deserves, but also claims great honour because he is aware of being more virtuous than most other people." But this self-knowledge" does not lead to exploitation of others or even haughtiness." For instance, when the magnanimous person, as Aristotle notes at 1124b19-23.

meets people with good fortune or a reputation for worth, he displays his greatness, since superiority over them is difficult and impressive, and there is nothing ignoble in trying to be impressive with them. But when he meets ordinary people he is moderate, since superiority over them is easy, and an attempt to be impressive among inferiors is as vulgar as a display of strength against the weak.

186

What is more, self-knowledge, on Curzer's view, "leads" the megalopsuchos to "aim at higher standards of passion and action than others." Aristotle concludes his portrait by offering examples of this. For instance, at 1124b\(\frac{1}{2}\)0-12, Aristotle contends that the magnanimous person is one "who does good but is ashamed when he receives it; for doing good is proper to the superior person, and receiving it to the inferior." In addition, at 1124b\(\frac{2}{2}\)4-26, we learn that the magnanimous person.

stays away from what is commonly honoured, and from areas where others lead; he is inactive and lethargic except for some great honour or achievement. Hence his actions are few, but great and renowned.

Furthermore, from 1124b27 to 1125a16, we are informed by Aristotle that the magnanimous person is "open in his hatreds and his friendship, since concealment is proper to a frightened person." He is "not prone to marvel, since he finds nothing great" Also, he is "no gossip", since he is "not concerned to have himself praised or other people blamed." The magnanimous person "especially avoids laments or entreaties about necessities or small matters." Moreover, the magnanimous person is one "whose possessions are fine and unproductive rather than productive and advantageous, since that is more proper to a self-sufficient person." Aristotle concludes his portrait by pointing out that the magnanimous person.

seems to have slow movements, a deep voice and calm speech. For since he takes few things seriously, he is in no hurry, and since he counts nothing great, he is not strident; and these [attitudes he avoids] are the causes of a shrill voice and hasty movements.

This, then, is the character of the magnanimous person.

As Curzer summarizes, the magnanimous person "has great virtue, knows it, does not flaunt it, and strives to maintain it."

Admittedly, the portrait of the megalopsuchos that Aristotle offeres in the NE is the focus of the critics of Aristotle's discussion of megalopsuchia. The above mentioned criticisms of the megalopsuchos make pointed references to the remarks Aristotle makes in his portrait.

Curzer does well in showing how, when the principle of charity is applied. Aristotle's discussion may be saved from the disparaging comments of critics. But it is important to note that the rich portrait of the megalopsuchos that is in the NE is largely absent in the EE. For instance, in the EE, Aristotle does not point out the magnanimous person's "attitude to danger" nor his "attitude to giving and receiving benefits", as Irwin puts it on p.101 of his NE translation, which he discusses in the NE at 1124b7-18. In addition, Aristotle does not mention in the EE that the megalopsuchos is "inactive and lethargic except for some great honour or achievement." (NE 1124b25) Furthermore, he does not discuss the megalopuschos being "open in his hatreds and his friendships," not being a "gossip," and having "slow movements, a deep voice and calm speech." (NE 1124b27-1125a14) In short, Aristotle does not include serveral of the details about the character of the magnanimous person in his EE discussion of megalopsuchia.

Instead, what he does do in the EE is remind his audience of his endoxic method at the outset. At EE 1232a19-22, Aristotle states that

As to magnanimity we must define its specific nature from the qualities that we ascribe to the magnanimous. For just as with other things, in virtue of their nearness and likeness up to a certain point, their divergence beyond that point escapes notice, so it is with magnanimity.

Upon indicating his endoxic method, Aristotle asserts, at 1223a29-31, that the "magnanimous man, as is indicated by the name we apply to him, is characterized by a certain greatness of soul and faculty." Furthermore, Aristotle notes, at 1232b1-14, that "it seems characteristic of the magnanimous man to be disdainful" because "he cares about few things only, and those great, and not because someone else thinks them so." But the megalopsuchos also "seenms to delight most of all when he obtains honour." Thus, Aristole claims, at 1232b15, that the megalopsuchos "would seem to contradict himself, for to be concerned above all with honour, and yet to disdain the multitude and reputation, are inconsistent." Then Aristotle resolves this problem, and I discuss his resolution below. Thereafter, Aristotle spends the rest of the

chapter, or from 1232b31-1233a30, discussing "for different kinds of men." In particular, there is the person of vanity "who is worthy of the small but thinks himself worthy of the great. Secondly, there is the person of "mean-spiritedness" who "being worthy of great goods, because he possesses the gifts that make a man worthy, does not think himself worthy to share in them." The "opposite of these two" is the "man who is worthy of great goods and thinks himself worthy of them, such being his disposition; he is the mean between the other two and is praiseworthy." Thus, Aristotle maintains that "it is clear that magnanimity is a mean." The fourth sort of person Aristotle wishes to distinguish is "neither wholly blameable nor yet magnanimous, not having to do with anything that possesses greatness, for he neither is worthy nor thinks himself worthy of great goods." It is evident that this person is similar to the temperate perosn Aristotle discusses in the NE. Also, it is certain that Aristotle's treatment of the four sorts of persons is offered in an effort to clearly indicate that magnanimity is a

virtue because it is a mean between the extremes of vanity and "mean-spiritedness" as he calls it in the EE.

The crucial difference between the two discussions of megalopsuchia, I think, is that the EE lacks the richly detailed portrait of the magnanimous person that is in the NE. I take this to be an indication that the two treatises may have been intended for different audiences. Indeed, I want to suggest that the portrait of the magnanimous person that is offered in the NE may perhaps be read as being a blueprint for what an ideal politician is to be like. If this suggestion is correct, then it may lend credence to the view that whereas there is a close tie between the NE and the Politics, the EE is relatively. uninterested in politics. Moreover, I should like to point out that the lack of a detailed portrait in the EE may indicate that it is the later work. My point is that since modern commentators have taken Aristotle's megalopsuchos of the NE to task as mentioned above, it is not implausible that some of Aristotle's contemporaries criticized his portrait of the megalopsuchos in the same fashion. It might be the case that Aristotle, not wishing to court the misguided wrath of contemporary critics who failed to employ the principle of charity in their understanding of his NE discussion of megalopsuchia, simply omitted controversial aspects of his detailed portrait in the EE.

At this point, let us recall Aristotle's methodological comments and his historical milieu. First, Curzer does well in pointing out that Aristotle's discussion of megalopsuchia "constitutes a particularly interesting juncture in the history of ideas; the point at which the vestigial, Homeric values of greatness and grandeur seem to clash with the newer value of moderation and the mean."11 Cooper, however, claims that Aristotle's account emerges, out of the rubble of a failed attempt to offer an "impossible" unitary account, as an "attempt in a broad sense to do justice to both Achillean and Socratic elements in Greek evaluations" of megalopsuchia.12 Still, Cooper seems to suggest that Aristotle's attempt to deal with the Homeric and Socratic strains in Greek thought on magnanimity is informed by his methodological commitments. Indeed, Cooper notes that Aristotle begins his account of megalopsuchos with characteristics "universally or generally ascribed to that character." Of course, that is precisely what Aristotle does at EE 1232a19-22. His general methodology, according to Cooper, is either to "save the phenomena" or to preserve" as many endoxa, or opinions of the wise and the many, as possible within a "coherent scheme."

Cooper takes this methodology to be "particularly appropriate" in giving descriptions of the virtues, for Aristotle's "purpose" is not to introduce new virtues or vices, but to "articulate the ones recognized by common sense morality, making full use of the vocabulary available in ordinary Greek." Aristotle indicates his methodology in the Posterior Analytics at 97b7-25. In this work, Aristotle writes, as Cooper notes, that:

We should look at what are similar and undifferentiated, and seek, first, what they all have that is the same; next [we should do this] again for other things which are of the same kind as the first set and of the same sort as one another but of a different [sort] from those. And when we have got what all these have that is the same, and similarly for the others, then we must again inquire if what we have now got [have anything that is] the same-until we come to a single account; for this will be the definition of the object. And if we come not to one but to two or more [accounts], it is clear that what we are seeking is not a single thing but several.

I mean, e.g. if we were to seek what pride is we should inquire, in the case of some proud men we know, what one thing they all have as such. e.g. if Alcibiades is proud, and Achilles and Ajax, what one thing do they all [have]? Intolerance of insults, for one made war; one waxed wroth, and the other killed himself. Again in the case of others, e.g., Lysander and Socrates. Well, if here it is being indifferent to good and bad fortune, I take these two things and inquire what both indifference to fortune an not brooking dishonour have that is the same. And if there is nothing, then there will be two sorts of pride.

In the above passage from Jonathan Barnes' translation of the *Posterior Analytics*, the terms "megalopsuchos" and "megalopsuchia" are translated, as Cooper mentions, as "proud" and "pride" respectively. Cooper claims that since Aristotle does not give any indication of deviating from the Posterior Analytics methodology in any of his three treatises on ethics, and that he "writes in all three texts as if there were only one sort of" magnanimous person, then it is "reasonable to think that he was attempting to present a unitary account."

I agree with Cooper that Aristotle is trying to provide a single of unitary account of what magnanimity actually is, but I think he fundamentally misconstrues what Aristotle's project is in his discussion of magnanimity. Whereas Cooper recognizes Aristotle's endoxic method, he insists that Aristotle's own account, his single or unitary account, of megalopsuchia must be something other than a synthesis of Homeric and Socratic views on megalopuschia. Indeed, Aristotle wants to place the virtue of magnanimity between the extremes of excess and deficiency. What he finds in his inquiry on the matter is that the Socratic and Homeric conceptions of magnanimity tend to be at the extremes of deficiency and excess respectively. As a result, the only sort of magnanimous person on Aristotle's view is one who is a mean between the Homeric and Socratic extremes. Thus, Cooper is in error in suggesting that Aristotle "logically cannot" produce a unitary account of a "single concept" of megalopsuchia, because there is "not merely a lack of unity between" the Homeric and Socratic types of megalopsuchia but "actually an incompatibility", which is, "of course, to be distinguished from the 'tension' overcome" in EE 1232b8ff, and previously mentioned. 15 It is difficult to see how Cooper can maintain that there is a tension between valuing honor as the greatest of external goods on the one hand and being indifferent to honor on the other, but not recognize that these are diametrically opposed, or incompatible, views. I should like to maintain that Aristotle is not merely resolving a tension in the *EE*, but he is showing how the only plausible view of magnanimity as a virtue is as a mean between the aforementioned extremes. If Aristotle's project is to offer a single, or unitary, account of magnanimity that is in accord with his framework of conceiving of virtue as a mean, then Cooper's criticism that he fails to offer a "proper" unitary account and must settle for offering a "middle way" between the Socratic and Homeric elements in Greek thought on magnanimity is erroneous.

Unlike Cooper, Curzer takes Aristotle's project in discussing the virtue of magnanimity to be one of trying to "incorporate what is right about the beliefs of the many and the wise (endoxa), and reject what is not."17 This seems to be precisely what Aristotle relates as being his method in the aforementioned passage in the Posterior Analytics. To be sure, Aristotle seems to indicate that he has established the univocity of magnanimity by placing the concept squarely within his framework of regarding virtue as a mean. Nonetheless, Curzer regards Aristotle as being confronted by two "clusters" of endoxa. On the one hand, the Homeric tradition considers the megalopsuchos as being (1) "relatively selfsufficient", (2) doing "great deeds", and (3) having "great desires for external goods." The Homeric megalopsuchos, according to Curzer "especially desires honor, since honor is the greatest of the external goods." The Socratic tradition, on the other hand, pictures the megalopsuchos as (4) knowing his "place and desert", (5) "acting moderaately", and (6) having "only moderate desires for all external goods including honor." Curzer accurately notes that these two pictures seem to be in "conflict."

Moreover, Curzer points out that Aristotle "considers the possibility of synthesizing these pictures" in the above mentioned passage from the *Posterior Analytics*. I take Curzer to be suggesting here that perhaps the resultant picture, or definition, that emerges from Aristotle's efforts in "synthesizing" the Homeric and Socratic views of the megalopsuchos is the single, or unitary, account of megalopsuchia, for which Cooper claims Aristotle is striving. Curzer, however, accurately notes that in *EE* III, 5 (1232b14-20) Aristotle poses the conflict between the above numbered (3) and (6) and

tries to resolve it by differentiating between honor from good men and honor from the masses. In the EE 1232b5-7, Aristotle mentions that the magnanimous man "cares about few things only, and those great, and not because someone else thinks them so, The magnanimous man would consider rather what one good man thinks than many ordinary men." But, according to Aristotle at 1232b10-13, "as regards honour, life, and wealth-about which mankind seems to care—he [the magnanimous man] values none of them except honour, He would be pained if denied honour, and if ruled by one undeserving. He delights most of all when he obtains honor." Aristotle notes at 1232b14-19 that

In this way he [the magnanimous man] would seem to contradict himself; for to be concerned above all with honour, and yet to disdain the multitude and reputation, are inconsistent. So we must first distinguish. For honour, great or small, is of two kinds; for it may be given by a crowd of ordinary men or by those worthy of consideration; and, again, there is a difference according to the ground on which honour is given.

Curzer concludes that Aristotle has shown that whereas the Homeric megalopsuchos "greatly desires great honors from good men", the Socratic megalopsuchos" disdains small honors from the masses." Although this seems to be a correct analysis, Curzer fails to offer the additional crucial point that Aristotle's megalopsuchos is a person who, by virtue of being a megalopsuchos, has all of the virtues, accepts honors from great, or excellent people, with a response that is the mean between disdian and utter exultation. In addition, the megalopsuchos must disdian a small honor offered by an ordinary person, becuase this is not of what he is worthy. Cooper, of course, takes the above passage from the EE to be an explicit resolution of the tension he sees "in Aristotle's thought" of the megalopsuchos valuing honor as "the greatest of external goods" on the one hand and cosidering, on the other hand, "even" honor, "although the greatest of external goods", to be a "small thing."18

Whereas Cooper and Curzer are in agreement that the EE succeeds in solving a problem regarding the valuation of honor by the megalopsuchos, they disagree about what this resolution

indicates about Kenny's thesis. Cooper claims that in "the light of" Kenny's thesis, "one wonders whether the fact that the Eudemian Ethics offers a solution of the tension is further evidence that EE is the later work." Cooper seems to assent to Kenny's thesis because he thinks the problem is explicitly addressed in the EE and is "underneath the surface" in the NE. He does, however, point out that Aristotle solves the difficulty "by distinguishing, as he also does in the Nicomachean Ethics, between honour from ordinary people" and "honour from good people." To be sure, in NE 1124a6-11, Aristotle offers the distinction between small and great honors conferred by ordinary and excellent people. Clearly, this distinction is offered in both treatises by Aristotle in an effort to resolve the conflict in Greek thought over the Homeric tradition's megallopsuchos placing great emphasis on honor and the Socratic tradition's megalopsuchos being insufficiently concerned with honor.

Unfortunately, Cooper does not precisely state why he thinks the tension that is evident in the EE is not on the surface in the NE, even though the same distinction seems to be used to solve the same problem in both treatises. In an effort to perhaps flesh out the furtive character of the tension in the NE, I suggest that in the NE discussion, Aristotle does not employ the phrase "he would seem to contradict himself," which he uses at EE, 1232b14, to indicate the difficulty of there being a megalopsuchos who might take the Homeric line on the one hand 'and greatly value honor, but then take the Socratic line on the other hand and value honor very little. In addition, Aristotle does not use the phrase "we must first distinguish" which he uses at EE 1232b16, in the NE to specifically point out to his audience the introduction of the distinction, between great and small honors conferred by excellent and ordinary people, that suggest that his own conception of a megalopsuchos is a person who is a mean between the Homeric and Socratic extremes. My point is that there seems to be a certain commitment to argumentative rigor, in terms of offering key phrases that clearly indicate the course of the argument, that is present in the EE and not present in the NE. This lack of argumentative rigor in the NE discussion of megalopsuchia, to which Cooper seems to be referring, may well support the Kenny hypothesis that the EE is the later work. lf, however, we are averse to playing the so-called "dating game" with resepect to the two work, then I should like to suggest that the relative lack of argumentative rigor in the NE may perhaps be in keeping with my aforementioned thoughts that the NE seeks to offer a portrait, rich in detail, of what the true megalopsuchos is like, and in this regard, might be intended for a different audience than the EE. Indeed, it seems plausible that someone committed to offering a portrait of a megalopsuchos might not be as interested, as someone not giving a detailed portrait, in putting forth a taught argument as to why megalopsuchia fits into an ethical framework that views as virtue to be a mean between two extremes.

Curzer, on the other hand, rejects the Cooper view that the explicit resolution of the tension in the EE might be evidence in support of the Kenny hypothesis that the EE is the later work, To be sure, he contends, unlike Cooper, that there is no tension in the NE between the Homeric and Socratic views on the valuation of honor by the megalopsuchos. Curzer claims that Aristotle "abandons the attempt to preserve both" views in the NE, by simply rejecting only the Homeric view that the megalopsuchos has tremendous desires for honor.20 The textual evidence Curzer adduces in favour of this interpretaion is from NE 1124a17, where Aristotle states that the megalopsuchos "does not even regard honor as the greatest good." Curzer's position is that since there is no tension in the NE, the fact that in the EE Aristotle offers a solution of the tension is "evidence that EE is the earlier work." He suggests that perhaps Aristotle "formulated the distinction between the sorts of honors in order to solve a problem in the EE." But then in the NE, Aristotle "decided to drop" the Homeric view that the megalopsuchos has great desire for honor, and "thereby eliminating the problem." Aristotle "retained the distinction, however, because it seemed intrinsically important."

Although Curzer does not clarify what he means by "intrinsically important", I suggest that the intrinsic importance of the distinction, for Aristotle, in both works is to indicate how the virtue of megalopsuchia is a mean between extremes. Curzer, to be sure, fails to place the above mentioned NE passage in its proper context. In particular, the above passage comes at the end of an important discussion which seems to refute Curzer's position on the NE and EE dating debate. For his part, Aristotle points out in NE 1124a13-17 that

the magnanimous person is concerned especially with honours, Still, he will also have a moderate attitude to riches and power

and every sort of good and bad fortune, however it turns out. He will be neither excessively pleased by good fortune nor excessively distressed by ill fortune, since he does not even regard honour as the greatest good.

Certainly, in the above passage, Aristotle appears to be arguing that the magnanimous person, on his view, strives for the mean between valuing honor excessively and insufficiently. If the Aristotelian megalopsuchos is to be a mean between the Homeric one and the Socratic one, then Aristotle not only rejects the Homeric view of the valuation of honor by the megalopsuchos, but he also rejects the Socratic view of the valuation of honor by the megalopsuchos. Consequently, in closing, it is fair to say that there is no tension in the NE between the Homeric and Socratic views on the valuation of honor by the megalopsuchos seems to be erroneous²²

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio, 45221-0374. AVINASH VAGH

NOTES

- Hereafter, all textual references to the EE and the NE are from the following: Eudemian Ethics. Trans. J. Solomon. 1925. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985.
- Howard j. Curzer, "Aristotle's Much Maligned Megaloplsychos", Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 69, No. 2, (June 1991). pp. 131-151.
- 3. Neil Cooper. "Aristotle's Crowning Virtue." Apeiron Vol. 22, No. 3, (September 1989), pp. 191-205.
- 4. Cooper, p. 196.
- Howard J. Curzer. "A Great Philosopher's Not So Great Account of Great Virtue: Aristotle's Treatment of 'Greatness of Soul." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 20, No. 4, (December 1990), pp. 517-538
- 6. Curzer, p. 533.

- 7. Cooper, p. 196.
- 8. Curzer, p. 533.
- 9. Curzer, pp. 532-533.
- Curzer, pp. 131-132. All further references to Curzer from this juncture to p. 189 of this paper are to his June 1991 article, and the page references are to pp. 132-133.
- 11. Curzer, p. 518.
- 12. Cooper, pp. 188-199.
- 13. Cooper, p. 193.
- 14. Cooper, p. 194.
- 15. Cooper, p. 198.
- 16. Cooper, p. 192.
- 17. Curzer, p. 532. All further reference to Curzer, from this juncture to the next Cooper reference, are to his December 1990 article, and page references are to p. 532.
- 18. Cooper, p. 196.
- 19. Cooper, p. 196.
- 20. Curzer, p. 532.
- 21. Curzer, p. 533.
- 22. I would like to thank Larry Jost for his many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

NEGATION AND NEGATIVE FACT IN WESTERN AND INDIAN LOGIC

Negations and negative propositions are very important subjects of discussion in philosophy. There are serious ontological, enistemological and logical problems concerning negations which have been widely discussed in Indian philosophical schools. In western philosophy, both modern and contemporary, as also in contemporary logic we find very little discussion of the ontological problems relating to negation. The epistemological problems concerning the significance of negative propositions however are discussed in detail by early modern logicians like Bradley, Bosanquet etc. and by contemporary logicians like Russell, Ramsay, Ayer etc. As to the logical problems relating to negations and negative propositions there is not much to be learnt from contemporary logic. The law of double negation. the law of duality or DeMorgan's law, Nature of universal and particular negations and Relations of equivalence holding between certain negations are perhaps all the logical issues that we find discussed in any modern logical treatment of negation. In contrast with this, Indian logic deals with a large number of important logical issues concerning negation. These, for example, are the issue of the logical structure of negation, the different scopes of negation, the nature of the counterpositive of negation, the different types of relational and non-relational determinants of the counterpositiveness relating to negation and so on. In this paper it is intended to give a brief account of the discussion of some of the ontological and logical issues relating to negation which fill the pages of the logical treatises of the Navya Nyāya or the Neological school of India. This school originated in thirteenth century A.D. in the Bihar state of India where the first great Indian formal logician by name Gangesopādhyāya wrote his monumental and voluminous treatise on formal logic known as Tattvacintamani. There are many other logical treatises of lesser importance like Muktāvali, Tarkasamgrahadīpikā etc. all of which discuss the problems of negation. The following brief account is based on the information available in all these works on the new logic.

First we take up the ontology of negation. A clarification needs to be made before presenting the follwing discussion of the ontology, The word 'Negation' is used in two different senses which must be clearly distinguished from each other. The first sense of the word is 'absence'. In this sense negation is just the absence of an entity at a place or time. The other sense of negation is 'negative statemen' 'negative proposition' or 'negative assertion or judgement'. Very often these two senses of the word are confused with each other. For example in symbolic logic the symbol '~' is used for symbolising negation so that if a symbolic expression like ~ P is formed by attaching the symbol ~ ' to the symbol 'p' standing for a proposition, then the expression would have to be taken to stand for 'the negation of the proposition symbolised by 'p'. Here negation cannot be taken in the sense of negative assertion or proposition. If it were so taken the law of double negation cannot hold. The expression formed by attaching two negation symbols to 'p' would then stand for 'the assertion or proposition which is the negation of the assertion or proposition which itself is the negation or the proposition negating the proposition 'p'. Now the original proposition 'p' and the proposition or assertion negating the negation of 'p' cannot be in any sense identical with each other although absence of the absence of a thing can be identical with the thing. So to identify the double negation of a proposition with the proposition does not seem to be correct although these could be regarded as logically equivalent to each other. Further even if the negation-symbol is taken to represent the assertion or proposition negating the proposition represented by the propositional symbol it does not become clear whether the negation intended is primary or secondary (of the proposition symbolised). On one alternative, only the predicate in the proposition would stand negated of the subject of the proposition while on the other alternative the proposition as a whole would stand negated or cancelled. The third meaning of mere absence is of course quite inapplicable to the proposition. But to distinguish the above two senses of the negation-symbol two different symbols need to be used.

After this essential clarification we turn to the ontology of

n

n

it

1

ıt

16

absence or negation (we shall be using these terms synonymously unless otherwise stated). Four different types of negation have been listed by Indian logicians. These are called 'Anterior negation, Posterior negation, Relational or occurrence- negation and Natural or being-negation or difference. The beginningless non-existance or absence of a thing before it comes into being is called the anterior negation of the thing. This absence has no beginning but it comes to an end with the origination of the thing of which it is the absence. The absence of a thing which comes into being as soon as the thing is destroyed is called its posterior negation. This absence has a beginning but no end. A thing once destroyed is never reborn. If the parts of the destroyed thing are put together a new thing similar to the original thing may be produced but not the original thing itself. The absence or non-occurrence of a thing at a certain palce or locus when it exists elsewhere is known as its relational or occurrencenegation. For example the book in the shelf is not present on the table so the book is absent on the table. Similarly a blue lotus does not have the red colour of the red rose, so the red colour or the red rose may be said to be absent or non-occurrent in the blue lotus. Lastly, a tree is different from a stone which means that there is the absence of the identity of the stone in the tree. This absence of the identity or the being of one thing on another is called their 'mutual difference.'

Lest it may be thought mere scholasticism to formulate so many types of negation it would be pertinent to briefly mention here some of the reasons for which Indian logic has admitted this diversity of negations. Anterior negation (or absence of a thing preceding its origination) has been accorded entitative status because without it the contingency of repeated origination of a thing cannot be avoided. For example when all the causal conditions relating to the production of a certain pot are present the pot comes into being. If this pot is destroyed and reduced to a lump of clay then another pot can be produced from the same material. If it is asked, 'why isn't the Original pot itself produced by the material which happens to be the same? The pot that is produced after the destruction of the original one is similar to the latter but not the same. Very often the same raw material is used to produce different specimens of the same thing by destroying the specimens produced earlier. These specimens cannot be identical despite being quite similar to each other. What 200 N. S. DRAVID

prevents the specimens being the same is the prior occurrence of a similar specimen. What this means is that for a thing to be produced or to come into being it is essential that it should have been absent or non-existent prior to its birth. This nonexistence is of the kind called 'anterior negation' and not posterior negation or destruction. When some material is remoulded into the shape of a thing fashioned earlier out of the same material and destroyed afterwards, it is the destruction and not anterior negation of the previous thing that precedes the new production. Thus the non-availability of the anterior negation of the earlier thing prevents its repeated production. About posterior absence or destruction there is no dispute. Destruction is a commonly recognised type of absence. If its reality is not admitted then things will never be destroyed or despite their destruction they will continue to exist.

The third kind of negation called relational negation or occurrence-negation though commonly recognised as real negation, its nature is not fully understood even by those who have thought about negation. In the two examples cited above only occurrencenegation is mentioned. In one case it is the occurrence-negation relating to an object like book and located on the table that is referred to. In the other example it is the quality of red colour whose nonoccurrence in the blue lotus is referred to. As simply occurrencenegations these two negations appear to be alike. But if we look closely we shall find that the denied occurrences in the two cases are of different types. The occurrence of the book either in the shelf or on the table is determined by the relation of conjunction while the occurrence or incidence of the red colour in the red lotus or red rose is determined by a relation which is different in nature from conjunction. This relation is called the relation of inherence or 'samavaya' in the Sanskrit terminology of Indian logic. One of the relata of this relation cannot exist without the other relation though this cannot be said of both the relata of the relation. There can be different kinds of occurrences of things depending upon the nature of the relations that determine the occurrences. The occurrence of things (or more precisely events) in time are referred to in statements like "x" was born on such and such a date. The occurrence of birth at a certain date is a different kind of occurrence than the occurrence of the birth at a certain place. The relations determining the temporal and spatital characters of the same occurrence are different from each

other. So while negating the occurrence of a thing or event at some locus or other it is necessary to mention the relation determining the occurrence at the locus.

Mutual negation is the fourth type of negation. It is commonly known as difference. The being of one thing excludes the bieng of others, so the beings of different things may even be said to be absent in each other by the identity-relation. But since there is no common usage that anything occurs even in itself by the identity-relation some logicians do not regard identity as an occurence-determining relation. Mutual negation in their view is only a special type of occurrence-negation which has the essential property of the thing negated as its counterpositive. For example, a pot and a tree are mutually different not because there is no occurrence of the pot on the tree or the tree on the pot but because potness does not occur or inhere in the tree or treeness in the pot.

Different views regarding the existential status of negation are advocated by Nyaya, Mimansa and other schools of Indian philosophy. Nyaya logicians hold that negation is as real-though not positively-as any positive entity. But they do not admit that negation occurs anywhere by the same relation by which any positive entity occurs. Some other thinkers regard negation as just a temporary aspect of the locus where it occurs and still others take negation to be identical with its locus. There are also thinkers who treat negation as a nonentity. According to certain thinkers of the Mīmānsā school the negation of a thing is the same as the affirmation of a thing or things opposed to the thing negated. We are just mentioning these different metaphysical viewpoints regarding the entitative status of negation without descussing them because the most important and interesting aspect of negation which is not known outside the pale of Indian philosophy is the logical aspect and this we are going to elucidate in this paper.

First, there is the relation of counter positiveness. Holding between the negation and that of which it is the negation. This relation is called-rather miscalled-as truth-functionality in modern ligic. The counterpositive and its negation exclude each other. So they are related by the relation of counterpositivity. If one is true the other is false. It is a relation of opposition which does not hold between

propositions and all their truth-functional compounds. So we have to give a special name to the relation of negation and the negated Further as explained above the counterpositivity of negations is determined in different ways. The negation of a pot on a table example is not just the simple negation of a pot. It is the negation of the conjunctive occurrence of a pot on the table. The negation of the blue colour say, on a brown table on the other hand is not the negation of the conjuctive occurrence of blue colour as in the previous case. It is the negation of the inherent-occurrence of the blue colour because the colour of a thing is never conjoined with any material object. Only two material objects can be conjoined with each other. Relations have always to be taken into consideration while analysing the nature of a negation. Various relations like conjunction. inherence, temporality, spatiality, qualifierness, self-identity etc. are listed as possible determinants of counter-positivity by Indian logicians. Without determining relation, the counterpositivity of a counterpositive to its negation (or the truth-functional-relation between the negated and its negation) cannot be maintained. A book occurs on the table by the conjunctive relation although it being noninherent in the table, its absence also may be said to occur there. So the bald statement that is often made that 'not 'P' is the truthfunction or negation of 'p' is not quite correct. Even with regard to the same relation like conjunction it will be found that both the occurrence by conjunction of a thing and its absence are located in the same locus. In the above example it is found that the book lying on the table occupies only a small space of the tabel the rest of the space on the table remaining vacant. So we can say that the book is in conjunction with the table so far as a certain part of the table is concerned but it is also not conjoined with the table so far as certain other parts of the table are concerned.

From relational determinants we now turn to property-determinants of the counterpositivity of negations. Let us take two instances of negation to elucidate this point. A book is a material substance. So the negation of a book can be described even by the statement. 'A material substance is not on the table' as it is done by the simple statement 'A book is not on the table'. The vast logical difference between the two statements which are intended to refer to the same entity is quite obvious. It cannot be said that the difference consists in the fact that the reference of the words 'a

material substance' is rather vague while that of the word 'A book' is quite definite. In some other sentence the qse of the words 'a material substance' can well be deemed to have very difinite reference. Besides it is irrelevant to the consideration of the nature of a negation to distinguish the references of the words 'a book' and 'a material substance'. The question to be answered is, what is the difference between the negation of 'a book' and the negation of 'a material substance'. That there is a great difference between these two negations cannot be denied. If there is no book on a table but say a claypot, even then the negation of 'a material substance on the table' cannot be asserted although the negation of a book there can well be asserted. This distinction between the two negations may be supposed to be due to the fact that like relations different properties also determine the counterpositivities of negations. Thus in the negation of a book on the table the book which is the counterpositive is such in its capacity of a book although it is also a material substance. But in the other negation the book and other things too figure as counterpositive only in the capacity of material substances; so in the first case 'bookness' and in the second 'material substanceness' would be the property-determinants of the respective counterpositivities of the two counterpositives. Thus to define a negation at least two things, namely the relational determinant-and the property-determinant of the counterpositivity of the negation need to be mentioned.

In some cases it become necessary to specify the property-determinant even of the property-determinant in order to correctly define the negation involved. Let us take two instances of negation like 'A red-coloured object is not here' and 'A coloured object is not here'. A red-coloured object is also a coloured object but these two negations are quite different from each other. The property-derminant of the counterpositivities of these negations is the same, namely, 'the property of being a colored object'. ('Being an object that is colored red' is included within this property). If despite this fact there is distinction between these two negations it is due to the fact that in one case the second-level-property-determinant is 'redness' and in the other case the second-level-property determinant is 'colourness'. Since 'redness' and 'colourness' are two different properties the negations involving these different second-level determinants cannot be the same.

Now a word about the law of double negation which is supposed to apply to all negations. In view of what has been said about the different types of determinants involved in the structures of negations it would have been obvious that the law of double negation cannot apply to all negations without suitable modification. To illustrate this point let us take 'the negation of the negation of a pot in which the first negation is of the occurrence of the pot by the conjunctive relation while the second negation is of the occurrence of the first negation by the temporal relation. The temporal relation is the relation by which all non-eternal things are supposed to be related with each other and with time. (Even a negation is temporally related to every non-eternal thing by this relation). Now let us see if the above negation of negation is equivalent in scope with the pot in order to find out if they can be identical with each other. The pot is conjoined only with the table, so its occurrence by the conjunctive relation excludes everything other than the table. The negation of the pot however is temporally related to every contemporary thing (excluding the eternal entities. In the view of Indian logicians nothing can be said to be contemporary with eternal entities). So the negation excludes past and future as well as eternal things from its scope. Thus the scope of the conjunctive occurrence of the pot and that of the above kind of double negation of it are absolutely divergent. This shows that the law of double negation cannot apply in this case.

The characteristic relation by which negation is supposed to occur in its loci is called 'Svarupa' which means self-relation. No positive entity is supposed to occur anywhere by this relation. But negation can occur even by other relations like the 'temporal' in loci other than its natural loci. For example in the above instance the negation of the conjunctive relation of a pot has everything other than the table-in which the pot is located-as its natural loci by the self-relation. But even on the table where the pot is present the negation of the pot can occur by the temporal relation. (The table being one of the contemporaries of the negation). If the occurrence of the negation by its characteristic relation is taken into consideration then the loci of this occurrence would be found to be exactly those that are excluded by the occurrence of the pot by the conjunctive relation. So the negation of such an occurrence of the first negation would be exactly coexistent with the pot and thus the law of double negation would have application in this case. The law therefore needs

to have revised formulation in the following manner. 'A thing and its double negation are identical if the second negation of the thing negates the occurrence of the first negation by its natural relation viz. the self-relation whatever may be the relation of the occurrence of the thing negated'.

Now we consdier an extension of the concept of relational determination of counterpositivity. The relation by which a thing occurring in a certain locus excludes its negation from that locus is the relational determinant of the counterpositivity of that thing. Now there are relations which do not and cannot determine the occurrence of a thing anywhere. The relation of conjunction in respect of the generic universal is such a relation. The generic universal cannot be conjoined with anything. So one can say that the generic universal is nowhere present by the conjunctive relation and that therefore the negation of the generic universal by the conjunctive relation has universal scope. Nothing is excluded from the scope of such a negation. Here conjuction happens to be the determinant not of the occurrence of the universal but of its absolute non-occurrence (by this relation). The universal does not exclude anything by this relation although it is the counterpositive of its negation. We have thus the concepts of determining-relation and counterpositivity extended so as to cover the cases of the negations of universal scope. It is because a thing is present nowhere by a certain relation that its absence is present everywhere. We may thus have negations of universal scope of everything if a relation incompatible with the nature of a thing is chosen as its counterpositivity-determinant.

A further extension of the idea of counterpositivity-determination is in the direction of a property-determinant which is incompatible with the nature of the counterpositive entity. This comes about in this way. A book on philosophy, for example, finds place on a shelf reserved for philosophy-books in a library only as philosophy-book, and not as a novel. As a novel the philosophy-book cannot have a place anywhere, which means that in the capacity of novel the philosophy-book cannot have a place anywhere in the universe. So the absence or negation of the philosophy-book whose counterpositivity is determined by the property of 'being a novel' is universally present. Such an absence having universal scope can be had of each and everything. A tree exists anywhere only as a

tree and not as a pot. A pot exists on the ground only as a pot and not as tree. So, as a tree the pot is absent everywhere, even the locus it exists on.

A question may here be asked, 'If there can be such negations, can't there be negations of non-existent things like the chimera. The sky-lotus etc.? Such negations would be absolute as their counterpositives do not occur anywhere by any relation as they are absolutely non-existent. The difficulty in admitting such negations is that the admission entails some kind of existence of the very things that the negations are intended to negate. Even for absolute negation to be significant there has to be there the counterpositive of the negation which is negated. If therefore one unreal like the chimera is admitted as existent, then other unreals like the barren woman's son, mirage-water etc. would all have to be admitted as existent. There will not be any end to the list of such diverse unreal existents.

Anticipating this consequence of the admission of absolute negations the majority of Indian philosophers have denied the reality of absolute negations. They interpret or anylyse the negation which is of the form of existential negation as a predicative negation. So, 'there is no barren woman's son', 'means on such interpretation that 'no male child is given birth to by a barren woman' or 'a barren woman does not give birth to a male child'. Both the subject and the predicate in these negations are real and the denial of the predicates is also real.

The foregoing elaboration of the concept of negation is just an indication of the different aspects of negation investigated by Indian logicians, specially those belonging to the neological school. A detailed and more sophiticated treatment of the subject needs a large-sized monograph wholly devoted to the analysis of the logical structures of different types of negation.

Affection 474/A, Professors' Colony, Hanuman Nagar, Nagpur, 440009. N. S. DRAVID

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

LINGUISTIC SOLIPSISM: A DEFENSE

This paper aims at a defense of linguistic solipsism against the physicalists' endeavour of refuting it. In this paper we shall embody the arguments which the physicalists developed while repudiating linguistic solipsism, and shall try to show how their attempt fails to reach its goal.

The physicalists, explicating mind-body problem in terms of physics, claim to discard the possibility of metaphysics. They promise to bring what we call mental level to the level of physics. Their enterprise is to translate the sentences of all sciences into the language of physics and to establish the unity of sciences. The reason for choosing physical language to express everything is that the language of physics is 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal'. It is the basic language of all sciences, that is a universal language comprehending the content of all other scientific languages and contains quantitative characteristics. Rudalf Carnap, a staunch champion of physicalism, states,

The physical language... consists of sentences that give in their simplest form a quantitative description of definite space-time-place (e.g. 'At such an such space-time-point the tempeature is so and so many degrees)¹.

So in order to make language 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal' lignuistic expressions in most cases, are made in terms of quantity rather than quality. The physicalists, therefore, think that the language of physics alone is appropriate for communication of our views and ideas. Dr. Neurath, a physicalist, says,

'Every sentence of any branch of any scientific language is equilpollent to some sentence of the physical language, and therefore be translated into the physical language without changing its content.²

This is what Neurath proposed to call physicalism.

Rudalf Carnap in an article entitled "Psychology in Physical Language" holds the view that sentences about the psychological states of person are translatable into the language of physics. He states,

.....every sentence of psychology may be formulated in physical language... all sentences of psychology describe physical occurrences, namely, the physical behaviour of humans and others animals. This is a sub-thesis of the general thesis of physicalism to the effect that physical language is a universal language, that is, a language into which every sentence may be translated.³

So for Carnap, psychological sentences which describe physical occurrences, behaviour of humans or animals or state of one's own mind are translatable into the physical language. The physicalists attempt thus, to translate the sentences of all sciences into that of physics. which they calim to be 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal'. The thinkers who advocate physicalism are Carnap, Neurath and Hempel, etc.

On the contary, solipsism regards that only 'I' and my expreience exist'. According to that doctrine I cannot transcend my experience. In other words, it is a doctrine which advocates existing world as an object or content of individual consciousness. It denies the independent existence of reality. For solipsists the immediate object of our sense experience is mind dependent (ideas, impressions, or sense-data). Solipsists, thus, maintain that only 'I' exist, or the self is the whole of reality, because the claim of existence is grounded in experience which is essentially immediate and perceived by an individual and is private to him. So the existence of the 'sky', the 'air', the 'earth', 'colour', 'shapes' etc., are the invention of the individual mind. Hence existential knowledge originates in the inner cognitive states of the individual.

In a similar strain linguistic solipsism regards that my sensedata belong to me and the sense-data of others belong to them. Therefore the language which I use to express my sense experience is meaningful only to me whereas, the language which others use is meaningful to them alone, because the language which we use to express the kind of knowledge derived from direct sense experience is personal. For instance, after having seen the leaf of a tree I say that 'the leaf is green', and another person who also perceived it would say that 'it is green'. But the two utterences are not identical becuase when I say that 'the leaf is green', I express only my sense experience whereas the other person who also utters that 'the leaf is green' expresses his own sense experience. So there is a difference in the above two expressions, which consists in the fact that whereas I understand well the meaning of the language that I express, the other one cannot understand the meaning of the language that I use. This is what is called linguistic 'solipsism.

The physicalists attempt to overcome this solipsistic problem. According to them, for example, when I say 'today is very cold', and another person says, 'it is not at all cold', and a third person says, 'it is neither cold nor hot', it is very capricious from the experiences that one can hardly arrive at the consensus in our linguistic expression of the weather. So the attempt of the physicalists is to remove the above difficulties in our linguistic expression. In such cases, using the physical language they will say that 'today's tempeature is 20 degree celcius or 25 degree celcius' etc. a statement which is equally acceptable to all. It is because of the fact that physical language is 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal'. Now let us spell out what is meant by 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal' character of physics. Regarding the meaning of the word 'intersensual', we may first observe that it refers to the knowledge of various sense organs and that its validity can be proved by our sense experience. To articulate its meaning in more clear terms, we may quote Joergensen,

That physical language is intersesual means that its sentences can be tested by means of various senses, because actually there is no physical function that can be co-ordinated solely with qualitative characteristic from single sphere of sense.⁴

Our next querry concerns itself with the problem of the meaning of the term 'intersubjectivity' in physicalism. That the language of physics is 'intersubjective' means it can be examined by various subjects and in this way we are able to establish a meaning for all. To quote Victor Kraft.

That physical language is intersubjective means, from the formal point of view, it must constitute a common system of sign and rules, and

from the semantic point of view, a given sign must have the same meaning for any language user.⁵

And thirdly, the language of physics is 'universal' means that every scientifically acceptable sentence, whether they originite from our everyday language or from a branch of science, can be translated into the language of physics. Victor Kraft spells out further,

Physical language must be uninversal, i.e., any sentence, any language must be tested into it; it must constitute a conceptual system in which any state of affairs whatsoever can be expressed.⁶

In the light of above discussion, the physicalists are of the view that all meaningful statements can be translated into the language of physics which is 'universal' and, thus, able to comprehend the content of all other sciences because in the example 'today is very cold'. it is clear that the temperature of a particular day which may appear too hot or too cold to different persons having different sensations. That is to say that sensation of hot or cold are not same to all. In such cases, the physicalists point out that the temperature of particular time is 20 degree celcius or 25 degree celcius. It is to be noted that this quantitative measurement of temperature in terms of celcius will definitely seem to be more accurate and authentic than its qualitative measurement that is, 'it is very hot or cold'. In the same manner, when we say that, 'this bag is heavy', the physicalists will say that 'the weight of this bag is 40 kg., 50 kg.' etc. And again when we say 'this room is rectangular', the physicalists would say that the room is 15 feet in length and 10 feet in breadth.

In all the cases above, according to physicalists the language becomes 'universal' and in every case it puts stress on quantitative measurement rather than the qualitative one. Thus they hold the view that it is not at all difficult to translate the ordinary language of sciences into the language of physics. It is to be noted here that things or material objects are usually described by articulating its primary or secondary qualities. The discussion so far made does not, however, pose any problem in respect of the primary qualities of an object or a thing, but it will definitely face a problem in respect of the secondary qualities of an object or a thing. When we explain an object or a thing in terms of its secondary qualities, say, 'this

is green', what do the physicalists say? How do they measure the greenness of an object or a thing? The physicalists measure the greenness of an object or a thing in terms of its wave length. For example, when we say, 'this is green', the physicalists will say its wave length varies from 4912° to 5750° A' and accordingly yellow from 57500° to 5850° A', orange from 5850° to 6470° A, and so on. Due to the development of science and techenology, the physicalists assert that different colours can be separated from one another by a machine. On the basis of differentiation of colour a machine is able to distinguish between different grades of letters. This gradation depends on the wave length of the colour. The colour of a first class stamp and that of a second class stamp is different. Man may be wrong in such gradation, but the machine may not. Likewise the physicalists express words through frequency.

Now the question is how the physicalists would measure the feeling and sensation of a man. In this respect, the physicalists have also made an effort to measure our different feelings and sensations. For example, when we say that 'so and so is happy' the physicalists would say that his physical condition is such that we can call him happy. Again if it is said that 'so and so is afraid' the physicalists would say that his physical condition is such that we can call him 'afraid', that is to say that his physical condition is characterised by the acceleration of breathing and pulsation, by the tendency to certain violent behaviour and so on.

Thus we see that according to the physicalists, like the primary qualities, the secondary qualities are also transformable into the language of physics and that the language of physics is 'intersensual', 'intersubjective' and 'universal'. Hence the physicalists turn all sciences into physics. Various sciences, in their view, are nothing but different branches of a unified system of knowledge. Physicalism, therefore, is an attempt at a unity of science.

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that physicalists. claim to rectify the defect of linguistic solipsism. The question is how far they have suceeded in their endeavour. Apparently it seems to us that the physicalists have been able to provide a scientific basis to the philosophical interpretation and there is no inconsistency or incompatability in it. For example, 'today's temperature is 25 degree

celcius' or 'this bag weighs 40 kg.' etc. is linguistically quite unambiguous and clear. Thus they conclude that they have been able to remove the unclarity inherrent in linguistic solipsism.

But a careful look into the matter discussed above reveals that physicalism could not achieve its professed claim. That is to say they could not overcome the difficulties of linguistic solipsism. It has already been pointed out that the physicalists are the language of physics in order to remove the discrepancies that the inherent in our statement of facts 'today's temperature is 20 degree celcius' or 'the bag weights 40 kg.' etc. But the meaning of the statements cited above varies from person to person, because objects appear different to different observers or to the same observer at different times under different conditions. For example a weight 40 kg. appears be heavier to a boy of ten years than it does to a man of twenty years. Thus despite the physicalists' effort. linguistic solipsism is irrefutable.

Again, we have seen that the physicalists' claim that like primary qualities, the secondary qualities are also translatable into the language of physics. In fact both qualities do not exist in the external object rather they exist in the apprehending mind. So when we express greenness in terms of its wave length or sound in terms of its frequency, these vary from person to person and even the primary qualities of an object change by the alternation of perceiver or his physical position and every bit of these qualities are observer-dependent.

Wittgenstein in 'Tractatus' spells out in defense of solipsism

....What solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact the limit of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.³

In a similar vein Wittgenstein in 'Philosophical Investigations', while explicating private language, is of the view that the language which a particular person employs refers only to his own experiences. He states,

ĺ

e

n

S

e

n

:1

n

e

"The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language".

Wittgenstein further states that "the language which describes my inner experience and that only I myself can understand". Therefore, the language that refers to the experience of a speaker is not understood by any one other than the speaker. Thus individual experiences cannot be expressed in physical language. Moreover, their attempt of translating psychological condition namely, feeling, emotion, etc., in terms of physics is not valid either, because all statements concerning mental states are not translatable into physical language. There may be some statements which are translatable, but, are not exclusive enough to explain and interpret all statements about our thoughts, feeling, emotions and even sensations. Ayer's statement, in this context, seems to be admissable and satisfactory. He says:

There are any number or statements about people's thoughts and sensations and feelings which appear to be logically independent of any statement about their bodily condition or behaviour.¹⁰

So all statements of psychology cannot be translated into the language of physics. What is more important is that the state of mind is so transitory and fleeting that it changes within a second. Consequently the attempt of translating such state of mind is ridiculous.

From our above analysis it is explicit that objectivity of knowledge remains an unsolved problem in solipsism. The solipsist cannot justify the existence of physical reality in terms of its quantitative and qualitative changes and causal relationship just as it is problematic for the physicalists to justify individual potentiality, creativity and competence. Similarly for the solipsists it is problematic to justify the objectivity of human experience.

In conclusion, we may point out that notwithstanding physicalist' strenuous effort to get rid of linguistic solipsism, it is irrefutable. They fail to account for the privacy or subjectivity of mental phenomena. Moreover, it is not an easy task to express all our utterences into the language of physics.

In fact, in the discourse of philosophical pursuit, besides

physicalists many attempts have been made to refute solipsism. But it is irrefutable. If we accept this the problem arises regarding the objectivity of knowledge and knowledge becomes subjective and relative, How do we counter this situation if we cannot deny the objectivity of knowledge?

Group of Philosophy
School of Languages
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi-110067

Md. ABDUR RAZZAQUE

References

- 1. Joergensen, J., The Development of Logical Empiricism, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1951), P. 78.
- 2. Ibid., p. 78.
- Carnap, R., "Psychology in Physicalism", (Trans. by George Schick),
 (ed). A.J. Ayer, Logical Positivism (New York; Free Press, 1959),
 p. 165.
- 4. Jorgensen, J., The Development of Logical Empiricism, (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1951), P. 78.
- 5. Kraft, V., The Vienna Circle, (New York; Green Wood Press, 1969), p. 161.
- 6. Ibid., p. 161.
- 7. Wittgenstein, L., Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (Trans. by C.K. Ogden), (London, Boston and Henley; Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1981), p. 151.
- 8. Philosophical Investigations, (Trans. by G.E.M. Anscomb), Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 243.
- 9. Ibid., P. 256.
- Ayer, A. J. The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, (London; Macmillan & Co ltd, 1964), p. 27.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

ARE JEEVANMUKTA AND BODHISATTVA IDEALS ASYMMETRICAL?

By 'freedom' we usually mean freedom from some undesirable state, such as freedom from hunger, poverty, slavery, external coercion or compulsion of mind and the like. In the context of Indian thought freedom is primarily taken to mean freedom from suffering or duḥkha arising out of ignorance or avidyā. Tattvajnāna or the knowledge of the truth is here regarded as a means for attaining freedom. Similarly throughout the history of Indian thought, barring only certain exceptions, freedom has been regarded as an ideal or a covetable state to be attained either through action, devotion or knowledge. Freedom as it is conceived in the Indian context (mokṣa) is considered to be the highest puruṣārtha or goal of life.

First of all it is to be noted that freedom in Indian thought is not necessarily a state to be attained hereafter, nor is it a state of other-worldliness which is to be attained by negating the worldly life altogether. Knowledge or illumination (Jilāna) instead of being merely a means of freedom is itself considered to be the goal for which every one should aspire only for its own sake in as much as freedom is supposed to consist in illumination itself. This is true of both the Vedantic and the Buddhist traditions in different ways, as illumination is viewed differently by them.

It has often been misunderstood that according to Sankara, Knowledge or illumination (Jñāna) is a mere means of freedom. But it is more appropriate to say that freedom, according to Sankara, is nothing but illumination (Jñāna). 'Srutayo Brahmavidyānantaram mokṣam darśayantyo madhye Kāryāntaram Vārayanti', as Sankara would tell in his commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, 1—4. It is true that at places Sankara speaks of Jñāna as a means to liberation e.g. When he says 'Niḥsreyasaphalam tu Brahmavijnānam' in his commentary on Brahma Sūtra 1-11, or when he says "mokṣa-sādhanam Jñānm" in Upadeśa Sahasrī. But in all such cases it is a mere concession

216 G. C. NAYAK

to the popular way of expressing the idea, and moreover the context in which such statements are made should never be lost sight of In the *Upadesa Sahasrī*, for example, *Jnāna* as an instrument of freedom can only mean the bookish knowledge of Brahman or vakvad vākyārthajñāna obtained through Śravana only which is to be firmly entrenched in the mind of the listener through manana and nididhyāsana finally culminating in Brahmajñana in the sense of Brahmayagai or the full comprehension of Brahman. And in the commentary on the first Sūtra, "Athāto Brahma-Jijnāsā", Sankara being primarily interested in showing the difference in the fruits of dharmaiinasa and Brahmajijnasa naturally talks of moksa or nihsreyasa as the fruit of Brahma jhana just to contrast it with worldly prosperity (abhyudaya) which is the fruit of dharmajñāna. As a matter of fact, however, there is nothing more to be aspired for beyond the comprehension of Brahman (Brahmajňāna) in Advaita Vedānta. Illumination or jňāna is freedom and in itself is bliss or ananda. Where jhana is used in Sankara Vedanta as a mere means (pramāna) for the comprehension of Brahman (Brahmavagati), as for example when Sankara says jñānena hi pramānena avagantumistam Brahma, there jñāna to my mind should be taken to mean a mere word to word, bookish, understanding of Brahman from the Sastra i.e., vākyād vākyārtha jňāna. In that sense alone Brahmajňāna and Brahmāvagati can be distinguished from each other, for otherwise jnana in the sense of aparokşa jňāna is certainly indistinguishable from avagati, and Brahmāvagati or jñāna in this context should mean an immediale and full comprehension of the nature of the real which constitute the purusartha or the aim of man and is identical with freedom (moksa).

Regarding the nature of this illumination (freedom) and its impact on the day to day life of the man and the society, we come across a variety of description in the Indian Philosophical literature. According to some it is a state of delight where one forgets all worldly botherations and is lost in some sort of Divine contemplation; the worldly life is either forgotten altogether or is relegated to a secondary place in the life of a freeman (the *mukta*). But freeman, while alive (*jīvan mukta*, as he is conceived in Advaita Vedanla), is certainly not a recluse or a hermit flying away from or shunning the worldly life. Illumination is considered to be extremely relevant to the day to day existence of man and conduct in the society; it

1)

n

d

1-

S

y

4

of

d

te

te

m

ts

10

e.

ly

be

n,

18

nl it is in no way antagonistic to or incompatible with normal day-to-day life of man.

Some of the misconceptions associated with the idea of freedom (mukti) are subjected to trenchant criticism by Vidyaranya in Pancadast. Enlightenment does not make one unfit for worldly transactions, otherwise it would be a kind of illness which of course it is not. Knowledge of truth is not something like the disease of consumption which makes one incapable of normal dealings. The idea is that illumination does not affect our normal life in any way. There is no difference between the ignorant and the enlightened as regards their activity or abstention from activity from the point of view of the body, senses, mind and intellect. Pancadasī is quite clear on the point that freedom does not consist in being like sticks and stones abstaining from food etc., it takes a pragmatic view of the whole issue. The man who is attached to objects is troubled by the world, happiness is enjoyed by one who is not attached. Therefore if one wants to be happy he should give up attachment, and that is all.

While discussing the concept of freedom in Indian thought one should be careful in interpreting certain well-known statements of treatises like Bhagvad Gītā, e.g., Udāsīnavadāsīno etc. As Pancadasī has very aptly remarked "Ajhātvā Sāstra hrdayam mudho vaktyanyathanyatha"; the foolish who does not understand the essence of the scriptures expresses his opinions in varieties of ways. That the enlightened is not forgetful about the world, illumination does not destroy duality, that it only makes one realise the self as real and the world as unreal only in a specific sense is clear from the following passage of Pancadaśi, "Atmadhireva vidyeti vācyam na dvaitavismṛtiḥ". Vidyaranya caricatures the idea that illumination consists in forgetfulness of the world of duality by pointing out that inanimate objects like pots should in that case be half-enlightened in as much as they do not have any knowledge of duality. Pancadasi is rather very clear on the point that the knower of truth fulfils his worldly duties well, as they do not conflict with his knowledge. In order to perform the worldly activities, according to Pancadasi, it is not essential that the world should be taken as ultimately real.

The enlightened person is not a conjurer; he does not conjure any thing out of existence nor does he bring about anything into existence by his illumination or insight. In the words of Wittgenstein, we may say in a sense "Philosophy leaves every thing as it is".2 What are required for doing normal activities in the world are the means such as mind, speech, body and external objects and these are not made to vanish by enlightenment. So why can the enlighened not engage himself in worldly affairs? Therefore, as knowledge of truth does not affect the means such as the mind etc., the enlightened person is able to do worldly activities like ruling a country, study of logic or engaging in agriculture The enlightened one, like an expert conversant with two languages. knows both the bliss of Brahman and the worldly joys and does not see any conflict between the two. The idea of freedom (mukil) as something mystical and other-worldly is thus entirely ruled out by Pancadaśi. It is as if some one has mastery over two different llanguages; as there is no incongruity here similar is the case with one having illumination continuing to be conversant with the worldly affairs. This dispels once and for all the deeprooted misconception about Indian thought that in freedom (mukti) one is transferred as it were from the mundane existence to a supramundane plane of Reality so that the worldly awareness is gone for ever. Enlightenment consists in mastering a technique and this has no conflict with our normal awareness. What is important to note in this connection is that the enlightened person is not affected or disturbed by the pleasure or pain caused by prarabdha; thus and only in this sense he is a freeman. The only difference between the enlightened who is free and the unenlightened who is in bondage is that the former remain undisturbed and patient through all his afflictions caused by prarabdha whereas the latter is impatient and suffers on account of this. This is how and this is the sense in which the metaphysical concept of freedom in Indian thought, instead of remaining confined to the conceptual level alone, is seen to have a definite bearing on our practical day to day life. Attainment of freedom (mukti) by no means makes one other-worldly or merely contemplative, transcending and thereby becoming totally unfit for, the day-to-day affairs of the world. Though undergoing similar experience or engaged in similar activities it is freedom from misery that characterises the enlightened whereas the unenlightened continues to be subject to misery.

As far as the ethical aspect of freedom is concerned, it is to be noted that the enlightened one is in a definitely advantageous position to do good to the society without any attachment whatsoever and the life of a jīvanmukta, though in itself beyond good and evil, can thus be conducive to the social welfare. In any case, there cannot be any question here of his life being one of unbridled licentiousness like that of a debauch. His life is a life of detachment alright, but at the same time the world can benefit immensely by his teachings. As an Acarya he can be source of unfailing guidance to the earring humanity. That is why an enlightened person is described by Sankara as both 'Vimuktasanga' and 'Sadāpāradayāmbudhama'. Ācarya Sankara is very clear about the life and conduct of such men of wisdom, the enlightened ones, There are great souls, says Sankara. calm and magnanimous, who do good to others as does the spring (vasantavallokathitam carantah)4, and who having themselves crossed this dreadful ocean of birth and death, help others also to cross the same, without any motive whatsoever. Here the words 'Vasantavallokahitam carantah', doing good to the world like spring, refer to the spontaneous goodness of the enlightened. It is indeed a pity that this spontaneous goodness of the freeman in the context of Indian thought has not been sufficiently highlighted, while the freeman's (jivanmukta's) life has been depicted as one of sheer moral indifference and callousness by those who are alienated from Indian thought and culture in some way or the other.

The free man in the Buddhist tradition is also one who is free from attachment, free from strong likes and dislikes. "Granthih teṣām na vidyante yeṣām nāsti priyāpriyam", says the Dhammapada. Tasmāt prājīto na tāmichhet ichhato jāyato bhayam", Says Bodhicaryāvatāra. Freedom is achieved through the realisation of Sūnyatā according to one of the most important trends of the Buddhist thought. In Bodhicaryāvatārapanjikā it is explicitly pointed out that "Sūnyataiva nirvāṇakāraṇam", "Sūnyataiva bodhimārga iti sthitam", This is true of the entire Mādhyamika tradition, of course.

The asymmetry in the Vedantic tradition of the Jivanmukta and the Buddhist tradition of Bodhisattva to which I would like to draw the attention of the learned scholars is as follows. Inequality is there every where, manifest on all sides to even a casual abservor, and is a matter of day to day experience, So to say. Equality comes

220

G. C. NAYAK

with enlightenment only which makes one free. A wiseman who is established in Brahman is also established in equanimity as well as equality. The wise (pandit) would look on a Brahmin endowed with learning and culture, a cow, an elephent, a dog and a parish with an equal eye (samadarsinah), says the Bhagavad Gitā. The mortal plane is conquered by those whose mind is established in equality (Sāmya), for Brahman is free from blamish and is equally there every where, and the wise men are established in Brahman. Astavakra Gua similarly speaks of a person having self-knowledge being equally disposed to all. "Sa eva dhanya atmajnah sarvabhavesu samah". Equality however, is inculcated in quite a different way in the Buddhist treatises like Bodhicaryavatara although here also it is a question of enlightement. Here it is based on realising the similarity of our pleasure-pain-experience. "When both myself and others are similar in that we wish to be happy and do not want to suffer in any way, what then is so special about me? Why should I strive for my happiness alone? Why should I protect myself and not others?" asks Santideva. I should dispel the misery of others because it is suffering just like my own, and I should benefit others because they are sentient beings just like myself.7 The realisation of similarity leads to an altrustic form of life. There is no absolutistic ontology, no ontology of Brahman, involved here. The comprehension of Sūnyatā alone leads to cessation of suffering here, "Sūnyatā duḥkhasamani'8, but this Sūnyatā which is emphasised is nothing but nihsvabhavata (essencelessness) and is not meant to be adhered to as a metaphysical doctrine.9 The argument advanced for viewing others as equal is quite simple and straightforward. It is based on our ordinary, day-to-day, experiences of sukha (pleasure) and duhkha (pain), that is all. That is why in the Dhyanaparamita chapter of Bodhicaryavatara we are asked first of all to make an effort 10 meditate upon the equality between self and others. We are asked to protect all beings as we do ourselves because we are all equal in wanting pleasure and not wanting pain. 10 The sense of equality arising out of the deliberations upon our day-to-day experience of pleasure and pain makes us concerned for others as we are concerned for ourselves. This typically empirical approach of Bodhicaryavatara is asymmetrical in so far as it is not based on any absolutions. any absolutistic metaphysics of Advaitic Brahman as is the case with a livanmukta.

1

ı

ty

y

e

e

n

e

y

)f

ıt

0

g

to

d

ty

re

th

Moreover, there is a positive emphasis in the Bodhisattva tradition on the alleviation of the suffering of others even at the cost of one's personal comfort. Karuna is the deciding factor here. "Karuṇāparatantratayā paraduḥkhaduḥkhinaḥ sarvaduḥkhāpaharaṇāya yatnah", says Prajnakaramati.11 If by one person's suffering the suffering of many would be destroyed, surely kindhearted people would accept it for the sake of themselves and others. In this context the example of Bodhisattva Supuspacandra, who sacrificed himself and allowed himself to be harmed by the king for the eradication of the misery of many is cited by Santideva.12 Hence an altruistic temper permeates the conduct of Bodhisattva, which to all outward appearance may be similar to the spotaneous goodness of a Jivanmukta. What is important to note here is that even moksa or liberation for one's ownself is not valued for its own sake by the Bodhisattva. Freedom of the Bodhisattva is primarily altruistic, not self-centric. There being Parārthaikāntā tṛṣṇā or longing only to do good to others, one does not care for one's own liberation, and there can be no question of indulging in self-conceit or wonder on account of this either. "Atah parātham krtvāpi no mado na ca vismayah."13 Doing good to others is spontaneous on the part of the Bodhisattva as it is in the case of a Jivanmukta. In this sense there is silmilarity no doubt, but there is also asymmetry in so far as there is a goal of freedom for mankind as a whole in one case, whereas there is an emphasis on the achievement of one's own freedom in the other. Both Jivanmukta and Bodhisattva would work undoubtedly for the benefit of mankind as a whole. Bodhisattva has no metaphysical axe to grind, nor is he interested in his own freedom so much as he is interested in the freedom of mankind.

Santideva's following remarks need a special mention in this connection as they are very significant and illuminating. "Will not the ocean of joy that would be there when all become free," asks Santideva, "be sufficient for me? What am I to do with my liberation alone?" "Mucyamāneṣu sattveṣu yete prāmodya sāgarah, Taireva nanu paryāptam mokṣenarasikena kim". The altruistic element is thus fully explicit in the Bodhisattva ideal, though at the same time it cannot be said to be entirely absent in the ideal of the Jīvanmukta, for altruism is ingrained in some form or the other in both of them. What makes all the difference, however, is that mokṣa is denounced in favour of an altruistic form of life in the Bodhisattva ideal which

222

G. C. NAYAK

is further devoid of any commitment to the absolutistic ontology of *Brahman*. All this needs to be pointed out over and over again even at the risk of repetition because the tendency to mix them up has been equally strong.

Inspite of all that has been said and done to reduce nirguna Brahman to Sūnya in certain quarters, Sūnyatā, I am affraid, cannot be regarded as a substitute of Brahman in the Buddhist context. The asymmetry therefore in both these traditions regarding their ideas of enlightenment, freedom and equality needs special mention in view of the persistent tendency to undermine this typical asymmetry in favour of some imaginary identity in the minds of those who would put Buddhism and Vedānta in one single basket for all practical as well as theoretical purposes.

N4/215, Nayapalli, IRC Village, Bhubaneshwar (Orissa) 751015. G. C. NAYAK

NOTES

- 1. Pancadaśi VII, 186.
- 2. Philosophical Investigations, 124.
- 3. Viveka cūdāmanī, 486.
- 4. Ibid., 37.
 - cf. Bhagavadgītā, 12.4, "Sarvabhūta hite ratah".
- 5. cf. Bhagavadgītā, 5.18 and 19. cf. also Sānkara Bhāsya, "Samam ekam avikriyam Brahma drastum sīlam yesām te panditah samadarsinah" (5.18) and "Yesām Sāmye sarvabhūtesu Brahmani Samabhāve Sthitam niscalibhutam manah antahkarnam". (5.19)
- 6. cf. Santideva, Bodhicaryavatara, 8.95 and 96.
- 7. Ibid., 8.94, "Mayānyaduhkham hantavyam duhkhatvādātmaduhkhaval, Anugrāhyā mayānyepi sattvatvādātmasattvavat."
- 8. Ibid., 9.56.
- 9. cf. Prajnakaramati Bodhicaryāvatārapanjikā, 9.34, "Šūnyatāyāmapi

nabhinivesah kartavyah".

- 10. Śāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra, 8.90, "Parātmasamatāmādau bhāvayedevamādarāt, samaduḥkhasukhāḥ sarve pālanīyā mayātmavat".
- 11. Prajňākaramati, Bodhicaryāvatārapanjikā, 8.103. cf. also Ibid., 9.1, "Yathābhūtadarsino Bodhisattvasya sattvesu mahākaruņā pravartate".
- 12. Santideva, Bodhicaryaavatara, 8.106.
- 13. Ibid., 8.109.
- 14. Ibid., 8.108.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007 Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3
July, 1995

SPEECH-ACTS: AS LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION*

Man utters meaningful sounds in order to communicate. And so much depends upon the hearer, because in order to be communicated he ought to share the same conventions of meaning attached to those sounds, as is meant by the man who utters it. Otherwise, communication fails, even if one speaks and the other hears. In that case they might be men of different linguistic conventions. A man who knows Oriya language only, cannot be communicated anything when he is spoken to in Malayalam language. For him it is just a string of meaningless noises. When both the speker and the hearer are the users of the same language, communication takes place. One of the important facts about; the human being is that they can be communicated by a wide variety of the uses of languages and definite meaningful expressions and this distinguishes them from animals. By way of communication, the speaker imparts and the hearer gets informations, understands ideas, feelings, emotions, desires, judges situations, etc. The whole affair is known as speech activities within the subject-matter of philosophy of language and analysis of speech acts, made by philosophers like Austin, I am not entering into a detailed discussion of it now. Speech activities aim at a successful communication, A communication is successful, if the hearer- may be the receiver-gets the desired information properly. In the three following sections I shall discuss the means, the content and the conditions of successful communication in the context of speech acts.

a) Means of Communication:

Sounds constitute essential ingredients for the communicative function of the language. But all pieces of sounds cannot impart informations. Some of them are completely meaningless and are mere

^{*}With minor changes this paper entitled "Speech Acts" was read and discussed as a Symposium paper in the 57th Session of Ind. Philo. Congress held at Chandigarh.

noises and many of them are purposive. A purposeful sound is an articulated one. The sound produced by the utterance of "octomoque" is a mere noise, whereas the utterance of "Good morning to everybody" is articulated and meaningful.

Communication is also established by means of some written marks. One may read it and be communicated. Reading involves reading of a sentence of a language or of signs. On the road side one may read, "curve ahead", or one who does not know English language gets the information out of the mark 'D' given by the side of it. As we know, 'Curve ahead' is an expression of English language whereas, the mark can not be claimed to be part of any particular language. It shows that communicative functions may be linguistic or non-linguistic.

This point cna be analysed with the help of a few examples. A driver of a bus with a picnic party inside, cautions the passengers not to shout on the ground that the language of the vehicle is not audible to him. Here the sound produced by the vehicle may not be meaningful to the passengers but certainly it has some meaning for the driver. If 'being-public' is the most characterstic feature of language, then we cannot use the expression "the language of the vehicle" for the sound of the vehicle, since it does not cummunicate anything to the passengers (public). Such communication is an example of non-verbal communication. Similarly there are many other sounds which are public, do communicate certain informations, and yet cannot be part of any language. For example, out of the sound of the continuous bell in a college premises, about a thousand students, one hundred exployees and one hundred teachers receive the information that the college hour has come to an end for the day. So also the siren sound informs serveral thousand workers regarding the change of the shift. All these are non-verbal communications very much different from the sounds of uttering "Good morning" or 'Suprabhatam', which are verbal ones.

It will not be very much outside the context to observe whether the sound produced by animals, like the dog and the cow, or birds like the cuckoo or other singing birds are verbal or not. An example may help us to take any decision. A dog is barking in a particular manner and the owner provides food being informed that the dog

is hungry. The dog barks in another manner, the owner says, "Rocky, stop, stop, it is my friend" and the dog stops barking. Are these sounds produced by the barking of the dog purely non-verbal communication?

A humnist's answer will be an affirmative one. Because for him, the sounds, where human speech alone is involved, are verbal ones¹. (I shall agian enter into this discussion in the last section). A linguist may take the cue from the humanist and propose that non-verbal communications are non-linguistic communications. The verbal communications are human speeches and linguistic expressions in the sense that those are made in accrodance with the rules of language. Language involves several aspects like syntax, semantics, phonology, phonetics, morphology, etc. When human beings talk in a language, they do so by observing the usual rules of that language.

But a follower of Austin with reference to the distinction between rhetic and phatic acts may further specify the levels of distinction between the various sounds by saying that the barking of the dog is utterance-like and so is a phonetic-like act. Because it has a sense it may be a rhetic-like act. But it is neither phatic nor phatic-like act as it is beyond the rules of any language. The Austinian break up of a meaningful lucutionary act shows that it contains, three distinct units, namely; units of utterance (morphemes) units of language (Pheme) and units of speech (Rheme).

b) Contents of Communication:

It is now clear that verbal linguistic communications are a sort of linguistic functions called as speech-acts, which come under the orbit of the discussions about philosophy of language. The chieffunction of language is its communicative function through various linguistic expressions (*LE*). Before deciding that when the *LE* satisfies the communicative function, it is also necessary to see what the *LE* communicates or in other words what is really the content of the communication? Is it (i) 'a thought' or (ii) 'the meaning of a sentence' or (iii) 'a meaningful utterance'.

Out of such possibilities, Pit Corder² would prefer to answer that 'a thought' is the content. With some reservations Frege³ would

accept it. But this answer begs a further question: what is a thought? As it is known that the mind is the substratum of the thoughts, but it cannot communicate those thoughts without the help of language, the thought requires a manifestation in and through the LE and consequently it takes the shape of a sentence. Even though it is not free from controversy but granting that thought can in principle be communicated in language the role of the person involved is also no less important. While manifesting it into a sentence he should be careful to see that the rules of the language (syntactical rules) have been observed. And the thought has been placed in the LE with its proper force (intention). In such a manner, 'thought' which is the potential propositional content, through LE becomes a statement and refers to a state of affairs. Thus to say that 'a thought' is the content of communication is to accept that a 'statement' or 'a proposition' is communicated.

Let me come to the second alternative answer, where not merely a sentence but the "meaning" of a sentence is the content of communication. It seems now that the sentence alone is a passive one. The sentence might have been written on a block, or on a wall or at a road side. No-body knows who has written and when it was written. Such a statement, uttered by a sensible being, fitting to the circumstances of utterance, bears meaning. This 'meaning' is significant for the purpose of communication.

Here it seems as if the 'meaning' of the sentence can be conceptually separated from the complex structure of "meening of a sentence". The meaning is communicated but not the sentence. In what manner such a premise can be accepted? Davidson proposes an answer which we find in Strawson's language, "syntactic and semantic rules together determine the meanings of all the sentences of a language and do this by means, precisely, of determining their truth-conditions". Probably it can be clarified by the help of one example that the sentence "I am happy" can issue so many units of truth, and also equal number of meaning units, if uttered by a number of persons in different circumstances. It shows that the 'meaning' has inseparable relationship with the truth-value and hence with the truth which can be conceptually separated from the sentence. Thus meaning of a sentence expresses a truth which includes who under which circumstance, expresses what supposition. Here for the

It

a

y

e

2

3-

of

n

es

nd

es

Ú

10

is

be

ce :e.

he

_ >

involvement of the speaker and the hearer, it leads to the other possible answer.

Let us consider the case of the third possible answer which seems to include both the previous answers and also speaks something new. 'A meaningful utterance' has got the potentialities of a thought, sentential form, a report of a state of affairs, or at-least a reference to a state of affairs and a meaning. It further involves an utterer (the speaker) and a hearer (for whom the utterance is made). Thus the meaningful utterance involves a sentence, the thought or the supposition made by the sentence as related to the utterer, the uttering circumstances of the utterer and the report of the utterance, etc. All these various factors are nothing but the bearers of truth-value as Strawson puts it: Primary or essential bearers of truth-value, variously named and no doubt variously conceived as statements propositions, thoughts (Frege) and seemingly reportive-propositions⁵ or constatives (Austin)⁶.

It shows that meaning is essentially related with the truthcondition of the utterance. Frege would express it strongly as that the thought of a statement is the sense of the statement which is decided by the truth-condition of the statement, i.e., meaning is dependant upon truth-condition.

At this stage it is obvious to conclude that the truth-condition which is taken as the 'meaning of utterance' is the content of communication. We know that truth-condition is not the truth itself. A falsity can also be communicated as a truth and can be communicated. 'Sun rises in the East' can be communicated in the equal manner as 'Himalaya is the second highest mountain of the world' can be communicated. The truth-condition of a proposition has nothing to do with the logical analysis of a proposition. That 'Meaning' has got factual references does not mean that facts determine the meaning or meaning is dependent on facts. However, the above findings out of the third (iii) probable answer creates another problem with regard to "meaning" and its relationship with truth, but it is not the aim of the present paper to discuss all these.

The only point that impresses us from the entire analysis made in the section (b) is that if the truth-conditions are absent, the purpose

of communication seems to be defeated. A satisfactory truth-condition leads to a successful communication. It is no doubt very much important, otherwise if there is no need of communication there is no need of language at all.

c) When does communication succeed?

The success of communication greatly depends upon the hearer, not the speaker. If the speaker utters meaningless noises, no hearer will put his attention towards him, no response is expected there.

Similarly, if the speaker utters an irrelevant statement no hearer takes note of it. And we know that the relevance of the statement depends upon the context. What is communicated also involves to whom it is communicated and when it is communicated. This is an agreement with Pit Corder's "Whilst language may be used to express our thoughts, this is certainly not its only function"..... The first thing, then, that we have to face is that we cannot say what the function of a bit of language may be if we take it in isolation from its context and the situation in which it is made"7. For example, 'Pass me the salt' is a relevant utterance if it is uttered only seating by a dining table. It is absurd while going for a horse race or teaching inside the class room. This relevant utterance serves the proper purpose of communication if the hearer gets the point and passes the salt towards the speaker or gives a reply that there is no salt in the container. Here we find that where the bearer responds justly we say that the communication succeeds.

П

Communication and Austinian Abstraction of Locutionary Acts

An abstraction of a locutionary act, shows that it contains three acts namely; phonetic acts, phatic acts and rhetic acts. Here in this part I want to discuss the role of the three levels of acts for a successful communication.

A phatic is necessarily phonetic and a rhetic is also phatic and phonetic. The first component of the proposition cannot be doubted. But the second needs further illustration.

A report of the phatic act is a rhetic act and a rhetic act

J

ę.

er

nt

to

an

SS

ıg,

on

he

ng

de

of ds

er.

he

is:

ree

his

r 2

and

ed.

acl

expressed in language observing the linguistic rules is the phatic act.

It seems phonetic act is uttering something, phatic act is uttering within a language and rhetic act is uttering with sense and reference (Meaning). A communication is successful when the three acts are successfully observed.

Now the question comes to the forefront as to whether phatic act is a necessary condition of a locutionary act for successful communication? In other words, are all the fault-phatic acts nonsensical? If anybody will use his own arbitrary linguistic code and rules, then certainly it will not be communicable. But can we allow some relaxation to this? Let us consider the case of poetry. The poems are not bound to any grammatical rules yet do communicate sense and reference. In another case, when lower class students write essays in English, numerous grammatical mistakes are seen, still they convey sense and reference to the teacher. A person not knowing English language, in order to know time from an English speaking person, can also ask, 'time? time?', and can get the reply. These are the cases where the grammatical rules are not observed. If the grammatical rules constitute a phatic-act, then the above examples are cases of fault-phatic.

On the other hand, we can have grammatically correct sentences but yet they do not convey any definite sense or reference. For example. "There are ten drops of water present in the lower pocket of my coat."

Now if locutionary act is to give only reports, then all these cannot be locutionary ones and do not convey any meaning. As faulty phatic these would be non-sense or meaningless for Austin. But practically excepting the last one which is a phatic act but not rhetic, those are not mere nonsenses.

Moreover, 'Thank you', 'Excuse me', 'Come here', 'Help me', 'Don't go' are all meaningful utterances in English, but do not possess any grammatical rules and yet do communicate definite sense. It shows that for the purpose of communication, though phatic is a sufficient condition, it cannot be a necessary condition. It amounts to syaing that the speech can be separated from the language.

Here it may be noted that the utterances of the later category are having illocutionary force rather than locutionary meaning. Now a border line between the locutionary and illocutionary acts has to be fixed. This I propose to do in the next part of the paper.

Ш

Intention and Communicability in Speech Acts.

There are many non-intentional communications or unintended LEs. For example, 'X' is staying alone in a house and is suffering from acute pain in his abdomen. At a particular moment when the pain is unbearble, he utters, "O, God' save me', No more can I stand it". Here for the LEs of X there is no hearer. As there is no intention behind the LEs there need not be the question of finding out the 'effect' (in Grice's terminology) or 'response' (in Strawson's terminology) or 'securing the uptake' (in Asutinian terminology) of the utterance. It is not a case of mutual communication. We say so because of the absence of hearer. Hence the hearer's presence and absence decides the intention of communication. When the hearer is absent, we say it is non-intentional communication. But can this criterion be followed strictly? Now let us consider another example. A person, Y, who has utilised the pen of his friend for putting a signature while returing the pen, even though engaged in some other activities deeply, streched his hand with the pen towards his friend and uttered, 'thank you' just as a matter of habit, but there is 10 sign of obligation on his face. Can we say that the LE of Y is an intended one? Does this LE of Y contain the sense that "I am thankful to you"? Certainly the point is debatable one. Are the habitual utterances intentional? Here according to the criterion mentioned in the above paragraph, only for the presence of the hearer, the LE of Y is intentional. If the utterance of Y, 'thank you', does not indicate any "attitude of giving thanks", then how can we accept that it is an intentional communication? Thus mere presence of the hearer cannot decide the intentionality of the communication, Hence we can agree with the basic psychological view that the intentionality (and non-intentionality) is, in fact, present in the speaker's mind. If the speker is conscious of his utterance, then he must be conscious for whom he is making the utterance. If he is making an utterance but not conscious of it then such utterance is also non-intentional one. A non-intentional utterance does not create any problem with

J

le

e

e

0

ıd

er

e.

er id

10

n

ul

al in

10

pt

18

ty

d.

æ

al

th

regard to speech-activities. It is the intentional LE which involves another problem of being-communicated or not being communicated. Being intended or not partly depends upon the presence of the hearer but being communicated or not fully depends upon the hearer. A non-intentional LE has no connection with mutual communicability. It is in the case of ILE (intentional linguistic expressions) that the question of being communicated or not, is raised.

We know that propositions consitute the major part of every language. In section (b) of the first part, it has been made clear that propositional aspect of language has truth-conditions which play a significant role for the meaning of the propositions. Such propositions, if they are audience-directed, are ILEs, otherwise, they are neutral linguistic expressions. (A neutral linguistic expression falls more in the category of non-intentional LE). An ILE, when it communicates a state of affair or is a report regarding the state of affairs, we call it a declarative or reportive sentence or a proposition, i.e., ILPE (Intentional Linguistic Porpositional Expression) But all ILEs are not ILPEs. Sometimes ILEs stand for a request or demands or answer or expresses somebody's happiness or satisfaction or answer desire or astonishment, etc. Since regarding the later ILEs, we cannot dacide the truth-value, these cannot be considered as ILPEs. Those are merely Intentional Linguistc Sentential Expressions (ILSEs). Thus the distinction between ILPE and ILSE within ILEs cannot be ignored totally.

Now if truth condition is the criterion of meaning then the ILSEs are bound to be meaningless. Frege has given a concession to some intervogative sentences, which invites "Yes-No answers because they can convey thoughts". Such concession is not extended to imperative sentences. Some linguists have said that these are neither pure *LEs* nor the part of Language. These are language like expressions. One may be astonished, but some have equated these expressions with the "calls of animals". And certainly we cannot accept that a sound which has got resemblance with the utterance of-a-few words of language has got a meaning and hence is an *ILPE*. If this is to be accepted, then language would cease to be a viable medium for expression of emotions, etc. If emotions have no place in language then language will be a stock-book of declarative sentences. Probably we have reached a similar point of view which

has been proposed by Wittgenstein in Tractatus.

The Language expresses all that is the case. The Language is the totality of declarative sentences; not of emotions or imperatives.

The language divides into declarative sentences. One need not wonder in accepting the antimetaphysician's consideration that the lack of truth value makes metaphysical statements nonsensical which is also grounded on equal footings.

But it cannot be claimed that language is not learnt through "meaning". Rather it is learnt through "uses" as Wisdom puts it. "Don't ask for the menaing, ask for the use". The expression of request, "please pass me the salt" is a meaningless one, because its truth-value cannot be decided. But when human beings are also well versed with communication of feelings and emotions through nonverbal expressions, to say that their utterances of emotions and feelings are all meaningless amounts to putting a restriction of not using the transitive verbs or the performatives in a language, or the presence of performatives in a sentence makes the sentence meaningless. Let us consider one example. X and Y have kept their vehicles at the middle of the road which has caused one accident. When they were condemned by the people for their irresponsibility,

X says, (i) I am an irresponsible person.

I shall change this habit.

Y says, (ii) I apologise for my mistake.

I hope, I will be excused.

Now with reagrd to the explanation of X the menaing of the explanation has got much relevance with the truth of the situation. So an interested person can make a truth-valuation of his statements and can determine its meaning. But with regard to the explanation of Y, rather than the bare meaning of the utterance, a desire of begging excuse is more important. It needs an evaluation as to whether his desire has been properly put into the language or not. With regard to the speech act of Y as the satisfactoriness of the expression is the aim of the expression, the satisfactoriness evaluation can be proposed. In other words, whether through explicit performance of the expression of the expression, the satisfactoriness evaluation can be proposed. In other words, whether through explicit performance is the satisfactorines of the expression, the satisfactorines of the expression is the aim of the expression, the satisfactorines evaluation can be proposed. In other words, whether through explicit performance is the satisfactorines of the expression is the satisfactorines of the expression.

mative formulae he could make explicit his intentions, is to be judged. It is now not merely speaking something but doing something in speaking something. Here one will unhesitatingly agree with Furberg that if we distinguish the 'sense' from 'reference', then conceptual separation between the "meaning of the utterance" and the "force of the utterance" is warranted. If truth-valuation decides the meaning of the *ILPEs* then the satisfactoriness-valuation or the warrantability-valuation (as Strawson's put it) decides the force of the *ILSEs*.

Thus in matters of communication, an *ILPE* has got the locutionary meaning which communicates a particular sense to any number of hearers irrespective of speech situation. And an *ILSE* has got the illocutionary force which is communicated to an audience in a definite set up.

Thus *ILSEs*, which are considered to be language like expressions or animals' call-like expressions by certain linguists, do positively communicate the force of the utterance to the hearer and occupy a sizable area in our language. As love, fellow-fealing, kindness, cordiality, etc., contribute a lot to the life of human-beings, they must occupy their place in the language of human-beings. While appreciating the colour of a lady, one will certainly prefer to express 'O, what a sweet colour you possess 'than to say that 'you possess an appreciable white colour'.

Grammar has accommodated not only declarative sentences but also imperatives, interrogatives, exclamations, etc., The verbs are not only intransitive but sometimes transitive also. One who wants to acquire some amount of mastery over a language he cannot avoid *ILSEs* in which we find profuse use of the transitive verbs through imperative, interrogative, exclamatory sentential patterns. Thus for the purpose of communication the *ILSEs* are more important then the *ILSEs*

Now we find that language is a rule-governed (both syntactic and semantic) system of expressions in accordance with the demands of the speech-situation. We fulfil and satisfy a lot of our demands and social needs making a requisition of similar demands by means of language. We can please others or harass others by means of communication. Here I agree with the linguist Halliday¹⁵ who says

that "the nature of language is closely related to the demands that we make on it, the functions it has to serve." We cannot separate the language completely from the speech situation. So I wish to differ from those linguists, who deny that both with regard to language and speech human involvement is a necessary condition and here I agree with P.F. Strawson that one knows nothing of human language unless he understands human-speech¹⁶.

Dept. of Philosophy N.C. College, Jajpur Town, Orissa-755001. D. M. PRAHARAI

NOTES

- 1. I have not taken here Forguson's Phatic-Locutionary ambiguity into account.
- 2. S. Pit Corder, "Introducing Applied Linguistics", Penguin Books, 1977, p. 36.
- 3. Frege, "The thought. A logical inquiry". Trans. Quinton, Mind, 1956, pp. 21-3.
- 4. P. F. Strawwon "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", Logico Linguistic Papers, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974, p. 177.
- 5. Words in italics are my additions.
- 6. P. F. Strawson, "Austin and Locutionary meaning", Essays on J.L. Austin, Edtd....Oxford, Clarendron Press, 1973-p.56.
- 7. Op. Cit. p. 37.
- 8. J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford University Press, 1976-p.92. Noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary in a certain construction, i.e., conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intention, etc. This act we may call a phatic act.....
- 9. John-Lyons, 'Human language' in Non-verbal communication, ed. R. A. Hindle. Royal Society and Cambridge University Press. (Linguistic expressions are attitudinals and cognitives; cognitive communicate states of affairs, attitudinals communicate

Linguistic Communicative Function

emotions etc.)

10. Frege. op. cit.,

0

0

d

- 11. L. Wittgenetein, Tractratus Logico Philosophicus Trans. Anscombe.
 - 1. The world is all that is the case.
 - 1.2 The World is the totality of facts.
 - 1.3. The World divides into facts.
- John Wisdom, "Ludwing Wittgenstein, 1934-37, Mind', LXI No. 242, April, 1952, p. 258.
- Mats Furberg, "Meaning and Illocutionary force" Sympossium on J.L. Austin Edt. K.T. Fann. Routledge and Kegan Paul p. 445.
- 14. P.F. Strawson, op. cit. p. 68.
- 15. M.A.K. Halliday, "Language structure and Language function", New Horizons in Linguistics ed. John Lyons, Penguin books. 1973 p.141.
- 16. P.F. Strawson, "Meaning and truth" Logico Linguistic Papers. p. 189.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007 Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF THE WORLD

The Cartesian tradition ponders man as a thinking-substance and relates that substance to the world epistemologically. In order to know the world the thinking-substance which is residing in body, needs to contemplate by going out from its inner sphere because the world is considered to be external. This epistemplogical relation between man and the world indicates that although the thinking-substance is in the body and has connection with the material reality, still this location does not explain a spatial determination of the thinking-substance. It is an unextended nonphysical entity and its existence in the material world is not imperative. Accordingly, man is a non-spatial and non-temporal being and is a worldliless subject, in the sense that he can exist without his body and without this world.

Heidegger stands against this interpretation of human existence and its relation to the world. Dasein (human existence), for him, is a worldly entity. One may think that since Descartes and Heidegger begin their philosophical expedition from human existence, they belong to the same tradition. No doubt Heidegger, like Descartes, considers man to be his starting-point but Dasein is substantially distinct from the Cogito. Heidegger undermines the Cartesian Philosophy and believes that the world and the worldliness of Dasein constitute the ontological structure of human existance.2 The most primordial characteristic of being a man, is to be in the world. The worldliness of Dasein, however, should not be interpreted in religious terms; that man is a mortal creature and his temporality can be understood as something contrary to the existence of a non-temporal being namely, God. Dasein's attitude towards the existence of God is neutral and characterised by indifferentism.3 Dasein is unconcerned with the existence of God and its being in the world has no religious significance. In Vom Wesen des Grundes, this point has been again discussed by Heidegger, where he states that Dasien has no intention to make a decision whether positive or negative, concerning the existence of God.4

Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein) is the first ontological constitution of Dasein and the first existential given in Sein und Zeit (1927). Although Heidegger's discussion of this existential is short but it is an ontological foundation for the other existentials which describe Dasein. The significance and the place of this existential are similar to the significance and place of the category of Being in Hegel's logic, as both of them are the broadest and the ground for the subsequent existentials and categories.

Dasein presuposes being in the world. This priority of the world for human existence in not recognised by Descartes for two reasons; first, man as a thinking substance is a worldliless creature, that he can exist without being in this world. Second, the problem for him is certainty and true knowledge rather than existence. Otherwise, the 'Cogito ergo sum' presupposes being in the world ontologically.' Besides, since the major issue is cognition then the world as an external object for the thinking substance requires a proof, whereas, the world, in Heidegger's ontogoly, does not require that and it is beyond human doubt.

Dasein as a self relating being is able to relate itself to the world and to the other Daseins only when it is in the world. But what is the world for Dasein? In answering this question Heidegger has analysed three meanings of the world:

- i. The world as the first existential and an a priori condition which constitutes the ontological structure of Dasein, and characterises the way in which Dasein is supposed to be.
- ii. The world as the totality of being including facts, events, objects and people and this concept of the world is synonymous to Nature.
- iii. The ontic meaning of the world which represents the place in which Dasein lives or the enviornment (Umwelt) where. Dasein has contact in its everyday life with objects used as equipments (das Zeug).

Every ontological term has at the same time an ontic base. The ontic base for the meaning of the world is the environment where

Dasein performs its activities in everyday existence. The enviornment is, hence, defined as the sum of the equipments which are used for practical purposes and is distinguished from the objectivity of the world as it appears in our theoretical understanding of the phenomena. The term "Umwelt" indicates the spatial relation of Dasein and signifies the place where Dasein "Lives" prior to all kinds of speculations and scientific analysis of the wrold. In this kind of relation to the world, and in this special kind of the world viz., Umwelt, there is a definite way of handling the objects described as dealing (Umgang), "This kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use: and this has its own kind of knowledge".

Being in the world is a unitary phenomenon⁸. But it can be analysed into three constitutive items; Being-in, Being-in-space, and the worldhood of the world. The first constitutive item has a twofold menaing. It is used to explain the relation of the entities to each other and to space. When we say, "The chair is in the room", we describe the relation of the chair to the room by "in" and the room is understood as space for the chair. In the second case Being-in functions as an existential and describes Dasein's relation to space. The proposition, "The chair is in the room" is logically and grammatically correct and similar to the proposition, "The man is in the room". But when we examine them on the ground of Heidegger's ontological analysis of "in" their meanings appear to be different. The relations of the chair and the man to the room which are shown in these two propositions are quite far from each other. As it is known, the presence of the man in the room is not same like the placement of the chair. Man's presence is not only corporeal and does not exist like the chair. Man has a unique way of existence which is called Existenz by Heidegger.

As we have seen, the constitution of "inhood" is used in our language to describe the spatial relation of Dasein as well as the objects. But Dasein is not in the world the way trees, stones, etc., are in the world. According to Heidegger, "in" has originally come from the Latin term "innen" which means "to reside" or "to dwell". Dasein resides in the world whereas trees do not reside but are in the world. The term "to reside" is a conscious characteristic of Dasein

to be at a place and at the same time to have feeling of belongingness or alienation for it. The entities do not enjoy this qualification and do not have the residing-relation to the world¹⁰.

The distinction between two different meanings of "in" leads to another interesting point and that is Dasein's spatiality. Heidegger's discussion on space is not concerned with the problem whether space is an a priori form of our outer sense or something relational. Space for him has an ontological structure and is an a priori condition for Dasein. And then the spatiality of Dasein presupposes the existence of the world. But Dasein's spatiality is different from the spatiality or other entities. The existential Being- in- space does not describe the position of the entities in space, and in addition to that we can not say that the entities are alongside the other in space. We use propositions like, "The book is by the window", in our everyday language, which is false even when the book touchs the window and there is no distance between them. The existential "Being-alongside" is used to describe Dasein's spatial relation. The entities do not touch each other.11 The existentials are different from the traditional ontological and epistemological categories. They analyse the structure or human existence and are not applicable to the entities. In this way, the application of the existentials "Being'in" and "Beingalongside" to Dasein provides a new conception of space. Beingin-space is understood on the ground of Care (Fursorge). The spatiality of Dasein is related to and depends upon its closeness and remoteness from an object or another Dasein, not mathematically but in the sense that how far Dasein cares for them. An object, for example, may be far from us but our concern shows that it is near. "A friend is approaching me on the sidewalk. He is not closer than the sidewalk to me, but I feel his presence to be closer than the sidewalk and even when he approaches me, I am not aware of the closeness of the sidewalk. The distance between Dasein and the objects or the other Daseins corresponds to care. Dasein, however, is "in" the world in the sense that it deals with entities concernfully and with familiarity. If spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only because of this Being-in. But its spatiality shows the characters of de-severance and directionality".12

As a protest against the Cartesian interpretation of subject and object relation, Heidegger insists that the primordial relationship of

d

e

10

e

e

ne

y

d

e

e

d

ıt

1

pasein with the world is based on the pragmatic consideration of using the world as equipments (das Zeug), and these equipments are made for specific purposes by Dasein and for Dasein and are characterised by disposability, "The work to be produced, as the "towards-which" of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. The shoe which is to be produced is for wearing (footwear) (Schuhzeug); the clock is manufactured for telling the time." To see the world as made of equipments with the pragmatic caharactaristic is the primordial relationship of Dasein with the world. To use an object, as something ready-to-hand is prior to the way we think about it and analyse it into its universal determinations. Accordingly, Dasein relates itself to the wrold in two ways;

- i. The primary attitude is the practical behaviour of Dasein towards the entities and uses them as equipments "ready-to-hand" (Zuhandenheit).
- ii. The secondary relation is derivative and theortical based upon scientific observation. This cognitive relation is considered by Descartes to be the only possible way of dealing with the world as an object present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit).

It is not wrong to see the world as something present-at-hand. but this relation is not the only possible way of dealing with the world. As it is discussed earlier that Dasein is a worldly entity, resides in the wrold, and uses it as equipments. Dasein is not as observer or a scientist only but relates itself to the world practically to accomplish its purposes. Descartes has not realized this paractical relation and has given priority to theoretical speculations, "What it is to be is for the first time definded as he objectiveness of representing, and truth is first defined as the certainty of representing, in the metaphysics of Descartes."14 Hubert Dreyfus has also remarked that the theoretical understanding of the world which is reflected in Descartes' subject-object metaphysics is responsible for the rise of modern science. 15 Heidegger is, then, trying to argue against the concept of objectivity and theoretical representation of the world by emphasizing the pre-scientific attitude of Dasein, and considering the world of ready-to-hand to be more fundamental and prior to presentat-hand. By doing that he solves also the problem of subject-object distinction and the existence of the world remains beyond human doubt. It should be remembered that the priority of ready-to-hand equipments to present-at-hand object is not related to pragmatic theory of truth. It is rather based on the distinction between the twofold relationship of Dasein with the world. To use something like my pen for writing and to think about the pen as an object of my speculation are two different ways of looking at the world. I am using the pen in my everday existence without thinking about it as an object, and this way is primordial to my analysis of the pen to its universal qualities. In this way, by making being-in-the world as a fundamental ontological requirement for human existence, and denying the priority of theoretical speulation, Heidegger shakes the foundation of the Cartesian tradition and provides us a new philosophical ontology.

Department of Philosophy, University of Karachi, KARACHI-75270. MUHAMMAD KAMAL

NOTES

- 1. Descartes, Rene, *The Meditations*, trs. by F.E. Suteliffe, New York: Penguin Books, 1977, pp. 103-106.
- 2. Biemel, Walter, Martin Heidegger an illustrated Study, trs., by J.L. Mehta, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, p. 64.
- Heidegger, M., "Letter on Humanism", Basic Writings, Edited by David Farrel Krell, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, pp. 229-230.
- 4. Heidegger, On the Essence of Reasons, trs., by Terrence Mallick, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969. p.28.
- 5. Kamal, M., Hegel's Metalogic, Karachi: Royal Books Co., 1989, p. 84.
- 6. Heidegger, M., Being and Time, trs., by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, London: Basel Blackwell, 1992, section 66, p.94.
- 7. Ibid., section 67, p. 95.
- 8. Ibid., section 23, p. 78.

Heidegger's Concept of the World

L

In

id ic

e

ce

ly

m

as

to

as

ıd

ne

W

k:

by

k,

p.

rd

245

- 9. Ibid., section 54, pp. 79-80.
- 10. cf.Brock, Werner, Existence and Being, Indiana: Regnery Gatenaay, Inc., 1979, pp. 27-28.
- 11. Heidegger, M. Op-Cit., section 54, p. 80.
- 12. Ibid., section 55, pp. 81-82.
- 13. Ibid., section 105 p. 138.
- 14. Ibid., section 69 p. 98.
- 15. Ibid., section 70 p. 99.
- 16. Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays, trs., by William Lovitt, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, p. 127.
- 17. Dreyfus, Hubert, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment", Heidegger: a Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus and Harrisnon Hall, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1992, p. 174.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/.

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor,

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

SOME APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION

The problem of induction that arose for Hume in connection with his theory of causation leads to a devastating consequence. Hume's argument could be exploited by a skeptic to argue that our belief that bread is nourishing is as much irrational as would be the belief that bread is poisonous, for given that we have so far experienced that bread has been nourishing it does not logically follow either that bread will be nourishing in the furture or that it will be poisonous. Similarly, it could be argued that it is as much rational to believe that bread is poisonous as it is to believe that arsenic is poisonous. Hence, it is natural that philosophers, being embarrassed with this type of consequence, should come forward with different sorts of arguments to solve, dissolve, or to reject Hume's problem. In this paper we shall make a brief survey of some of the major attempts to deal with the problem.

Hume's argument which is often called the traditional problem of induction can be briefly formulated as follows. Any argument used rationally to justify induction must be either deductive or inductive. If a deductive argument with premises known on the basis of experience is used, the conclusion will be too weak. For the premises of such an argument are about past experiences only, and since the conclusion is a necessary consequence of the premises the content of the conclusion cannot extend beyond the past to cover any possible experience of the future. And if we use a strong inductive argument, we would be begging the question against Hume. Therefore, an argument used to justify induction must have a conclusion that will be too weak, or else the argument must be begging the question. Now this argument shares the form of the following argument known as constructive dilemma:

$$\begin{array}{c} (p \ v \ q) \\ (p \rightarrow r) \ \& \ (q \rightarrow s) \ / \ \therefore \ (r \ v \ s) \end{array}$$

Since this is a formally valid argument, any attempt to challenge the conclusion of this argument must be directed to questioning the truth of the premises.

There are three ways of defeating this dilemma. First, we can go between the horns by rejecting the disjunctive premise of the dilemma. But to reject a disjunction is to show that all the disjuncts are false. We shall presently see that those who want to dissolve the problem of induction try to refute the dilemma by going between the horns. Secondly, we can grasp the dilemma by the horns by rejecting the conjunctive premise. But to show that a conjunction is false we need to show at least one of the conjuncts is false. We shall see that one approach, known as the pragmatic justification of induction, attacks the first horn, while another approach, known as the inductive justification of induction, grasps the second horn of the dilemma.

Finally, a third attempt to avoid the problem of induction consists in granting the skeptical conclusion, but showing that induction is not involved in scientific method.

Of the three approaches mentioned above I will begin with the last. This is the falsificationist approach taken by Karl Popper. According to Popper, Induction has no role whatsoever in science. He maintains that what is called induction is a myth, for the so-called inductive arguments are always invalid and therefore not justifiable. Belief in the uniformity of nature, according to him, is a mere psychological fact. Thus Popper is a thoroughly Humean skeptic about induction.

Popper's basic point is that the distinctive mark of the statements of empirical science, unlike metaphysical statements and tautologies, is falsifiability. The reason why he chooses falsifiability rather than verifiability as the logic of theory selection is simple. We would be committing what is called the fallacy of affirming the consequent if by affirming the consequent of a hypothetical statement, such as 'If Smith can correctly solve the problems of differential calculus, he knows the rules of differential calculus', we affirm its antecedent. However, we can logically deny the antecedent by denying the consequent of this hypothetical statement. Similarly, it

is widely known, explicitly or implicitly, that a universal generalization is falsifiable by a single counterexample to it, whereas it is impossible to verify a universal generalization by any finite number of positive instances of it.

Popper, therefore, holds that the aim of empirical science is to formulate theories to stand the test of very possible serious attempt at falsification. Scientific theories are not final truth, but conjuctures or hypotheses designed to explain the world. The job of the theoretician is to propose hypotheses, while the job of the experimenter is to devise ways and means for falsifying, not confirming, these hypotheses.

At this point it is convenient to explain the notion of the hypothetico-deductive method in order to properly grasp the further development of Popper's view. This method, unlike the method of enumerative induction where a hypothesis is arrived at by generalization from observed instances, begins by accepting a hypothesis whose truth is in question as well as a number of statements of initial conditions tentatively accepted as true. From the hypothesis and the initial conditions we deduce an observation statement. If the observation statement turns out to be false the hypothesis is disconfirmed, but if the observation statement fits with reality the hypothesis is said to be confirmed to some extent by the statement. If more and more such observation-statements are found to be true, the hypotesis becomes more and more confirmed, and at some stage we are justified in regarding it as well established. Thus the hypothetico-deductive method aims to make scientific method entirely deductive. In addition to the making of observations, the only nondeductive aspect is imagining some ingenious hypothesis; but this is a psychological matter of discovery and as such needs no justification.

It is this method of theory-selection-by-accumulation-of-positive-instances that Popper rejects, i.e., the idea of confirmation by Positive result. According to Popper, if the test result is negative we can reject the hypothesis, but if the result of testing the hypothesis is positive, we can only say that we have failed to falsify the hypothesis.

For example, when the statement 'All ravens are black! survives

every attempt at falsification, we can only say that the statement has not been falsified. This is equivalent to saying that we have not observed a non-black raven. But the content of this statement is less than the content of the observation statement that some black revens have been observed. Again, when we say that the statement 'All swans are white' has not been falsified, all we mean is that a nonwhite swan has not been observed. Here too the information of this statement is less than the simple statement of the observation of white swans. Popper, however, believes that when a hypothesis continually survives severe attempts at falsification it is 'corroborated'.

When one hypothesis is falsified, we discard it and accept another hypothesis that has not been falsified. Popper maintains that hypotheses differ from one another in respect of falsifiability, and that we should select these hypotheses that are as highly falsifiable as possible. Moreover, our search for facts should be guided by the effort to find facts that will falsify the hypothesis in question.

According to Popper, the content of a hypothesis varies directly with the degree of falsifiability of the hypothesis. Tautologies lack empirical content, becuase they are compatible with every possible state of affairs. The greater the number of facts excluded by a hypothesis the greater the risk of its being falsified by possible states of affair. Therefore, the greater the content of a hypothesis the gretar the number of its potential falsifiers. We know that the probability of a hypothesis is defined in terms of the number of states of affairs with which the hypothesis is compatible. Thus the greater the probability of a hypothesis the lower the number of its possible falsifiers, and hence the lower its falsifiability.

Popper maintains that a highly falsifiable hypothesis which survives severe tests becomes corroborated, and the greater the degree of severity of the tests the greater the degree of corroboration. It is clear that *modus tollens* without corroboration is empty, but *modus tollens* with corroboration is good, non-deductive, scientific method. It we now accept as legitimate the question, why should we accept from among all the unfalsified hypotheses the one that is highly corroborated, we have, if effect, raised the issue of induction. So Popper has not really succeeded in showing that scientific method operates without reliance on induction.

R

Ve

10

ck

nt

at

on

is

pt

at nd

he

ly ck

es

ar

ty

rs ne

le

X

d.

nt

y

Let us now consider the attempt to justify induction by an inductive argument without committing the fallacy of begging the question. This approach, as already pointed out, attacks one horn of Hume's dilemma in order to avoid the conclusion. The use of a self-supporting inductive argument to justify induction is intuitively the most appealing. If we are asked why we believe that the inductive method will work in the future, the most natural answer would be that it worked well in in the past. Among the philosophers the most well-known advocate of this approach is Max Black.5 He rightly points out that the inductive support of induction does not commit the simple fallacy of petitio principii involved in assuming as a premise the very conclusion to be proved. Thus if we argue from the fact that a certain rule of induction, such as the elementary rule of general induction, has been successful in the past to the conclusion that this rule will also be successful in the future, we are not in fact assuming the conclusion as a premise.⁶ Although an inference is a always according to a certain rule, the inference, being distinct from the rule, need not assume the rule as a premise.

But Salmon has made a distinction between "premise-circularity" and "rule-circularity", and in terms of this distinction has shown that an argumet may involve rule-circularity without involving any premise-circularity. To see this point let us consider the following argument:

If affirming the consequent is valid, snow is white.

Snow is white.

Therefore, affirming the consequent is valid.

This argument conforms to a certain rule whose validity is asserted by the conclusion of the argument. However, this argument cannot convince us that affirming the consequent is a valid rule, for we know on other grounds that this rule is invalid. The above argument, however, is circular, for, although it does not assume the conclusion as one of its premises, its conclusion asserts the validity of the very rule to which the argument conforms. As such the argument cannot establish the truth of the conclusion, or rather the validity of the rule to which the argument conforms. This point becomes clearer when we remember that a decuctive argument can establish the truth of its conclusion only if the pormises are true

and the argument is valid. If any one of these two conditions remain unsatisfied, the truth of the premises cannot establish the truth of the conclusion. Judged by these criteria the premises of the argument stated above cannot establish the conclusion as true, for the argument conforms to a rule that cannot be regarded as valid. Similarlly, the use of self-supporting inductive argument, according to Salmon, involves rule-circularity. Thus just as a person cannot act as a judge in his or her own case, so also the inductive method cannot pass a verdict on the question of its own legitimcy.

Whereas the inductive justification of induction attacks the left horn, the pragmatic justification of induction grasps the right hom of the dilemma by producing a valid deductive argument in order to justify induction. Hans Reichenbach is an outstanding advocate of this approach. Of course, he argees with Hume that it is impossible to establish by argument that any inductive argument will ever necessarily lead from true promises to a true conclusion. Reichenbach believes that although the sucess of induction as a method of prediction cannot be determined a priori, it can be shown to be superior to any other method available. His argument can be put simply as follows:

Either nature is uniform or she is not.

If nature is uniform, induction will be successful.

If nature is not uniform, then no method will be successful.

Therefore, if any method will be successful, then induction will be successful.

This is obviously a deductively valid argument. And the first and the second premise of this argument appear to be true. But the third premise cannot be readily seen to be true. So we can ask a question: Could not there be some alternative method of prediction, such as the method of crystal ball gazing, that would work even if nature is not uniform?

Reichenbach has an ingenious answer to this question. If nature is not uniform but chaotic and still some strange method, say the method of crystal ball gazing, does really work, then there will be at least one uniformity, viz., the continued success of the crystal

ball gazing method. Thus the following will eventually be considered a strong inductive argument:

Crystal ball gazing has been reliable in the past.

Therefore, crystal ball gazing will be reliable in the future.

Thus if crystal ball gazing is reliable, then induction also will be reliable in so far as it will ultimately discover the reliability of crystal ball gazing.

Since induction works, if any mothod works, we have nothing to lose and everything to gain by adopting the inductive method. This is the essence of Reichenbach's argument to justify induction.

If is interesting to note that Reichenbach does not claim to be showing that nature is uniform or that induction will work. He just tries to show that induction is the best method of prediction, whether it happens to work or not.

It may further be noted that Reichenbach's first premise is a tautology. And his conclusion follows even only from the second premise and the contraposition of the third premise by the rule of hypothetical syllogism, Hence, the first premise is actually redundant. This, however, is not a serious defect of the argument.

From the empirical point of view the first premise is an oversimplification of facts, for it is not plausible to say either that nature is uniform in all respects or that there is no uniformity in nature. However, this premise being unnecessary for the conclusion, and the second premise being unquestionably true, the third premise must be entirely responsible for any defect in the conclusion of Reichenbach's valid argument. The third premise seems to be faulty in so far as it is based on an inductive justification of a method used to justify induction. Therefore, the pragmatic approach does not succeed in meeting Hume's challenge. In fact this approach is an altermpt not to validate but to vindicate the inductive procedure. To vaindicate an inductive rule is to show the practical reason for the adoption of a rule.

Finally, we shall consider the linguistic (or, conventionlist)

approach which attempts to go between the horns of Hume's dilemma by trying to show that no argument whatsoever is neccessary to justify induction. Thus this approach consists in showing that the disjunctive premise is false in so far as we do not need to justify induction either by a deductive argument or by an inductive argument. According to this approach, the problem of justification is a pseudoproblem. Paul Edwards' and Peter Strawson¹⁰ are two important proponents of this wiew. We shall briefly present below some of the important points of the linguistic approach.

According to this view, the problem of the rational justification of induction arises from a misunderstanding of the meanings of such words as 'induction' and 'rational'. Deduction is not the only type of reasoning that can be legitimately used. Induction is also an independent mode of argument that cannot be judged by the standard of decuctive argument. Similarly, the question why it is rational to accept inductive arguments is a silly question, for part of what we mean by being rational is understanding and accepting inductive arguments as a linguistic convention. If a skeptic asks why it is rational to accept any argument at all, his question cannot be answered without begging the question, for he has called into question the very instrument for rational discussion. Similarly, it does not make sense to demand justification for induction by calling into doubt the machinery that is used for justification. Thus the dilemma of induction seems to be a 'paper tiger'.

The main difficulty with this view is that if the members of a given society understand that rationlity consists in the use of counterinductive arguments and we understand by rationality the use of inductive arguments, then there is no way to show that our standard of rationality is superior to theirs. For if we ask them to justify the use of counterinductive arguments in preference to inductive arguments, they might, by the same type of reasoning as we have used, reply that is exactly part of what they mean by being rational. Thus rationality in this sense becomes merely a matter of convention.

We have discussed serveral approaches to Hume's dilemma designed to show that there is no logical justification for inductive arguments. Popper tried to reject induction as a method of sceince. But the he failed to reject induction, for his concept of corroboration

of a hypothesis by its survival of the severest possible tests for falsifying it, is only a disguised form of the concept of confirmation. The inductive justification of induction involved a rule-circularity, although it did not commit the fallacy of petitie principii. The pragmatic justification also fails to answer Hume's problem, for this approach only takes account of the adoption of inductive policies. The linguistic approach, as we have seen, ultimately reduces the concept of rationality to social conventions. Thus none of the arguments that we have discussed have been able to meet Hume's challenge.

The failure of all these arguments might quite naturally lead one to suspect that there is something seriously wrong with Hume's argument. Hume's problem of induction was the problem of justifying induction by justifying something more fundamental, i.e. the principle of uniformity of nature that would serve as a guiding principle in inductive reasoning. But discovering the uniformities of nature is perhaps the most difficult, if not an impossible, thing to do. All the different arguments to justify induction as well as Hume's argument for the impossibility of justifying induction have one thing in common. They are all based on the presupposition that the justification of someting is a matter of presenting a valid or correct argument in favour of that thing. This is one sense of reason. But it is not necessary that this should be the only sense of reason that is appropriate for all purposes.

As Pollock points out, there are two different sorts of justification corresponding to two different sorts of reasoning, viz., "primitive reasons" and "reasons". Primitive reason is the stronger of the two concepts, and P is a primitive reason for Q if this is a basic epistemic fact that cannot be derived from anything else. In this sense the "reason for" relation is not a transitive relation. Thus, for example, that house's looking red gives me a reason for thinking that it is red. But reasoning in the second sense consists in deriving one proposition from another. Pollock, however, does not think that the relation between the premises and the conclusion of an inductive argument is a primitive reason relation. This distinction might lead us to look for some sense of reason or justifiction that would not be the result of some valid argument.

Although the linguistic approach to the problem of induction

is not quite satisfactory, we can learn an important lesson from it. It does not make sense to demand justification for a certain mode of argument which is itself an essential instrument for the justification of other things. In fact the root of the problem of induction lies in trying to give an empiricist account of the guiding principle of induction. For an empiricist there are two possible ways of solving the problem of induction. One approach would be to try to deduce the statement of the principle of inductive reasoning from a purely formal principle. But in fact we cannot deduce the principle of inductive argument from a tautology. Another approach would be to try to deduce the statement from an empirical principle. In this case we would be begging the question, for this approach assumes that past experience is a reliable guide to the future and this is exactly what we are trying to prove.

Since the problem of induction cannot be theoretically solved in either of the two ways, a thorough going empiricist, such as Ayer, has to conclude that it is not a genuine but a fictitious problem. But Russell, in spite of being a philosopher in the empiricist tradition, frankly admits the truth of a non-empirical principle which he calls the principle of induction on the ground of its being the simplest self-evident principle. Thus, although Russell. Hike Hume, believes that if the principle of induction were false there would be no reason for accepting our empirical generalizations and the predictions based on them, he, unlike Hume, takes a rationlist's position with regard to this principle as well as the pirnciples of deductive arguments. As Russell says:

Logical principles are known to us, and cannot be themselves proved by experience, since all proof presupposes them. In this, therefore, which was the most improtant point of the controversy, the rationalists were in the right.¹⁵

Thus it is clear that any reasonable attmept to justify the principle of induction must proceed along rationalistic lines.

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh. AHMED JAMAL ANWER

?

e

n

S

e

e

S

S

S

j

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. See Copi (1982), pp. 269-272. Refuting a dilemma is not a way to prove that it is formally invalid. Rather, it is a way to evade the conclusion without questioning the validity of the argument.
- This is possible only when the alternatives in the disjunctive statement are not exhaustive. If, however, the disjunctive premise is a statement about mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, it is impossible to escape between the homs.
- 3. See Popper (1959) for the most comprehensive account of Popper's position.
- Popper applies the falsifiability to distinguish between science aand non-science, but not between meaningful and meaningless statements.
- 5. See Black (1954). ch. 11.
- 6. To say that an argument with a true premise is successful is just to say that it has a true conclusion.
- 7. See Salmon (1967), pp. 14-15.
- 8. See Reichenbach (1949) ch. 11.
- 9. See Edwards (1949), pp. 141-163 for Edwards' view on the dissolution of the problem of induction.
- 10. See Strawson (1952), pp. 248-263 for Strawson's view on the dissolution of the problem of induction.
- 11. See Pollock (1984), ppl. 423-426.
- 12. See Ayer (1946), p. 50.
- 13. See Russel (1912), ch. VI.
- 14. See Russell (1912), p. 38. and Russell (1961), p. 647.
- 15. Russell (1912), p. 41.

Works Cited

Ayer, A. J. (1946). Language, Truth, and Logic (London: Victor Gollanoz)

Black, M. (1954). Problems of Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press).

Copi, J.M. (1982). Introduction to Logic (New York: Macmillan).

Edwards, Paul. (1949). 'Russell's Doubt About Induction', Mind, vol. 68.

Pp. 141-163.

- Pollock, J.L. (1984). 'A Solution to the Problem of Induction', Nous, 18, pp. 423-462.
- Popper, K. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London).
- Reichenbach, H. (1949). The Theory of Probability (Berkeley: U. of California Press).
- Russell, R. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford U. Press).

 —(1961). History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Salmon, W.C. (1967). The Foundations of Scientific Inference (U. of Pittsburgh Press).
- Strawson, Peter. (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory (New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc.).

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 3 July, 1995

BOOK-REVIEWS

Dr. Ranjan K. Ghosh: Concepts and Presuppositions in Aesthetics: Ajanta Series on Aesthetics, VI, Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1987 pages: 152.

The 20th century philosophy is marked by its method of analysis. In India too, scholars have pursued this method for discussing and investigative philosophical problems. However, where concrete experience is the basis of the philosophical investigations which proceed to abstract level, this method of philosophizing is likely to make the subject-matter estranged from its roots if the investigator has not the feel of the art under consideration. Nevertheless, philosophers take interest in the abstract topics and pursue their studies although such pursuits in the absence of sympathetic response end in some kind of futility and irrelvance. Of course such a situation needs to be changed. Dr. Ranjan Ghosh, the author of "Concepts and Presuppositions in Aesthetics" has made a serious attempt in this direction. He is not merely a philosopher of insight but is also a practising artist. He has several beautiful paintings to his credit. It is good that he uses his training and insight in the field of fine arts, to philosophize in the domain of taste and beauty. The present work is a testimony in this regard. It is an encouraging feature in the context of the development of modern Indian philosophy.

Dr. Ghosh exhibits the same spirit when he writes in the preface of his present book that "There is, perhaps, need for a dialogue between the philosopher and the artist on general issues which are of importance for both". (p vii) There is no doubt that the absence of insights in the field makes the discourse empty and verbose whereas the inner stream of the experience of the creative artist makes the discourse richer. Keeping in view this position Dr. Ghosh discusses the concepts and presuppositions of aesthetic. Indeed these lopics are of cardinal importance.

Art is communication and one who communicates has a certain intention regarding the content he communicates. This is the domain where nobody can proceed without taking into consideration the intention of the artist. Dr. Ghosh begins his book by devoting the first chapter of the book to the discussion of the concept of intention. And he does it by using the method of analysis. First he enumerates the basic questions related to intention and classifies them into why type and what-type. He angues that what-type questions can be raised only with regard to works of art (p. 4) From this he proceeds to bring before us the two different senses of intention, one it in the context of why-type questions and the other in the context of what-type questions. The second type question involves the sense of 'privacy' about the artist's intention.

After distinguishing between the 'why-type' and the 'what-type' questions Ghosh refers to the basic categories which he uses throughout the book. This kind of distinction helps him to raise the question like the privacy of artist's intention (p.6). The strength of Dr. Ghosh's method is that it allows him to bring in the modern frame-work for discussing the age-long problems of aesthetics. In fact, Dr. Ghosh's work should be regarded as examplary of philosophizing as applied to arts. When an artist is involved in the creative activity, his attention is focussed rather on the object he is presenting than on the process of creativity and the psychological elements and aspects involved in the process. But in order to understand the inner process of artisl's mind, Dr. Ghosh applies his method and investigates the nature of intention. We think that the analysis of this inner processes can be possibly and ably done only by that mind which can have the inner approach to the inner process. Dr Ghosh exploits his artistic calibre and strength to have such an 'inner approach' in the philosophical analysis of the aesthetic problems. Thus we get a proper blend of the artists personality in this kind of deeper and successful analysis. In his deeper and extensive analysis he introduces another useful distinction viz. narrow sense and wider sense of privacy (p.8). With this kind of procedure he arrives at a very significant point. He says, "Seeing possibilities is seeing the object" (p.27) This really hints at the creatives at a very significant point. at the creative potential of the artist. In fact it is here that the artist scores over the critic and embanks on his creativity.

Dr. Ghoshl continues this important thread in the next chapter,

Book-Reviews 261

in

in

he

he

n.

les

iyed

to he

at-

of

œ'

out

on

h's

for

h's

ied

ion

ess

red st's

of be

ner

bre

cal

of

sis.

ful

lib

ys,

ints

tist

ler,

Presuppositions of Aesthetic Experience'. Art is actualization of something. But it is not an actualization of something which is actual. It is actualisation of something which is beyond the actual. It is imaniged, contemplated and reached by the artist. He goes beyond the actual world and contemplates over the possibilities. He discovers (or invents) his world in these possibilities and actualizes some of the possibilities, Before creation, i.e. before actualization, the artist experiences the possibilities and then wants others to share with him his experience. Hence he actualizes, i.e., objectifies, expresses, the experienced possibility which can be now experienced by others. Dr. Ghosh writes, "To experience a work is always to experience it against this spiralic background. New possibilities are realized; even the artist may 'discover' them in his own work when he experiences it dispassionately" (p.53). Both the worthiness and the greatness of a work of art is to be identified by following the same clive. A truely great work of art will never stop throwing up new 'possibilities'. Realization of such complex possibilities will bring richness and intensity to our experience." (p.53). There is a continuity involved in it. It seems to have a dialectic form in its essence. He further says, "Once I have an aesthetic experience of a rich and intense kind it will arouse expectations with regard to my experience of other work of art. It is an ongoing phenomena here too" (p.53) In order to strengthen this point Dr. Ghosh aptly takes the help of Bharata. He writes ".... the Indian Rasa Theorists and commentators on Bharata's Rasa Sutra recognize that rather than experiencing passively the Rasika (Sahrdaya) (the experiencer) participates in such experience. What I am saying accords well with this view point." (p.54). There is, so to say, a kind of dialectic between the artist and the appreciator and both proceed by enriching each other in this process. Nevertheless, the 'experience' of each is unique for the experiencer, tries to express or communicate it. "Every work of art has a public context but the experience that results from it is private. 'Public context' implies everthing that is sayable about the work of art and ils relation to other works of art. The 'privacy' I speak of is with regard to the realization of the possibilities within the context of aesthetic experience" (p.54). The dichotomy of privacy and publicness involved in aesthetic experience may look as if it was enigmatic or Paradoxical. But Dr. Ghosh makes it more and more sensible and intelligible. There is no point in reducing the dichotomy by discarding

either of the alternatives, since that will affect adversely the core of the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic experience needs to be understood in its rich and varied form. "Aesthetic experience is not any one single kind of experience as there are varieties of experiences possible within the ever-widening contours of such description. Yet experiencing art is a teachable concept in quite the same sense as art-making activity is such in some important respects" (p.55).

A major concern of the study of aesthetics is with the various aesthetic judgements passed. This important area is taken up for discussions by Dr. Ghosh in the third chapter, 'The Problem of Aesthetic Judgement'. He begins the discussions by clarifying his approach to the problem. He writes, "My concern now is with the problem of aesthetic judgement. Is there one single common way of judging all works of art? Are all aesthetic judgements of the same type? My answer to both questions is in the negative. I see a variety, here, too" (p.56). Dr. Ghosh in his approach as well as in his conviction appears to be quite open and this is a true spirit of an artist. Restricting oneself to the subject is reducing one's own freedom to philosophize; and this goes against the concept of creativity. When one holds the view that 'seeing possibilities is seeing the object' (p.27) also allows a sufficient scope to one's creativity. This helps one not to become dogmatic. One has to be always aware of the other side, the other way and the other possibilities Dr. Ghosh keeps this philosophic paradigm before himself, without of course, marring the rigour of his presentation. He does not allow his mind to rattle in any disorderly way. He classifies the various aesthetic judgements in a systematic manner. He writes, "I will want to say that there are atleast two different kinds of judgements, and I will call them (i) w-type judgements and (ii) e-type judgements." (p.56) He works out his scheme in an orderly manner and in the context of what he discussed in the previous chapter, viz. the public context and the privacy of the experience.

Passing or making a judgement presupposses a cretain frame of reference. Although in aesthetics, a judgement is passed on an 'aesthetic' object, the object of this judgement is not taken in isolation. Such understanding or appreciation of an object is never possible. Any object has a context in the form of a history and the evaluation is related to its roots in history. Dr. Ghosh makes this

Book-Reviews 263

re

be

10

es

et

as

US

or

bis

he

ay

me

ty, his

om

nen

ct

lps

the eps

ing

ttle

nts

ere

em

rks

hat

the

me

in

ver

the

uhis

clear when he says, "Art objects can never be viewed otherwise than in a continuum howsoever distinctive or original a particular work may be. Picasso could not be Picasso just in virtue of one single work; he had to father a whole tradition" (p.71). Any work of art is only like a point in this continuum, a continuum of the contributions of the artist as also of the continuum of the tradition of artists to which the particular artist belongs. "Around every work of art there is a tradition. If a new and entirely original work stakes its claim to the title, 'work of art' then there must be a new and original tradition. Past works of art form a tradition in the background of which any work may be judged" (p.71). To belong to the continuum is significant for the work of art. Nevertheless, the originality consists in breaking away from the continuum. Here, however, the artist might have to pass through noticable stress and strain. To understand the break from the tradition the appreciator has to have, first, a total grasp of the tradition as a continuum. Then alone he can relate to it the 'original' work of art which makes a departure from the tradition. Dr. Ghosh is aware of this point when he says, "To create new and original works one must break the tradition and create a new one. Many a time a new work (very original) or a new trend-setter does not receive immediate recognition because the connected tradition has still not come to full bloom" (p.72).

Dr. Ghosh continues his investigations in the fourth chapter, "Critical understanding: Process and Response', in which he takes up the point of art as an expression. He raises two questions, "(i) What does the artist express? and (ii) What decides whether he expresses truely or not?" (p.77) And he himself further says, "Question (i) is a pseudo question, I maintain Question (ii) is a typeically aesthetical question." (p.77). Because, according to him, the first question is concerned with life-situations while the second does not. And in the explanation of this he tells us that, "A ture expression of the artist is his own expression, it no longer is imitative though the signs he works with must have a common context" (p.80).

This helps understanding the nature of arts in general. For a philosopher this is the question of defining art, viz. "Do all works of art have some common feature of property?" (p.91). In fact, this is a very challenging task set for any philosopher. Since the area

of aesthetics is quite different from that of logic, we do not expect the precision in aesthetics the same way we have it in logic." "But to be ambiguous is not the same as to be meaningless. 'Art' is so much an ambiguous word that it is quite meaningful to ask what is Art' (p.93). Nevertheless art does involve a kind of theorization and precision of its own kind. Art can never go unattended with some theory or definition. After a particular art form has become well established it is difficult to say which follows the other, the theory or the art-activity. (p.96). And the reason given by Dr. Ghosh is very significant. He writes, "Theory is important because it makes clearer the ongoing process of creativity" (p.98). This is how he gives a different direction to the point in defining art.

As it is difficult to get a precise difintion of art, though it is sought for the philosophical purpose, it is equally difficult to pin point the meaning and criteria for a work of art. This is the topic for discussion in the sixth chapter. Here Dr. Ghosh makes use of the previously introduced distinction between the w-type and e-type judgements, and arrivies at a point that there are no paradigm cases of art in the strong sense of the term.

This leads Dr. Ghosh to the problem of commitment. Dr. Ghosh discusses it in the seventh chapter. The considerations of this problem are based on the understanding of the relation between art and society. He analyses this from different angles and considers in this context several other normative concepts like response, responsibility, freedom etc. In fact, responsibility is determined by freedom. Hence, one has to first decide whether an artist is free and if so, in what sense he is free. Dr. Ghosh reminds us of the typical question "Does the artist have freedom to create any type of art he chooses' (p.133). In a fairly long discussion on the point of freedom he makes a reference to cinema which is not usually brought under such discussions. But this helps to relate the discussions, re: the role of art in relation to siciety. For this he introduces a "distinction between the phrases 'art-is and art-doing' (p.139). Here again, the modern tools of analysis are used ably to drive the point towards its conclusion.

In this entire book, thus, Dr. Ghosh discusses such related topics of aesthetics which are of cardinal importance to the subject.

Book-Reviews 265

Although the topics are varied, he has put them together maintaining consistency and continuity. Here lies the methodological strength of the presentation. In brief, in Dr. Ghosh's book we find a very lucid and novel presentation of the problem and is likely to be a trend-setter for the students of aesthetics. The book in short, is challenging in regard to methodology and novel for the perspectives, the auther explores from the blending of art and philosophy. The work should provoke as well as encourage the researchers to think in depth about the aesthetic problems which arts in general pose to philosophers.

Dept. of Philosophy Poona University, Pune 7. S. E. BHELKE, S. S. BARLINGAY,

П

Rudolf A. Makkreel, IMAGINATION AND INTERPRETATION IN KANT: THE HERMENEUTICAL IMPORT OF JUDGE.

MENT. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press. 1990. pp. x + 187.

With the possible exception of the philosophy of David Hume, the three *Critiques* of Immanuel Kant during the past 200 years have received more attention than the writings of any other philosopher in the Western world. Several commentators on Kant have not gone much beyond the first *Critique*. But in the present work under review Makkreel has extended his commentary to develop an expanded theory of the imagination as a function of reflective rather than simply of determinate judgement in the employment of ideas of reason in providing a more complete interpretation of the contents of our experience.

It has been said that with Kant the faculty of the imagination came into its own, as it were, gaining much more respect than it had hitherto enjoyed. In the third *Critique* imagination is no longer constrained to serve the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories) in causal judgement alone, but along with reflective judgement is enlarged to recognise an indeterminate sense of wholeness in some slective capacity patterned after an aesthetic sense of the beautiful. Ideas of reason are given legitimate scope to encompass the human as well as the natural sciences.

In Chapter 1 of Makkreel's carefully documented work, the building of images for Kant is found to take various forms, one of which (Gegenbildung) allows images to fill the role of linguistic signifiers or symbolic analogues to the thing that is represented, making them indispensable to conceptual understanding. Image formation may take place almost at a subliminal level in the implementation of the knowledge process. Images may furnish both an upper and a lower limit to absorb the shock in the apprehension of discretely sensed intuitions, compensating for a lack of harmony in a reality that is all but primitive.

In Chapter 3 imagination is portrayed in the traditional manner

Book-Review 267

as a synthesizing faculty having its origins, as Kant has told us, deep within the human soul. It is a faculty of a *priori* intuition resulting in a synthesis that underlies even the concept of an object in general. Imagination brings to bear its own formative powers by applying the universality of categories to the universal condition of all sensibility (which is identified as time) in the construction of objects that come to be meaningful in experience.

In Chapters 4 and 5 the centrality of creative imagination in the Critique of Judgment is elaborated. But in this later work Kant's theory of the imagination is considerably altered and even reverses itself to accommodate an aesthetic component and wholeness which never appeared earlier in the categorical deduction of all (human) experience. Aesthetic imagination is now a mode of reflective judgment which negates the conditions of time itself, for Kant speaks of an imaginative cosmological regress instantaneous to the point of the annihilation of time so that imagination no longer presents images in a linear sequence. Moreover, an aesthetic representation in myself, it is claimed, imparts an immediate awareness of well-being, unity and harmony, a sense of purposiveness without the presence of any further design or of any further object. The purest form of reflective judgment is one in which we are able to discern a sense of beauty in the awareness of aesthetic ideas enabling us to move freely from the particular to the universal in advance of the causality of determinate judgment which allegedly has accounted for ordinary and meaningful objective experience.

Aesthetic imagination is subjective, and in Kant's words involves only a "making distinct of objects". For in knowledge arising from the aesthetic we are concerned only with the apprehension of the form of objects. Aesthetic imagination attains an epistemological function only in some proprietory sense, self-activating and satisfying to the subject, acting more freely than the imagination which supposedly was bound by the understanding within the confines of causally determinate laws.

The conclusion seems inesoapable that the aesthetic imagination is not limited to the determinate knowledge of the categories as deduced in Kant's earlier *Critique*, but even apart and independent of nature plays its role in the organization of the content of all nature in general including human nature. Kant has now raised the possibility

of an aesthetic mode of interpretation in the comprehension of our world in its entirety, relating not only to pure concepts of the understanding, but to the ideas of reason as well. The concept of (the) imagination has become greatly enlarged and is to be seen in a more or less independent capacity as a function of judgment in the service of the understanding.

Reflective judgment articulates the function, not only of nature objectively, but aesthetically and subjectively in supplying an elective conditionality to nature in accordance with our own human needs and desires. Every recognised object may be taken "analogous to spiri" as a self-determining phinciple of life itself. The tortured causal epistemology we were offered with great assurance no longer holds. Entities that possess life must be shown to be freely self-organizing and purposive. The doctrins of the categories turns out to be anything but definitive for all experience; it makes no complete and satisfying contribution to epistemology and none at all to metaphysics.

Makkreel wants us to believe that intellectual ideas which were thought to be illusory are now utilised to furnish a well-rounded meaning to all life and living. Categorical laws of the understanding deductively proven in the first *Critique* have left certain aspects of experience quite unfinished. Imagination springs to life as a mediating link to provide what is termed a "completely formative" content to rational ideas heretofore supposed to be completely empty of content. In the first *Critique* rationsl ideas were dismissed as having only a regulative function in the understanding of phenomena, but in the third *Critique*, along with ideas available from the imagination, ideas of reason seem to be readily invoked to play a key role in the interpretation of our knowledge of experience as a whole and in capturing the felt fulfillment of life.

It is further noted by Makkreel that the teleological interpretation of life for Kant derives not only from our aesthetic sense, but from the various goals to which we might aspire. Purpose as an incentive is recognised in accordance with human needs. Only under the condition of the ideals and values that we appropriate to ourselves selectively and apart from terrestrial nature are we able to declare for the purposiveness of nature. Nature only points to those higher ends that are to be found in manking alone, ends higher than nature hereself is able to either fulfill or afford. This doctrine is to be found is Section

Book-Review 269

83 of Kant's Critique of Judgment. Kant is saying that only by prescribing a principle of purposiveness to ourselves in separation from nature are we able to articulate the telos that might be found sporadically with nature in some desultory fashion. Man is himself the ultimate purpose, a final end independent of and free from nature in order to be in a position to proclain for himself moral autonomy. Purpose for us operates by a system, not of instruction from nature, but in accord with the recognition of our own needs and aspirations.

Chapter 7 is taken up with teleological ideas and the interpretation of history. Purpose in the natural world may be exercised in assessing the usefulness of one species to another, but can scarcely become meaningful without the assumption of (some) final purpose, or in other words the presupposition of purposiveness as an idea in general in order to attest to the significance of life itself. Telecology is examined from various angles, as for example, a natural chain of purposes observable in nature, a final or moral purpose to be found in humankind and a speculative teleology in accordance with reflective judgment and the ideas of reason. The ideal goal for both the individual and for society in Kant's view is one of moral fulfillment and moral wholeness which can only belong to mankind as sovereign over and above nature.

Makkreel has made a significant contribution in showing that the Critique of Judgment declares for an indeterminate universality of communication through feeling, an approach that is yet of prime importance without appealing first to concepts. This is accomplished largely by a non-discursive appreciation of aesthetic ideas in relation to imagination in its role of symbolic form. The imagination is seen as almost a substitute for reason, and in playing a stronger and more flexible part than formerly depicted seems to surpass reason in its ability to supply content to ideas in order to earich experience largely on its own terms. In a kind of networking of recognition rather than only of instruction, the imagination not only accommodates ideas, but even produces ideas in working toward a more complete rounding out of all possible human experience.

59 Victor Street, London, Ontario, Canada N6c 1 B9.

ALBERT W. J. HARPER

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs.10/.

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs.10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor, Indian Phile

Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,
Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 October, 1995

A THEORY OF TIME

A REVIEW OF THE CHALLENGE OF TIME

Time is perceived in connection and association with events. There are two ancient paradoxes on which this understanding of time escapes its commonplace meaning. For a sequence of events to be observed or conceived, there has to be a corresponding sequence of moments of time. Since the events in a sequence are separate, the moments in the corresponding time sequence are also separate. This presents the opening dilemma. There is an undefined gap, however small, between two moments. Thus, among other things, an interval of time has to be open at least on one end, or time cannot be continuous. Let this be called Impasse 1. Another preliminary point is that separate events can not be observed or conceived without a measure of temporality. Or, time is required to define time or time is not definable. Let this be called Impasse 2; the circulatory one, which, perhaps, might have made the study of time, as it really is, rather unpopular.

There is the third initial predicament of an apparent multiplicity of time

"Time 1 is the time in the physical theory, what is represented in the equations of dynamics by the letter t.... Time 2 is the time of human consciousness...."

The comprehension of t remains more or less elusive. The usual oversimplification regarding Time 2 is to think about it merely as date, hour, minute, second and part of a second, or as a "date' in short. However, Time 2 takes up forms that are different from date. A discussion on its demographic and actuarial case may be seen in the Appendix which will justify assigning to Time 2 a V(t)² like functional form and assuming that t is a metaconcept. The cases of other disciplines may not be necessary to discuss in this short paper.

And the notion does not remain restrictive to t and V(t). An analytically established Time 0, which may be called v(t), has to represent a "pre-time" status corresponding to a given "event-and-observation" condition. Apart from Time 0, there can be other preforms of V(t). Call them $V_p(t)$'s. These preforms are internal to V(t). Externally, each event or idea is commanded by a particular state of refinement in observation or awareness to conceptualise its own time of consciousness. The third predicament is, therefore, a Multiplicative Temporality.

Conversely, and without falsifying multiplicative temporality, the ordinary activity and observations like eating luncheon an hour after noon or filing a tax-return on a deadline or assuring how many years more a person may be expected to live or holding that truth triumphs, are synchronistic activities although they are or may be subsultive. These involve constriction to a fixed place where the luncheon will be when the hour strikes one after noon, or to a post-office during working hours before the deadline, or to a fixed notion that a particular ratio involving elements of time provides the expectation of life, or to the presupposition that truth and untruth always exist in two separate bundles. It is a serious business to synchronise. This paper will presume that the understanding of synchronal temporality follows the perception of multiplicative temporality in the reverse.

AN ELEMENTARY UNDERSTANDING OF TIME

The beginning is a thought. It implies an orderliness on conclusion of a chaos. When the mind travels "backwards" into the "past", it follows a course which is understood, orderly and incidental. Beyond a point, which one may theorise and call the beginning, nothing is orderly or incidental, or therefore comprehensible. It follows that beyond that point, no consciousness can exist. If a conglomeration of all consciousness leading to awareness regarding things and ideas, physical or abstract, is conceived at that point, then a rule of orderliness has to be at work there, to separate awareness, real or abstract, into one group called S. The same rule places the remainder into another group N "that which is not S". Since it is the beginning. S and N both exist; and time remains as awareness in S and something else in N. By definition the conceptions of S and

N arise together. By definition S is next to N. By definition, the separation of S and N is subjective and therefore, the rule governing their separation is such that S may increase, size and content, as consciousness expands with the extension of knowledge, and therefore, it is also omnipresent. By definition, N is large compared to S. Or, N>S, such that is S absorbs n things and ideas into consciousness, or N->(N-n) while S-> (S+n), the initial identity of N>S is not disturbed because N is large compared to S and S is large compared to n.

One may call this arrangement of separating S from N, to be Rule 2³. Rule 2 exists.

Theorem: The Rule 2 exists.

For an inductive start to an idea or physicality, an acceptance of a system prevails. That, which is not in the system and that which is included in the scheme, are separated by some rule. Call it Rule a. A deductive termination of an investingation of a conscious idea or physicality is that which is an idea or that which is a physicality that is dependent upon attributes like information regarding and refinement of the initial idea or the original physicality or the introductory deductive process. The conclusion of the deductive process alters these attributes. Therefore, a deductive end has to be a result that opens further questions. If deduction aims at finding a terminal result, then a rule has to absorb the terminal questions. Call it Rule b.

Rule a and Rule b exist.

Therefore, if Rule a or Rule b or both; or variations of Rule a or Rule b or both; or Rule a, Rule b, both, all variations of Rule a or Rule b or both; severally, or in groups, or altogether, are called Rule 2, then Rule 2 exists.

Another Rule 1 decides in what way N yields a part to be turned S with Rule 2; and other rules.

This is a "chaos to order" premise that accepts that time is a mental concept which gave meaning to an *order on conclusion* of a chaos. The chaos was that which did not permit a separation of a concept, including the concept of time, or a thing from N that existed while S did not. An "order" is not definable without a temporal connotation of its "start". An "order" of

corrective or expansive variation, or variation of other types in the static or cyclical patterns of the universe, bears the same temporality. This central position is due to the fact that the functional form of V(t) works universally in relation to everything under the consideration, whether physical or abstract. Time is the associative situation of "order" out of "chaos", or the first concept. There is no need to compromise on this cardinal position, If all planets and stars stop moving and all bodies give up the property of gravitation, there remains no way to relate an event with the position of any moving body or to a change in the level of external energy, then it may be reasonable to give up the concept of time and assign as important a position as that of time for comprehending change to another internal or static attribute like hardness. It is not easy to outline how such a conceptual exigency may work. Until such a situation arises, or such a situation is required to be conceptualised, time will continue to be associated with everything one can imagine.4

Definition of time

The attempt will be to understand Time 2 first and Time 1 next, and not, as is usual, the other way round. The time, which is common to S and N, becomes conscious time in S if it is defined by four elements, two of events or ideas, and two of observations or awarenesses. Let 't' be time; 'a' be observations or awarenesses; and 'e' be events or ideas that are not 'time', real or abstract. Let e₁₁ be the first stage or effect that 'e' confers to a₁ and let e₁₂ be the second meaning of 'e' as it appears to a₂. If

 $e_{11} \neq e_{12}$ or, e_{11} and e_{12} are not the same $e_{11} = e_{12}$ or, e_{12} is next to e_{11} $e_{11} \geqslant e_{12}$ or, e_{11} and e_{12} are not simultaneous events $e_{11} \neq e_{12}$ $e_{12} \Rightarrow e_{13}$ $e_{14} \neq e_{14}$ $e_{15} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{16} \Rightarrow e_{17}$ $e_{17} \Rightarrow e_{18}$ $e_{18} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{19} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{12} \Rightarrow e_{13}$ $e_{14} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{15} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{16} \Rightarrow e_{17}$ $e_{17} \Rightarrow e_{18}$ $e_{18} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{19} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{12} \Rightarrow e_{13}$ $e_{14} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{15} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{17} \Rightarrow e_{18}$ $e_{18} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{19} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{19} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ $e_{12} \Rightarrow e_{13}$ $e_{15} \Rightarrow e_{15}$ $e_{17} \Rightarrow e_{18}$ $e_{18} \Rightarrow e_{19}$ $e_{19}

O is an operator that may empathise real or unreal t with an association or event or idea with observation or awareness:

A Theory of Time

275

V is the operator that can operate on both real or unreal twithin S; and there is an *Operator* "A" of "oneness" that can operate on any O or e or a, to create V(t) in the manner

$$V(t_1, t_2) = A\{O(e_{11}, a_1), O(e_{12}, a_2)\},\$$

so that

e

d

ıt

og og

S

h

$$V(t_1, t_0) = O(e_{11}, a_1)$$
 and

$$V(t_0, t_2) = O(e_{12}, a_2)$$

where t_0 joins the domain or duration of t_1 and t_2 to depict the "nothing" status of t when no observation or awareness operates. This is the first part of the rule of *Operator A*.

In this part of the rule, it is assumed that the duration between t_1 and t_2 contains the non-time t_0 and also that, although 'e's are not 'time', they may not be, perhaps, but not necessarily be, free of temporality and that is why it is necessary to say that they are at least not simultaneous.

Here, $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ and $O(e_{12}, a_2)$ are the first and the next parts of time that may be associated with a set of observations or awarenesses that come one after the other. These generate $V(t_1, t_2)$, the *conscious* time. If e_{11} and e_{12} do not exist, then $V(t_1, t_2)$ does not exist or time does not become a phenomenon.

It can be suggested that this first part of Operator A is but a universal rule.

Proposition:

If every unit of association of an event or idea Ω based on observation or awareness δ reduces to oneness, then the concept that reduces them so is defined.

Symbolically, using the likeness of the nomenclatures previously explained. U is defined for argument h by

$$\begin{array}{llll} U(h_1, & h_2) & = & A\{O(\Omega_{11}, & \delta_1), & O(\Omega_{12}, & \delta_2)\} \\ \text{where} & U(h_1, & h_0) & = & O(\Omega_{11}, & \delta_1) & \text{and} & U(h_0, & h_2) & = & O(\Omega_{12}, & \delta_2). \end{array}$$

Example:

- 1) Ω 's can be number of electrons: h's can be electric charge; A can be induced by a conductor to generate a flow of current $U(h_1, h_2)$ as moderted for $U(h_1, h_0)$ and $U(h_0, h_1)$.
- Ω's can be amount of heat in unit mass; h's can be temperatures: A can be induced by a medium to generate U, a rate of transfer of heat.
- 3) Ω 's can be money; h can be money in bank; A can be induced by a change of bank rate to generate U, a change in bank deposits resultant from the propensity to save at levels of Ω 's that remains predictable with a previous rule $O(\Omega.\delta)$.
- 4) The case of conscious time v(t) already discussed.

Now, let θ depict "difference" an Operator A difference be defined by

$$A\{O(e_{11}, a_1) \ \theta \ O(e_{12}, a_2)\} = \text{nothing} = \phi$$

This is the second precept of the *Operator A*. Ordinarily, "Operator A" will indicate presence of both the codes.

It means that, when supervised by *Operator A*, $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ and $O(e_{11}, a_2)$ can neither be two independent parts of the time derived nor do they consist of the same part of time gleaned by Opertor A. $O(e_{12}, a_2)$ is next to $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ because $e_{11} \Rightarrow e_{12}$ and $a_1 \Rightarrow a_2$, but $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ and $O(e_{12}, a_2)$ do not lead to duality.

It can be shown that the second part of the rule of Operator A has universal applicability.

Theorem :

If
$$A\{O(\Omega_{11}, \delta_1) \mid \theta \mid O(\Omega_{12}, \delta_2)\} = \text{nothing} = \phi$$
,

where θ is a difference, then the concept of U is not only continuous but also permits no other concept to alter U in so much as $U(h_1, h_0)$ and $U(h_0, h_2)$ are neither independent parts nor the same part of $U(h_1, h_2)$.

R

e:

of

be

ge

at

ıle

e5

ly,

1,)

ne

ed

E,,

ly.

10

101

er

277

Since $U(h_1, h_0) = O(\Omega_{11}, \delta_1)$ and $U(h_0, h_2) = O(\Omega_{11}, \delta_2)$, and operator U is that of reduction of $O(\Omega_{11}, \delta_1)$ and $O(\Omega_{11}, \delta_2)$ to an oneness, $U(h_1, h_0)$ and $U(h_0, h_2)$ are understood but they do not manifest independently. At same time they cannot be made identical because there is nothing to compensate one with any part of another on account of the difference between them having been reduced to nothing by definition externally.

Example:

U's of the examples 1,2 and 3 of the proposition do not alter, or understood differently, etc., as long as $O(\Omega, \delta)$'s are unique or of same compostion or not tempered by external interference etc.

Solution to Impasse 1 and Impasse 2 for V(t1, t2)

One confronts with two questions:

- (1) Can e_{11} and e_{12} be observed without a gap in time? Electrons and photons sometimes appear thus in real experiments.⁶ Also, some thoughts may have the same property.
- (2) Are O's temporal by nature? Or, has time being used to define time?

 $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ and $O(e_{12}, a_2)$ are the non-dual separations of parts of time. Then, $V(t_1, t_0)$ and $V(t_0, t_2)$ are also non-dual separations of $V(t_1, t_2)$. This makes Impasse 1 vanish for $V(t_1, t_2)$. It also completes the difinition of V(t) or conscious time in use which may now be stated as below:

Parts of conscious time constitute of and generate from the operation of awareness or observation on events or ideas placed one after the other with a possible gap of nil temporality in between. Any such gap is demolished by a hitherto undefined Operator A. As a result, parts of conscious time constituted or generated by the operation of awareness or observation on events or ideas, come one after the other without any gap in between, to constitute or generate an instant of conscious time.

In this definition of conscious time v(t), the definition of t is left out which will be defined now, without an explanation at this stage, as below:

Temporality as a metaconcept can be defined as conscious time generated with maximum possible refinement of awareness or observation of the maximally refined events or ideas ad infinitum.

Can it be said that $O(e_{11}, a_1)$ and $O(e_{12}, a_2)$ cannot exist if V(t,, t,) does not exist? The proposition is argumentative. The answer is "no". If the operators of awarenesses were $O(e_{11})$ a,) and O(e,,, a,), or awareness was one but the events were two, requiring awareness to be operated twice, then the operations on awareness were dependent upon time and they could not have defined time. But, when they contain a, in one and a, in another, both awarenesses subsist by themselves, whatever be the status of time. Thus, it is not necessary that two subsequent observations or awarenesses must be temporal. Such a thought arises when one identifies oneself as the observer. This premise is unnecessary. If events and ideas may come one after the other, then their observers may also come one after the other. The relationship and the rule of O or A or V are presided over by Rule 2 that can have no limitation in perception. Further, the emergence of time precedes appearance of any other concept, including the concept of limitation. Therefore, Impasse 2 vanishes for $V(t_1, t_2)$.

-Conversely, Operator . A is a valid postulate of Rule 2.

Operator "A" is a valid postulate for Rule 2.

Since the conscious time, which is associated with all things and ideas governed by Rule 2, is interpreted without an impasse with Operator "A". Rule 2 supervises Opertor "A".

Thus, Operator "A" is a legitimate premise of Rule 2.

The instants of time

Proposition .:

Let the lowest numerical value of $V(t_1, t_2)$'s be called "instant". An instant relates to a's and e's. So, it is dependent upon the status of refinement of the conceptual level of a's

A Theory of Time

279

and e's. An instant that results from the maximum possible refinement of a's and e's, is the most refined instant. One may call it i_m . A less refined status of a's and e's, like "seeing" with rays of light or electro-magnetic waves, creates limitations and generates instants that are less refined and may be called i_x . It becomes obvious that, on account of the rule of *Operator A*, (1) i_x 's will exist in continuity by themselves and (2) i_x will contain i_m 's in continuity.

Timeframes

Timeframe will mean a set of events and ideas that contain no more than a single pencil of V(t). Timeframes are different for, as for example, different musical impulses present within a compostion, or unreal parts of time sequence created in a dream, or the act of walking across the room to reach the door as against dividing the floor mentally into halves and then dividing the second half again into halves and continuing doing so. The last example is due to Zeno 7 whose "paradoxes" have been much discussed in the contemporary literature on time. A subjective summary of these is provided as below:

The paradoxes of Zeno derive their main strength from the mixing up of different timeframes. One part of a paradox created ever-continuing or never-starting positions, which, when assumed to have also been applicable to another timeframe that related to a logically valid situation, made the logically valid situation appear untenable.

In the example of walking across the room to reach the door and mentally bisecting the distance again and again, a solution to Zeno's other problems of half-distances is provided. Zeno's paradox would state that one cannot reach the door walking across the room because of the unending half distances in between. Zeno's paradox will come true only if the walker stops at every half-distance and, may be, marks the floor at that point. Otherwise, the timeframe of walking up to the door and the timeframe of subdividing a floor with half-distances are different and may exist together. A few of the paradoxes, like the one given below, are perfectly explainable through the relativity of time and motion in ordinary dynamics.

Two equal rows of a stadium moving in opposite directions with the same speed, go past each other in half the time they go past a similar but stationary row. Therefore, half, time is equal to full-time.

This paradox is demolished with the laws of dynamics of Newton that use a timeframe of moving object with respect to a stationary object and another timeframe for moving object with respect to another moving object.

For the theory of time presented in this paper, Zeno's paradoxes are invaluble: They project with crystal clarity that events or ideas can have or be constituted with different timeframes.

Multiplicative Temporality

A pencil of V(t) constituting a timeframe contains i_x 's at a given level of refinement of observation and awareness; or at R_x level. By definition, there has to be as many series of i_x 's as there are R_x level timeframes which may be supportive of a single activity like a musical composition, or a dream, or shooting down of a flying duck. It is possible that such series of instants, and the connected groups of a's and e's in timeframe, and the timeframes themselves, would be correlated or interdependent.

Definition of and solution to Impasse 1 and Impasse 2 for t

The concept of i_m based on maximum possible refinement of a's and e's leads to a requirement of convergence of a's and e's to a single pair of a's and a single pair of e's through a process of progressive refinement. Otherwise, a comparatively less refined state will continue to persist and i_m can never be a sustainable concept. It follows that at the status of an instant being i_m, a's and e's become repetitive; or V(t) becomes a constant or identity; or V(t) defines t at the point of maximum refinement of events and observations.

One may find an analogue in considering the reversibility of the function

y=f(x) as x=g(y) as $x \to \infty$, and to x=ak because $y\to k$ when $x\to \infty$.

ĵ.

ic

ct

19

at

or of

e

n,

h

d

h

11

n

of

k

In other words, the distinction between Time 1 and Time 2 vanishes at the state where events and observations attain the maximum refinement and consequently, the concept of Time o can not arise at that stage. Let this be called i_-stage that yields (Time) of commonsense. Since, t and V(t) become the same or differ only with a constant or identity factor at i_stage, and for V(t) Impasse 1 and Impasse 2 always vanish, it follows that these two impasses vanish for t at that stage. As a corollary, t can only be conceived ad infinitum when time is defined as in this model. Based on these, the definition of t emerges as has already been presented. The second corollary is that the arguments of conscious time need always carry a label to indicate the level of their refinement. The shortened form of V(t) can be very misleading because it represents Vp(t,, (r_x) , where r_x is the level of refinement of O, a, e and subscript p represents, as explained below, the support that V(t) has to let the Operator A rule operate.

Support for Operator A

Operator A creates oneness from the duality of two sets of observations that occur one after the other. This is a constructed situation. Therefore, it has to take place in a narrow zone of S that endures such an exclusive operation: Call this a zone of support. Let a Rule 3 supervise what goes into support from S and what within the possibility of human comprehensibility may remain "timeless". Let support follow the basic rules of geometry.

Transcendants of "support"

Let there be a *support* P_r(A_p) of class p, relating to p groups of real or abstract events and awarenesses, and II groups of *transcendent* or unreal components.8

$$\begin{split} & A_{_p}\{O_{_p}(e_{_{p1}},\ a_{_l}),\ O_{_p}(e_{_{p2}},\ a_{_2})\}\\ \text{is the Operator A of }P_{_r}(A_{_p})\ \text{for t and}\\ & A_{_{ll}}\{\Omega_{_{ll}}(\epsilon_{_{lll}},\ \phi_{_l}),\ \Omega_{_{ll}},(\epsilon_{_{ll2}},\ \phi_{_2})\} \end{split}$$

is the same for that which is not yet time. The subscript P to A, O, and e bears the meaning that they relate to t within $P_r(A_p)$. For that which is not yet time, Π , ε and ϕ

represent that part of the unreal components of $P_r(A_p)$ that sustains Operator A; and O is also changed to Ω because "observations" of real and unreal e's have to be textually different. The term Π represent the *transcendent* of a *support*. Π , ϵ and ϕ belong to the substratum of time. *Conscious* time cannot be unreal; and hence, V bears the subscript p only.

Nowness

Proceeding as before, one may postulate

$$\begin{aligned} V_{p}(t_{1}, t_{2}) &= A_{p} \{ V_{p}(t_{1}, t_{0}), V_{p}(t_{0}, t_{2}) \} \\ &+ A_{II} \{ \Omega_{II} (\tau_{1}, \tau_{0}), \Omega_{II}(\tau_{0}, \tau_{2}) \} \end{aligned}$$

It may be recalled that the expression is derived from $e_p \neq e_{11}$ and $e_p \neq e_{12}$, and

$$\begin{split} &V_{_p}(t_{_1}, \quad t_{_0}) {=} O_{_p}(e_{_{p1}}, \quad a_{_1}) \quad \text{and} \quad V_{_p}(t_{_0}, \quad t_{_2}) {=} O_{_p}(e_{_{p2}}, \quad a_{_2}) \\ &\text{and} \quad consequently, \end{split}$$

$$V_p(t_1, t_2) = A_p\{V_p(t_1, t_0), V_p(t_0, t_2)\}.$$

Therefore, no part of $A_{II}\{\Omega_{II}(\tau_1, \tau_0), \Omega_{II}(\tau_0, \tau_2)\}$ adds a value to *conscious* time at (t_1, t_2) . This unreal component of *support* that is convertible to time, transmutes itself as real components of next "now" or to (t_1, t_2) .

The abstraction of time at "now" is the argument of $\Omega_{\Pi}(\tau_1, \tau_0)$ and $\Omega_{\Pi}(\tau_0, \tau_2)$ at "now". There is a logical $\upsilon_{\Pi}(\tau)$ which is the counterpart of $V_p(t)$. This is a part of Time 0. At next "now", this part of Time 0 may become Time 1 or may become Time 2 without going through the intermediate stage of Time 1, provided the primordial observations become real observations at the next "now". Unlike t and V(t), which are derived from an unrestricted concept of time, $\upsilon(\tau)$ emerges from a *support* that has already backed t to become V(t). The second restriction on $\upsilon(\tau)$ is that it emerges at "now". Or, $\upsilon(\tau)$ is a part of "now" and its presence is not defined outside "now". Time 0, components of Time 0, Time 1 and Time 2 constitute the "nowness" at (t_1, t_2) .

A Theory of Time

283

Resistance of nowness to change "Force" and the "Relevancy of Past"

The reality of time is the argument of V(t,, t,). So, V₁(t₁, t,)'s, which contain the same argument although they are the preforms of time, turn, by definition, at least a part of the intangible concepts of the substrate of time contained in them, that which are pre-times, into a tangible concept of time or components of Time 2. In doing so, the real and unreal components of emerging time instrument alteration of the values of operator V on t, and t2, which may be postulated now as q V(t1, t2) $\geq \prod_r p_r V p_r (t_1, t_2)$ where q<1; and R = 1-q is the resisting power of V(t₁, t₂) to change; p_r the strength of a support to effect time such that Σ_r $p_r = 1$; and the product operator is indicative or a common zone of $P_r(A_p)$ that affects $V(t_1, t_2)$ t₂). In this postulation, q. R, and p_r are enforced identities that assist to understand and ensure that V(t,, t,) may not exceed in value the product term on the right hand side of the equation. Each $V_n(t_1, t_2)$ projected individually on $V(t_1, t_2)$ will leave a zone on V(t1, t2) that is not covered with the projection, because $P_r(A_p)$ must have an inclination with $P_r(A_p)$, the logical support of conscious time in which V(t1, t2) exists. The absence of such an inclination will make $P_r(A_p)$ the smae as $P_r(A_0)$. Thus, the product term of the expression will leave an unaffected zone on V(t₁, t₂). This untouched part is the "force" of conscious time that will resist a changing of its own "identity" completely, whatever be the modifications various support-borne sub-strata of time, real or unreal, may suggest. One may as well call this the "force of the past". And, the angle of inclination of a support may be called the "relevancy of the past". An inclination of 90° will relate to parts of "past" which have no "relevancy" at all, because, then, the projections reduce to points carrying no volume or substance, or do not affect $V(t_1, t_2)$.

Freedom of now

S

f

1

e

S

()

In an orderly world of perception, $P_r(A_p)$ contains $V_p(t_1, t_2)$'s, Time 1 and Time 0. As ordained by Rule 2, Time 0 is that which has not become t. Time 0 is also that which can become Time 2 but has not yet become so. Time 0 is incidental to (t_1, t_2) and its circumstances. The projection of

 $V(_{p}(t_1, t_2))$ on $V(t_1, t_2)$) at (t_1, t_2) , which is "now", will contain Time 0.

The Rule 2, Rule 1 and any or all of their likely associates, exclude imbalance; and as a consequence, when the status of consciousness tends to become somehow "complete" in S, Rule 2 draws from N, under the supervision of Rule 1, that which did not exist before, and therefore not yet comprehensible, to restore the required equilibrium of reality and unreality in S. Subsequently, supports contained in S under the supervision of Rule3, receive their due share of unreality. Thus, $v(\tau)$ will always be present at (t_1, t_2) . Also if consciousness tends to be complete, the instants become i_m , and by definition, t and V(t) become the same. At any situation other than such completeness of consciousness, and since a $V_p(t)$ is projected on V(t), there has to be at least one functional linkage or one common element, which perpetually vacates room for at least one element to belong to Time 0.

Therefore, writing more liberally, τ for $\upsilon(\tau)$ as argument of $N_p(\tau)$ so that it may represent that which has the potential to become real or abstract time at next "now", $\upsilon(\tau) = \phi$ or $N_p(\tau) = \phi^9$.

If that be so, then, there exists $f_p = [N_p(\tau) - \phi]$ which is the "freedon" of "now" of "now" and N_p is an operator of nowness of support $P_r(A_p)$ of order p at (t_1, t_2) , which is real; such that $N_p(\tau)$ increases with the elemental constitution of $v(\tau)$; or $N_p(\tau)$ assumes a higher value if the status of consciousness is higher, because, in that case, the freedom of "now" to innovate is enhanced with the liberalisation that may be derived from the higher status of consciousness.

Linear and continuous time

The concept of V(t) within a timeframe is of a real, linear and continuous time. What is between two entities of t, does not make V(t) an unreal or a nonlinear or discontinuous concept. The rules of *Operator A* demolish discontinuity and nonlinearity from the concept of time.

Because, the *support* of V(t), which is a product term, is common to all others of $V_p(t_x)$'s arranged in i_ϕ moments, where the subscript "x" to t imply a paired character of two consecutive R_ϕ level durations of t's. Call this $P_r(A_\phi)$. In the extreme case when all other *supports* of $V_p(t_x)$'s coincide with $P_r(A_1)$, the argument of V(t) can have two real contents, one from $P_r(A_1)$ and one from $P_r(A_0)$. On account of the Operator A rule, for the existence of t in i_ϕ sequence, there has to be a non-dual separation of events or ideas and their R_ϕ level observation. Or, two contents of V(t) leads to one identity. Therefore, V(t) itself can not have more than one elementary dimension at any "now", or V(t) is a linear duration common to $P_r(A_1)$ and $P_r(A_0)$, or a creation of two *supports* or a creation of one dissentient *support*, say of order 1.

On the same analogy, for $P_r(A_o)$ having n groups of dissentients, V(t) will be a linear duration of order n; because no other form will sustain the elementary relationship between V(t) and any of the $V_p(t_x)$'s.

Thus, V(t) is linear.

Also, V(t) is continuous because the rule of Operator A demolishes the discontinuity.

APPENDIX

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCHRONON AND ALLIED MATTERS

Justification for assigning v(t) like form to Time 2

In a relevant duration of time, a population is required to be related with its increase by birth and in-migration and decrease by death and out-migration. It is known that the earth, as well as life on it, have existed for finite periods. The emergence of man is said to be the latest event in the evolutionary process of living beings. It occurred only a short geological while ago. Let this limited duration of human existence be called the demochronon and separated from other time sequences like, say, one relating the radiation from a rock since the first man sat upon it;

the main difference being the disagreement between the shrolest durations of time that are required to understand demography and the ones needed to grasp the energy loss from an atom Demochronon is a part of the "date", defined in the main text. In the beginning, human beings were very few in number. Some believe in genesis from a single man and woman. Even at the present time the count of human beings yields a number that is large but finite.

Only females, who are usually half the human population can beget a baby to increase the human race when they attain sexual maturity and are yet not too old. Naturally, women who answer this restricted grouping is but a small part of the total human population. The ova of an ordinarily healthy woman remain infertile till the woman reaches her puberty. On attaining this child-bearing age, an ovum matures once in a mensual period, usually every 28-30 days. Extraneously introduced sperm may then fertilise it to create a human zygote. The process of growth within the woman's womb, called pregnancy, is completed on an average in about 240 days, at the end of which the woman gives birth. During pregnancy and for a minimum period of about 40 days after child-birth, the woman does not present an ovum for fertilisation by sperm. This is a period of compulsive infertility. As a woman completes the age of 45 years, on the average a physiological change called menopause occurs and her capacity to produce a baby is terminated. Between puberty and menopause, a female can conceive at intervals of 28 days. This capacity is limited only by the period of compulsive infertility and the days within the 28 days cycle when the ovum is not presented to be fertilised by sperm. Unlike many other animals whose urge for cohabitation between the male and the female of the species is limited to a fixed number of days in the year, a man and woman may have sexual relations at any time. Thus, at every moment of conscious time, subject only to the limitations described above, a woman may conceive and lead humanity to increase. But it is also a natural phenomenon that, because of the aforsaid limitations, increase by birth has to be but a smaller fraction of the number of people that exist al given moment. The population of a region also can increase through in-migration of people into the region. Increase in population

16

10

al

in

is

d.

ly

th

n

m

οf

nt

he

nd nis

ty

ot

de

he

le.

he

ad

at.

be

al

se

nll

by births and in-migrations relate to every point of, say, auxochronon which is related to demochronon but cannot be the same.

Death can occur at any stage of human life. It decreases the species in number. Nothing in nature can prevent a loss of human life at any moment. Under the ordinary circumstances, deaths are fewer than the births for most of the societies. The human population of a territorial region may also decrease due to out-migration of people at any time and at any age. The decrease in population relate to any point of, say, meiochronon.

Since demochronon is of limited duration, the count of humanity is finite and both auxochronic increase (i) and meiochronic decrease (d) are "events" for the population as a whole, i and d are finite numbers. But the human race never ceased to exist continuously in demochronon or C. The "common" postulation is that there are no such things like auxochronon or meiochronon. and i or d occur in continuity within a duration of C. This is really not possible. A duration of C can be made as short as one pleases, and there will be a corresponding population, p relating to each point of it, but not shorter than the shortest duration within which at least one i and one d can take place for the existence of a "growth" relationship like p,=po+i-d, where po and p, are respectively the population at the beginning and the end of the duration. The alternative is to accept saltuses like p=p0+i and p=p0-d. Or, that there are parts of C that bear no relationship with i or d. So, if auxochronon and meiochronon are not taken to be different forms of Time 2, the natural law that i and d can take place at any moment of our conscious time, is contradicted. The failure of "common" leads to the posibility that event i takes place in an intersection of an Icurve with C, and event d takes place, likewise, in the intersection of a D-curve with C. Or, demochronon (C), auxochronon (I) and meiochronon (D) represent different dimensions of conscious time. Or, that not only demochronon but also auxochronon and meiochronon are "date" like concepts. It is, thus, justified that each of these can be assigned with functional forms of t, like v(t), where t is now a metaconcept.

Again, in the mortality experience of a cohort of people the basis of actuarial investigations. Using the well established

notations, the survivors 1_x at exact age x are linked with qthe probability of dying between exact ages x and x+1. The probability distributions of both l_x and q_x have x as the argument One may estimate q_x from D_x , the actual number of deaths considered to liave been suffered by a real mid-year population P_x , that provide for a sort of age-specific death ratio M_x . Secondly, no one really waits for a cohort to die out. One synthesises a cohort either from the past data of population and deaths or by converting the current M_x's to q_x's approximately. Thus, inadvertently, actuarial study begins, sooner or later, directly from census or sample data, or indirectly from synthesised data, a priori or a posteriori, with a form of arrangement of people in a table with two variables : rows given by age 'a' and columns given by date 't'. A cohort emerges diagonally in downward steps from a cell of this table along the rows and columns subsequent to the cell or along an 'x' path. In other words, an actuarial study uses time in three frames : age of cohortrows, hlikiachronon; the date to which the age relates-columns, demochronon; and surviving- diagonals, epizochronon. This gives three distinct meanings to three kinds of conscious time; and also puts three types of time to three different uses, justifying that hlikiachronon and epizochronon are also "date" like concepts and can be given a v(t) like form, where t is the metaconcept of time.

The use of terms like auxochronon, meiochronon, hlikiachronon and epizochronon was for the purpose of demonstration. It is not essential to devise such terms and the common words may serve all practical purposes once it is understood that every concept or activity bears its own concept of time. It is also possible to pick up the common features to work in unison with related time forms. As for example, if age, date and surviving are arranged within demochronon in an 'year' of 365 days or 240 days, it becomes unnecessary to bother about the individual characteristics of geneachronon or thanatochronon even though the conception of these is inescapable in theory.

C-8806 Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110037. J. K. BARTHAKUR

d

1

S

,

S

g

S

1

n

y

n

g .

1

NOTES

- Park David: The Image of Eternity Roots of Time in the Physical World; The University of Massachusetts: Amherst. USA: 1980 p-100.
- 2. V is the first letter of vyavaharika time, or "time put to use" in Sanskrit.
- 3. Of Brahman or the "initial reasoning" for the purpose of this paper.
- 4. Atharva Veda says that following creator of things (Prajāparī) or creation of things, a divinity (Rohit), that which is the source of knowledge and source of happiness, came into being: which became identical with time. (AV:XIII: 2:39)
 - In other words, the concept of divinity came next to the creation of that which was not divine; and the moment the ideas of creation and divinity materialised, time appeared. The text says that "divinity becomes time"; that is, time is not the "concept next to the concept of divinity" but the "concept next to the concept of creation" or "time is the first concept created".
- 5. Based on the concept of advaita proposed by Adi Shankaracharya while commenting upon the twelve verses of Mandukya Upanishad of classical Hindu literature.
- A separate essay will demonstrate how the theory of time presented in this article can explain such departures from the commonplace expectations.
- Born in Greece in 490/485 B.C. According to Plato, Zeno of Elea described, in defence of his teacher Parmenides, a number of paradoxes relating to space, time and motion.
- 8. "P" stands for the first two letters of the word "pratistha" or "placed on support" in Sanskrit.
- 9. 'N' is the first letter of 'Nitya' or 'every now' in Sanskrit.
- Tanabe H., Philosophy as Metanoetics, Berkeley (California), 1986,
 P. 65.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY PUBLICATIONS

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly
Department of Philosophy
University of Poona,

Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct, 1995

ŚAMKARA'S NOTION OF SĀKŞIN : ITS ANTICIPATIONS IN UPANIŞADS AND GAUDAPĀDA

Vedanta is the most important philosophical school of Indian thought. Vedantic texts have been the subject of numerous commentaries which have given rise to seven principal schools of Vedanta. Advaita Vedanta is the non-dualistic system of Vedanta expounded primarily by Samkara (ca. 788-820). It has been, and continues to be, the most widely-accepted system of thought among philosophers in India, and it is one of the most challenging and provocative philosophical achievements to be found in the East or the West.

In recent times a great deal of work has been done on many facets of Advaita philosophy, but relatively little attention has been paid to its epistemology. Professor Eliot Deutsch points out that "except in the later phases of the tradition, and even here to a limited extent, ...there is little awareness of epistemology as a distinct philosophical discipline." One possible explanation for this phenomenon of philosophic issues is the Advaitic taxonomy. Advaita does not treat epistemological issues separately but rather interweaves them with metaphysical considerations.

The goal of Advaita Vedanta is to show the ultimate non-reality of all distinctions; reality is not constituted of parts. Advaita is not so much a theory of monism as it is one of non-dualism. The term "advaita" etymologically means non-dualism. Identity is not so much asserted as that distinction is denied. The "oneness" that Advaita upholds, does not require variety and multiplicity in order to be affirmed. Identity exists as an element in the system of presuppositions rather than being explicitly by these presuppositions. It is the background against which all the presuppositions have a use. What distinguishes pre-Samkara non-dualistic Vedanta and Samkara's non-dualistic Vedanta is the very utilization of this negative approach. Every proposition, by presupposing this background, implicity asserts the identity which is a portion

of that background. All claims of distinction have meaning only against the background of that recognition of identity. A philosopher's job is to peel away the layers of apparent distinctions which have accrued rather that to directly establish the identity. Philosophy is only a means of approaching reality. It is the road that takes one to its goal but never itself enters the goal thereby becoming a part of that reality.

Brahman, the ultimate reality, is of the nature of consciousness. Brahman is the only reality that there is, one only without a second, non-dual. It is the source of whatever could appear in consciousness, a single undifferentiated whole. To borrow from Artistotle's metaphysics, it is "impassable." It is impervious to any ascription that might be imposed on it. It is a whole which transcends any efforts to describe it, in so much as any effort to characterize it as "this" or "that" denies its essentially infinite nature. Accordingly, any effort to talk about Brahman, even for that matter to think about it, is to undertake the impossible. Thinking and talking presuppose description, and description is inherently limiting.

The problem is of undertaking a journey toward a goal which is completely transcendent. How can a finite, imperfect, limited being achieve identity with Brahman where all subject object distinction is obliterated? Since its non-duality seems inconsistent with the plurality of empirical existence, what is the status of this duality? The task is to elucidate reality as the essence inherent in all appearances. It not only transcends the world of appearance but is present in all of that appearance. Transcendence and immanence are not incompatible; they are two complementary facets of the same situation. If the empirically given world had a reality of its own, then one could indeed speak of Brahman's transcendence, as contrasted with its immanence within empiricality. Only Brahman exists and therefore it is transcendent. However, it remains the case that when one strips away the cloak of the empirically given, one is left only with Brahman; the reality of the empirically given world.

The problem is to explain how that which is real and that which is an appearance become interrelated, and hence confused. How do we retrace the path which leads to this confusion,

and then away from this confusion, when both paths take us through the realm of that which is only apparent. From an ontological point of view, this movement, this process, this journey never did and never could occur. Nevertheless, the appearance of the movement, at least to those who seem to have moved. is a fact about them. This interrelationship, that between the real and the apparent, gives rise to two different but complementary, approaches to the absolute. To be an object in the world is to be a subject presented with other objects. Both nevertheless have the same essential being, and accordingly can only be understood as different aspects of that reality. There appears to be a difference, there is a phenomenal difference, but each is of the same essence, the only reality. They are brought together, have intercourse with each other, through Brahman, and Brahman is reached by understanding that which is essential to both the knower and that which is known.

The initial involvement of the real in what is apparently real and a subsequent withdrawal or retracing of the real from the apparent are addressed by the Advaitins as a problem in an epistemological context. From the noetic perspective, being in the world is confrontation between what is present as an object and that to which it is thus present. These are the objective and the subjective poles of a knowledge relation. Even though appearing as two different sorts of entities with natures apparently opposed to each other, like light and darkness, they are essentially one and the same reality. The platform on which the two meet and make one relevant to the other is reality in the ultimate sense (Brahman). That reality is sought by the respective analysis of the knower and the known. The knower (atman) and the reality to be known (Brahman) coalesce into one, i.e., atman is brahman. The epistemological inquiry thus takes the form of an investigation into the nature of the ground on which all duality, including the duality of the knower and the known, is based.

Investigation of this apparent duality, and of the reality upon which it is founded involves us in two separate activities. Initially we must understand the world of objects, the world of phenomena, and that which generates, their status as objects. Additionally, we need to understand what it is bo be a subject,

a knower. We need an analysis not only of what it is to be a knower, but also what is involved in knowing. What is it that knows? What is it that makes this knower both 'this' and a knower? How do we distinguish it from both the object that it knows, and more important, from the object that another knower knows? An Advaitin of course tries to answer these questions. As part of the effort to completely explicate the process of knowing, it puts forth the concept of sāksin.²

What or who is "sākṣin"? It is notorious that there are words, and the underlying concepts, which are difficult to translate from one language to another. In many cases, the translation might require and entire book in order to fully explicate the meaning. The term "sākṣin" etymologically means "witness" or "a disinterested observer." It signifies seeing without being the agent of the act under consideration. I have translated the word "sākṣin" as "witness", but it must be understood that sākṣin refers to a witness in the sense of the phenomenologically pure observer: the observer who observes without bringing anything to the observation. Its interests are not involved in what occurs. Witness in Advaita is intelligent but indifferent or detached. Its indifference or detachment is really its refusal to acknowledge the illusory distinctions of names and forms which fragment reality.

Sākṣin, for Advaitins, is eternal, non-dual, and remains unchanged. While consciousness as Brahman is eternal and is non-different from Brahman, it also persists in empirical-practical experiences. Pure consciousness, on account of nescience, appears as witness.

For Advaitins, *Sākṣin* helps reveal at once the ground of the empirical world that is experienced as well as the ground of the notion of the "I" It bridges the gap between the real and the empirical; or, better yet, provides the link between the empirical and the real.

...on the one hand, $s\bar{a}ksin$ which participates in the process of empirical activity (vyavahārāngatva) cognitive or otherwise, is not taken as completely transcendent in character. On the other hand, $s\bar{a}ksin$ need not exhaust itself within the confines of the empirical individual ($j\bar{i}va$). In approaching the concept of $s\bar{a}ksin$, its $j\bar{n}a$ transcending character comes first into consideration. The primary point of departure in the question of $s\bar{a}ksin$ is the empirical

individual, who not only cognizes but also feels and enjoys.3

Sāksin, in othe words, mediates the polarity of the real and the apparent, because it participates in the empirical individual. However, it is more fundamental than the merely empirical. It is a form apprehension, which is direct, nonrelational, non-propositional, and non-evaluative, both in cognitive and paractical affairs. It is the basis of all knowledge:

it is wrong to speak of saksin as knowable, for it is the element of awareness in all knowing: and to assume that it is knowable would be to imply another knowing element—a process which leads to the fallacy of infinite regreess. But the saksin does not therefore remain unrealized, for being self-luminous, by its very nature, it does not require to be made known at all. Its presence is necessarily equivalent to its revelation and it is therefore never missed [as] the pure element of awareness in all knowing.⁴

Sākṣin as the principle of revelation is not different from the self-luminous ātman. Standing behind all objects of knowledge, it furnishes illumination for all that which is known, making that knowledge possible. Accordingly, sākṣin carries with it a kind of accessibility which is not available to either Brahman or ātman. It is completely independent, existing in its own right and not in relationship to anything else; it is seamless, eternal existence, the ground of our understanding of 'I', and the ultimate reality which the "I' names. It is the basic Advaita Vedanta epistemological principle; the Advaitin's solution to the problems of epistemology. In the Advaita system, the concept of the witness-consciousness (sākṣin) is the single most important postulate of the principle of revelation operative in experience, cognitive and noncognitive alike.

The source of sākṣin as a philosophical concept is obscure.⁵ It is virtually nonexistent in the Upaniṣads, although compounds, such as sarvasākṣin⁶ and nityasākṣin⁷ do occur. It is difficult ot assign any precise referent to these. They could be construed as referring to Brahman, saksin, or even Isvara. There is too little evidence to make an informed decision. These scattered references, however, can undoubtedly be construed as anticipating the later systematic development of this concept.

296

BINA GUPTA

Any scholar working on Advaita is well aware that although the Upanisads are not systematic philosophical treatises; they, nevertheless, without any doubt remain the foundations on which rest the entire edifice of Advaita ontology and epistemology. Almost every later theoretic development of Advaita of Samkara can with some propriety be looked upon as exegesis of some fragmentary, and admittedly obscure, Upanisadic passage. The important Advaitin concept of sāksin provides an excellent example of such an exegesis.

My goal in this paper is to trace the evolution and growth and the early crystallizations of the epistemological ideas associated with this notion in some major Upanisads. I shall analyse some of the key terms and passages that foreshadow this important notion in some major Upanisads. These Upanisads echo the same point in different ways; that which lies beyond the plurality of names and forms, i.e., the self is not accessible through empirical modes of knowing.

If the question should arise as to why I am concerned only with the Upanisads, the reply is that Upanisadic texts were Samkara's concern. I am not so much interested in the historical development as I am in the conceptual development of the notion of sākṣin. I believe that I can adequately explicate the conceptual development of sākṣin in Advaita without concerning myself with other literatures, such as Mahabhārata and Sāmkhya-Kārikās; the literatures necessary for an historical analysis of this notion. I am appealing to the Upanisads because Samkara found them to be authoritative, and he did not believe that he needed any other foundation for his analysis.

Although the term "sāksin" does not occur in the early Upanisads, the epistemological ideas associateds with this term are very clearly presented and developed in the Upanisads. For example, Brhadāranyaka Upanisad (BU) ccontains the most detailed analysis of knowing and its presuppositions, drastā or vijītatā, antaryāmi, atmajyoti, or svayamjyoti are some of the concepts that have been analyzed in detail in this Upanisad. These terms anticipate the later notion of sākṣin. Therefore, the primary focus of my investigation will be BU.

Whenever the term "sāksin" appears in the Upanisada, it appears as an alternate designation for the self, especially when viewed in an epistemological context. The definition of the self is one of the central of the Upanisads, and BU is no exception to it. Among the Upanisadic teachers, Yājnavalkya12 is well known for his instructions regarding the knowledge of the self. In the course of discoursing with his wife, Maitreyi, Yajnavalkya informs her that the self is the basis of all knowledge. It is different from the objects that are known. Therefore, it cannot be known in the manner in which the objects are known: "You cannot see the seer of seeing, you cannot hear the hearer of hearing. you cannot think the thinker of thinking, you cannot understand the understander of understanding (na drster drastaram passeh na śruteh śrotaram śrnuyah, na mater mantaram manvithah, na vijnater vijnataramvijaniyah).13 This is the best evidence for a forerunner of saksin in the BU for Yajnavalkya. The self is the ultimate subject that can never be made an object of knowledge. That is why it can only be described as "neti", "neti" ("not this," "not this"). It is not an exaggeration to say that this passage is an anticipation of the later conception that the cognitive functions are apperceived by the seer which in itself is not an object of more ultimate awareness. Again the passage: "He entered in here, even to the finger-nail tips, as razor would be hidden in a razor case, or fire in a fireholder. Him they see not..."14 when translated into the epistemological terms states that the self is not knowable by any empirical means of knowledge.

The Kena Upanisad makes the same point when it states that the self is other than the known and the unknown. The Taittiriya Upanisad (TU) declares that words and mind turn back, not being able to attain it. Words and thought are applicable in the realm of names and forms where plurality is manifested; they are simply pointers and in that sense useful. The self is to be comprehended as "It is."

This very same self is said to be the self of the world. In response to the question about the inner controller (antaryami) of the world, Yājnavalkya in BU states that the principle which lies behind the everything, which controls everything from within is the inner controller, and this inner controller is the immortal

298

BINA GUPTA

self: "He is never seen but is the seer, he is never heard but is the hearer. He is never perceived, but is the perceiver. He is never thought but is the thinker. There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other thinker but he. He is your self, the inner controller, the immortal (adrsto drastā asrutah srotā, amato mantā, avijnata vijnata nanyo'to'sti drsta, nanyo'to'sti srota, nanyo'to'sti manta, nanyo'to'sti vijnātā: esa ta ātmantaryāmy amruah: ato'nyadārtam).¹⁷

The self of the Upanisads is never objectified, since it is not an object of any empirical knowledge. The "I" is an ascription; since all characters are objects of the self, it is characterless. The products of ignorance are agency, enjoyment, and empiricality;" what is essentially Brahman is self. At the level of pure self's, individuality is indistinguishable. The stuff of the sleeping self is vijnānamaya, pure consciousness. Individuality persists even though the specifics, say of the empirical self, are discarded and the vital airs are withdrawn. The function of seeing is given up by the sleeper, who is untainted and unrelated, and is as pure as water. Because the all-knower cannot be known by something else, in can be defined as not knowing anything. The essence of all being is the unconditionally immediate self. The seer of seeing is not seen and the indwelling essence of the individual is the self.

Another very important and well-known section of BU, which anticipates the notion of saksin discusses the self as its own light: "The self, indeed, is his light', said he, 'for with the self, indeed, as the light, one sits, moves about, does one's work and returns (...ātmaivāsya jyotirbhavati, ātmanaivāyam jyotişāste, palyayate, karma kurute, vipalyeti iti)." This sought after "light" is more basic than the physical light which makes for the perception of physical objects. It is significant to note that the above reply is given in response to the question "what light does a person here have?" In the waking state a person moves with help of various lights that are outside his/her body. But what serves as a light for a person in dreams and in deep sleep? one cannot see dream objects without light. From deep sleep, again, one awakes with the remembrance that one slept happily and knew nothing; this shows that some kind of light functions in

bl

1:

er

Cr

he

10

la, h:

an

SS.

19

elf

en

ed

is

nd

vn

22

ce

ch

vn

he

's

e.

ť"

n

ly

n

of

es

n.

in

deep as well. Therefore, Janaka asked about the light which serves a person when he is asleep. Yajnavalkya answers that the self is the light that serves a person in all the states: waking, dreaming, and the dreamless sleep. Light, in the context, does not simply signify consciousness and its conditions in an abstract sense, but that which helps one to sit, walk about, work, and return.

Janaka further asks: "Which [among the sense-organs] is the self?²⁶ Yājnavalkya replies" The intellect performs the function of thinking. However, the self assuming the likeness of the intellect creates the appearance of thinking."²⁷ Samkara in his commentary on BU explains why such a confusion occurs: "the intellect being transparent and next to the self, easily catches the reflection of the intelligence of the self."²⁸

To overcome this problem, a kind of physico-psychological method is used that progressively unfolds the essence of atman. In the Chandogya Upanisad (CU), Indra and Virocana approach Prajāpatī for knowledge of the immortal self.29 Initially, Prajāpatī informs them that the true self is nothing but the self seen in a reflection. This answer satisfies Virocana. Indra, not satisfied with Prajapati's explanation returns to him for further explanation. Prajāpatī tells Indra that the self is experienced in the deep sleep; "When a person is asleep with senses withdrawn, [when one] is serene, and sees no dream-that is the self. This is immortal, this is Brahman."30 Indra is not satisfied with this answer either because this explanation suggests that when everything is withdrawn, and when only unconsciousness remains, than is the self. Indra returns to Prajapati again and lives with him for five years, and finally Prajapati reveals to Indra the true nature of the self-the self is immortal, the body is destructible; it is the abode of the immortal self.31 The real self continues in all states. This passage stresses the continuity of the real self. The self is progressively identified with the bodily self, the dreaming self, and self the dreamless sleep, until finally it is declared to be that which is not affected by the changing modes. It is present in all three states.

Again, the description of self as self-luminous (svayamjyoti) in BU anticipates the theory of saksin, where the cultimacy of

·VU

the self is again explicated by indicating that the seer is unseen and that the knower cannot be known. The sun illuminates ojbects in waking life. Since the sun does not shine in our sleep, and yet objects are revealed, there must be another source of illumination. It is said: "When he goes to sleep he takes along the material of this allembracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated (sa yatra prasvapiti, asya lokasya sarvāvato mātram apādāya, svayam vihatya, svayam nirmayā, svena bhāṣā, svena jyotiṣa prasvapiti; atrāyām puruṣah svayanniyotirbhavatī)³² In the waking state, the subject is aware of the subject-object distinction. While dreaming, subject is only aware of the dream objects; the waking individual himself become both the subject and the objects so to speak.

Since the objects revealed are similar it follows that, even in the waking state, there must be a single source of illumination. This illumination, existing where other sources do not, or cannot exist, can only be from the self itself. As with knowing and seeing, just so is self, while illuminating everything not itself illumined. The dreaming self forsakes everything else while enjoying objects, bliss and pain. The dream world, being his own creation, is lighted by nothing other than the Self. He himself becomes the light and accordingly must shine in its own light. The self is continuous in all three states, and just as a large fish extends over both the banks of a river and cannot be identified with either bank or the river, 33 so the self is not identical with any of the three states. In both deraming and waking stages, duality is present. In deep slepp, however, there is a lack of relatedness which is bliss (samprasanna). The ultimate self, being of the nature of consciousness itself, has no self-consciousness; it is without a second.34. The ultimate consciousness being intrinsically unrelated has its self-luminosity made manifest only in relation to an object. The self-luminosity of the ulitmate self, lacking an object as in deep sleep, is not evident.35 It is pure consciousness, lacking anything of which it is conscious. The seeing of the seer, being its own intrinsic nature, never ceases, even in deep sleep where there is nothing to be seen. It cannot be distinguished from not seeing, since there is no other thing to be seen or not seen. Seeing can

al Is

n

a

ct

t,

f

h

g

[.

n

d

be empirically realized only when an other is posited by ignorance. There can be no seeing when everything becomes the self and there is nothing to be seen. The notion of self, remaining the same in all three states being the self-effulgent light in them, clearly anticipates the later notion of witness-consciousness.

One of the key Upanisadic passages that is cited by the later Advaitins³⁶ occurs in the *Brhadaranyaka Upanisad* (BU). The question is raised about "what directly and manifestly is the Brahman?" Then such a Brahman is defined (or rather left undefined). It is said; Brahman is direct and immediate (yat sākṣād aparokṣād brahma).³⁷ In this text, Brahman is described as the essence of all that there is. Brahman in this context is not sakṣin in the technical sense, or even for that matter in a non-technical sense, but what is rather an undifferentiated and undifferentiable principle which can signify indifferently either sākṣin or Brahman.

What is stated here is obvious. The self is what continues in the three states of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and is therefore not identical with any of them. This is a clear discription of the notion of self as witness standing behind everything that is known-known discursively in wakeful life, known dreamingly in dreams, and known as unknown in deep sleep-shining forth in its own light revealing eternally and continuously.³⁸

The three states of the self discussed above, become the focus of investigation in some major Upanisads. It is one of the common methods adopted in the Upanisads for arriving at the knowledge of the self. For example, the entire Māndūkya Upanisad (MAU) is devoted to a discussion of these three states of the self. It contains one of the most succinct and systematic treatments of this method. At the outset, this Upanisad identifies the sound aum with all-that-there-is. Aum is what was, what is and what will be. It signifies a correlation between microcosmos and the macrocosmos. It is also what is beyond time; the unmanifest basis of the manifest universe. Aum stands for Brahman; it is the most affective sound symbol of Brahman. The word "aum" consists of three letters; a, u, m which correspond to three forms in which the self appears in the states of waking, dreaming, and the dreamless sleep respectively. The knowledge of Brahman

encompasses not only the three states, but also the fourth turiya, the undifferentiated state of pure of consciousness, which is beyond the changing and conditional, phenomenal modes of existence,

The three states of the self are known as: visva, taijasa, and prajňā.39 Visva is the waking self. It cognizes the external objects. It has seven limbs⁴⁰ and nineteen mouths.⁴¹ Since in this state the self is in contact with the external objects, its experiences are gross. The waking self is the first part (pada)12 of Brahman, Taijasa, the dreaming self is the second part, in which the mind enjoys impressions imprinted upon the mind during the waking experience which are then presented as if real. In this state, the self is "internally conscious", it experiences subtle objects created out of the mental impressions, This state is contradicted by waking experiences. Dream-objects, irrespective of how real they might appear in one's dreams, disappear upon waking up. This concept is not treated consistently throughout the history of Vedanta, the latter tradition explaining them as simply products of avidyā. The third part, prajītā, is a state of dreamless sleep during which the mind and the senses are quiescent. Consequently, there is a cessation of normal consciousness. Subject-object distinction no longer exists, nor a distinction among objects. There are no desires, no dreams. There is no experience of pleasure and pain etc. It is an entirely undifferentiated state. There is a sense of bliss, because there is a temporary union between the Absolute and the embodied self. It is a state in which the knowing self, while still capable of knowing does not know anything. This self still has the capability of knowing all objects and therefore is called prajna; "It is not a state of consciousness in the ordinary sense; but it is not a state of blank or absolute consciousness either, for some sort of awareness is associated with it. It is not, however, 'the objectless knowing subject that endures in it...; for along with the object, the subject also as such disappears then. It is rather a state of non-reflective awareness, if we may so term it."43

The phenomenon of deep sleep is especially significant since in it all mental activites are suspended, and the consciousness of individuality is absent. It points to the fact that knowledge of duality is only a conditional and temporary feature of finite lives. From deep sleep, one awakes and recalls that he slept

id

6.

a.

al

in

its

in

nd

if

es

te

ve

nc

ut

te

re

19

ce

e.

on

in

es

ig te

le.

SS

ıg

cl

e

SS

10

happily and remembered nothing. In this state distinctions are not overcome. The self being hidden by a kind of undifferentiated darkness absorbs duality and multiplicity. Deep sleep demonstrates that something permanent, unchanging, and foundational to all experiences must be present even when the consciousness of external objects is not present. This state is different from turiyā, the state of release, which is the underlying substratum of the triple states of waking, dreaming, and the dreamless sleep.

This tri-partite distinction by means of which the self-successively occupies, yet remains independent of; the three states is elaborated by Gaudapada.4 "Visva is he who cognizes in the right eye. Taijasa is he who cognizes in the mind within and Prajna is he who constitutes Akāsa in the heart. Thus, one atmancis conceived as threefold in the (one) body."45 What we have are three states of embodiment of the self that remain pure, unrelated, and with a oneness, which is confirmed by the judgment, "I am he." Visva, taijasa, and prajnā are all self, but only as embodied. The visva can not only perceive objects, it can also approach these objects mentally, by remembering, imagining, or dreaming about them. The dreaming self is the same self is the waking self. When consciousness rests in itself, all imagery ceases, and the self is prajna. The self exists although all mental processes stop, only the potentiality or vital airs persists. The undifferentiated nature of the self is clearest in this state. The fact that the prajñā self reawakens, and can say "I am he", proves that even if in the sense of potentiality, prajna had been embodied. It is only when there is not even potentially the change of embodiment that prajnā passes into the real, unconditional nature of the self, turiva. The "I" reemerges after deep sleep, it is not recreated. The self, in itself turiva, is embodied in different forms or states.

A determination of what characterizes visva and taijasa is necessary, so that we are able to ascertain the true nature of turiya. Keeping this in view, Gaudapada states; "Visva and taijasa are conditioned by cause and effect." Since the effect actualizes only when certain conditions are fulfilled, and at other times it remains potentially contained in the cause, visva and taijasa are governed by causality; being conditioned by both non-apprehension and misapprehension. Ignorance, the state of not knowing, is

304 BINA GUPTA

the substance of causal potentiality. Its actualization is knowing otherwise, to be positively mistaken.

Gaudapada further notes; "prajnā does not know anything of the self or the non-self, nor truth nor untruth. But turjya is ever-existent and ever all-seeing." 47 Prajnā is conditioned by cause alone. Unlike visva and taijasa, prajnā does not comprehend itself or others. It therefore is in a state of not knowing, covered by undifferentiated darkness. Turīya, on the other hand, is not conditioned by cause and effect. It is effulgent and all-pervasive source of objects. It is beyond ignorance. It is sarvadrk (the seer of everything that there is) as well as its witness. It exists in all beings during the waking and the dreaming states, and is called the seer of everything. 48 There is nothing beside turīya. Therefore, it is never associated with the causal condition that may result from non-apprehension of reality. Accordingly, the non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of reality are not possible in turīya.

At this juncture, Gaudapāda reminds his readers that although non-perception of duality is common to both prajītā and turīyā, only prajītā is conditioned by cause, because prajītā is sleep and consists in the non-apprehension of reality, and gives rise to the cognitions of variety and multiplicity. It is the causal state that immediately precedes the state of waking up. Turīyā, on the other hand, is non-dual witness and by nature pure consciousness itself. Therefore, it is said that turīyā is not governed by the conditions of cause and effect. In the one case, the undifferentiated darkness absorbs duality while still containing it; while in the other there is not even the potentiality of duality, and no darkness. These are different states. The dormant darkness (bijanidrā) is present in prajītā, but it does not, cannot, affect turīyā.

Prajnā also anticipates the later notion of saksin. Prajnā consciousness is the self as unified; distinctions are not overcome in this state but rather are present in an undifferentiated state. The senses do not function in sleep and therefore the "I" as explicit awareness is absent. The $j\bar{i}va$ is said to be the perceiver of $avidy\bar{a}$ in this context; the cause of the manifold world of appearances. "The self in this state is not aware of itself, or of others, and is therefore shrouded by undifferentiated darkness

Samkara's Notion of Saksin

1

e

h

ıl

d

S

1

305

in which duality is absorbed... But it is only the self in the third stage that is epistemologically significant as containing the potentiality for a cognitive relation characteristic of wakefulfile.

Several other Upanisada argue along the same lines. For example, Katha Upanisad (KU)⁵¹ makes a clear distinction between the self which is associatted with the body, the senses, the mind, and the self which is pure and not associated with either the body or the mind or the sense. The first is empirical, unlike the changing consiousness, the pure self. It is Brahman, beyond buddhi, the witness of all, sarvasāksī. But, how can sāksin be equated with supreme reality, as it is here, and still be relegated to the empirical bhokta? Māndukya Kārikā provides the following answer; Brahman is sarvasāksi or sarvadrk only to the extent that its nature as seer is not affected when there is nothing to see; saksin, on the other hand, is the witness of everything that appears, it is literally a seer.52 This also explains seemingly contradictory claims that pure consciousnesss (cit) cannot be known as an object of mediate knowledge, yet it is known as involved in every act of knowing. The absolute self does not possess enjoyership; its enjoyership is created by the limiting adjuncts, e.g., intellect. Another Upanisad reiterates the same point, when it states that "The absolute self thinks as it were, and shakes as it were, and so on."53 Passages such as "when there is duality, as it were..."54 reinforce the idea that the knowledge takes place in the phenomenal world, and therefore is not applicable to atman.

Prasna Upanisad (PU) argues in the same vein in its argument for the existence of the self. The assertion that there is consciousness is a necessary condition for the assertion that there are things. To say that there are things, and yet no consciousness is to contradict yourself. The experientially invariable can only be isolated against the background of the invariable. Without consciousness, there can be no objects. Such a consciousness is never absent, not even in deep sleep.

This analysis of the notion of *prajīnā*, and the relationship among the three states raises a number of questions. What role, if any, does the *prajīnā* play during dreaming, or, for that matter, during waking stage? Is *prajīnā* different in different individuals?

306

BINA GUPTA

Or, is there one *prajnā* in all individuals? Equation of sākṣin with God only confuses the issue further. 55 We have a principle associated with body, the experiencer of pleasure and pain; and on the other hand, pure consciousness, the observer of both the enjoyer and the enjoyed. It witnesses objects, it does not enjoy them. It is not an exaggeration to say that we may have here in an obscure form an anticipation of *Isvara-Sākṣin* (Goddefining-consciousness), a later doctrine. 56

In his writings, Samkara seeks to give a systematic, and rationalistic, account of the theory of the self that he largely takes from the Upanisads. The whole notion of selfhood remains unchanged from that of the Upanisads, while he endeavors to flesh out a theory of avidan sufficient to unify the diverse and at times inconsistent Upanisadic teachings. Reflecting the inconsistencies of the Upanisads, he sometimes speaks of pure consciousness as Brahman, and at other times as the witness-self, even at other times as Isvara. In his discussion of the self and its functioning, Samkara is perfectly clear as to his conception of the real nature of the self. However, he is not so clear, when he discusses the immanent self of empirical experience. Brahman, Isvara, sāksin, and even ātman appear to be synonymous in many contexts and the distinct nuances of these terms are not clearly explicated.

These ambiguities have given rise to a number of confusions for modern interpreters of Advaita Vedanta. For example, Tara Chatterjee, in her article on the notion of saksin notes; "Advaita Vedanta combines in the concept of saksin, two aspects. As described in the Upanisads it is absolutely passive, and as presented by Samkara, it is [a] never-to-be ojbectified principle of awareness present in every individual."57 While Dr. Chatterjee is to be commended for distinguishing between the two aspects of the sāksin notion-passivity and non-objectivity-she misattributes the passivity aspect to the Upanisads and non-objectivity to Samkara. In point of fact, the reverse is the case. It is indeed true that Advaita Vedanta combines in the theory of saksin the two senses outlined in her paper. However, the passivity of saksin is not a motif in the Upanisads. Not surprisingly, she does not, because she cannot, provide any textual references from the Upanisads to support her claim. First, as pointed out elsewhere in this

paper, the theory of saksin is not clearly articulated in the Upanisads. The term "sāksin" does not occur there, although some of the elements embodied in the Advaita notion of sāksin, e.g. the self as the ultimate subject, do occur. These elements, however, have not congealed in a single concept in the Upanisads.

Second, the non-objectivity of the self is repeatedly emphasized in the Upanisads, while its passivity is contributed by the Advaitins. The Upanisads repeatedly emphasize that self is the ultimate subject; it can never become an object of knowledge. The notion of self as light in the Upanisads provides a clear counter example to Professor Chatterjee's claim. The light metaphor in the Upanisads underscores the freedom, and not passivity, of the self. it is a way of explaining the unvarying nature, unrestricted freedom of the self. Self is luminous by its very nature. It is the principle that makes perception and conscious action possible. All cognitions point to the activity of the self. Upanisads nowhere explicitly deny the activity of the self. Specific activities start at a given point in time and terminate at another point. What remains constant through them all is the self as pure consciousness, which makes manifestation possible. Saksin, like the self of the Upanisads, is self-luminous. A light does not require another light to manifest it. Similarly, sākṣin being self-luminous illumines all; it does not require anything outside of itself to illuminate objects. In Samkara's philosophy, one finds the term "sāksin" in its technical aspect. Samkara defines the concept; it fulfills a well-defined function in his system. The theory of saksin provides for Samkara the much needed epistemological foundation to defend the Upanisadic metaphysics.

Metaphysics and epistemology, as they constitute elements in western philosophy, can be isolated from each other. It is frequently suggested that, e.g., in Kant, epistemological conclusions can be arrived at independently of any metaphysical theory. For example, Dryer notes; "Princhard writes, Kant's problem is similar to Locke's. Locke states that his purpose is to inquire into the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge (Kant's Theory of Knowledge, p.2) Similarly, Kemp Smith presents the Critique as concerned with the theory of knowledge generally, without referring to its concerns with metaphysics." Accordingly, these philosophers maintain that Kant's theory of the transcendental

308

BINA GUPTA

unity of apperception is postulated by him on epistemological grounds. Other interpreters of Kant, notably D.P. Dryer and Martin Heidegger, vehemently disagree with such an epistemological reading of Kant. Dryer further notes that according to Heidegger; "The aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is fundamentally mistaken if this work is interpreted as a 'theory of experience' or as a theory of positive sciences. The *Critique of Pure Reason* has nothing to do with 'theory of knowledge." 59

Whether or not metaphysics and epistemology can be isolated from each other is true in the western context, it certainly is not the case in the Indian philosophy, and is especially not so in the theory of saksin. The theory of saksin does not require logical justification; it does not require proof, because besides being an epistemological theory, it also reveals the ultimate nature of reality, and is mandated by that reality. The conclusion is that there is a level of experience, wherein knowledge and existence are the same. Thus it should come as no surprise to the readers, that the concept of saksin in Advaita is established on epistemological grounds, and accordingly, is called on to perform that function. It would be wrong to assume, however, that this concept is postulated solely on epistemological grounds. One must not lose sight of the fact that sāksin is grounded in the metaphysical reality as revealed by the scriptures, and therefore approximates reality.

I hope I have shown in this paper that the epistemological foundation of the notion of $s\bar{a}ksin$ are to be found in the Upanisads. The fact that these ideas are adumberated in the Upanisads does not, of course, compel the theory of $s\bar{a}ksin$ that one finds in Samkara, but when taken together with the philosophical requirements of his system, they do require a development such as is to be found in his works. The theory of $s\bar{a}ksin$ forms the epistemological foundation for his metaphysics. It is a natural shaping of the elements to be found in the Upanisads into a form that serves his purposes. It is as if Samkara were a midwife assisting in the birth of elements that were gestating in the Upanisads.

However, it is important to notice that this is not simply a work of exegesis. The Upanisads are essentially open texts that allow considerable creativity in their interpretation. Samkara

is not simply making clear things that already exist in the Upanisads. nor even simply synthesizing the elements that are to be found there, but taking these elements and using them as a background against which to develop an original theory. Original philosophical work occurs when people bring their own intellectual abilities and accomplishments to the historical corpus of the discipline. The resulting work represents both, a historical development of the discipline, even if it radically transforms the discipline, and also a new and contemporary way of understanding that corpus. And of course, once Samkara puts forth a theory of saksin. it then becomes a part of that corpus, and is available to later philosophers for the same sort of work. The people who have followed after Samkara—criticising, reforming, refining and developing the theory-provide clear evidences of such a continuity. The theory of saksin illustrates Samkara's creativity and originality— the aspects of his philosophy so often underplayed.

Department of Philosophy, 437 General Classroom Building, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 BINA GUPTA

NOTES

- Eliot Deutsch. Advaita Vedanta; A Philosophical Reconstruction (Honolulu, Hawaii: Univeersity of Hawaii Press. 1973). p.81.
- This study on sākṣin represents the second phase of my research on Advaita Vedanta. This article is part of a detailed study that I wish to do on the notion of sakṣin. I became interested in the notion of sākṣin while working on my book Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta; Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, recently published by Bucknell University Press. Section 6 and 7 of this work deal with sakṣin and some of the issues surrounding this important notion. The best available current resource on the notion of sakṣin is A. K. Chatterjee and R. R. Dravid's monograph The Concept of Sākṣin in Advaita Vedānta (Banaras: Banaras Hindu University, 1979). This short monograph has helped me to focus on some of the important issues surrounding the notion of sakṣin.

While making some useful points, the monograph either at times uses technical terms with insufficient precision and at other times without English equivalent. As a result, the significance and ramifications of these terms is not clear to the readers.

- 3. A.K. Sinha. The Idealist Standpoint: A Study in the Vedānic Metaphysic of Experience (Visva-Bharati. Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, 1965), p.73.
- 4. M. Hiryanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p.343.
- 5. As a philosophical concept. saksin is found in the later Upanisad such as Svetāsvatara (6.11) and Maitrī (6.16). It also occurs in the Sāmkhya-Kārikā (19), in which the puruşa is said to be the witness of prakṛtī.
- 6. Katha. II. 3.2 (see Samkara's commentary on it).
- 7. Mundaka Upanisad. 3.1.1 (see Samkara's commentary on it).
- 8. BU, 3.4.2.
- 9. 'Ibid. 3.7.23.
- 10. Ibid., 4.3.6.
- 11. Ibid., 4.3.9.
- 12. Yājnavalkya appears twice in BU; first in a verbal contest with other brahmins and subsequently in a dialogue with King Janaka of Videha.
- 13. BU. 3.4.2.
- 14. Ibid., 1.4.2 R. E. Hume (tr.), The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 82.
- 15. 3.4.2.
- 16. II. 4.
- 17. Ibid., 3.7.23.
- 18. Ibid., 1.4.10.
- 19. Ibid., 1.5.20.
- 20. Ibid., 2.1.17.

Samkara's Notion of Saksin

311

- 21. Ibid. 2.1.19.
- 2. Ibid. 3.4.1.
- 23. Ibid., 3.4.2.
- 24. Ibid., 3.7.1. & 3.7.23.
- 25. Ibid., 4.3.6. Also see Katha. 2.2.15: "He shining everything shines after him": CU. 3.4.13: "His form is light..."
- 26. BU. 3.4.7.
- 27. Ibid.
- 28. The Brhadāranyaka Upanişad with the Commentary of Sankarāchārya (tr.). Swami Madhvananda (Madras: Advaita Ashrama, 1941), p. 612.
- 29. CU. VIII. 7-12.
- 30. CU, VIII. 11.1.
- 31. CU. VIII.12.1.
- 32. Ibid., 4.3.9.
- 33. Ibid., 4.3.18.
- 34. Ibid., 4.3.11.
- 35. Ibid., 4.3.23.
- See Vedānta Paribhāsā (VP) Passage #2.11, in Bina Gupta. Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretaion (Lewisburg, PA:Bucknell University Press, 1991). p. 139. Hereafter this book will be cited as Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta.
- 37. BU. 3.4.1.
- 38. Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta, p. 56.
- 39. MAU. 3.5.
- 40. CU. 5.18.2.
- 41. 19 mouths are:the five organs of sense (hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell), the five organs of action (speech, hands, locomotion, generation, and excretion), the five vital breaths, the mind (manas), the intellect (buddhi), the ego-sense s(ahannkāra), and the mind-stuff (citta).

- 42. "Part" should be construed not as spatial part, but rather a mode or an aspect of Brahman. It is to understand Brahman in a certain way, from a certain perspective.
- 43. Hiriyanna, Outlines, p. 71.
- 44. The Māndukyaopaniṣad with Gaudapāda's Kārikā and Sankara's Commentary (tr.). Swami Nikhilananda (Mysore:Sri Ramakrishna Asrama. 1974). 1.6.1-2. p.26 Hereafter this book will be cited as Māndukya Kārikā.
- 45. Ibid., 1.6.2.
- 46. !bid., p. 57.
- 47. Ibid., 7.12. p. 58.
- 48. Ibid.,
- 49. Ibid., 7.13, p. 59.
- 50: Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta, kp. 57.
- 51. KU. I.3.4.
- 52. Māndukya Kārikā. 7.12.
- 53. BU. IV. iii.2.
- 54. Ibid., 2.4.14.
- 55. Mundaka Upanisad, 3.1.1 (see Samkara's commentary on it).
- 56. See VP passages 37-41 in Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta. "Consciousness conditioned by māyā is Isvara or the supreme lord. When maya is a qualifying attribute, it is the state of being a God (Isvarava); and when it is a limiting adjunct there is the state of being a witness (sāksitva). Such is the difference between the state of being a God (Isvaratva) and the state of being a witness (sāksitva), and not between God and the witness-consciousness possessing these attributes." Introduction, p.71.
- 57. The Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 10 (1982), p.341.
- 58. Quoted in D.P. Dryer's Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics.

 London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966, p.18.
- 59. Ibid., p. 18.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct, 1995

FALLIBILISM AND PUTNAM*

I

From the many topics in Putnam's philosophical writings which might profitably be discussed I am going to choose one in the present paper : fallibilism.

It might be agreed that one major obligation imposed upon philosophers is to seek an intelligible account of the whole reality or, if you like, of the world as a whole. Hilary Putnam, in his attempt to offer a view about the world, claims that there may be, and in fact are, different views of the world as a whole at the same time. For, according to him, any view of the world emerges essentially from within a specific conceptual scheme and is intelligible only if considered in terms of that particular scheme. This, if true, at once gives birth to the thesis that there could simultaneously be different intelligible worldviews, since there could simultaneously be different viable conceptual frameworks. In this way, Putnam concludes that ...there is more than one true version of reality...'

Now a question may be raised whether or not any such true version of the world is true once and for all. Putnam replies in the negative. He argues, to put the point briefly, that since man is essentially fallible, no such view could be taken to be immune to revision. Thus Putnam makes the eesential uncertainty of any world-view contingent on man's essential fallibility. This is how, as I see. Putnam exploits the thesis of fallibilism. In the sequel, I shall deal with this trend of Putnam's philosophy.

II

Let me start the discussion of Putnam's fallibilism with the following statement: "Even a statement that really is analytic

I am thankful to my colleagues. Professor Kalyan Sengupta and Dr. Chhanda Gupta for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

is not immune from revision, for even if a statement is in fact a law of logic, ...we are not prohibited by any methodological canon from revising it; we shall just be making a mistake if we do... (... 'Fallibilism' does not become an incorrect doctrine when one reaches the truth in a scientific inquiry)"?

Let us accept Putnam's view that we can never urge that any statement is immune from revision. In the light of this, Putnam's assertion, that we would be *mistaken* in making a revision with respect to 'really analytic' statement, seems to be rather unwarrented or at any rate idle speculation. For one thing, we could never be in a position to ascertain that any statement is 'really analytic' and hence is immune from revision, and consequently we could never seriously ascertain that we would be *mistaken* in making revision with respect to any statement whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, it is admitted that we could see and ascertain that a given statement is 'really analytic' and hence is immune from revision, then Putnam's position, as expressed in the above lines, would become hopelessly problematic. For, this admission entails that we can legitimately claim to have revised a certain statement even if we acknowledge that the statement is immune from revision and hence we are mistaken in revising it. That is, a revision would make sense and be legitimate even if it is mistaken. It would be quite silly to treat ourselves as fallible if it is simultaneously admitted that we have made a genuine revision with respect to a certain statement and that we are mistaken or even may be mistaken in making the revision, so that the statement in question may nevertheless well be true. How could we be said to be fallible if our fallibility can never ensure falsity?

In the same article, Putnam remarks: 'We never have an absolute guarantee that we are right, even when we are'.' This suggests that we can never assuredly conclude that we are wrong on a certain issue, since it may be that we are right on that particular issue. In other words, it is possible—really possible—that we are all the while right, although we cannot claim that we are right on any given issue. But this entails a rather serious point about our fallibility. It is usually agreed that to say that

Y

in

al

if

ne

al

IS.

be

g, nt

nd

ld

nt

ee

ce ed

ye

he

en

be

to

al

in en

Ŋ

le

n

is

ıg

at

11

10

1S

we are fallible is to say that it is *possible* that we are always committing mistakes. But then if we can *never* ensure that we are wrong on any issue, how could we ensure that we are fallible? If we never have an absolute guarantee that we are right, could we ever have an absolute guarantee that we are wrong? If Putnam is to be consistent, he must answer, No. So we never have an absolute guarantee that we are wrong. Consequently, we could never ensure that we are fallible. It thus seems that, if we accept the statement just quoted with all its implications, we could never conclude that man is a fallible creature.

In another article, Putnam writes: 'The claim of the moderte doctrine [which Putnam accepts] is that there are no truths which it would never be rational to give up; for every truth or putative truth, there are circumstances under which it would be rational to accept its denial'. But, then, Putnam immediately warns us that the statement that there are no a priori truths should not itself be taken to be true a priori. For, as Putnam argues, this position, that there are no a priori truths, has been reached and acknowledged 'on the basis of an induction from the history of science'.

Now the crucial question is whether induction could ever give us the licence to *conclusively* affirm that a certain position necessarily holds good. The answer should be, No, and Putnam would, I hope, agree, since Putnam does not take inductively reached conclusions to be *absolutely* true once and for all.

But, then, he himself concludes, as just quoted, that 'for every truth..., there are circumstances' that would lead us 'to accept its denial'. This suggests that, according to Putnam, every truth would someday turn out to be rationally unacceptable. How is he so sure of it? Does he obtain this truth from some non-inductive grounds? If so, and if this is absolute, then there is at least one absolute truth, namely, no truth that is inductively obtained is absolute. To avoid this self-inconsistant position, Putnam should have rather said that a truth which is now taken to be rationally acceptable might (and not would) turn out someday to be rationally unacceptable.

At one place Putnam urges that whatever statement we

take to be true or rationally acceptable, we do so from 'within a theory of rationality'. As long as we continue to accept this theory of rationality, we could not rationally judge the statement in question to be not true or rationally unacceptable. And if a change takes palce in future with respect to the theory of rationality we endorse, the rational status of the alleged statement would in all likelihood be affected. But this does not—and this I want to emphasise—entitle anyone to conclude that any such change is forthcoming.

Putnam believes⁷ that anyone at any point can speculate whether 'an ideal theory of rationlity' would permit us to believe in the truth or rational acceptablity of the statement as we now do believe, and hence Putnam treats every truth as theory-relative and 'Provisional'. So he considers it to be "a really important thesis' that 'no statement is totally immune to revision'⁸. But this view commits Putnam-whether he is aware or not—to accept that no given theory of rationality could strictly be regarded as 'an *ideal* theory of rationality', since, on Putnam's view, any statement that is regarded as true in any theory of rationality is not totally immune to revision. Surely it would not be in order to regard a theory of rationality as an *ideal* one if every statement it ensures as true is open to be discarded.

But if *no* given theory of rationality could be regarded as *ideal*, the claim that in future 'an *ideal* theory of rationality' would or even might emerge becomes baseless or at any rate dubious-even as a speculation.

But even this view-which seems to be a consequence of Putnam's claim that any statement is revisable—that no given theory of rationality could be regarded as ideal is confronted with a difficulty. The trouble consists in specifying the exact ground on which one could conclude that no given theory could be regarded as ideal. Putnam might answer: this is the lesson we should take from the history of science. History of science teaches us that a theory which was acknowledged to be a quite rational theory at a given period of time came to be rejected at a subsequent period. But this sort of argument — which is basically inductive in character—at best entitles us to conclude that the theory of rationality that we now acknowledge to be

n

11

if of

11

h

9

e

nt

11

ot

d

٧,

n

d

of

ic d

n

e

d

true might (again not would) fail to continue to be so in future, and consequently that the 'truths' that we now endorse in terms of our theory of rationality might (not would once again) fail to be so endorsed in future.

All this shows, once more, that what Putnam should and could claim is that all truths may be or are possibly provisional and not are provisional. This being so, Putnam appears not justified when he states, '...our answer [i.e., an affirmative answer to the question, 'Is it rational to believe in the truth of s?'] itself is a provisional one and... the true shape of future theory will be different in many unforeseen ways, from what we now envisage'. He should have replaced 'is' by 'may be' and 'will be' by 'might be'.

It is important to notice what implications the 'possibly provisional' thesis bears for our fallibility. The most important point that is entailed by the 'possible provisional' thesis is that man's fallibility does not imply the awkward thesis that every statement is fated to be rejected or revised. It (fallibility) rather implies that man should always remain prepared that what he now finds quite rational to accept may turn out to be rationally unacceptable, that what he now finds unquestionably true may eventually become modified and even cancelled. There is no denying that man commits mistakes. But there is no necessity that man is systematically committing mistakes. No doubt man is always in the risk of error. But it would be too much to hold that man is all the time in the midst of error. Furthermore, if the fallibilist argues that every statement is false or (more weakly) is liable to be false, then the fallibilist's own statement would not itself hold water. Put in these terms, fallibilism becomes self-defeating.

Truly speaking, in order to sustain his thesis, the fallibilist need not deny the thesis that as long as we do not come across any good reason to question or abandon the truth of a statement, we have every right to be totally sure that the statement is true and not is likely to be true. It is sometimes urged that, at any rate, the reasons that people find, at any point of time, for acknowledging the truth of, say, s are to be inadequate, since s might turn out in future to be false.

But it is crucial to recognise that so long as we do not find any good reason to abandon s, we are entitled to claim the reasons for accepting s to be adequate. Or else, we must not claim that s is true in the first place. To be sure, to hold that the reasons on which we accept s as true are not adequate is virtually to withdraw the claim that s is true. We cannot really claim truth on admittedly inadequate reasons. To do so is to render all truths tentative, and in that case we would have constantly to wonder if we are ever able to establish the truth of any statement. I am not saying that the reasons we provide in support of the truth of any statement have to be final. But then it is silly to say that they have to be inconclusive To repeat, we are entitled to treat the reasons we now find to be the reasons for the truth of s as convincing and adequate. until we come to have further convincing grounds to question the former as adequate reasons for the truth of s. So there is nothing for the fallibilist to be constantly haunted by the thought that we are mistaken. Only we must not dogmatically hold on to a so-far-accepted truth, if convincing reasons are found for questioning it. But to say this is not to say that we must always accept that our present views are not free from error.

At this point, I want to add a rather interesting and unnoticed point about our fallibility. It is often urged, quite correctly in my opinion, that man can never claim that the 'truths's he now admits of are ultimate or final; they *might* be questioned, revised and even abandoned in futhre. Thus I entirely agree with Putnam when he puts the revisability—thesis in a guarded manner: "...we cannot be sure that it would *never* be rational in *any* context to give up a statement that is regarded (and legitimately so, *in a given context*) as a 'necessary' truth" 10.

But then it is rarely noted that the same holds good equally of falsity. If man might be erroneous in acknowledging some statement as strue, he might, by the same token, be equally erroneous in concluding that a certain statement is false. Fallibility, provided it holds, must hold in either case in the same way. This, if correct, entails an extermely important point which is this: Man can never conclude either (a) that any experiment—however

crucial-has proved or established a theory for ever, or (b) that any experiment-however severe-has refuted a theory for ever. If, because of human fallibility, there could be no terminal foundation in respect of truth, then, by the same token, there could be no such foundation with respect to falsity either. The attitude to the fact of human fallibility is different on the part of pessimists and optimists in philosophy. The former say that our knowledge is an endless chain of errors and delusions, whereas the latter view it (knowledge) to be an endless chain of better, less faulty understanding of the world. In truth, however, as just noted, there is no ground for our being either a pessimist or an optimist with respect to our knowledge, if only for the reason that, because of our essential fallibility, at no point we can ensure that what we (now) know is incorrigibly erroneous or irrevocably correct. In brief, if nothing can be asserted finally and irrevocably, then all assertions, comprising acknowledgments and refutations are tentative.

The implication of all this for the present context is clear. The 'version' which man *rejects* as a correct version of the world might well turn out at a later time to be a *correct* version of the world, since man might be erroneous in acknowledging something as rejectable. So, just as an admittedly true version of the world, i.e., a version we may have reason to accept, might turn out to be a false version of the world, similarly an admittedly false version of the world, i.e., a version we may have reason to reject, might turn out to be a true version of the world. To deny any of the two possibilities is to assume our own infallibility. Invoking Hume, we can say: A true fallibilist will be diffident of his philosophical doubts as well as of his philosophical convictions. 12

If I am correct in the foregoing, then I have something of consequence to observe about Putnam. Putnam seems to endorse the view that man's fallibility indicates that his judgements are infinitely perfectible.¹³ In other words, on his view, the discourse of human judgements is, in terms of man's fallibility, getting progressively, more and more 'perfected'. But, as just noted, because of man's fallibility, there could be no guarantee that a subsequent world-view would be better version of the world than an earlier one. Since man may be erroneous in rejecting

as well as accepting a world-version, there could be no guarantee that every subsequent world-view would be more perfect than the (preceding) one which replaces or revises; on the contrary, it might transpire on a still later revision that it is the former world-view that is really the correct version of the world. No doubt this rarely happens. But the possibility of this cannot be a priori excluded. Consequently, it would be a hasty, if not faulty, observation that the 'striving forward' would necessarily be progressive in nature. Human fallibility, rightly understood, reveals that the growth of any human study does neither presuppose its imperfection nor entail its development.

I shall conclude my essay by saying something more about Putnam's thesis of 'ideal rational acceptability'. In an article, Putnam writes: 'A statement is true, in my view, if it would be justified under epistemically ideal condifions for many sorts of statements...' In another article, he remarks: '...truth itself, on my view, is an idealization of rational acceptability' He reaffirms this view again in yet another article in which he says: '...I... believe that the only notion of truth that makes coherent sense is the... view that sees truth as an idealization of rational acceptability'. 16

Now all these statements entail Putnam's favourite thesis that genuine truth can be had only from 'the ideal rational theory', only if deemed acceptable, from the 'ideal perspective of rationality'.

It might be enquired whether man could ever come to own the 'ideal perspective of rationality' ensuring thereby genuine truth, i.e. the truth that is not subject to further revision only because it has been ensured in an ideal perspective of rationality. Putnam would respond in the negative. He unambiguosly declares: '...we [i.e., men] cannot really attain epistemically ideal conditions, or even be absolutely certain that we have come sufficiently close to them'. ¹⁷ Indeed, Putnam must insist that man can never ensure genuine truth, i.e. the truth once and for all, for otherwise Putnam would not be able to maintain his other pet thesis that all human truths are revisable. (In fairness to Putnam, I must report in parenthesis that he exempts at least and perhaps at best one proposition, viz. 'Not every statement is true', from

the scope of revisability.¹⁸ But I think this concession would not affect or alter Putnam's overall position that all important human truths are revisable. He himself considers the above truth as a 'trivial' one¹⁹).

Now from both of these theses—one, man could never come to own the 'ideal perspective of reationality' which alone could ensure, eternal truth, and the other, every human 'truth' is revisable— it follows as a corollary that man can never know genuine truth. For we cannot say that we know a truth to be genuine and eternal, and admit at the same time that this truth is revisable We cannot have the cake and eat it at the same time. To make room for human knowledge to encompass genuine truths, Putnam would have to say either (a) that a revisable truth is still a genuine truth thereby abandoning the thesis that genuine truth is to be had only in the 'ideal perspective of rationality'; or (b) that it is at any rate possible for man to own the 'ideal perspective of rationality' and hence to know genuine truths, thereby abandoning the thesis that all human truths are revisable.

Putnam (or a Putnamian) might urge at this point that even the 'ideal perspective of rationality' is relative to us, i.e., relative to a particular spatio-temporal human discourse. But were it so, the alleged 'ideal perspective' would become contingent and subject to change, i.e., would be itself revisable. In that case, it would be difficult to miantain the all-important ideal character of the said perspective. Worse even, it would also be then difficult to make sense of the revisable character of human truths. You cannot say that a truth is revisable in terms of a perspective which is itself revisable.

Putnam, however, gives the impression in one of his books that he is against *dehumanisation* of any ideal perspective of rationality. There he appears to be against the idea that there could be any perspective— however 'ideal' or 'rational' it might be—which would be totally free of human mistakes in interpreting the world.²⁰ Here Putnam deprecates the notion of absolute perspective of rationlity and regards each and every perspective as temporary and revisable. He holds at another place: 'Truth, in the only sense in which we have a vital and working notion of it, is

rational acceptability (or, rather, rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions; and which conditions are epistemically better or worse is relative to the type of discourse in just the way rational acceptability itself is'21.

So any rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions' derives its rationale or credibility from the 'appropriate type of discourse', i.e., the type of discourse in which it is acknowledged to be operative. But if so, then—and it is crucial—no 'rational acceptability under sufficiently good epistemic conditions' could be said to suffer any jolt, as long as the 'appropriate type of discourse' would obtain for it. In the 'appropriate kind of discourse', each is absolute. You might say here that a certain rational acceptability under a certain set of sufficiently good conditions would at any rate lose its rationale or operative force only if the 'appropriate type of discourse' ceases to obtain, So how could be any of them absolute? But, then, it is important to keep in mind that any such ratioanl acceptability is claimed to be absolute only in relation to the particular appropriate type of discourse; that is to say, each 'rational acceptability' is meant and expected to be valid only in 'the appropriate type of discourse'. So every 'rational acceptability under a set of sufficiently good epistemic conditions' is absolutely valid within its appropriate type of discourse. Consequently, it makes little sense to treat any specific 'rational acceptability under a set of sufficiently good conditions' as better or worse in respect of its appropriate type of discourse. If any such 'rational acceptability' is deemed better or worse in respect of some different type of discourse, that would clearly be not its virtue or fault, only because it has not been meant to sustain itself as 'rational acceptability' in any alien discourse.

Putnam, in any case, contrary to his humanisation of 'rational acceptability', does not seem ultimately to like the idea that truth be confined to the territory of any particular spatio-temporal discourse. He concludes one of his essays with these words: 'We don't have an Archimedean point; we always speak the language of a time and place; but the rightness and wrongness of what we say is not *just* for a time and a place'. 22

Given Putnam's discourse-relative view of truth I find these lines a bit puzzling. His discourse-relative account of truth suggests

ly

ic

te

is

no

IS'

ite

nd

in od

ce

So

int

ed

pe

int

e'.

od

ate

eat

tly

ale

ed

se,

it

ty'

12

1at

ral

ds:

he

255

se

sts

that we invariably acknowledge something as true solely in terms of the rules and criteria available and prevalent in our discourse. If Putnam allows that we could and do exploit rules and criteria of any alien discourse for recognising the rightness or wrongness of what we say, then his view that 'we always speak the language of a time and place' would lose its poignancy. And if this be the case, then it must be admitted that some rules and criteria are present and operative in both of the two discourses in question. But, then, inasmuch as what we say is right (or wrong) is also right (or wrong) in another discourse, it is not strictly true that we always speak only in the language of our time and our place.

It might be urged that there is after all a difference between saying something and recognising the rightness or wrongness of what is being said. Well, nobody ever denies that people at a certain time and place always speak in the language available to them, i.e., the language of their time and place. But then this question would be raised: Do they recognise the truth-value of what they say solely in terms of the rules and criteria available in their language alone? If Putnam replies, Yes, then he would have to revoke his thesis that the rightness or wormgness of what we say is not just for a time and a place. If he replies, No, then he would have to admit that we do not recognise the rightness or wrongness of what we say invariably in terms of the rules and criteria available in our own language alone. And this admission would ultimately lead to the acceptance of some universal rules and criteria present in all human languages. I do not know whether Putnam would concede this.

To put the above point slightly differently: It is true that saying that X is right has to be governed solely by the rules and criteria of a particular space-time-bound language. But, as Putnam, himself admits, it is the rational acceptability—and not just syaing—of X's being right that ensures the rightness of X. Now Putnam urges in the lines quoted above that the rightness (or wrongness) of what we say is not confined to a particular space-time-bound discourse. Consequently, Putnam has to accept that the rational acceptability of rightness (or wrongness) of what we say transcends, at times at least, the limits of

the given language and hence of the given discourse. I do not know, once again, whether Putnam would accept this.

TIRTHANATH BANDYOPADHYAY

Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Calcutta-700 032.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1. Hilary Putnam, 'Models and Reality' in his Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Vol.3 (henceforth RR) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 19.
- 2. "Two Dogmas' Revisited" in RR. p. 96.
- 3. Ibid.
- 4. 'There is at least one a priori truth' in RR, p. 98. My emphasis.
- 5. Ibid.
- 6. 'Analyticity and Apriority' in RR, p. 130.
- 7. Cf. Ibid.
- 8. "'Two Dogmas' Revisited" in RR, p. '95.
- 9. 'Aanlyticity and Apriority' in RR, p. 130.
- Hilary Putnma, Reason, Truth and History (henceforth RTH). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 84.
- 11. Karl Popper once speaks of 'the uncertainty of every empirical falsification', and he adds that this uncertainty "should not be taken too seriously... There are a number of important falsifications which are as 'definitive' as general human fallibility permits'. (See his Realism and the Aim of Science, Hutchinson, London, 11983, p. xxiii.)
- 12. Cf. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book-I (Edited by D.G.C. Macnabb), The Fontana Library, 1962, p. 322.
- 13. See RTH. p. 167.

Fallibilism and Putnam

Y

OL

Y

ity

is.

ge

al

n.

d

325

- 14. 'Reference and Truth' in RR. p. 84.
- 15. 'Philosophers and Human Understanding' in RR. p. 200.
- 16. 'Quantum mechanics and the observer' in RR. p. 267.
- 17. RTH. p. 55.
- 18. See RTH p. 83.
- 19. See RTH. p. 84.
- See Hilary Putnam. Representation and Reality. A Bradford Book. The Press. Massachussets. 1988, pp. 91-92.
- 21. 'Why reason can't be naturalized' in RR. p. 231.
- 22. Ibid., p. 247.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY **PUBLICATIONS**

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/.

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

MORALITY TO OVERRIDE RELIGION WORKING OUT A LEAD FROM SWAMI VIVEKANANDA*

. . .

. . . .

.

.

•

.

.

.

Every great thinker bequeaths something not only to his posterity but to his contemporaries as well. What he bequeaths is generally expected to produce some enrichment in the life of the bequeathee. When something material is bequeathed, the enrichment of the bequeathee is quite often automatic. For example, if a man bequeaths that his treasure of one million rupees would pass on to his nephew after his death, as soon as he dies, the nephew becomes a millionaire by himself doing nothing. If he is reckless, he may become a pauper the next day by losing the entire amount in an unlucky game of dice. But the moment he owned the money he became rich because to own a million rupees is to be rich. The situation is not so straightforward in the case of non-material goods, say, in that of thoughts or values. The reason is twofold: The bequeathee does not get, say, the thoughts bequeathed automatically. To own them, to let them enrich his life-style, or his thinkig, he has to have a proper understanding of what they mean and imply and to implement them in his way of living in the right manner. If he simply parrots them, or carries them in his head as he carries a headload on his head, they do not become his thoughts and produce no enrichment of his life. If he takes pride for possessing them, his pride would be comparable to that of the blind son of dead painter for possessing his father's paintings. More importantly, effective transmission or utilization of thoughts requires that the nisus, the thrust, of the thinker's way of thinking be gotten hold of not only appreciatively but also creatively and critically. If one succeeds in this venture, he gets from

^{*} Extensively revised version of the paper entitled 'Moralizing Religion', read at the ICPR Seminar on "Swami Vivekananda: Retrospective and Prospective": Hyderabad, March 23-25, 1994

the thinker some valuable guidelines for improving the quality of his existing way of life as well as for shaping his future in a manner which not only he considers desirable, or the thinker would have considered desirable, but which anyone else is likely to, i.e., in a manner which is desirable on public, objective, grounds.

An understanding of a thinker's thoughts, which is creative,and consequently critical because it cannot be creative if it is not critical,- is necessary because everything which he has said cannot be, or need not be, used as a guideline. Even the thinker does not intend that it should be. The lead, or leads, which are to be derived from his thoughts should not only be in keeping with his intention, with the nisus of his thinking, but also relevant or pertinent to the time, to the demands and exigencies of the time, in which they are to be utilized. Such an exercise may take the thinker beyond the time he lived in. We may then even go beyond him, beyond the boundaries of his thoughts. Every thought, or system of thoughts, has its boundaries because it is the thought, or system of thoughts, of a human being, a finite creature, however great a thinker he may be. No great thinker would ever mind such goings beyond him. If he does, he would be dogmatic and therefore not a great thinker. Dogmatism is an antidote to all great thinking. Only by taking him beyond his time, or by going beyond him, we immortalize him in a meaningful way. This process may begin in his lifetime and continue after his death. But he may also be ignored when he is alive and taken note of only after, or much after, his death. Using a Nietzschean phrase, he may be posthumously born

Swami Vivekananda was not born posthumously. His thoughts were not merely taken note of, but become popular and respected all over the world in his lifetime. But till date we have not exhausted all, or even the most relevant leads his thoughts can give. This is not surprising because the thoughts of a great thinker are capable or throwing up different types of leads which perceptive minds may pick out according to their existential needs. But what is surprising is that his thoughts have been mainly used in the country of his birth for adding a cosmetic shine

0

y

is

id

er

h

in

ut

es

ly

S.

g,

at

S,

m

ıd

a

ıd

n

ly

IS

ot

n

h

329

to its image and not for rejuvinating its valuestructure, as he would have wished.

Swamijee is basically a religious and moral pragmatist, and one of a very elevated kind. He is not of the humdrum variety. A very important, or the most important, lead his works provide pertains to the *character of the religious attitude itself*, i.e., to the way one should fashion, shape, or develop his attitude towards his, or for that matter, any, religion, or religious consideration. It is extremely relevant to the present social situation in India, and perhaps more relevant today than it was in the Swami's time.

On more than one occasion he has emphasized that religion is a social institution, an agent of social change and growth, and not merely one of personal salvation. Rather, for him, it is only, or primarily, through its functioning healthily as a social institution that it functions as a viable agent of the religious individual's own spiritual salvation. Many have claimed that religion is fundamentally a means for personal salvation, and it is only as a gesture of condescension, or benevolence, that a religious sadhaka participates in schemes of social welfare. It is this trend of thinking which, in an extremist form, is exhibited in, what Sri Aurobindo calls, the ascetic denial. The ascetic denial recommends for the sadhaka withdraw from all social involvement and commitment, in effect, withdrawal to oneself, to complete solitude. The Swami, being a sanyasi, cannot deny the importance of religion, or its role, in helping a sadhaka to attain salvation or moksa. But personal salvation is not, for him, an isolated, self-contained, Objective of religlious sadhana, nor the latter a purely personal affair. Unless religious sadhana is fortified with a strong moral and social will, a will to involve oneself regularly in efforts to promote social well-being, it cannot be a viable agent for moksa. To use religion properly as a means for personal salvation, to be religious in the true sense of the term, is to use it welfare, an agent of the amelioration as an agent of social of the existing human condition. The religious person, even a sanyasi, therefore, should vigorously involve himself in, and not withdraw from, social participation.

A social institution functions healthily if it works as an

agent of social cohesion and upliftment, as a promoter of cooperativeness and willingness to understand sympathetically others'
needs and view-points, aiming at making available to every one,
without any discrimination, happiness the world permits of without
compromising the dignity of its inhabitants as free individuals.
This means that it has to function under the overall control
or guidance of morality. Therefore, when Swamiji emphasizes
the social role or context of religion, or of religious life, he
means that religion has to be in keeping with morality. That
is, if a situation arises in which a religious belief or practice
conflicts with an accepted or justified moral priniciple, the former
should yield to the latter, and not vice versa.

That morality is so important that religion cannot supersede or override it is highlighted by two clamis which he quite often makes, namely, (a) that the Vedanta is practical and (b) that religion should not contradict reason. By emphasizing the practical nature or the Vedanta he intends to assert that the Vedantin must not remain an ascetic, cut off from social involvement, but should contribute to the good of the society, i.e., to the alleviation of human suffering, as far as practicable. By emphasizing the concordance of religion with reason he intends to make religion free from dogmatism. As dogmatism is very often a cause of immorality, even in this emphasis the importance of morality is uppermost in his mind.

If the Swami's principle of the non-supersession of morality by religion, or that of the supersession of a religious belief by a moral consideration in case there is a conflict between the two, is made an effective principle of social life, or of religious life for that matter, it can sovle in a fair manner some outstanding, or long-standing, issues. Take, for example, the alleged Vedic injunction that a woman cannot study the Vedas, or recite a Vedic verse. Off and on, some religious leader reiterates it and then a furor is created. But generally the debate centres round the issue of whether or not the injunction has actually been made by any Veda. Some scholars claim that it has not, while some, who say that it has, try to give to it an interpretation not too unpalatable. But all this is scholastic, a scholastic way to sidetrack the main issue which is substantively

moral. The real issue is whether or not it is morally right to debar a woman from studying a Veda, or from reciting a Vedic verse, and if it is not morally right, and if any Veda issues the injunction, the injunction should be rejected. That is, when there is any conflict between a moral principle and any Vedic injunction, positive or negative, it is the latter and not the former which should yield. The thrust of Swami Vivekananda's thinking about religion, I am sure, is in this direction, and not in the direction of defending the Vedic, or any religious, authority at any, even moral, cost. No sane, rational, person whould think of, controverting this approach to religion and its relationship to morality.

The claim that a religious principle should not contradict reason needs a little more discussion. It may be taken to mean that (a) it should not be formally inconsistent or self-contradictory. For example, the principale, saying that it is wrong to kill any animal but not wrong to kill one whose killing is prescribed by a Vedic scripture ('वैदिकी हिंसा हिंसा न भवति'), promulgated by any authority whatsoever, would be self-inconsistent and therefore against reason. If killing any animal is wrong, even killing one whose killing has been required, or sanctioned, by a scripture, even a Veda, would also be wrong. To affirm the former and deny the latter would be self-inconsistent.

It may also mean (b) that it should not be counter-productive in the sense of obstructing the achievement of the goal of religious life. It is irrational for an agent to use a means to achieve an end when he knows or believes that it is going to obstruct, or is not going to, or not likely to, be of any help in the latter's achievement. This is the instrumental sense of irrationality (and rationality). Obviously, if the use of a religious principle is irrational in this sense, it is irrational, or against reason, and should be dropped. But this type of irrationality gets its point from the axiological status of the end. If an end is desirable, commendable, in its own right, it is irrational and also condemnable, on the part of an agent, to use a means to achieve it which is obstructive or ineffective. But if it is undesirable, or condemnable, in its own right, then to achieve it to use a means of the above type would be irrational but commendable. The agent would be irrational in the use of the means because he would be

using it while knowing or believing that it is not going to help him in achieving the end, but he would be doing something commendable because he would thereby be avoiding, or making unlikely, the achievement of something not worth achieving. Therefore, to hold that no religion, or no religious principle, should go against reason in the instrumental sense would have a valid point only if the end or goal of religion is worth having in its own right. This means that it must be morally right or good to achieve it because nothing achieving that which is not morally right or good can be in its right worth having.

It seems to me that the Swami would require religion to be free from both kinds of irrationalities, i.e., formal inconsistency and instrumental inappropriateness (coupled with the condition that its goal be necessarily of a morally commendable character). By emphasizing the concordance of religion with reason he, in effect, reiterates the importance of morality for religion. Being a sanyasi he applauds the dignity of religious life but takes pains to show that it owes its dignity very much to its enrichment with morality.

That morality can supersede religion in case of a conflict between the two has a very salutory implication for secular social life. Religion is generally taken to be something sacred, more sacrosanct than other human phenomena, say, politics. Therefore, if a moral consideration can supersede a religious consideration when the two conflict with each other, it should surely supersede a political consideration when the latter conflicts with it. That is, if the Swami's direction is properly understood and followed, politics has to be in conformity with morality and to be superseded, if the need be, by morality, and in no case it should be allowed to supersede morality. But in current political life it is the reverse which generally happens. A political party takes action against a member of it, who works against a candidate of the party even if the latter is morally corrupt, on the ground that he has indulged in anti-party activities. But it rarely happens that action is taken against a politically influential or useful member on the ground of his having indulged in immorality. Party, i.e., political, considerations supersede moral considerations, and not vice versa. Political life is the field in which the Swami's lead needs to be most seriously taken and meticulously followed because

it offers tempting exigencies for tolerating, encouraging, or indulging in, immoralities. A Swami who does not believe in the overriding character of moral considerations, or does not have the will to go by a moral as against a political consideration, cannot bring in political life any improvement by joining active politics. That this is true is clear even to a casual observer of the present—day Indian political life. Gandhi realized quite in the early years of his political career the potentialities of political life to motivate adoption, and (pseudo-) justification, of immoral practices in the fake name of national interest, and therefore never missed an opportunity to emphasize that the link between politics and morality should never be severed. Nothing can be more vocal on this point than his declaration that he would not like to achieve India's freedom from the British subjugation if its achievement involved the use of immoral means.

There is a built-in tendency in a religious conviction to make one a little dogamtic, rigid, or what we call, a fundamentalist. To hold a religious belief is to hold it with conviction and commitment, to hold it as unfaultable. If I believe that Krisna is an avatara, I cannot also believe that what he claims to have done he might not have done, nor that what he has done is not morally right. For example, I cannot believe that he did not create the four castes (चतुर्वर्ण) when he says he did, nor can I believe that the real duties of these castes are different from those which he says he has assigned to them. That god, or an incarnation of God, cannot tell a lie, or make a false claim, or do something wrong, is, for a believer in god, a substantive, unfalsifiable, truth. A Ramabhakta cannot believe both that Rama killed Sambuka and that his killing him is wrong. If god is such and such, it is wrong to say, or even to think, that he is not such and such, and threrfore anybody who does that does what he ought not to have done. If one only believes that he may, or may not, be such and such, he cannot have the kind of reverential dovotion (आस्था) to god which goes with a sincere theistic faith. The theist's belief that god is such and such, howsoever extensive the area covered by 'such and such' may be, must be categorical and definitive.

It is only respect for morality and rationality, or simply morality (as morality is a rational affair); which can tone

down, or rub off, religious rigidity. It is only one's respect for morality which can give him the (moral) courage to say that Rama did not kill Sambuka, or that, if he did, what he did was wrong and therefore he cannot be called an avalara, or that such a god need not be revered the way it is.

The Swami's emphasis on morality is prominently visible when he says that one should see 'Siva in the poor, that to serve Siva is to serve the poor, to ameliorate his condition, This is so because poverty is an evil, a cause of suffering, and freeing anyone from his suffering a moral good. A religious person who serves the poor serves god more truly than he who worships it in a temple, but ingores the sufferings of the temple sweeper. A religious consideration taken to be too sacrosance to be superseded; or toned down, by a moral consideration may encourage one to ignore human suffering, and to feel wrongly that he is justified in doing that. For example, if he believes that the poverty of the poor is a punishment to him given by god on account of some sins committed by him, and that though poverty is a moral evil causing a lot of suffering, and it is morally right to alleviate the suffering, if he believes that a religious consideration is never to be overridden by a moral one, he may feel motivated to ignore the suffering of the poor, thinking he deserves to suffer. He may as well believe that to interfere with his condition would amount to interfering with god's law, a law which should never be infringed. But if he believes in the overriding authority of a moral consideration, he would not hesitate to go ahead in alleviating the suffering of the poor. He may then change his religous belief, ignore it, or invent some other escape route, but would not justify ignoring the suffering. The Swami puts this truth in a sweeter, softer, manner, when he says that Siva is to be seen in the poor, the suffering individual.

Is the in-principle acceptance of the overriding character of morality, in case of a conflict between it and religion, or the requirement of the concordance of religion with (reason of) morality, going to destroy religion's identity by getting it engulfed in morality? in morality? Certainly not. Everything religious is not morally relevant. Whether one worships Siva or Visnu is morally neutral. It becomes morally relevant when it has some social implication.

CL

ly

1e

a,

le

to

n.

g.

us

ho

ole

ict av

ly

es

en

nat

nd

nat

ral

or,

nat

ith

he

n,

ng

ore

ify

er,

he

ter or

or)

ed

lly

n.

For example, suppose a Siva-devotee thinks that, on the Sivaratri day, he ought to propitiate the deity by pouring on the lingam one hundred litres of cow's milk, when that is the total quantity of milk available in the neighbourhood. This would mean that, if he executes his plan of worship, the milk-fed babies would have to starve on that day. His religious principle 'I (or one) ought to pour one hundred litres of milk on the Sivalingam on the Sivaratri Day becomes morally relevant because it conflicts with the moral principle 'Milk-fed babies ought not to be deprived any day of their daily ration of milk.' In such cases the moral principle overrides the religious principle, and I am claiming that giving to it this sort of authority is in accordance with the Swami's conception of religion.

One may say that the principle of pouring one hundred litres of milk on the lingam is not really a religious principle. But why is it not? The only plausible reason is that it is not defensible on any moral ground and conflicts with a sound moral principle. In fact, religious principles, which are morally relevant, i.e., those about which the question of concordance or discordance with some moral principle or principles can be raised, derive their authority from their concordance with morality, or negatively speaking, are able to retain whatever authority they have only as long as they are not discordant with morality. Therefore, the question of destroying religion's identity by requiring it to have concordance with morality, whenever concordance is relevant, does not arise. Rather, it seems to me that Swami Vivekananda would prefer religion's concording with morality even if it makes it lose its idenity, or dissolve itself in the latter. And, even if he would not, we should, because only by ensuring of its concordance, only by moralizing it, we can reasonably hope its functioning as an effective agent for the amelioration of the human condition, the condition of an individual, or of a society.

I have not so far referred to any philosophical lead obtainable from the Swami's works because, as I have said in the beginning of the essay, he is basically or mainly a religious and moral renovator. His aim was not to present a hard-core philosophical theory, and he has not given one in any area of philosophy, not even in philosophy of religion, nor a new argument or

reasoning for an old theory or conclusion. It is not proper to call him a neo-Vedantin philosopher as some have done. 'Neo-Vedantin' is an adaptation from 'neo-Hegelian'. But the Swami is not a neo-Vedantin in the sense in which, for example, F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, or T. H. Green is a neo-Hegelian. He has not done to the Vedanta what anyone of the latter has done to Hegel's philosophy. Nor has he done to the Vedanta of Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Nimbarka, or of anyone else, what either one of them did to the thoughts contained in the Upanisads, Brahma-Sutras, or Bhagavadgita. He did not aim at making the classical Vedanta more sound or elegant by plugging in some of what he took to be its logical holes. No such thing was his objective. It is not that he has failed to present a philosophical theory, or given a poor one. He has not attempted to give any.

Some philosophers have put on him the mantle of a great philosopher. They have tried to justify doing that by themselves writing, or by getting written by their doctoral students, some comparative or non-comparative account of what the Swami has said on some topics some traditionally reputed philosophers have written on. But none of these attempts has succeeded in deriving any philosophical lead from his works, any lead following which one can make some departure, or go in some new direction even in any of the traditional fields of philosophy, like metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of religion, etc., not to speak of any one of the newer ones. Some of these writings do fulfil certain promotional requirements of their authors or supervisons but that means nothing about the status of the Swami as a philosopher. Such works are bound to be, as philosophical pieces, insipid and no string of them, howsoever pompously made, would be a respectable garland for the Swami's elevated neck.

To say all this is not to deny that the Swami is a great thinker. One need not be a great philosopher in order to be a great thinker because to be one he need not be a philosopher. Rather, to call Swamiji a great philosopher and not to be able to validate the claim by exhibiting his innovativeness in philosophical theorizing is to put him in a bad light. It may give the impression that he faild to give anything new in philosophy. But the question of his failure or success does not arise. His objective was not

philosophical theorizing, but showing to the world a path of moral rejuvination. This he did with the passion and persuasive power of a prophet. Whether or not the world, or his own motherland, has followed the path is another matter. It is a typically Indian propensity to call one, who has achieved, or is considered to have achieved, some greatness in any field of life, a great philosopher. In place of doing him honour, it very often does a lot of dishonour because it is not very difficult for experts to assess the claim to his greatness as philosopher. It is childish to deny this obvious truth of the academic profession of philosophizing on the so-called ground of there being no agreement about the criterion or criteria for calling one a great philosopher, or even a philosopher. But some 'philosophers' have not been less childish than some non-philosophers in this regard.

Opp. Stadium Main Gate, Prem Chand Marg, Rajendra Nagar, Patna-800016.

1

S,

S

s,

ıl

e

n

RAJENDRA PRASAD

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY **PUBLICATIONS**

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs.10/-

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A.Kelkar and P.P.Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs.100/-

Contact: The Editor.

> Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona, Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

ALTHUSSER'S CONCEPION OF IDEOLOGY: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION*

In the framework of Sociological Marxism, where Marxism is interpreted as a conventional Sociological theory, ideology is the false representation of the reality. It is a fundamental assumption of this framework of interpretation that human beings in a social whole are divided into different classes; they view reality in different perspectives which are biased towards their respective class-interests. Precisely, ideology is said to be this biased view, the partial/false representation of the reality. No knowledge is free from indeology in so far as every knower belongs to a specific class and has class-interest which determines his mode of perception and thus the content of his knowledge.

The thesis that ideology is the false representation of reality implies the representational concept of knowledge, i.e., the idea that knowledge is the representation of reality. That is, the concept of false representation is possible only when it is assumed that the process of knowing is the process of representation. As Paul Hirst says, in order to defend the thesis that ideology is a distorted recognition of reality, it must be argued that the process of knowledge described by empiricism is a real process.

Therefore, to accept the sociologist thesis of ideology is to accept empiricism. Louis Althusser stands for a non-sociological school of Marxism. His whole programme, in the course of his 'scientific' interpretation of Marxism, is to construct a theoretical scheme which is methodologically free from sociologism. The construction of such

^{*} The central theme of this paper has been taken from the third chapter of the thesis entitled "Knowledge and Ideology: Towards a Non-Positivist Reconstruction of the Epistemological Scheme of Marxism" submitted by me to the Department of Philosophy University of Hyderabad for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

I am grateful to Dr. Amitabha Dasgupta, my resarch supervisor, for his help in formulating the ideas discussed in this paper.

340

MADHUT. V.

a theoretical scheme, in view of the above account, must be based on the rejection of the empiricist thesis, more specifically, on the rejection of the representational theory of knowledge. Precisely, this is the task which Althusser undertakes before proceeding to his constructive enterprise.

In the first section of this paper I attempt to show how Althusser rejects the representational theory of knowledge. That is, I try to highlight Althusser's assumptions regarding the 'materiality' of ideas which provides the ground for his non-representational epistemological scheme. In the second section I come to a brief exposition of Althusser's view of ideology which is supposed to be based on the thesis of the marteriality of ideas. Third section embodies a methodological critique of Althusser's view. Note that I would not attempt here to criticise Althusser's scheme in a general perspective. Rather, my aim would be just to show that there is a methodological contradiction involved in Althusser's scheme, i.e., to show precisely that his theory of ideology, at the epistemological level, does involve the empiricist framework which he originally wishes to dismiss by advancing the thesis of the materiality of ideas.

T

In his celebrated essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses²' Althusser advances the thesis of the 'materiality of ideology' which clearly implies the refusal of the representational theory. Ideology, according to this thesis, is not to be understood in terms of the category of representation; it is not 'ideal' or 'spiritual' but 'material'. Ideology does not consist of ideas as opposed to matter, precisely because, ideas are not something which belong to a spiritual realm separated from the material realm. They are material in the sense that they are fully expressed in the objective social forms; they are to be understood as the concrete forms of social practices and social relations.

To put it in Althusser's own words, "...'ideas' or 'representations', etc., which seem to make up ideology do not have an ideal (ideale or ideelle) or spiritual existence, but a material existence". Here, the two expressions, i.e., 'ideal existence' and 'material existence' need to be elaborated. Althusser seems to believe that 'ideal' is of the nature of something pure, isolated from the social practices and social relations. In other words, it is of the nature of 'representation' which 'exists' as

1,

1

ı

f

ıl

0

n

an abstract realm. The term 'material' obviously refers to the objective social paretices and social relations, in other words, to the concrete social phenomena. The thesis of the materiality of ideology discards the possibility for a radical separation between ideal and material; it advances the idea that the so called 'ideal' is expressed in the concrete social practices and has a kind of materiality.

Althusser explains this with the help of some examples. An individual who belives in God behaves in certain ways, adopts certain corresponding practical attitudes; he goes to church to attend Mass, kneels, prays etc., and does follow certain conventions. Similarly, an individual who believes in justice, Althusser observes, will submit himself unconditionally to the rules of law and acts according to them. In both the cases, individual's belief is expressed 'objectively' in certain practices. The practical attitude an individual adopts is not a matter of his voluntary choice but is the necessary condition of his belief. Believing in God is following certain conventions practically. Similarly, to believe in justice is to act 'according to the idea of justice'. If one does not act according to the idea he has, it is because he has other ideas in his head as well as those he proclaims, and that he acts according to these other ideas, as man who is either 'inconsistent' or cynical, or perverse.

Ideas exist in actions. What is an action? Althusser insists that an action is not to be understood in individualistic terms, in isolation from the collective praxis of the society. That is, an action is determined by the behavioural patterns, modes of activities of the people in a given society; it is to be conceived as being inserted into social practices. Ideas, thus, cease to be 'private' and turn to be 'public', the objective social practices.

Althusser makes his position regrading the objectivity of ideas some more clear by further arguing that practices, into which ideas are inserted, exist in rituals. It simply means that a defenite form of life is associated with every practice, that there are certain rules and conventions to be followed in the case of every practice. To be precise, every practice is inscribed into a form of life, a ritual and also is governed by it. The same example of the believer can be pointed out here. A believer who belongs to a particular religion does perform the actions according to the conventions followed by other members of his religion. In other words, he acts according to the rules and conventions of the particular religion to which he belongs.

Religion, here, is the form of life, the ritual which governs his actions,


By all means, the practices inscribed into rituals are objective social forms. They are no way abstract, but concrete. They have 'materiality'. Their materiality. Althusser maintains, is to be concieved in terms of the 'material existence of different ideological apparatuses'. To put it in concrete terms, the materiality of social practice is to be percieved at the fundamental level of its existence as the instance of a ideological apparatus.

What is an ideological apparatus?. To answer this question we have to go little deep into Althusser's theory of state appartuses. In line with Marx's analysis of social formations, Althusser argues that the process of production of every social system presupposes the process of the reproduction of the conditions of production. That is, every social system, for its existence, has to reproduce its conditions of production at the same time as it produces. What are the conditiones to be reproduced? Althusser answers: One is the forces of production and the other is the relations of production. 'Forces of production' refers to the combination of three elements namely, labour, the material which is worked by the labourer and the tools which are used for the labour. So, the reproduction of the forces of production means 1) the reproduction of the labour power, 2) the reproduction of the materials, and 3) the reproduction of the tools. What does the 'reproduction of the labour power' mean? Althusser would say that it primarily means the reproduction of the skills of the labour power, i.e., keeping labour power 'skilled' in oder to be suitable enough for the process of production. The development of every system (of production) depends primarily on the development of the capacity of the labour to work or, rather, on the efficiency of the available labour power. Every system, therefore, necessarily reproduces its conditions of production; it keeps the available labour power competent enough; or, in other words, it reproduces the skills of the labour power. Althusser's observation is that this process of reproduction of the skills is internally related to another process i.e., the reproduction of the realtion of the labourers to the existing system of production.

This is to say that the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills but also, at the same time, reproduction of its relation to the established order. The relation that the labour power requires to have to the existing order is the relation of submission; the labour power should be submissive to the established order, (labourers

should be ready to work according to the rules of the established order). So, a reproduction of the relation of the labour power to the established order means, in Althusser's language, "a reproduction of its submissions to the rules of the eastablished order". Submission to the rules of the established order is the submission to ruling ideology. Every system reproduces this submission; it ensures through different institutions such as schools, church, army etc., the submission of the individuals to the ruling ideology. All the individuals must be 'steeped' in the ruling ideology; to put it in Althusser's own words. "all the agents of production, exploitation and repression... must in one way or another be steeped in this ideology in order to perform their tasks 'conscientiously' —the tasks of the exploited (the proletarians), of the exploiters (the capitalists), of the exploiters' auxiliaries (the managers), or the high priests of the ruling ideology (its 'functionaries'), etc.,"6.

The institutions, through which the reproduction of the submission of the individuals to the rules of the established order is carried out are state apparatuses. For a better understanding of Althusser's theory of state apparatuses we shall illustrate the whole idea discussed above as follows:



344

MADHUT.V.

['A' refers to the institutions through which 'B' and 'C' take place. 'B' plus 'C' is equal to 'D'. 'D' along with 'E' and 'F' constitues 'G'. 'I' follows from 'G' and 'H'. 'I' is the ultimate condition of every 'J'.]

Althusser argues further that there are two kinds of apparatuses; Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) and Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). RSA contains the institutions such as Government, administration, army, police, courts, prisons etc., which function by force to guarantee the submission of the individuals to the rules of the established social order. ISA contains different religious, legal, political, educational, cultural institutions which function not by force but by 'ideology'.

What does Althusser mean by saying that ISAs function by ideology? Let us follow his example: children at school learn different techniques and knowledges. In learning them they also learn the 'rules' of good behaviour, i.e., the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the division of labour, according to the job he 'destined' for: rules of morality, civic and professional conscience which actually means the rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by the class dominations. In short, the Educational ISA moulds the individuals as the good citizens of the established social order. Thereby, as Althusser assumes, it reproduces the submission of the individuals to the rules of the established order, to the ruling ideology. As different from other State apparatuses which use 'violence' to ensure the 'subjection' of people to the ruling ideology, educational ISA functions by 'ideology', i.e., it imposes the rules of the established order upon the individuals and make them assimilated into the system.

Here, we shall not go into the empirical details of the functioning of different ISAs, as it is out of our concern. What concerns us is the clarification of Althusser's claim that the existence of an idea which is inscribed into or governed by a ritual is to be concerived in terms of the material existence of an ideological apparatus. In the light of the above discussion, which was focused on Althusser's conception of state apparatus, we shall briefly explore the connection between idea and ideological state apparatus.

According to Althusser, as we had seen earlier, an idea which is inscribed into a social practice is no more a subjective entity, it turns to be an objective social form. As an objective social form,

it has 'material' existence within the framework of a particular ideological apparatus, that, it exists materially as the instance of a particular ideological apparatus. Idea, thus becomes 'material'. For clarifying this point, let us take the same example of the believer. An individual's belief in God is inscribed into certain practices which are governed by a 'form of life', i.e., a religion. Religion, in Althusser's accounts is an ISA; it functions as an ideological instrument of the state to ensure the 'subjection' of the individuals to the established order. So, to say that belief is inscribed into the 'form of life' called religion is to say that it has a material existence as the instance of religious ISA. This is precisely to say that beleif ceases to be subjective; it becomes 'material'.

Obviously, the epistemological thrust of Althusser's thesis of materiality is to reject the conception of the subjectivity of ideas, i.e., to dismiss the empiricist hypothesis that knowledge is the subjective representation of the reality. This rejection provides the methological foundation for a non-representational view of knowledge in which ideas are not to be understood in terms of the category of representation, but as the concrete instances of different material ideological apparatuses.

II

To accept such a non-representational conception is to reject the sociologist mode of interpretation of ideology. That is, if idea is not the representation of the reality, then ideology can never be the distorted representation of the reality. Then, what is ideology? Althusser answers by putting forth a new theory according to which ideology is a representation of the imaginary relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence. This theory, in its depth, is highly complex and thus, the assumptions implied in it need to be analysed thoroughly.

For the sake of convenience we shall break the above thesis into two premisses. Premiss (1): Ideology represents the relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence. Premiss (2): The relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence is 'imaginary'. In considering the first, a fundamental question arises, namely, what is the difference between (A) 'the representation of the reality' and (B) 'the representation of the relationship of individuals

346 MADHUT.V.

to their conditions of existence'? To be sure, Althusser whould answer by saying that both of them are mutually exclusive, that (A) implies the sociologist hypothesis i.e., idea is the reflection of the reality, whereas, (B) presupposes the 'materiality of ideas'.

Against the sociologist hypothesis Althusser argues: "Ideology is not the (false) representation of the reality. It represents not the existing relations of production (and the other relations that derive from them) but above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that are derived from them, that it represents not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but individual's, relation to the real relations in which they live" To express the whole idea implied here in strict epistemological terms, ideology is not of the form of a (false) representation of reality but of a representation of the relationship of the individuals to the reality.

The relationship of the individuals to reality, according to Althusser, is not abstract. Individuals are related to the relations of production not in an abstract manner but in the concerte realm of their practical life process. To borrow the term from Paul Hirst, it is a 'lived relationship' To proceed from there on it is necessary for us to have a distinct view of this 'lived relationship'.

- 1. Lived relationship is not in the mode of 'reflection of the real', it is a real relationship;
- It is not false or distorted, since it is a concrete form of individual's existence in a society.

We shall reflect upon each of the above points. The first one precisely says that 'lived relationship' is the real relationship. Obviously, the expression 'real' refers to concreteness, that which is not abstract. Individuals' relationship to the relations of production is not an abstract one. It is a relationship in which they live. Individuals do not merely represent the reality; they 'live' the reality. In other words, individuals and the relations of production are mediated through life in a concrete manner. Consequently, as the second point says, the question of falsity or distortion does not arise at all in such a relationship. X can be false or distorted in relation to Y only when there exists a possibility for X to represent Y. In other words, the question of distortion arises only in a relation where X is the representation of Y. The relationship

n

of

e

f

f

1

of the individuals to the relations of production is not that of an abstract form in which the former represents the latter, but that of a concrete necessity. For example, in a society where capitalistic relations of production exist, an individual can live only by involving himself in it. More clearly, living in a capitalist society without being involved in wage-labour (which is the real relation) is virtually impossible. It is a concrete necessity for each individual to have a 'lived relationship' to the existing relations of production. Ideology for Althusser, represents this lived relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence.

A question naturally arises, namely, is it the case that the relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence is a real relationship and thus the ideology in which it is represented is positive, no way negative, that the question of distortion even in the slightest degree does not arise at all in the case of ideological representation? Certainly Althusser does not give an affirmative answer to this question. Because, such an answer would definitely result in rejecting the whole Marxist problematic of ideology. Rather, he tackles this problem in a different, but surely not in a convincing manner. He introduces the concept of 'imaginariness', according to which the relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence is necessarily 'imaginary'. Althusser is not very precise on this point and therefore the doctrine of 'imaginariness' remains a little obscure. We shall try to have a close look on it and see the implications behind this concept.

We have already seen that, ideology, in Althusser's account, represents the real, lived relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence. This relationship, Althusser argues, is necessarily in an imaginary mode. How can a real relationaship be imaginary? Althusser answers that the notion of 'imaginariness' does not in any way imply the 'unreality' of ideology. The relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence is real in the concrete sense of the term; but, at the same time, it is imaginary because it does not reveal the most fundamental nature of that realtion. It does not make explicit the real conditions of existence, but does reveal the relation of the individuals to their conditions of existence. In Althusser's own words, what is represented in ideology in not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals, to the relations in which govern the existence

348 MADHU T. V.

of individuals is blurred and only the relation of individuals to their conditions of existence is represented.

We shall make this point clear with the help of an example which has been given by Althusser himself. For workers in a capitalist society freedom is a lived relation. They have to believe in freedom because it is a necessary condition for their existence as free labourers, Their existence under capitalist mode of production is dependent on their formal ability to sell their labour power to whoever they choose. Freedom, therefore, is not an 'ideal', but the lived relationship of the worker to his conditions of existence. But this relationship is in an 'imaginary' mode, because it conceals the fact that the labourer has been exploited by the very act of selling his labour-power, or, in other words, it does not reveal the real nature of the relations of production. It is clear here that freedom is both real and imaginary. It is real because, it is the lived relationship of the worker to his conditions of existence. It is imaginary because, the worker lives in relation to his conditions of existence in such a way (imaginary mode) that he can never simply recognise these conditions¹³.

To sum up, ideology, in Althusser's sense, represents individuals' relaionship to reality, i.e., to the relations of production. The relationship which is represented in ideology is both real and imaginary. Real, because it is the concrete condition in which individuals live; it is a 'haved' relationship. Imaginary, because it prevents the individuals from recognising the real nature of the relations which govern their existence.

m

We have seen in the preceding sections that the whole attempt of Althusser is to replace the sociologistic scheme which, at a fundamental level, assume the empiricist conception of ideology with a new scheme which speaks for the materiality of ideology. To put it in concrete terms, all that Althusser wishes to do by his theoretical endevour is to provide a non-empiricist and a non-sociological framework of interpretation where ideology is not simply the false representation of the reality, but the representation of the 'lived' relationship of the individuals' to the reality. It is beyond dispute that the basic thrust of Althusser's thesis that what is represented in ideology is not the reality but the relationship of the individuals

to the reality as aganist the simple reflection theory of empiricism which necessarily follows the deterministic thesis, i.e., ideology is determined by the objective reality. But, our question is, does this thesis really alter the whole problematic of object/subject dualism of classical empiricism? Does it really indicate the meaning that ideology (idea) is concretely real in the sense in which the material relations (Matter) are real, that the former is not epi-phenomenal or something always determined by the latter? An affirmative answer to these questions would undoubtedly enable us to agree with Althusser's claim that his scheme is anti-empiricist in the strict sense of the term. But, that is not the case here when we logically analyse Althusser's theoretical system and get realised that, at a basic level, it retairs the empiricist framework which entails the classical subject/obeject structure of knowledge.

When Althusser says that ideology represents the relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence it is assumed here that there is a separation between the process of representation and the thing represented. Assuming such a separation is assuming the possibility for the former to be dependent on the latter and for the latter to be independent of the former—the relativity of the former and the autonomy of the latter. Ideology, understood to be assuming only a relative existence, becomes epiphenomenon; it is only an effect, reality being the source which lies independent of it. In other words, ideology, if it is argued to be merely a form of representation, becomes an appearence determined by the reality which exists outside its domain; it can never become an objective social practice. Thus, by supposing ideology to be a form of recognition Althusser falls back to determinism, to the conception that ideology is determined by the objective reality.

We shall explain the above point with some more clarity in the following manner. Suppose 'A' is the representational mode, and 'B' is the 'reality'. From the premiss what is represented in 'A' is always 'B', it logically follows that 'A' is nothing but the representation of 'B' and changes in the forms of 'A' (A^I, A^2, A^3) correspond to the changes in the forms of 'B' (B^I, B^2, B^3) . (To say that ideology always represents the 'relationships' is to say that different forms of ideology correspond to different forms of relationships). If this necessary and universal relationship of correspondence is admitted, then there is nothing wrong in

MADHUT.V.

assuming that A is determined by 'B'. The only way to avoid the idea of determination is to deny the universality and necessity of the relationship of correspondence. But, rejecting the necessity and the universality of the relationship between 'A' and 'B' amounts to the denial of the premiss itself, i.e., what is represented in 'A' is always 'B'. So, it follows that determinism is the unavoidable consequence of a theory which assumes ideology as a form of recognition.

By assuming a position which cannot be well supported with evidence from Althusser's writtings some may argure that both 'A' and 'B' are identical, that, ideology is nothing but the relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence. This position can easily be claimed to be alien to Althusser just by pointing out that the concept of representation, which is explicity employed in Althusser's theory, is contrary to it, But here, we do not stop with such a claim; rather, we try to show briefly that Althusser's scheme, even if it is claimed to be presupposing such an identity-thesis, cannot escape falling into the representational framework of empiricism. For this, let us assume that both 'A' and 'B' are identical. Obvioulsy, if they are identical and 'A' represents nothing outside itself, then it amounts to saying that 'A' is not representational in the strict sense of the term. That is, when it is assumed that there is no separation between ideology and relationship (of the individuals their conditions of existence), it is also assumed that the relationship itself is the ideology and it can never be a representational mode. But, in Althusser's formulation, as we have seen before. relationship of the individuals to their conditions of existence is imaginary. The reason for Althusser to call it as imaginary is that it does not represent the most fundamental nature of the relations in which individuals live. That is, relationship is said to be partial; it is of the nature of a partial representation of the reality. Obviously, the position which identifies ideology with imaginary relationship results in the partial representationthesis of sociologism. And, to defend such a thesis, as we had said earlier, it must be argued that the process of knowing the process of representation. So, Althusser's scheme, even if it is argued to be based on the assumption that ideology and 'lived relationaship' are identical, cannot remain non-empiricist

Althusser's Conception of Ideology

V.

oid ity

lty

B'

he

gy

led

nat

Juc

ce.

ser ich

it.

try

red

let if

en

ict

15

als the nal

re,

ce

ury of

is

on gy

n-

ad ng

en

gy

ist

351

in the strict epistemological sense.

The consequence of admitting the category of representation is to practically deny the essence of Althusser's concept of the materiality of ideology. The thesis of the materiality of ideology is originally meant to distroy the classical conception of ideology, i.e., as the superstructural phenomenon composed of ideas, images, mental reflections of something 'objectively' real. The so- called ideas, according to this thesis, are claimed to be inscribed into the objective social practices; they are 'material'. A theory of ideology basing on such a conception of ideas is supposed to he one which treats ideology as a concrete social practice, not as a form of reconition determined by an independent reality. But the concept of representation- as it entails the space for a rigid separation between that which represents and that which is represented, and for the former to become a form of recognition which is determined by the latter—leads Althusser to a positivistic mode of theorising which fundamentally contradicts the spirit of his materiality-thesis.

Dept. of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad Hyderabad-500134. MADHU T. V.

NOTES

- 1. Cf. Hirst, Paul: On Law and Ideology. The MacMillan Press, London, 1979, p.23.
- Althusser, Louis: 'Ideology and Ideological state' apparatuses', in Essays on Ideology, Verso, Thetford, 1984, p. 1-61.
- 3. Althusser, Louis: Essays on Ideology, p.39.
- 4. Ibid., p. 42
- 5. Ibid., p. 6
- 6. Ibid., p. 7.
- 7. Althusser lists the following institutions as Ideological State

352 MADHUT, V.

Apparatuses: The religions ISA (the system of the different churches), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private schools), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties), the trade union ISA, the communication ISA (Press, Radio and Television, etc.,), the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, Sports, etc.,). Cf. Althusser, Louis: Essays on Ideology, p.17.

- 8. Ibid., p.6
- 9. Cf. Ibid., p. 36
- 10. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
- 11. Cf. Hirst, Paul: On Law and Ideology, p. 32.
- 12. Cf. Althusser, Louis: Essays on Ideology, p.39.
- 13. Cf. Althusser, Louis: For Marx. Penguin, Hardmondsworth. London. 1969, p. 234.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

PHILOSOPHY AS GEO-PHILIA: TOWARDS THE RECOVERY OF THE IDEA OF THE EARTH

al

In about 1957, Merleau Ponty gave a series of lectures at the College de France, on the idea of the Earth, which he took to be the culminating idea of Husserl's later philosophy. In these lectures, he retraced the history of nature and attempted to disengage a fundamental ontological sense of nature from that history; he, in particular, remarked that we must overcome what he called "the Copernican conception" according to which nature is only an object in Euclidean space. "We must again learn a mode of being whose conception the Copernican has lost-the being of the ground and that of the Earth, first of all-the earth where we live".

Ever since Kant3, we have come to realise that our experience and knowledge are no mere passive reflections of what is antecedentally given, but that we organise our experience by way of a certain activity and spontaneity of the mind. This is the demand of the transcendental orientation that we see the world as the accomplishment of the subject. It is because of this that Heidegger claimed that every philosophy, whether it is conscious of it or not, must turn to the subject and indeed it is with this turn to the subject in Descartes, that modern philosophy begins. While one may and indeed must go beyond Descartes, yet, as Husserl has shown, no philosophy today, can fall short of the Cartesian break through to consciousneess. And accordingly, the phenomenology of Husserl presents itself as Cartesian Meditations. In these meditations, the rule of consciousness is affirmed and acknowledged and an attempt is made to reflect upon the world of nature and of community in the light of the clarity and distinctness of the first person existence of consciousness. This indeed is the inner sense of the Copernican turn. It was an attempt ot understand both the world of nature and of society or community as the constitutive accomplishments of consciousness:

Community Consciousness Nature

The first Copernican turn was First Person philosophy⁴ in the sense that it takes as its supreme point of reference, the unity of self consciousness and it sees its basic task as the explication of experience both as experience of objects (Nature) and of experience of other subjects (community) in terms of the constitutive activity of this self consciousness. But, in this attempt to consistently philosophize in terms of the monological model, the critical programme encountered certain limitations or stresses and strains:

- (1) it separates the subject from the world—the contrast between the constituting and the constituted is ontologically unsurpassable;
- (2) it separates the self from others;
- (3) it introduces a division or distinction within the self between the transcendental and the naturarl, between the 'personalitas' transcendentalis' and the 'personalitas' Psychologica's

For the monological Kantian paradigm, the essence of the human is seen in terms of the capacity for pure thought, the 'I think' which accompanies all my representations—it is the unity of self consciousness which makes any representation part of my experience. But the stresses and strains of a philosophy of consciousness, such as that of Kant soon led to the exploration of other models, other epistemic paradigms. The most powerful of these post-critical epistemic paradigms was the Hegelian one which takes Recognition as the primal term.6 It is as a critique of the presupositions of the philosophy of consciousness that we may understand the dialectic of the master and the slave in the Phenomenology of the Spirit.7 This parable, in its epistemological or transcendental sense, is the expression of Hegel's view that without interpersonal interaction there is no 'self' or 'self consciousness' and the subject is formed as such in what he calls the demand for 'recognition'— self consciousness exists in and for itself when and by the fact that it so exists for another, that is, it exists only by being acknowledged"— the self becomes aware of itself as a self only in its relation to the other; the point to note is that it is not merely the awareness or consciousness of the self but the being of the self, its being as the subject, that Hegel is talking of here.

For Fichte, the self or the ego posits itself against the not self or the non-ego and to a certain extent, Hegel too would accept this.

n

S

ıt

1

t

f


But as Kojeue goes on to point out, insofar consciousness posits itself in opposition to an object or worldly thing, its own being is that of a thing or worldly object. It is only when consciousness is in relation to another consicousness, where the impelling demand is not mere desire, but desire for recognition that it is formed as a subject i.e. as self consciousness.

We may now describe the contours of the Philosophy of Recognition within the triadic framework of Nature, Community and consciousness, thus



Nature, in the sense of the object knowledge, feeling and will emerges out of the historically evolving patterns of inter-human description, identification and theorization; on the other hand the sense of individuality, the picture of my self as a person and hence as having a value and autonomy in my own case, is also the fruit of the same inter-human schemes of language and action.

When we go from the philosophy of consciousness to the Philosophy of Recognition, we are not simply caught in a philosophical drift; we are not simply being tossed from one paradigm to another; on the contrary, there is a certain kind of progress, perhaps the only kind that can be found in philosophy; we have the experience of reaching beyond a framework of thinking to its presuppositions and grounds. Thus, the philosophy of consciousness, the monological paradigm, is displaced when we ask as to the conditions of its possibility; when we ask, not what self consciousness is like, or even whether there is such a thing as consciousness, but given that there is self consciousness, we ask about its presuppositions. And surely one of the presuppositions is inter-subjectivity. It is only in the reciprocities of recognizing and being recognized that each one of us forms the self image of ourselves as persons. Thus, the presupposition of self consciousness is Recognition but if we ask what now are the presuppositions of recognition itself. What makes that possible, then, once again the foundations of our inquiry are lowered; once again the framework of our inquiry shifts and new epistemic horizons open up. It is in this voyage beyond the Critique of Pure Reason and The Phenomenology of the Spirit that we could come upon, The Visible and the Invisible 10 as marking a new configuration, a new pattern formed out of the triad of Nature, Community and Consciousness; the new pattern, the Philosophy of Participation takes shape as



In the Hegelian phenomenology of recognition, there is a universal and constant as well as a variable historical aspect. While under all conditions of human existence in the world, the sense of self identity and self consciousness is constituted by a inter-relations of individuals. (in this sense, the sociality of subjectivity is an eidetic truth) yet this inter-subjectivity assumes a variety of forms, both synchronically and diachronically. At any given time, there is a multiplicity of forms of 'sociation', as Simmel would say, in terms of which the individual forms a self image and a self conception. I am cast into many positions in which I am called upon to play a variety of roles against significant others: I am seen and treated as son or daughter, brother or sister, pupil or class mate, juvenile delinquent or social wreck or a poor lost soul. In each one of these froms, my self identity and sense of being a person is shaped but all these synchronic types, the entire spectrum of the vocabulary of self images, is itself the result of a historical process. As Hegel knew very well, the languages of the self are the products of the historical formation of culture, what he called 'the bildungs process'. The philosophy of Recognition therefore has to begin with the phenomenology of the diverse forms of intersubjectivity. But it cannot simply treat all these moulds of the self as on the same level; there is certain order, a certain kind of stratification of these different forms. Schutz, for example, distinguishes several modes of relationaship to the other, the chief ones being the mode of fellowman, consociate, functional or impersonal role relationships and predecessor and successor.11 But of all these modes, it is the immediate face to face encounter with the other, where each participant is 'bodily present' that is the basic mode in the sense that it is in terms of this 'bodily presence of the other' that the other types of inter-subjective relationships can be explicated; now, what gives a special status to this mode of intersujbective experience is the phenomenon of bodily presence, for here the other is present not merely with me but before me, as an embodied being characterized

11

et

al

IS

ıt

٢,

e

ie ie

lf

al

S

e

ıt

n

t

d

by perceptual immediacy. There are two aspects to this embodiment that we have to note at this stage. It is because the other is not a mere disembodied consciousness, a Cartesian Cogito, but exists before me in all the concreteness of carnal presence, with all the P and M-predicates, as Strawson would say12, that I am able to recognize him, not as an object of my thought, but as a co-subject in my life. In this matter there is a certain measure of contrast with and opposition to Sartre13; for Sartre, the look of the other reifies me; I am, as it were, pulled back into the body and congealed. Prior to the look. I was a free floating consciousness, but the look discloses my embodiment and in that act turns me into an object. This is because for Sartre, the body is a thing; within the ontology of "Being and Nothingness", the in-itself and 'the for itself' exhaust all ontological possibilities. It is precisely here that the philosophy of Merleau Ponty finds its point of exit from the presuppositional world of the whole of modern philosophy. Merleau Ponty would agree that for certain purposes, the body can be treated of as an object, as a thing of physics, in the Cartesian manner, but in my experience, in perception and communication, I do not experience my body as a thing; I live in it as in a medium and also it is my living animate body which inserts me into the world thus equipping me to know it. As he puts it, "I know the world not because I am the subject and the world, an object but I am a subject who knows the world because I belong to it".14 And this brings us to the second aspect of embodiment.

In his phenomenological analysis of perception, Husserl had emphasized the transcendency of the object of perception. My perception reveals the objects as having various determinations and characteristics revealed in the perception itself; I see the tree as having leaves and fruits, with birds and squirrels and other little animals, but in the very same experience of perceiving the tree in all these determinations, the tree is also given as having other properties and attributes, not given here and now. The tree as an object, as a thing of nature, is transcendent to my perceptions of it and this transcendency is the very mark of reality or being. A thing which has no properties other than those given in the act itself, would be precisely a fiction or an imagined object; similarly we cannot conceive of any human perception, or indeed any experience whatever, which will not have this perspectival profile like character, which could present the object, not in this way of aspects and shadings but totally in all its plenitude.

For Husserl, this perspectival character of experience is an eidetic law which "not even a God can alther". 15

For the point of view of embodiment, given the fact that the subject of perception is not a free floating pure consciousness but an embodied subject, it is easy to see why all experience must have this perspectival character, for the body situates me at a given place and time and also particularizes my relations to things in a uniquely personal way. But the living body not only explains the transcendency of my perceptual experiences but the fact of my embodiment also accounts for another feature of my living experience. As a counterpoint to the Husserlian theme of transcendency, Merleau Ponty emphasizes the phenomenology of intimacy; I experience my embodiment as an inner constant experiential background, sometimes in focussed and thematic way but mostly in an implicit and subliminal manner, with a fringe consciousness; it is more 'lived thro' rather than known, but this implicit, subliminal manner of its givenness should not be taken as minimizing its epistemic importance. For one thing, it is a genuine mode of knowing—what Polanyi calls knowing by indwelling and secondly, again as Polanyi shows, all foussed and thematic awareness is possible only because of this kind of marginal consciousness, while reading text, I am keenly, centrally, aware of the meaning content precisely because of my implicit awareness of the words. Sharp localized focal awareness is possible only against the background of a large apperceptive mass of implicit knowing. But for our purposes, embodient can be taken in larger and extended sense, in which even external things like the tools and implements to which we have been habituated, the habitats of our own past and the familiar trees and plants and particularly animals, could be known in the mode of intimacy. Human consciousness is capable of developing a certain rapport with things and on the basis of that intimacy, it acquires, on the one hand, the skills of tact and sub-liminal discrimination and on the other a tendency to invest natural objects with personal significance. The first, the phenomenon of tact, is at the bottom of all human powers of craftsmanship, while the second is the seed bed of culture and art. And in the other direction, just as it is our presence to each other as embodied subjects which makes our mutual recognition possible, it is also our embodiment that explains the peculiar historicity of human intersubjectivity of. A tradition is made possible by communication nication and the networks of relationships that follow such extended

communications and here again, as Husserl observed in The Origin of Geometry¹⁶, it is language that preserves the objectivity and intergenerational availability of funded knowledge. But not only knowledge. but every form of human discovery and acquisition also enters into history as tradition only by passing into language. Secondly, the sedimentation of our historical existence in the form of buildings. cities, implements, tools, temples and fortresses, academics, libraries. work places, leisure reports and places of dwelling and places of dying, in fact, the entire life cycle from birth to death can be objectified and hence made recognisable as meaningful only by the material sedimentation of ideas, feelings and values. The very sense of identity of a people, the continuity of a culture, is represented by these sedimentations. In that sense, our unique human sociality also is rendered possible by the mediation of nautre. It is in this sense that, for a philosophy of Participation, the single most important fact which holds the clue to all the enigmas of history and consciousness is the fact that throughout the entire period of its existence, homo sapiens has lived and evolved only on the planet earth. This perspective does not deny either the Philosophy of Consciousness or the Philosophy of Recognition. But it is to ground the Critique of Reason and the Phenomenology of the Spirit in an ontology of Nature. Reason as well as Recognition, Consciousness as well as History- both reflect and express the exigencies of life. My knowing, from the simple perceptual affirmation of ordinary experience to the astonishing constructions of the scientific genius, is the knowing of a being preadapted to this planet and which has gone through a complex evolutionary process on this planet in the course of which it has developed its perceptual, conceptual and imaginative powers; the forms of beauty that I create, the orders of harmony which I can recognise and respond to- these too are the precipitates of an earthly habitat and evolution. And also the forms of fellowship and community, the patterns of interaction and sharing with others— these configurations of sociality also are the dispositions of a being which can have one and only one home- the planet earth. And lastly, the ideals that move us, the images of goodness and purity— these are not of course empty fancies; the philosophy of participation need not deny the human spirit in order to affirm nature but these perfections of the spirit, if we read them rightly, only clarify our natural existence. The heights of the spirit are a measure of the depths of our belonging to the earth. The philosophy of participation does not, in short, deny science, religion

art and ethics; it only bids us understand them as what they are the science, religion, art and ethics of beings, which in all immensity of time and the vastness of space, amidst all the millions of possible worlds, have however evolved on this planet in a complex symbiosis of plant, animal and insect life.

·Husserl once described the phenomenological standpoint as the discovery of the third dimension by plane beings¹⁷. In one sense such a discovery does not add any new truth or principle to our knowledge: it is not a change in the content but in the form of our knowledge, Perhaps the same could be said of the Philosophy of Participation in a much truer sense; after all, the Earth is not something which is strange and unfamiliar to us and its discovery is not like the discovery of a new planet in some alien star system; indeed, we have entire sciences dealing with the earth, we have a geology and a geography and oceanography and also the sciences of rivers and lakes and forests and fields. And of the life on earth also, we have an impressive amount of knowledge and information. The forgetfulness of the Copernican man is a strange kind of amnesia; it is not the forgetting of any fact or theory. Nor is the discovery of the earth, the discovery of a new fact or set of facts about our planet. In one sense, after the discovery, nothing changes; as Husserl said of the 'epoche' nothing is added and nothing taken away; what was true before does not become false and what was false before does not become true. But in another sense everything has changed; everything appears in a new light, because our approach, our perspective has changed. And this change, although it has consequences for all the sciences and all the arts, is not basically theoretical or aesthetic change. It is, in its inmost core, a change in our sense of value and the gooda moral change.

In the dominant traditions of the Western moral theory, morality has been understood as essentially or primarily a feature of the realtions between human individuals in ever widening contexts of interaction. In this sense, the primary context of the moral is the social but once a moral point of view has been formed out of social and communal life, it is possible to consider human relations with nature in a derivatively moral sense; so also one can develop a personal ethics concerning one's own inner or subjective life. But both these extensions of the moral point of view, towards the ecological and the personal, are, as it were, only quasi moralities.

Philosophy as Geo-Philia

h

n

h

y

e

le

g

er

ot

ut

ıd

d

ty

ne of

ne of

15

p


Is

361


or moral by way of analogy. This position can be represented as:



This particular moral sensibility has a certain affinity with the political for both ethics and politics are dimensions of the life of a community. But there has been another tradition also, a more inward looking one, which sees an affinity with the religious or the spiritual. This too may be represented as:



Howsoever much the two paradigms may differ in other respects, they yet share a common fundamental presupposition, namely, that only humans are the bearers of intrinsic value and hence only they have rights in the strong moral sense. It is this presupposition about value which is changed when we go over to the third paradigm:



There has been an intense debate in recent years over the issue of the continutiy or otherwise of environmental ethics (in the sense of deep ecology) with traditional humanist ethics. On the one hand, people like Leopold18, think of environmental ethics as the extension and generalization of the evolving moral point of view, whereas others, after Lynn White19, see the ethics of deep ecology as involving a radical break with the prevailing assumptions and presuppositions about the good. Here again the Philosophy of Participation would bid us see the relationship between the old and the new morality in a more dialectical manner. In one sense, the earth ethics is dependent upon the traditional ethics, for it has to use the concepts and conceptual distinctions and connections of the language of the moral. A new morality cannot be introduced to us, without in any way presupposing a background moral or meta ethical context; hence the traditional moral discourse functions somewhat like the meta language for the new morality. Categories like intrinsic value and instrumental value and the more important categorial intuitions like, for instance the truth that the good is what ought to preserved or brought into being and that any rule of conduct can be justified only in terms of the above moral principle, are the necessary devices through which the intelligibility and authority of the new moral attitude can be shown. Also, as Knat very well saw, human morality is the morality of respect and since respect is a feeling, the supreme principle of morality, or the moral law, must be not merely retional but it must also be such that it can move the will by way of giving rise to a feeling of respect. In these and other ways, the new morality must have a certain continuity or commensurability with the anthropocentric moral point of view. Further, as we saw, the philosophy of participation is not a simple denial or negation of the uniqueness and privilege of the human; in its own way it is also a humanism. Hence it cannot simply negate the core intutions of a humanist ethics. But at the same time, the new morality is not a mere extension; to see it as a mere extension would be precisely the standpoint of an enlightened liberalism or utilitarianism. Such an ethics may be called an ecologically enlightened ethics in the sense that our environmental knowledge and information serve as inputs for such a system of morality; therefore, its prescriptions and recommendations do take environmental conditions and consequences into account. But such ecological experience and knowledge do not lead to any genuine or radical moral discovery; for such an enlightened liberalism, the human is the only form of intrinsic value.

The earth ethics breaks with the prevailing moral consensus precisely at this point, for such an ethics. Nature also is an intrinsic value²⁰ but in a sense such a formulation is seriously misleading for it makes it appear that it is only a case of addition, only an extension of the principle of value. But the idea of the intrinsic value of natural entities is a conceptual explosive which, when introduced into the framework of the prevailing moral point of view, shatters everything within that framework; all the necessary moral concepts and the relations between them, are stretched to the breaking point and the coherence of the whole is seriously jeopardized. Hence we can understand

N

ns

ed

be

he

ty ry

ce

he

be

a

ity he

he

on

ay

ore

ew on

sm

lly

ge

ty;

tal

cal cal

an

us

an

sly

of

he

lal

he

at

ns

ce

nd

why some feel that the point of view of deep ecology is conceptually incoherent, that it cannot be thought through with consistency.

One cannot simply dismiss these reservations and doubts as merely the remnants of anthropocentric hubris, for the notion of the intrinsic value of natural entities does raise serious moral and philosophical problems.

Persons are said to be bearers of interinsic value; if we now speak of nature as also an intrinsic value, what is the relation between the two? Is there *one* concept of intrinsic value applicable to both or are there *two* different concepts of intrinsic value?

When we describe both nature and humans as intrinsic values, are we bridging the gulf between these two? And how do we understand this attempt—are we bringing nature upto the human level i.e., humanizing nature, or are we recognising that man also is a natural entity i.e., naturalizing the human?

In cases of conflict between these two sets of value, how do we respond to such conflicts? Do we have a criterion of choice and does this criterion justify the sacrifices we may have to make and even more importantly, by what theoretical principles, can we make sense of the sacrifice of intrinsic value?

And granted that we can speak of a non-human in as an intrinsic value can we extend this to the *eco-system* as a whole. Is the eco-system or nature an individual?

The humanistic understanding of intrinsic value is based on an exclusivist criterion— on what distinguishes the human from the rest of nature, while there have been different views on the question of the human essence, yet all of them had one common point— since they were based on the logic of exclusion, nothing else could be an intrinsic value. But the philosophy of participation must think of intrinsic value precisely in terms of shareability, in terms of something for which there could be human as well as animal and plant exemplifications. Because of this, there would arise problems of grading of more or less of exemplifications of intrinsic value but even for the traditional theory, such problems would arise, although there is a tendency

to brush them under the carpet (for instance, the value status of children, unborn fetuses, the mentally retarded etc.) The basic term or fundamental value predicate must be something which has both human and non-human domains of application and at the same time, it must be *morally relevant* e.g. if it is shown that something has the chosen property or attribute say, R, then from the fact that "X is R", morally relevant consequences such as "X ought to be protected", "it is right to take care of X" etc. follow.

Keeping these things in the mind, I suggest that the relevant characteristic may be thought of as 'richness'21. While the task of developing a theory of value as richness is taken up in the sequel to the present work, I would like to offer a few orienting comments on the idea of richness as intrinsic value. First of all, it can easily be seen that richness is a good in the *morally relevant sense*, for form 'X is rich in the relevant sense' it seem to follow that 'it ought to be protected'22. One could, of course, say that this ancient rain forest is a rich eco-system, but its preservation is of no concern to us-there is no formal self contradiction, but there is a kind of conceptual incoherence as in saying "I know P but I do not believe it or in saying" "I ought to do X but I am not inclined to do so".

Secondly, the concept of richness has many dimensions or aspects to it²³, such that it has a built-in-basic for developing a theory of gradations of value, for some of these dimensions have a certain obvious claim over others Thirdly, in the light of the multidimensional character of richness as a value, it can be seen that it has a natural application to human beings also i.e. humans can be seen as instances of natural richness in the relevant sense. But one particular aspect of richness becomes particularly relevant in the context of the application of the idea to human beings.

I suggest one of the aspects of richness as a value is the serviceability of the thing²⁴. But this serviceability itself can be distinguished into various types, (i) to individuals of the same kind (intra-species serviceability), (ii) to individuals of other species (inter-species serviceability) and (iii) to the eco system as a

ic

ch

at

en

ch

nt

sk

in

W

le.

in

int

ne

ch

re

ıal

it

to

00

ng

ns

ht

an

SO

in

es

he

is

an

110

3

whole (systemic serviceability). While all these three are interlinked. in the sense that the fulfilment of (i) has implications for (ii) and (iii), such serviceability may be called indirect serviceability whereas when (ii) and (iii) themselves act as motivations for behaviour, it could be said to be direct serviceability. In terms of these two distinctions, one could suggest a principle of value ordering : the larger the domain of direct serviceability, the greater the richness of the thing and hence the more the intrinsic value. Since the value of the thing enhances the status of the thing which has the value, from the above it follows that environmentally protective action enhances the intrinsic value of human beings and hence an enrichment. Form this point, it is only a step to the recognition of "the ecological imperative", as Alfred Leopold puts it "Treat the beauty and integrity of the eco system not only as a means but as an end in itself25. To have regard for the eco-system not merely as a means but as an end in itself is to have a respect or reverence for the eco system in a morally relevant sense; we may call it ecological respect and relate it to the respect for persons. Since persons are said to be ends and not merely means, the phenomenology of respect as we find it in Kant's moral theory may provide a clue to the understanding of ecological respect.26

For Kant, respect or reverence is a feeling produced in us by the recognition of the moral law or the categorial imperative; this recognition of the authority of the moral law is itself an achievement of pure practical reason, but it produces in me a feeling, which is sui generis. It is this feeling which as respect or reverence, is essential for moral action. This feeling of respect, as Kant describes it, has two sides to it— on the one hand, a subjection or subordination and on the other, a self exaltation or enhancement. As Kant remarks, the distinctiveness of the human form of morality is that man experiences the moral in the form of a commandment or imperative; we have, as he says a moral will, not a holy one. But within imperatives in general, the moral is a pure obligation, a categorial and not a hypothetical imperative. It does not propose that we ought to do is what we want or desire; it simply proposes that we ought to do X whether we may desire or not desire. It disconnects our sense of obligation from all desire and inclination and subordinates all our other needs and powers to this one demand of doing what we ought to. In recognizing such an absolute demand and its uncontestable authority over me, in my acceptance of the sovereignty of the moral law over all passions and inclinations, in short, in my conception of myself as a moral subject, I experience a subjection, a subordination of the self- I am under the governance of the moral law and this governance is absolute and uncontestable- there is simply no other court of appeal, not even religion.

The recognition of the moral law as imposing a pure obligation upon us has two aspects to it; if on the one hand, it leads to recognition of the overriding authority of the ought, of the subjection of the self to its unconditional demand, yet in the self same experience of obligation, there is also a moment of self exaltation or enhancement. Along with the bindingness of the obligation, I also experience a certain equally unconditional power for since 'ought' implies 'can', I also become aware of that in me which is capable of living up to the demands placed upon me; I know that my will is free and that it can move me purely by the recognition of what ought to be done. I can suspend the force of inclination and desire and act solely from the sense of what I ought to do. In this recognition of my freedom, I recognise that I am not merely a wroldly or natural being determind by the laws of causality but I am also an end, a noumenon and as such, capable of another kind of possibility— the laws of freedom. This realisation exalts me for now in my noumenal freedom, I realise an intrinsic value, as a member of the kingdom of ends.

It is this dialectic of self subordination and self exaltation, of phenomeanl subordination and noumenal enhancement which constitutes the feeling of moral respect in Kant's phenomenology of the moral consciousness. To this dialectic of subordination and exaltation, we must also add a third element— the feeling of respect also discloses me as a member of the kingdom of ends.

As Heidegger remarks, Kant's analysis of respect is one of the finest phenomenological analyses in moral theory and hence may serve as model for our own attempt to classify the

Philosophy as Geo-Philia

l,

n

İs

ne

ne

of

of

al

of

ed

ve

I

ly

of .

10

SO

of

ne

ie,

n,

ch

gy

on

ng

of

ne

nd

he

367

notion of ecological respect.

Like in the case of moral respect, in the case of ecological respect also, we can discover a dialectic of self subordination and self exaltation.

When I reflect how my individual presence here and now in the mode in which I exist and experience the world, goes back to the very beginning of life on this planet, and how behind me there is an unbroken generational bond of filiation which stretches across the millinea of recorded as well as unrecorded prehistory, of how the seeds of my strenghts and vulnerabilities have been prepared for in these successive stages of formation, when looking beyond my own individual case, I reflect that the same is true of every one who lives now, or once lived or will live on this planet, namely, that behind every one of us, literally the whole of the past of humanity is mobilized and in this vast field of forces every one of us has an unbroken line of descent going right to the very first dawn of the human race, when further, I look beyond individual geneologies and consider the evolutionary process itself which has led to me and where I stand now and when I realise the complex and incessant patterns of connection and relationships in which our lives and those of other species have been woven together and further when I realise that every one of our human powers and capacities has been made possible by this pattern of a common evolutionary destiny, when, in short, I understand what it means to say that we are the children of the earth and that the earth has been and shall be the only home we can recognise as our home, I feel a self subordination. Ecology discloses the world as an evolving community of life in which I have membership but not mastery. But at the same time, it reveals me as having a particular niche in this web of life. It is the same ecological science which leads to my self subordination, which also exalts me, for on the one hand, the human subject has an understanding of not only what is the nature and requirements of its own position in the ecological system, but it also has an understanding of almost all other species and their needs and requirement. In that sense, the human subject has an awareness of not only its own good but the good of all other species. Unlike other forms of life, humans can come to have an idea of the world from the view point of other species, they can go a long way towards understanding the image of the earth as the home for myriad forms of life. A single species, one in the midst of millions, and yet in its consciousness, it can represent the good of all; it can think in the place of all. But not merely think; today, we do have a large fund of preservationist and conservationist power. We have the knowledge and the power for a custodial role. Knowledge and power, science and technology can give but the motivation can come only from a feeling of ecological respect. Here too the principle of Kantian ethics holds-the will must be moved by a respect for the environment.

And that leads us to a final question; are we capable of that feeling of respect for the environment? If it should turn out that such a feeling places too great demands upon human beings, that it expects the impossible from human psychology, then the entire argumentation for a transformation of our ethical frameworks for the need for a philosophy of the earth would be subverted. Hence, in a way, that is the decisive question of all. Is what we have been describing as Geo-Philia- is that a real possiblity for us? Without anticipating the details of the argumentation with which my current work 'Philosophy as Geo Philia' is concerned at this point. I would like to indicate the lines of response to the question about the possibility of such a mood as Geo Philia. Now the question whether a certain kind of fundamental attitude or feeling is possible or not is a peculiar kind of question. It is not simply or straightforwardly a factual or empirical question; it is partly a conceptual question in the sense that it is asking whether we can clarify the presuppositions implied by such a possibility. Behind such a question, lies a certain image of human nature and its relation to the world. And the question about the possibility of Geo Philia is firstly whether we can give a clear philosophical articulation of this image of what it is to be human vis-a-vis the world.

But the task of clarification of the possibility of Geo Philia cannot be halted merely at the level of philosophical presuppositions and images of human nature; one must enter into other matrices of intelligibility, into other 'symbolic forms' in Ernst Cassirer's sense, and see how these give further content and form to the idea of participation. In other words, one must think in terms

f

d

ζ;

st

al e

al

11

у,

al d

n

S

"

e

)f

n

is

n

S

a

i.

S

S

S

of a philosophy of science and a philosophy of art and philosophy of religion in the light of the recovery of the idea of the Earth. It is precisely in this form that I shall be concerned with the project to Geo Philia in my next work. But that extended discussion of science and art and rleigion is given an orientation by a few broad themes of our evolutionary history on the plants:

- 1. Throughout its histroy, the human species has lived and evolved only on this planet.
- 2. In the course of this evolution, the human species has developed complex and pervasive bonds with the natural environment, which bonds have a way of making themselves felt even when we are ignorant of them, or forget them or seek to deny them.
- 3. Such bonds have given rise to needs which pervade every aspect of our lives.
- 4. We are beginning to realise that such needs for contact and communication with other species, when frustrated may lead to all sorts of unsuspected deprivations and defecits. On the other hand, the fulfilment of such communicational needs is a particularly satisfying and even a healing process; we are beginning to suspect that ecological respect may have a therapeutic meaning as well.
- 5. On the other side of the fence, as recent studies of animal communication and animal learning suggest, humans seem to stimulate the cognitive potentials of other species; it appears possible that we can play another role than that of the predator.

All these indications seem to suggest that almost as if there is a genetic base to ecological respect. We can respect nature, geophilia is natural.

National Fellow Indian Institute of Advanced Studies Shimla, 171005 R. SUNDARA RAJAN

NOTES

- 1. Merleau Ponty's lectures at the College de France in 1957 quoted in "The Phenomenology of Merleau Ponty" by Gary Madison, Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1981, p.213,
- 2. Ibid.,
- 3. Marjorie Grene in her "The Paradoxes of Historicity" has argued similarly for a return to the natural context of philosophical anthropology. Marjorie Grene. "The Paradoxes of 'Historicity' in 'Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy' (ed) Brice R. Wachterhauser, State University of New York. New York. 1986. pp.168-92.
- 4. The idea of a First person Philosophy is discussed in "In the Spirit of Hegel: A Study of G.W.F. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit" Oxford University Press, New York, 1983, p.427.

For an elaborate discussion of the three aspects of the subject in Kant, see Martin Heidegger: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (trans.) Albert Hofstadler, Indiana, University Press, Bloomington, Indiana, 1982, p. 137

- 6. See Robert Solomon. "In the Spirit of Hegel".
- 7. For this interpretation of the dialectic of the Master and the Bondsman in the Phenomenology, see "History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology". Merold Westphal, Humanities Press. NJ. 1979.
- 8. Robert Solomon, "In the Spirit of Hegel", p. 427.
- 9. *Ibid.*,
- Merleau Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible (trans.) Alphonoso Lingis, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1968.
- 11. Alfred Schutz, The Structures of the Life World (trans.) Richard Zaner and H, Tristram Engelhardt, North Western University Press, Evanston, 1973.
- 12. P.F. Strawson, 'The Concept of Person' in *Individuals* Methuen. London, 1953, chapter 3.
- 13. Jean Pual Sartre, Being and Nothingness (trans.) Hazel E. Barnes, pt. III, chapter 1, sec. IV. Washington Square Press, 1956.
- 14. Merleau Ponty quoted in "From Phenomenology to Metaphysics!

 An Inquiry into the Last Period of Merleau Ponty's Philosophical

 Life" Remy Kwant, Duquesenne University, Pittsburgh. 1966.

- 15. Edmund Husserl, "Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy" (trans.) F. Kerston, sec. 44, pp. 94-95, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1983.
- 16. Edmund Husserl, The Origin of Geometry, Appendix in "The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy" (trans) David Carr, pp. 353-379, North Western University Press. Evanston, 1970.
- 17. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, pp. 119-120.
- 18. Alfred Leopold, "The Land Ethic" in A Sand County Almanac, Oxford University Press.
- 19. Lynn White "The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis" Science 155, 37, see also his Machina Ex Deo.
- 20. Peter Miller. Value as Richness: Toward A Value Theory for the Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics, Environmental Ethics, 1982, vol.4, No.2.
- 21. Ibid.,

n.

b

CS

ty

he

of

ect

n.

he l's

19.

SO

ard ss,

en.

es,

cs:

- 22. Ibid.,
- 23. Peter Miller in the above article provides an exhaustive discussion of this point, but for our present purpose, only one of the dimensions of 'richness' is relevant.
- 24. The interpretation of 'serviceability' suggested differs from that of Miller.
- 25. Alfred Leopold, The Land Ethic.
- The Phenomenology of ecological respect is modelled on Heidegger's interpretation of respect for the moral law in Kant. See "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology". Martin Heidegger, pp. 131-137.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY **PUBLICATIONS**

Daya Krishna and A.M. Ghose (eds) Contemporary Philosophical Problems: Some Classical Indian Perspectives, Rs. 10/.

S.V. Bokil (Tran) Elements of Metaphysics Within the Reach of Everyone, Rs.25/-

A.P. Rao, Three Lectures on John Rawls, Rs. 10/-

Ramchandra Gandhi (cd) Language, Tradition and Modern Civilization, Rs.50/-

S.S. Barlingay, Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections, Rs.70/-

Daya Krishna, A.M.Ghose and P.K.Srivastav (eds) The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Rs.60/-

M.P. Marathe, Meena A. Kelkar and P.P. Gokhale (eds) Studies in Jainism, Rs.50/-

R. Sundara Rajan, Innovative Competence and Social Change, Rs. 25/-

S.S.Barlingay (ed), A Critical Survey of Completed Research Work in Philosophy in Indian Universities (upto 1980), Part I, Rs.50/-

R.K.Gupta, Exercises in Conceptual Understanding, Rs.25/-

Vidyut Aklujkar, Primacy of Linguistic Units, Rs.30/-

Rajendra Prasad, Regularity, Normativity & Rules of Language Rs. 100/-

Contact: The Editor.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Department of Philosophy University of Poona,

Pune - 411 007

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

CAUSATION, EXPLANATION AND UNDERSTANDING*

The topic of Causation, Explanation and Understanding continues to attract philosophers' attention. This is due to the fact that the whole topic carries with it certain metaphysical presuppositions which have always been worth considering. The topic also provides for configurations of certain aspects of philosophies of Science and Action theories. In this paper, I will try to explore some of these. For the sake of elaboration, I will draw from Strawson's Individuals1 which, in analytical circles, have still retained its intellectual charm. I will also draw from one of Strawson's notso-very-frequently-anthologized paper entitled Causation and Explanation². In that paper, Strawson takes up a specific issue of an event or action 'under description'. Strawson's discussion hinges upon a full-scale theory of Causation and Explanation which in my opinion has its roots in Individuals. As is wellknown, the descriptive metaphysics Strawson develops centers round the primacy of substance. It will be useful to remind ourselves that for Kant space and time are pure forms of intuition whereas substance is a pure concept. Here, I will not go into the contrast between Kant and Strawson as far as the metaphysics of substance is concerned. What immediately interests me is the primacy of substance as Strawson views it, which I think, lends validity to some of our assumptions in Philosophy of Science and Action theories.

I

We often associate causality with explanation and there is nothing wrong in doing so atleast prima facie. In fact, in ordinary

For the exposition of Strawson's position in this paper I am indebted to Professor M.P. Rege for valuable discussions I had with him.

speech the distinction between causality and explanation is hardly recognized and the vocabulary that is used is in fact common to expressions which we use to record causal relations and explanations, But the two, i.e., causality and explanation are different types of relations. For example,

- "(1) The use of inferior material in the construction of building was responsible for (2) its collapse.3
 - does not tell us whether the relation between (1) and (2) was that of causality or of explanation. But consider:
- "His death, coming when it did, was responsible for A) the breakdown of the negotiations"4. AND
- "His death's coming when it did, was responsible for the B) breakdown of the negotiations".5

"death" as in (A) is an event in nature. In (B) it is His not. "'Death" in (A) marks an occurrence of an event. In (B) it is the fact that a certain event occured in nature at a certain time. In ordinary language we do not draw this distinction since there is no need to do so, but in philosophy, Strawson argues, the distinction should matter.

Causality is a natural relation that obtains between two events, things, states of affairs, which are extra-linguistic, natural or extensional. The relation that holds between these is also extra-linguistic, natural or extensional. Explanation, on the other hand, is a non-natural, linguistic, intentional relation that holds between facts, truths or propositions. Some philosophers have referred to this distinction by using alternate but corresponding terminology. For example, J. L. Mackie talks about two kinds of causes. viz. productive and explanatory. Events on this distinction are productive causes, whereas facts or propositions (involving occurance of events) are explanatory causes.

Causality is as much a natural relation as are the relations of temporal succession or spatial proximity. For example,

t1 (to the left of) t2 indicates a spatial relation.

C2 (after) C1 indicates a temporal relation.

Now, the relation of causality as it holds between t1 and 12

E

ly

n

S.

es

ng

2)

or

he

is

B)

ain

ice

es,

W0

iral Iso

her

lds

ave

ing nds

ion ing

ons

12

or between C1 and C2 will hold howsoever one refers to t1 or t2. That is to say, a statement which asserts that the relation R which holds between t1 and t2 will continue to hold irrespective of referring phrases one may use to make that statement. For example, I can refer to t1 as 'this' and t2 as 'that' or as "Probal's book" or as "the thing Probal brought from Calcutta" provided they refer correctly and respectively to t1 and t2. In this sense, a spatial relation obtaining between t1 and t2 or the temporal relation obtaining between C1 and C2 is Extensional. Thus, a causal relation subsists between events which occur in nature. This relation either subsists or does not subsist. If it subsists it is true to say that C1 is the cause of C2 howsoever one may refer to C1 and C2. There can be various referring expressions used for referring to C1 and C2 but the statement couched in them would assert : that C1 is the cause of C2will remain true. Causal relations are natural in this sense. To say that causal statements expressing natural relations among events are extensional is to say that various modes of referring to entities involved in that relation make no difference to the truthvalue of the statement which is made by using those referring phrases.

Suppose I say:

- (C) the explosion of the Bomb on the third Floor (e1) brought about the falling of the terrace (e2)
- (D) The lightning of a thin wire attached to a stick which John had brought from Bombay (e¹) brought about falling of the terrace (e²)
- (E) The burning of the fuse of what John had brought about from Bombay (e1) brought about the falling of the terrace (e2)
- (C), (D) and (E) are alternate descriptions of the same happening to the effect that a certain relation holds between two events viz. e¹ and e². One and the same event, thus, can be described in several ways and since every event can be described in terms of a causal relation, how one refers to the terms of that (causal) relation makes no difference to the relation itself. If the relation between e¹ and e² holds, it holds howsoever

376

e¹ and e² are described. This is what is meant by saying that Causal relations and statements expressing such Causal relations are extensional. To use Frege-Quinean terminology, the statement which states that a causal relation obtains between e¹ and e² is referentially transparent.

As causal relation holds between events, states of affairs, objects, which are in nature, explanation or explaining relation holds between facts, or truths, or propositions. What explains i.e., explanans and what stands explained. f.e., explanandum is always a truth, a proposition, a fact. Thus for instance, e¹ and e² are events in nautre and that there is a causal relation between the two. Now, when one gives an explanation as to why e², it is not e² (an event) that is explained, but what is explained is the fact that e² occured at t². Similarly, when someone asks for an explanation of an event e¹, it is not e¹ that stands explained, but what is explained is the fact that e¹ occured at t¹. Thus the relationship that obtains between two events is that of causation and not that of explanation. But the relationship that obtains between two facts is not that of causation but that of explanation.

While taking the distinction between causality and explanation to be sharp one, how do we further relate it to our *understanding* of explanation in general? Strawson suggests that there is a certain connection between explanation which is a non natural relation and 'a certain natural facts about our human selves'. The natural facts about ourselves, according to Strawson, refer to our "coming to know that p will tend—to induce a state—which we call understanding why q".7

One of the ways in which one explains the given event is by giving a cause of it, i.e., by making a statement that such and such is the cause of that event and because the cause has occured, an event in question has occured. This is what we call explanation. Now, what Strawson is saying is that when someone, say A, notices that e² has occured and finds the occurance of e² puzzling and if someone, say B, tells A that e² has occured because e¹ has occured, then this will provide an explanation as to why e² has occured. The statement explaining the occurance of e² will be of the form:

3

it

n

S

is

ld

ed ks

d,

us

n

ns n.

n

18

a

al

er

ch

nt

at

se

at

en

ce

as

n

ce

An event of such and such type occured before e^2 OR An event of such and such type brought about e^2 .

Now, A who was earlier puzzled about an occurance of e² is no longer puzzled. So a certain mental change has been brought about in him. He has now come to understand why e² has occured. But what brought about this understanding of succession of events in him? His hearing and understanding this statement. A's coming to understand this statement is a certain kind of occurrence and therefore an event in nature. Similarly, his coming to understand why e¹ is another mental event in nature and the relation that holds between these two events is that of causation. But the entities between which this causal relation holds have an intensional content.

The distinction between causality and explanation, if not properly articulated gives rise to a confusion of a special type. The confusion relates to our describing an event in question. As we have noticed above, the causal relation which obtains between two events, if holds, holds irrespective of how we refer to or describe the terms of that relation. If so, can we say, as we seem to say, that an event e under some description is the cause and under some other description an explanation?

An answer to this question will depend upon how we take explanations to be. If all that what we want are explanations then what matters are the appropriate facts about events in question rather than their descriptions. "Selecting an appropriate fact about an event or condition may involve choosing among different possible descriptions of the same event or conditions". Explanation, i.e., a statement to the effect that why a certain q does not involve "choosing among different descriptions of the same fact. The fact is in this connection something to be stated. not described". So whether it is a statement about a causal relation or about explaining relation it is misleading to say that one thing e under one description causes the other and explains under another.

Singular events are individuated by singular terms of the scientific language employed. For example, "Excessive alcohole intake caused his death". His "death" as we have noticed earlier is a singular event in nature, so also his intake of excessive alcohole is a singular event in nature. We, thus, employ singular

causal claim : e caused e1. But what makes the sentence "e caused e¹" a singular causal statement? In Strawsonian account on this point, we have noticed that if 'e caused e' states a causal relation which obtains in nature, then "e caused e" would be a causal statement. But this sounds tautological or even trivial. Those who are developing causal account of Human action believe that a singular causal statement is the one which is backed up by causal laws. This general view has been expounded differently by different philosophers. For example, Davidson would say that "when reasons and actions are appropriately redescribed in a physical vocabulary, they may instantiate causal laws and thereby be regarded as causes and effects". Thus, when events are described in purely physical vocabulary, they instantiate physical laws. Some philosophers, like Tuomela, put a stricter condition "Singular causal claims" like e1 causes e2 do not "display the structure of events and not generic properties in virtue of which the singular events can be shown to be causes and effect"."

In order to turn a given singular event into a 'cause', that event must be backed up by a law. This is the principle of various Causal theories of events, or of event-causality in general. The statement of a causal law is *linguistic* whereas the *law* itself, is natural. This is the point which Strawson makes when he says that *explanations* are *intensional*. An intensional explanation is a move from a singular causal statement like e caused e^1 or e is the cause of e^1 to a corresponding linguistic expression of the type "that e has P caused that e^1 has Q" "without affecting the truth of Singular Causal statements"."

One important observation made in this regard is by Tuomela. He says, "We seem to be able to go back and forth between ontological (or material) talk and linguistic fact-talk". The ability to "go back and forth" between the extensional causal statements (understood as Strawson suggests) and intensional explanation is, I think, due to the functioning of ordinary language itself.

П

What is true of causal statements is not true of explanations. As noted, mode of referring to entities involved in causal relations viz. causal relata, makes no difference to the truth-value of the

E

Int

ıld

al.

ve

ed tly

lat

a

by

are

cal

on.

the

ich

'11

e',

ple

in

eas

ces nal

ke

tic

0"

12

la.

en

ity

nts

is.

f.

ns.

ns he statement made by using these referring phrases. To continue our example :

- A) The explosion of the bomb on the third floor brought down the terrace.
- B) The lightening of the fuse of what John had brought from Bombay brought down the terrace.

Of the two, A has an explanatory power; whereas B deos not have. Supposing further, that as a matter of fact what "John had brought from Bombay" happens to be a bomb then the phrase "John had...." will refer to the same event. But even then that phrase of its own will have no explanatory power. The reason why B has no explanatory power is that we have certain knowledge in terms of which A turns out to be an explanation while B does not. An explanation which is offered presupposes certain context and our knowledge of that context. In the above example the context is that of regularity in nature, causal process, etc., and our knowledge of these. It is in this context that A is and B is not a satisfactory explanation. The explanation will be genuine and not spurious provided what it seeks to explain is described in a certain way and not in any arbitrary way.

An explanatory power of a statement which is offered as an explanation and the truth value of that statement are two different things. This is illustrated by B above. B has truth value Truth but lacks explanatory power. Similarly, there could be a false explanatory sentence i.e., a sentence may be false and yet used as an explanation. Suppose I am a corrupt builder and my engineers have warned me that due to the use of inferior materials used the newly constructed building will collaps during the rains. What I do is to explode an ordinary cracker and create an impression that the bomb had exploded. And if I tell the people that the building collapsed because of the explosion of bomb, this will be counted as an explanation or even as a relevant explanation. But as a matter of fact it is a false statement. So, that the statement's being true or false is another.

One seeks an explanation out of curiosity, out of wonder

as to how a certain thing has happened. Explanation seek to satisfy this curiosity-eliminating a sense of surprise so that one can see that what has happened, happened 'naturally' or "as a matter of course". To create such an understanding, such a mental state, that one gives an explanation. That causal relations obtain in nature and we may either describe them correctly with the help of true causal statements or we may describe them incorrectly by making false causal statements. All this may happen. But when we give explanations we give them in such form and manner that the relation between cause and effect becomes clear or explicit. But when we make a causal statement it is not necessary that the implicit causal relation becomes explicit, This seems to be Strawson's position. When he says that causal statements of the type e caused e1, such causal statements are only descriptive but not explanatory in nature. But causal statements are always made with an eye to explanation, an eye to a possible querry as to why and how something has happened. This is the usual context for anyone to make a causal statement.

Part of the above discussion, especially the one pertaining to the distinction between causal statements and explanations, suggests that the distinction has to be made if we recognize that causal statements are extentional whereas explanations are intensional. We have also noted that as far as the relation of causality is concerned it is a natural relation and it does not matter which terms, phrases or linguistic marks do we use to refer to it. If the relation holds, it holds irrespective of referring phrases. Thus,

- A) Sir Walter Scott wrote only historical novels.
- B) The Author of Waverlely wrote only historical novels. Since 'Sir Walter Scott' and "The Author of Waverley" refer to one and the same entity, we have seen on the earlier occasion, that, it makes no difference how one refers to the individual provided one refers to him successfully. Success in this case will be determined by procedure of identification and criterion of identity. The question now is about the alternate ways of referring themselves. The fact that there are such alternate ways of referring to one and the same particular is obivious. One trivial reason, as far as the above example goes, for referring

E

ln

16

as

ns

ly

be

av

ch

ct

nt

it.

al

re

its

le

is

ng

is, ze

re

of ot

10

ng

S.

er

n.

al

711

of

ys

10

19

to Sir Walter Scott as 'the Author of Waverley' would be that 10 use the phrase 'Sir Walter Scott' again and again becomes boaring and is certainly repetitive. But when someone says that the auther of Waverley (instead of Sir Walter Scott) wrote historical novels one may be making a point, which can be made sharply only by referring to the "Author of Waverley" and not "Sir Walter Scott". For example, referring to "Sir Walter Scott" as "The author of Waverley" might have something to do with the phenomenal success of Waverley or that Scott didn't write anything except historical novels, or in the legal context of copy rights etc., It is possible, that when we make alternate descriptions, use different phrases for referring to one and the same particular. such descriptions or phrases might have explanatory power of differing degrees. That the statements we make to describe particulars has to have truth value is well taken. But it is not merely the truth value of a statement that matters. The manner in which the statement is made i.e., the phrases used for referring to the individuals, or events or actions— i.e., the mode of referring also matters since they have explanatory power.

Suppose.

- A) John gave Peter half his wealth and distributed the remaining half among Tom, Dick and Harry.
- B) John gave his youngest son half his wealth and distributed the remaining half among his three elder children.

Both A and B have the same truth value. But A does not have the explanatory power which B has. The reason why we use different phrases for identifying the same particular very often lies in the explanatory power which those phrases have and which other phrases may lack and therefore, substituting one phrase for the other and although there is no change in the truth value of both the statements, even then these two statements serve two different *purposes*. For, as in the above example, it may be that Peter is John's son from his first wife and Tom, Dick and Harry are his sons from his second wife. And what John did is to be communicated to John's first (or even the second) wife. Here the person to whom John gave half his wealth is to be referred to by his name would be

practical. But suppose what John did is to be situated in the legal context, then referring to the person to whom John gave half his wealth will have to be referred to as "The youngest son". Thus, the two statements serve two different purposes. And this is also true of causal statements where our interests in causes are primarily practical. The theoretical interest develop much later and even when they develop there is always an eye to the practical application of such theoretical knowledge that we may acquire. So, causal statements carry with them context of explanation. This is what Strawson rightly points out when he says that in the ordinary discourse the two, i.e., causal statements and explanations are not sharply distinguished because there is no need to do so. In fact, the common speech will be frustrated if the distinction is sharply made. Because a causal statement has to have an explanatory role the causal statement cannot be divested of its explanatory role except in philosophical contexts where philosophers want to emphasize that causal statements are merely extentional whereas explanations are intensional.

III

If Strawsonian distinction between causality and explanation as two types of relation is correct, then, according to him there are two levels.¹⁴

a) A causing B simpliciter

That is, what we have talked about, namely, the causal relation which obtains in nature.

b) The truth of A explaining the truth of B.

That is, what we have talked about as explaining relation.

Now, descriptions of A (as in 'A' causing 'B' simpliciter) and descriptions of the truth of A are to be distinguished clearly. What Strawson says is that if these are not so distinguished then the content of these descriptions begins to appear the same, which it is not.

This raises the question of the suitability of descriptions (as long as descriptions enter into statements about events and

e

n

ıt

se

nt al

ts

r)

d

e,

15

facts), the rightness of facts (as long as the right kinds of facts lend explanatory power to explaining relation) and the validity of the causal relation itself (as long as we believe that causal relation obtains in nature). But again, what is the connection between the three?

Surely, and this is the quest of Science, that "the power of one fact to explain another must have some roots in the nature itself where events occur, conditions obtain and the causal relations hold." But if we do not hold this, then "causal relation itself has no natural existence or none outside our minds" or our belief in causal relation or causality in general is simply "the projection upon the world of some subjective disposition of ours, the disposition, perhaps, to take some facts as explaining others." ¹⁷.

Two questions arise in the above argument. But lest we proceed, it is clear that this is the familiar empiricist understanding of the issue at hand. Empiricist position, in general, recognizes that there is a natural basis for our "disposition" to take some facts (about events) as explaining facts. The two questions now are (i) What is the nature of this disposition and (ii) whether the "natural basis" for the operation of these dispositions 'was intrinsically capable of being detected or observed or established in any particular case."18 The history of empiricism, atleast in its Philosophy of Science aspect and all the consequent developments in such aspects of Philosophy of Science where methodological issues are taken seriously, is full of this intense debate over the nature of 'dispositions' to take some but not all facts as explaining facts and the nature of the "intrinsic ground" for such dispositions to operate upon. The debate over causality, if we may so understand, centers round a certain tension, if not a paradox. If there is a natural basis for causality it must be intrinsically detected in any (arbitrary) particular case, but that there is such a basis is validated not by any particular case but by some other relation like that of generalization. In other words, "causal generalizations are not generalizations of Particular instances of causality, rather, particular insitances of causality are established as such only by the particularizing of causal generalizations".19.

This, as Strawson has termed, is an "accepted view" of causality in the Western Tradition. As per this view, it is through observation of repeated instances of one event following after the other that we form the notion of cause. This view, further, has met with objections from within as well as from outside the empirisist tradition. The view has two aspects:

- (1) It is true that there is no singular or plural relation as such which is detectable in particular cases and be termed as causal. In this respect, the notion of causality or that of cause differs from that of Substance with which, according to Strawson, it is traditionally associated. Both these notions, viz. cause and substance, are 'highly abstract' and are not rooted in particular observation.
- (2) But in the case of individual substance we can make a distinction between "an instance" and 'a kind of which something is an instance. But this distinction is not available in the case of the notion of cause. History of empiricism attaches a far greater Significance to this fact, i.e., the non-availability of 'an instance' and "kind" distinction in the case of the notion of cause. According to Strawson, one has to distinguish between the notion of cause and the notion of causation. He writes, "Though the notion of cause, understood as a relation between distinct particular events or circumstances, finds, in the observationvocabulary no footing which exactly parallels... in the case of the notion of substance, yet the notion of causation in general does find a footing or rather a foundation in the observation vocabulary."20. Strawson, thus points out that the notions of cause and causation differ in that the former has no basis in observation vocabulary, the latter has. "There is an enormous variety", to quote further, "a great multiplicity, of kinds of a mon and transacion which are directly observable in the particular case and which are properly to be described as causal in so far as they are varieties of bringing something about, of producing some effect or new state of affair"21...

A point of clarification: What is the nature of action and transaction leading to bringing something about? Consider, for example,

Causation and Explanation

E

of

er

Τ.

le

as

as

se

n.

nd

ar

a

ng

se

ar an

of

en

es.

en

n-

of

al

on

se

nc

to

211

ch

re

ct

n

385

a) X pulls Y

This is a schema involving a two-place predicate and a transitive verb. It is not filled up by designations of distinct particular events or circumstances. It will be filled up by designations of particular substances. e.g.

b) A pulls B

Now, Strawson's contention is that such predicates signify 'some specific exercise of causal power by an agent'. Generalizing from this, Strawson contends that observations of specific varieties of the bringing about of effects by things is a commonplace knowledge. "The observation-vocabulary is as rich in names for types of effect producing *action* as it is in names for types of substances". Names for substances and names for actions (i.e., substances and corresponding actions or actions involving corresponding substances) are "indissolubly linked with each other", that is to say, vocabularies concering names of substances and names of actions are converging upon one another.

Thus, something acts to bring about an effect in another by "a characteristic exercise of causal power; and in observing such a transaction one already possesses an explanation" about the change which has been brought about. Strawson's contention is that since "one has observed the change being brought about in some characteristic mode", there is no need of "dissolving this transaction into a sequence of states of affairs— a sequence of distinct existences and wondering whether or in virtue of what, the sequence constitutes a causal sequence." 24

Explanations are required, as per the above account, where the outcomes are observed but not their bringing about. In such cases observable action of bringing about an outcome is explained to someone who has not observed the said action. In such cases explanation rests upon observable relations in nature. But explanations are not always so straightforward and when explanations are not so straightforward, one requires further causes.

The search for further causes, or for causes themselves, depend upon 'models of bringing about' of the exercise of causal power, which nature presents to a gross level and observation of regularities of association of distinct existences". Thus, there

386

is always a two-way process between our understanding of effects by observing their "grosser modes of production.... and investing the minuter processes which underlie the grosser." But in the process of the evolution of a physical theory, the utility and the use of gross models of bringing about wears out and so also the notion of cause loses its role in theory.

What is the distinctive feature of causality as a natural relation? According to Hume, it is the idea of a necessary connection, The language-game concerning causality in Hume's philosophy also has synonyms like "efficacy", 'agency', 'power', 'force', 'energy', 'necessity', 'connection', 'productive quality', etc. This language-game in Hume's philosophy is determined by his general principle: Seek the impression from which the idea of cause effeciency, etc. are derived. If we concentrate, Strawson asks, on "Power", "Force" and "Compulsion" what will be their groundings in terms of sense impressions? The most obvious answer will be in terms of our experience of physical bodies exerting force upon one another. Examples of "pulling" something (something is being pulled by) or "pushing" something (something is pushed by) and thereby experiencing the force, power or compulsion which either we exert or is exerted upon us. An impression of force which is exerted or "suffered" then is the source of one of the ideas, namely, force which is synonymous to that of cause. We not only use the idea of force with reference to mechanical push and pull which are instances of action of natural relatios which are directly observable and which, because they are observed and properly recorded provide appropriate explanations of outcomes of changes. "We see the man pick up the suitcase and lift it on to the rack". The outcome is that the suitcase is lifted and is on the rack. That is the explanation of why the suitcase is there.

The point Strawson is making is that mechanical transactions are fundamental to the notion of causality in general.

What are mechanical transactions? For example, my pushing the stone, or my lifting the stone, my pulling a tree and so on. These are basically the push and pull type of primitive actions. They are fundamental for our introducing changes in the states of affairs of the world. For example, that a certain

)F

CIS

ing

the

ind

SO

Iral

on.

ohy

ce'.

his

eral

ise.

sks.

ngs will

rce

ing

hed

ion

ion

of

that

nce

of

use

iale

nick

15

lion

ons

ing so

tive

in

ain

stone at a certain point of space is pushed by me, an outcome of which is that the stone is pushed to some other point of space. The mechanical transactions of the type considered here. involve bodily movements, power and force, compulsion and constraint. Each of these have a great bearing upon the notions of action and changes introduced in the world. Mechanical transactions of the push-pull, lift, put, remove, open, close, bend, stretch, dent, compress, type involve bodily movements, are subject to the Newtonian Laws of gravity power and force, as well as compulsion and constraints as understood in terms of relevent physical/bodily abilities. Further, the mechanical transactions of these categories are also natural. A gust of wind pushes the vessle or the aeroplane, the stone on the slope pushes the hut. Strawson's contention is that when we look for the sophisticated causal 'mechanisim' where we usually talk of causal connections or causal links

Notions of attraction and repulsion confirm the claim that mechanical transactions provide a base for the sophisticated causal explanation. Mechanical interaction model is paradigmatically explanatory. It accounts for the interaction of physical bodies as well as fluids. "The search for causal theories", Strawson contends "is a search for modes of action and reaction which are not directly observable at the ordinary level, and which we find intelligible because we model them on those various modes of action and reaction" which we notice at the macro experience level. But this needs a qualification, because this suggests a sharp distinction between theory and observation.

But is the model Strawson is providing satisfactory for answering the empiricists' position which, due to its own logic, finds it difficult to defend causality beyond a certain point? Strawsonian model takes "mechanical transactions as fundamental in our examination of causality in general". After all what we seek is a "why" of a certain mechanical transaction, i.e. why that particular manifestation occurred, why the type of which it was an instance was then and there realized".28

This question takes us further into the nature of the relationship between the types of substance and types of action and reaction. That there is a link between the notion of substance and action

is evident but, as Strawson points out, it is often missed or underrated due to the influence of Humean theory of Causation,

The conceptual link between the notion of substance and the notion of action is seen through the "characteristic dispositions" substances have to "act or react in certain ways in certain ranges of · circumstances."29 It is a dispositional characteristic of any substance that it acts and reacts. This assumption seems to be fundamental to the empiricists as well as the rationalists despite their differences in their respective understanding of what exactly is the nature of substance. Strawson, in his Individuals has developed this point i.e., of dispositionality of substance concepts in a larger context. There he argues that there are certain basic elements which comprise our conceptual system, These basic elements are material bodies and persons and they are basic amongst objects in general. What makes them basic among all other particulars is that they are directly in space and time and have certain positions and relations in a single spatio-temporal order because of which their identification or reidentification is possible. In the present context of explanation (of action) the general position of Strawson's descriptive metaphysics can be restated. The extension will be something like the following.

Basically, all action is reaction. This follows from the dispositionality of substance concepts. As per the doctrine of dispositionality of substance. "a thing has a disposition to become F in a situation G if it is such, were G to come about, it would become F."30 Thus, it is an outcome which validates dispositions, potentials, powers substances have. Dispositions, as the doctrine of dispositionality states, are realized or manifested in the appropriate circumstances. Categorial properties of substance, on the other hand, are so defined that they are thought to be present in substance despite circumstances. In the history of philosophy and of science it is the argument for the dispositionality of substance which has gained more acceptability than that of the categoriality of certain properties of substance. "The modern physical thinking finds no categorical basis underlying the notions like that of a charge, or a field or a probability wave, that fundamentally characterize things, and which are apparently themselves dispositional"31. The modern physical theory thus prefers the dispositional rather than the categorical (and thereby the atomistic) conception of substance.

1.

d

25

ly

0

21

at

e

n.

ic

e

le

n

e

n

n

This understanding is relevant for our understanding of an issue on hand, namely mechanical transactions as fundamental in our understanding of causality in general. To be more specific. the issue is that of the necessity which causation or the idea of cause claims to have. In the empiricist framework, as the histroy of empiricism tells us, the necessity of causality is explained in terms of the observed regularities in terms of the succession of events. Our concept of necessity is thus rooted in the observed similarities amongst occurrences of the relevant phenomena. But the necessity implicit in the causation has to have an independant theoretical ground than the observed similarities in the relevant phenomena. One possible move in this direction would be to recognize the "thorough going dispositionality of our ordinary pre theoretical concepts of things and their qualities"32. It is with this dispositionality Strawson claims, the 'generality' which is the core of empiricist argument, is already given. But this dispositionality of substance is not available to an atomist-empiricist combine since for them our concepts of things and qualities are analyzable into and alternately constructed out of "wholly non-dispositional concepts (of sense qualities) plus generalizations relating them"33.

On the other hand, our pre-theoretic concepts of substance having dispositions despite all attempts of empiricism, in general, are not so analyzable. Despite analysis, they retain their core. They are thus, "basic conceptual stock; and to think otherwise is to misrepresent us as being theorists before we have the means of theorizing." The means of our theory formation, of our theorizing, are in terms of our notion of substance or, as Strawson puts it in *Individuals* material bodies and persons.

Of such basic-to-theory-concepts, it is necessary that they regularly act and react in certain ways, just as it is necessary that substances are directly in space and time and occupy certain spatial positions and locations in time. "This is the conceptual setting in which dispositionality carries generality within it" is on the setting of this conceptual scheme that observation of regularities, of sequences of similarities among substances having "powers" and "properties" will make sense. The routine empiricist argument fails to recognize the setting in which our notions

of substance and the regularities observed in their motions, are used. That is to say, "mere regularities of succession do not themselves satisfy us that we have found causes." The regularities as such demand something more than their being objects of observation of repeated occurences or similarities of the other form. What is needed when we are seeking explanation is an understanding of the 'inner mechanism' of the regularity which connects two items of the relation. When we are seeking explanation we are seeking how this inner mechanism works. As remarked earlier, such is the full knowledge, a satisfactory explanation. Such an explanation, as stated above, need not be and in fact is not theoretical. It is always intended to be practical.

The general point which emerges then, is "though we do indeed learn much about the operation of causality—through the operation of regularities of succession, we do so because the general notion of causal efficacy and causal response, of effects being brought about in a variety of specific ways, is already lodged with us, is already implicit in a wide range of concepts of things, quality, action and reaction which belong to our basic stock of concepts of observable"³⁷. Kant, as we know, had clearly anticipated the difficulty in explaining causation with its alleged necessity or generality in terms of experential concepts. "Causal efficacy is not derieved from the world of objects, but is a presupposition of it"³⁸.

Causal theories are mapped on the twin notions of mechanical action and physical force. This is the basic model underlying causal theories which seek to explain the relationship between natural phenomena. But what about *Human Action*? Here too, one can think of some primary or even primitive model for explaining human action. It is usually offered in terms of action and motivation. The question, why we are acting the way we do demands both: Causation as well as Explanation. Before one begins to theorize on this, it is natural to suppose that we have immediate causal knowledge of our motivations which are complexes of our desires, and aims which "lead" us to their fulfilment. Is such knowledge intuitive? It seems to be so. That human beings possess this knowledge is a unique fact, a unique feature about human beings i.e. agents who perform certain actions. An agent not only "knows", in this intuitive,

E

re

101

ies

of

ier an

ich

on

ed

on.

act

do

the

the

cts

idy pts

sic

rly

ed

sal

a

cal

ng

en

00,

for on

we

ore

al

ch

10

be

ct.

m

sense of 'know' what are his motivations, what is in his power to introduce or avert, but he also knows that what is within his powers is also within the power of ours. It is in this awareness lies the root of the notion of agency on the one hand and of refinement of the causal theories on the other.

Explanations are sought under the state of ignorance of what induces or causes what. This is our common and immediate understanding of explanations. But they are also sought when we possess a certain amount of knowledge of expected responses or effects but find them not occuring. This paves for a theoretical pressure, a demand for further improvization of theory. The situation seems to be that (i) human beings uniquely possess a pre-theoretic, intuitive knowledge of the types of substance or of natural kinds and of the qualities in respect of which individuals of the same kind differ from one another and this being inseperable from the knowledge of causal propensity and power (ii) this pre-theoritic or intuitive knowledge gets refined so as to possess more and more certainty and predictive power (iii) this process marks the development of science i.e., from the pre-theoretic to the full scale theory. In the process some pressures are generated. Remaining at the level of ordinary observation one can refine one's conception of causation. But the theoretical pressures are greater. What such pressures demand are propositions of greater generality, or propositions stating laws. What the theory demands is an abstraction of particularities and adherence to the terms which a given theory employes as tools of explanation. But the gap remains in this process of abstraction of particularities and our ordinary causal explanations. The question now is : should the gap be bridged or should one recognize the difference of the two domains viz. that of theory and practice.

We find some one falling down the staircase. He misses the steps due to insufficient light or due to oversight etc. and these should count as sufficient explanations for us to know how did he fall. We do not understand his falling in terms of laws which would cover all such cases, though we suppose that there are laws and have bearing upon individual cases. But the formulation of such laws is an activity of a different type, at different level.

392

SHARAD DESHPANDE

But how are laws of a theory established and how are they applied in practice? These questions belong to philosophy of science. What at present, as far as the above argument goes, we need to notice is that the explanations sought and offered at the level at which we employ the common vocabulary of description do not presuppose the existence of general laws and further, in doing so our ordinary language explanations do not turn to be deficient.

Department of Philosophy, Pune University.

SHARAD DESHPANDE

Pune 411 007

NOTES

- 1. Strawson P.F. : Individuals : An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics London, Methuen 1959.
- 2. : Causation and Explanation, Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events, Bruce Vermazen, Merrill Hintikka (ed) OUP, 1986. (Hereinafter C and E)
- 3 to 5 C and E P. 116.
- 6. Mackie J.L. : The Cement of the Universe, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1974, p. 265.
- 7. C and E p. 117
- 8. Ibid, p. 118
- 9. Ibid p. 118
- 10. Davidson, Donald : Causal Relations, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 74, 1967, pp. 691-703
- 11. Tuomelo Raimo : Causes and Deductive Explanation : Proceedings of the 1974 Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association (ed) Cohen. Hooker et. al Reidel Publishing Co. 1976 p. 327
- 12. Loc Cit
- 13. Loc Cit

393

Causation and Explanation

14. C. and E p. 118

15. Loc Cit.

E

re

hy es,

ed

of

nd

ot

E

ve

on ce

6.

on

16. Loc Cit.

17. Ibid. p. 119

18. Ibid. p. 119

19. Loc Cit.

20. Ibid. p.120

21. Ibid. p. 120-1

22. Loc Cit

23. Loc Cit

24. Loc Cit.

25. Loc Cit

26. Ibid. p. 122

27. Ibid. p. 125

28. Loc Cit

29. Loc Cit p. 126

30. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy: 1994 (ed) Simon Blackburn p. 107

31. Ibid p. 108

32. C and E p. 127

33. Loc Cit

34. Loc Cit

35. Loc Cit

36. Ibid. p. 128

37. Loc Cit

38. Loc Cit.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Life Members (Individual)

- 333. Nilesh N. Dalal112/5348 Pant Nagar,Ram Narayan Narkar Marg,Ghatkopar, Bombay 400 075.
- 334. Prof. R. C. Sinha
 Head, Philosophy Department,
 B.N. College, Patna University,
 PATNA 800 005 (Bihar).
- 335. Prof. Praveen Sharma,98 Vijay Nagar,Jalandhar City 144 008 (Punjab).
- 336. Prof. Mishra Binapani, IVB Quarters, Nl. 27/2 Unit 3, Bhubaneshwar 751 001 (Orissa).
- 337. Shri. Kiran Desai Centre for Social Studies, P.O. Box No. 69 Nanpura, SURAT 395 001 (Gujarat).
- 338. Prof. M. K. Mohanty
 Philosophy Department
 Delhi University,
 Delhi 110 007.
- 339. Shri. Laxmikant V. Bansod Near Parmartha Mandir, Panchpakhadi, Thane 400 602.
- 340. Fr. George Mathew Professor of Philosophy Sadupdesa College 281, Hennur Road, P.O. St. Thomas Town, Bangalore 560 084.

Institutional Permanent members

52. Institute of Management Development and Research Fergusson College Campus, Pune 411 004.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR RAJENDRA PRASAD ON VALUE EDUCATION: SOME REFLECTIONS

Readers of the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* do remember that Professor Rajendra Prasad's thought provoking article entitled "Philosophy, Education and the Quality of Life" was published in this journal in Volume XXI, No.2, April 1994. Subsequently in Vol.XXII, No.2, April 1995 of the same journal two reactions on this article have appeared under the titles: "Professor Rajendra Prasad on Philosophy, Education and the Quality of Life: Some observations" by Dr. Abul Kasem and "Value Education" by Prof. N. Malla. I want to add a few of my observations in this regard.

I have divided my reaction into two sections. In the first section I have made certain observations on Education and the Quality of Life, considering the views of Prof. Rajendra Prasad on this issue. In the second section, I have made certain remarks on the papers of the Late Dr. Kasem and Prof. Malla who commented on the paper of Prof. Prasad.

T

Prof. Prasad argues that the role of philosophers is very much relevant to the present day world. Their relevance consists of solving some of the social issues. In the opinion of Prof. Prasad, philosophers should concentrate on some current social issues; their discussion should attract the peoples' attention to create public opinion. Philosophy being a cognitive inquiry, a philosopher could exhibit his philosophical interest by logically analysing the issues of social importance. Citing some issues of social relevance, Prof. Prasad mentions those of reservation of jobs and in enrolment in academic institutions, secularism verses religious commitment, social responsibility of intellectuals.

professional verses general morality, the social role of education as an inculcator of values etc.

Referring to the collapse of values in Education Prof. Prasad writes: "...One hears almost everyday of a *student* having used unfair means in an examination with a revolver in his under pocket; of a *teacher* having helped him with the materials to copy from or having manoeuvred his own doctorate by giving, directly or indirectly illegal gratification to his supervisor or to the examiners;...".

The foremost elements of Education are (1) Educator (Teacher) and (2) Educatee (student), (3) parents and (4) Management. Let us consider in this context the responsibilities of these four factors in maintaining the quality of education.

A teacher has to make himself busy with teaching and research. Unless one is a good researcher one cannot be a good teacher. So a teacher has to keep himself abreast of the latest research areas to make teaching effective. Teachers should maintain standards of education. They should not encourage copying in the examinations. In order to achieve the credit of producing degrees, research supervisors should not resort to cheap techinques such as allowing the students to copy theses from standard books. This kind of practice may allow a teacher to produce a research degree, but it diminishes the standards of education and damages the character of students. If students resort to copying and get degrees, without any hard work, they will be easily exposed and failed in the interviews.

Prof. Prasad criticises the teachers who write and publish cheap guides in the place of text books. He aptly says that "Writing or publishing a cheap help book, which makes serious study unnecessary, is as abominable as, and perhaps more than, inventing, or manufacturing, an instantly energizing drug which makes health care dispensable. The former damages the thinking ability of its reader and the latter some vital organ of its consumer". If cheap guide books are available no student desires to study texts because studying a guide makes his task easy rather than studying a text. But a student should be aware of the fact that studying a text makes him a better knowledgeable person than studying a guide.

D

n

ad

ed

er

to

ıg,

to

er) nt.

ш

nd

od est

in in

ng

es

S.

ch

es

ed

sh

at

us m,

ch

ng

12

an

ct

11(

Similarly preparing the examination by studying the notes, dictated by the teacher makes the student dull and poor in his subjects. So the teacher should stop dictating notes to his students. If a student prepares his own notes by consulting different books in the library, he will have a better hold on his subject rather than getting by heart the notes prepared by the teachers and mechanically reproducing in the examinations. So the teacher should not dictate notes in the class rooms, specially in the undergraduate and post graduate classes. On the other hand the teacher should thoroughly discuss the problems in class and see that the student will participate in such discussions.

It is the duty of a student to work hard to maintain the quality of education. Students should make use of the facilities, provided to them such as the scholarships by different Educational bodies. Unfortuntely some of the students enjoy the scholarships without attending classes. As the required attendence is linked with the sanctioning of scholarships, they used to get their attendence certificates, threatening the Heads of the Departments and Institutions. Consequently they do not score good marks as they seldom attend the classes. Moreover they resort to all violent methods to get higher marks and ranks. They go on strikes and force the management to close down the institutions. The foremost duty of students is to stop these unwholesome attitude. If they care for their studies, they can score good marks and ranks without resorting to any foul methods.

Parents also have a crucial role in maintaining the educational values. A student spends only few hours in his educational institution whereas he spends more time in his home. Home is the first school of a child and his parents are the first teachers. It is the fundamental duty of the parents to mould their children in proper way.

'Management' is another important element of the educational system. As it is the liaison body between the teacher and the student, it has to care for the welfare of these two sections. Unfortunately the management of most of the private institutions aim only at exorbitant fee collection. They never bother to improve the quality of education.

In these days it is a fashion to talk about job oriented

education, ignoring its values. Most of the present day students wish to become either engineers or doctors. Their parents also encourage such courses through paying heavy donations. They even discourage their children to study the arts subjects like Philosophy, religion and culture. It is true that a study of professional courses offer them better jobs. But more than jobs, one's education should train a student for better (ethical) living. One's education may make a person an engineer or a doctor. But what is wanted is that one should first learn how to live as a good human being. So values are more important than the type of job that one holds in society. If we take into consideration the values, the subjects like philosophy, religion and culture are preferable to the science and technological subjects. Science and technology may help for the material advancement of man, but they cannot help for his 'ethical' advancement and 'spiritual' enlightenment Bertrand Russell rightly remarks that while the physical and biological sciences offer the goods of the body, philosophy offers the goods of the mind.3 Will Durant observes that through the medical advancement and researches science may save the lives of people in retail but it kills people wholesale through its dreadful weapons of war.4 To put it in a nutshell values are more important than the material and technological advancements.

Some of the internal values of Education, as Prof. Prasad mentioned are: "respecting a fellow student because of his being a fellow student and not because of his parents' social or economic status, elegance in behaviour inside (and outside) the school, law-abidingness, punctuality, cooperativeness, i.e., sharing benefits and burdens with others and consequent entailment of inordinate self-interest, commitment to complete an assignment in time, pride in academic exellence, ...etc". The value of Education consists not in the accumulation of mere bookish knowledge but in learning manners. Prof. Prasad has rightly said: "the value of discipline inculcated by an educatee may be exhibited, in later life, in his disposition to stand in a queue at the railway booking counter, or in talking gracefully with his superior who has taken a hurtful but just action against him".6

П

In the following lines I will take up certain points for

Value Education : Some Reflections

D

06

y

ce

n

on ed

an

at es,

le

gy

ot

nt.

ds

cal ole

ns

int

ad

ng

nic

ol.

its

ate

de

sts

ng

ne

in

er, ful

or

399

discussion from the paper of the late Dr. Abul Kasem who commented on Prof. Prasad's paper.

In the course of his paper Dr. Kasem remarked: "we are simply engrossed in asserting and reasserting some stale philosophical theories already propounded either in the East or in the West as purely intellectual exercise for name, fame and fortune... our philosophical activity does not reflect our life. Rather it is totally divorced from social reality and has become the monopoly of a group of so-called intellectuals".

But I sincerely feel that the philosophical theories cannot he brushed aside by arguing that they are irrelevant to the present day world. The metaphysical and ethical questions posed by the philosophers since the dawn of philosophical inquiry are the need of the hour. In the present day and age we witness violence and bloodshed in the name of religion, community and nationality. Religious tolerance and moral living are not valued any more. People cheat and kill their fellow beings for selfish ends and religious fanaticism. At this juncture the questions of God, religion and morality, raised by the philosophers since ages, are very relevant. Being fed up with the mundane matters, the ancient philosophers raised the questions of 'values'. They opined that man should live for certain higher values. Of the four values, namely 'dharma', 'artha', 'kama', and 'moksa' accepted in Indian philosophy, 'artha' and 'kama' are considered lower values while 'dharma' and 'moksa' are higher values whereas moksa is considered the highest value. Socrates' criticism of the Sophists is again an inquiry into higher values of life. While the Sophists considered 'wealth' and 'power' as virtues, Socrates considered them as inferior to knowledge. Socratic ethics consists in the idea that 'virtue is identical with knowledge'. The issues raised in the ancient philosophical thought, Eastern as well as Western, are very much relevant to the present day society wherein the moral values are fast diminishing.

Referring to the degeneration of values in Education Dr. Kasem wrote that Ph.D., degrees are sold for cash or kind.⁸ I agree with Dr. Kasem who opines that standard of Ph.D. degree in the universities is not satisfactory. But I want to add that the very rules framed in universities have an important

role in the degeneration of the standard of Ph.D. degrees. Some universities insist that at least one of the adjudicaters must be a foreigner whereas other universities don't have such stipulation. It is needless to say that it is not difficult to get a Ph.D. degree if one registers his work in a university where foreign examiner's adjudication is not insisted. The student generally prefers the easy way. My intention is not to be-little the adjudication of Indian examiners. What I want to focus is that when all the Indian universities have UGC a guiding body they should follow the common but stringent rules and regulations for awarding Ph.D. degrees. That will help in maintaining the quality of research in Indian Universities.

Now I will consider Prof. Malla's comments on Prof. Prasad's paper. Prof. Malla writes that Prof. Prasad's paper gave an impression that if teaching is done in a disciplined manner, things will automatically change; but he differs with Prof. Prasad on this point. The intellecuals, Prof. Malla writes "have to perform the role of the activist along with performance of their normal academic duties" they have to adopt the "non-violent act of protest against injustice, corruption and malpractices".

But I think that Prof. Malla's contradiction with Prof. Prasad is not justifiable. Prof. Prasad wrote in the very beginning of his essay that he shall limit himself "to discussing primarily, or almost exclusively, the role of formal education" The kind of 'activism' that the intellectuals have to play apart from their normal academic duties, is not discussed in detail by Prof. Prasad as it is out of the scope of his paper. But this does not mean that Prof. Prasad is against any non-violent 'activism' of the intellectuals against injustice. In fact Prof. Prasad has implicity suggested this when he said that philosophers have to participate in social activities and organise "a movement to protest against deforestation, or against rigging in political elections".

To sum up I agree with Prof. Prasad, when he contends that philosophers should aim at solving some of the socially relevant issues through their active participation. I agree with his views on the collapse of values in eduction and the need to bring back them. I also agree with the discussion of Prof.

Value Education: Some Reflections

D

le

n.

ξn

rs

on

all Id

ng ch

l's

on ill

is

he

nic nst

ad

of

ly, nd

eir

ad

an · he

ity ite ist

ds ly th ed of.

401

Abdul Kasem and Prof. Malla on Prof. Prasad's paper but for a few points as explained above.

Sri Venkateswara University, B. SAMBASIVA PRASAD Tirupati,
Andhra Pradesh.

NOTES

- 1. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.XXI. No.2. April. 1994. p.103
- 2. Ibid., pp. 109-110
- 3. Bertrand Russell. Problems of Philosophy, p. 154
- 4. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy. p. XXVII
- 5. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No.2. April 94. p. 111.
- 6. Ibid., p. 115.
- 7. Ibid., Vol. XXII. No.2. April. 1995. p. 170.
- 8. Ibid.,
- 9. Ibid., p. 177.
- 10. Ibid., 178.
- 11. Ibid.,
- 12. Ibid., Vol. XXI. No.2. April 94. p. 102.
- 13. *Ibid.*; p. 100.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

We publish herebelow a letter received from Prof. A. N. Aklujkar, Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada V6 T 1Z2, in the context of the Review of the Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari, published in the IPQ, January 1994 Issue (Vol. XXI, No.1). With the publication of the reactions of Prof. Johannes Bronkhorst and Prof. S. S. Barlingay to the said review, in IPQ, July 1994 Issue (Vol. XXI. No. 3), the matter was treated almost as closed then and there. We however publish the letter received from Prof. Aklujkar only in order to extend to him an opportunity to clarify a couple of points that concern himself in the context of the Review. The Editors would like to make clear that with the publication of this letter, the matter has been how treated as finally closed, and that no further correspondence will be entertained.

Chief Editor

Sirs,

The review, published in *IPQ* January 1994 issue (Vol. XXI, No.1), of *Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari* is unfair and imbalanced. The reviewer Dr. J. Ouseparampil has clearly not read the publication with a philosophical temparament or pure scholarly motivation. One cannot avoid the impression that he has a personal score to settle (at least) with the editors of the volume he was asked to review. Even the English expression of the review conveys an agitated mind, which, to make the matters worse, seems to have made an entirely unfounded assumption that it alone has grasped the 'issues' in Bhartrhari's Philosophy.

Dr. Ouseparampil tells his readers that I have not taken into account, at all, Bhartrhari's theory of meaning in my Ph.D. dissertation *The Philosophy of Bhartrhari's Trikandi*. First of all, my dissertation is a subject of minor mention in the *Proceedings* he has been asked to review. So a relatively long discussion of it is irrelevant. Secondly, the longest chapter in my dissertation happens to be 'Meaning'. This one example should suffice to establish that it would not be a good use of one's time and energy to respond to the details of Dr. Ouseparampil's review.

One wrong impression that the review is likely to cause, however, should be corrected. I should receive no part of the credit for organizing the Conference and editing its Proceeding. All or most of the essential hard work was done by Professors Johannes Bronkhorst and Saroja Bhate, and, as far as I can judge from the reaction of the attendees and of the specialists who have read the *Proceedings*, it was done very well. Beyond contributing two papers, I played no special role.

14th July 1994, Vancouver, Canada.

ıl.

r.
th
n.
al
ne
of
ne
ed
's

Prof. A. N. Aklujkar

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

- 1. Ahsen, Akhter, Ganesh: Invocation and Commentary on Consciousness, New Delhi, Virgo Publications, 1995. Also published by Brandon House, Inc. New York, 1995.
- 2. Andler, Daniel and Banerjee, Parthsarthi and Chaudhari Mahashweta and Guilllawne, Oliver (editors); Facets of Rationality, New Delhi, Sage Publications India Pyt. Ltd., 1995.
- 3. Bahm, Archie J.; Epistemology- A Theory of Knowledge, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87106-3805, 1995.
- 4. Chahal, Dr. Surjeet Kaur; Environment and the Moral Life, New Delhi, Ashish Publishing House, 1994.
- 5. Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar: Definition and Induction: A Historical And Comparative Study, Honolulu, Uni. of Hawai Press, 1995.
- 6. Gupta, R. K.; Social Action and Non-Violence, New Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995.
- 7. Jhanji, Rekha; *Human Condition in the Mahabharata*, Shimla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1995.
- 8. Jhingran, Saral; Secularism in India, New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 1995.
- 9. Kaipayil, Joseph: The Epistemology of Comparative Philosophy:

 A Critique with Reference of P.T. Raju's Views, Rome,
 Centre For Indian & Inter-religious Studies, 1995.
- 10. Liynan, Zhu and Blocker, Gene (ed.); Contemporary Chinese Aesthetics, New York, Peter Lang Publishing Inc. 1995
- 11. Nayak, G. C.; Philosophical Enterprise and the Scientific Spirit, Delhi, Ajanta Publications, 1994.
- 12. Sen, P. K. and Verma, Roop Rekha (eds.)

 The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, New Delhi, Indian Council
 of Philosophical Research, 1995.

- 13. Srinivasan G.; *Insights into Inward Consciousness*, New Delhi, Indian Council of Philo. Research, 1994.
- 14. Sharma, Arvind; *The Philosophy of Religion : A Buddhist Perspective*, Bombay, Oxiford Univesity Press, 1995.
- 15. Tandon, Alok; Man and his Destiny with Special Reference to Marx and Sartre, New Delhi, Indus Publishing Co., 1994.

b-

la

W

e.

W

al ss.

an

a,

ıd

e,

se

it,

il

- 16. Yadaw, Sabhajeet S.; Prescriptivism as an Ethical Theory A Study in the Philosophy of R. M. Hare, Varanasi, Sanjay Book Centre, 1994.
- 17. Sankarnarayanan S., Sri Sankara: His Life, Philosophy And Relevance to Man in Modern Times, Madras, The Adyar library & Research Centre, 1995.

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Volume XXII

Number 1, January, 1995		Page	No.
N. S. Dravid	:	Anomalies of the Nyāya- Vaisesika Concept of Self	1
Kolawale Owolabi		Edmund Husserl's Rehabilitation of Cartesian Foundationalism : A Critical Analysis	13
A. R. Kelkar	:	Language as Empowerment	25
P. P. Gokhale		Is there a Moral Perspective in Patanjali's Yogasutra?	41
Patiraj R.	:	The Sphota Doctrine of Bhartrhari	67
Number 2, April, 1995		Page	e No.
Rajni Srivastav		Macpherson's Theory of Democracy	81
R. P. Singh	:	Hegelianism: Post-modernists' Charges Refuted	95
Warren A. Shibles		Association Theory of Meaning: A Reconstruction of the Literature	105
S. Panneerselvam		Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory of Discourse	123
Albert W.J.H.		Arts and Ontology	133
A. B. Randeria		It is the Judging that Matters	141
Arnold Kruger	:	Mahatma Gandhi : Hindu Evangelical and Puritan?	159
Abul Kasem	:	Professor Rajendra Prasad on Philosophy, Education and the Quality of Life: Some	169
N Malla		Observations Value Education	175

Number 3, July, 1995		Page	No.
Avinash Vagh	:	Aristotle on Magnanimity	181
N. S. Dravid		Negation and Negative Fact in Western and Indian Logic	197
Md. Abdur Razzaque		Linguistic Solipsism : A Defense	207
G. C. Nayak		Are Jeevanmukta and Bodhisattva Ideals Asymmetrical?	215
D. M. Praharaj	•	Speech-Acts : As Linguistic Communicative Function	225
Muhammad Kamal		Heidegger's Concept of the World	239
Ahmed Jama Anwer		Some Approaches to the Problem of Induction	247
Number 4, October, 1995		Page	e No.
J. K. Barthakur		A Theory of Time	271
Bina Gupta	•	Samkara's Notion of Sāksin: Its Anticipations in Upanisads and Gaudapāda	291
Tirthanath Bandyopadhyay	·:	Fallibilism and Putnam	313
Rajendra Prasad		Morality to Override Religion Working Out a Lead from Swami Vivekananda	327
Madhu T. V.	•	Althusser's Conception of Ideology: A Critical Exposition	339
R. Sundara Rajan'		Philosophy as Geo-Philia: Towards the Recovery of the Idea of the Earth	353
Sharad Deshpande	•	Causation, Explanation and Understanding	373
B. Sambasiva Prasad		Value Education	395

0.

3 1 9

ngkar sairandaga (1900). Sairandaga kang yang

Indian Philosophical Quarterly

VOL XXII NUMBER 4	(STUDEN	CONTENTS TS' SUPPLEMENT)	October 1995
Pallavi Vaid		The Absolute Conception of Reality: Reflections of Bernard Williams' View	on
Anthony Savari F	Raj L. :	Metaphysical Foundatio of Teilhard de Chardin's Thought	ns 11

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4 Oct., 1995

THE ABSOLUTE CONCEPTION OF REALITY: REFLECTIONS ON BERNARD WILLIAMS' VIEW

Williams maintains a distinction between the idea of the wrold as it seems to us, and that of the world as it really is. The contrast implies two possibilities: Perspectival knowledge, which is about the wrold as it seems to us, and non-perspectival knowledge, which would be about the world as it actually is. He writes:

"In reflecting on the world that is there anyway, independent of our experience we must concentrate not in the first instance on what our beliefs are about, but on how they represent what they are about. We can select among our beliefs and features of our world picture some that we can reasonably claim to represent the world in a way to the maximum degree independent of our perspective and its peculiarities".

and

"the idea of the wrold as it really is involves at least a contrast with that of the world as it seems to us... the world as it really is, is contrasted with the world as it peculiarly seems to any observer. In using these notions, we are implying that there can be a conception of reality corrected for the special situation or other peculiarity of various observers, and that line of thought leads eventually to a conception of the world as it is independently of the peculiarties of any observers. That, surely, must be identical with a conception which, if we are not idealists, we need: a conception of the world as it is independently of all observers."

Thus our knowledge of the real world would be "non-perspectival" in not being affected by the "peculiarities" of the observers and would be indicated in the "absolute conception of the world" desired by realists like Williams. A complete, convergent account of the world can be attempted using terms for primary qualities alone³.

The absolute conception of the world is basic to Williams' notion of non-perspectival (human) knowledge. "It is implicit in our idea of knowledge that such a conception should be possible and that it should have a determinate content⁴. Such a conception would lay bare the nature of a reality which exists independent of all observers: it alone can explain why the various individual conceptions differ and how they are related to one another. We can claim to "know" (in Williams' special sense of 'knowledge') reality only by "overcoming any systematic bias or distortion or partiality in our outlook as a whole, in our representations of the world"5. Ordinary human knowledge is person-relative, and hence considered indeterminate and contestable The absolute conception alone, for Williams, can be a source of knowledge which does not suffer from such indeterminancy; for it would refer to a reality which exists anyway, something whose determinate, convergent understanding is possible. But, will this knowledge also not remain 'perspectival'? Williams clarifies:" There is no suggestion that we should try to describe a world without ourselves using any concepts, or without using concepts that we, human beings, can understand. The suggestion is that there are possible descriptions of the world using concepts which are not peculiarly ours and not peculiarly relative to our experience"6.

In Descartes' progoramme of pure enquiry, certainty was an important end of scientific enquiry: he was interested in achieving certainty of the truth of the beliefs forming the so-called absolute conception. Williams however maintains that the search for an absolute conception does not involve a search for certainty. He preserves the Cartesian connection between the possibility of an absolute conception and the possibility of knowledge, without preserving the connection with the demand for certainty. Williams would say that the supposed connection makes no sense once the indeterminacy of the mental is recognized. The notion of psychological certainty is as illusory as the idea that the psychological has a fully determinate content. "We may for recognizable reasons know more, each of us, about what we want or believe or intend that others know, but there is nothing in the inner life to give us answers to these questions which are indubitable. When we give interpretations in terms of belief, desire and intention, it is possible that we should be confronted by alternative and conflicting schemata of interpretation, and alternative and conflicting shemata of interpretation, and the

3

choice between them be underdetermined by the facts".7

On the basis of the indeterminacy thesis and its related ideas Williams can show that the notion of an absolute conception and the notion of certainty (of the truth of beliefs forming the conception) are logically independent, that certainty in science is a myth and is an obstacle to its actual aim viz., contributing to the unending process of scientific progress, and also that success in forming an absolute conception would not mean the completion of scientific enquiry.

This, however, does not mean that the enquirer does not want to be certain about the truth-value of his beliefs. Wanting to be certain in this sense does not entail wanting to end scientific enquiry. Detaching the demand for an absolute conception from the demand for certainty would mean that the enquirers are unable to say that their beliefs regarding the physical world are true within their conceptual framework. (There is no hope of overcoming relativism, whatever description is attempted it would be relative to a method and a conceptual framework). The enquirers can come to recognize whether or not the beliefs forming the absolute conception are true, for if the truthvalue of their beliefs is not decided how would knowledge of the world be possible, and how would convergence in science be possible? The possibility of convergence in science or the lack of it, would be evident only on deciding and claiming the certainty of the truth of their belief. So the project for an absolute conception does involve an interest in certainty but this interest is different from the interest in finality which does not acknowledge the contingency of the human situation/world. As Williams himself says of the Cartesian enquirer: "(He) is committed to being correct, not to being omniscient: he wants (ideally) all his beliefs to be true, not (even ideally) to believe all truths"8. When the nature of the physical world has been beleived to be determinate and for that reason the project of giving an absolute description of the world has been conceived of, then why should correctness/certainty about beliefs not be possible, and why should one deny that this project involves a desire for certainty?

Williams points to two different paradigms of privacy with regard to the mental. The case of bodily pain where the contrast between the situations of the subject and of the observer is shown by the difference between 'being in pain' or 'experiencing it personally' and 'believing that someone else is in pain'. In the case of thought the

contrast centres on the point that overt expression of the thought depends on the thinker: it depends on his will whether or not he declares his thought. "The contrast between having the thought and thinking about someone else's having it is less dramatic and can vanish. It totally vanishes where the thought is entirely verbal, and the one who conceives it has a thought with exactly the same verbal content". For example, the statement 'the sun is shining'. In this case all the activities-thinking, speaking, hearing and understanding are homogeneous in their content. One can say that "if A's thought is just these words then we can be given the words, and being given them we shall be given his thought just to the extent that the meanings we all ascribe to those words are determinate" 10.

But in the case of a thought which is not entirely verbal the content of the speaker's thought may differ from that of the hearer's understanding e.g., 'that rose is red'- this is a thought which is based on the sensation of 'red' at some previous point of time. If sameness of the content of experience is not possible in the case of the sensation (e.g., the colour 'red') it is also not possible in the case of the thought (e.g., 'that rose is red'). Thus in the case of statements wherein the speaker's thought and the hearer's understanding may vary, the meaning of the words used to express the thought may be said to be indeterminate. The indeterminacy of the word 'red' would mean that it is understood in a variety of senses, say, r₁, r₂, r₃, etc. (thus signifying the various possible shades of the colour 'red'). The possibility that the word 'red' reminds you of the shade r, whereas I am reminded of r2, does not mean that I deny that r₁ is an instance of 'red'. This analysis shows clearly that the psychological is engaged in the physical; yet it does not have uniform describable nature. We do experience and observe things differently. Yet the variance of perception is no disqualification for one's knowledge being effective. For it does not suggest that the various perceivers/thinkers who think and feel differently, are not capable of knowledge. If I am thinking correctly then this point goes against Williams' belief that the psychological fails to be a candidate for knowledge because it lacks the objectivity that is possible in the case of the physical world.

For Williams, the knowledge generated by a non-absolute conception would not count as 'knowledge' for it may not have overcome the limitations/biases of the enquirer whose conception it is. It seems as if Williams would consider the knowledge generated by an absolute

conception to be infallible for it he recognized the fallibility of all human knowledge he would not claim that the possibility of knowledge depends on the possibility of an absolute conception. Accepting the fallibility of human knowledge entails accepting that ordinary conceptions of the world can in principle generate knowledge of the world (even though such knowledge is fallible) and that there is no need for an "absolute" conception.

If an absolute conception is still considered desirable for the purpose of "improving the truth ratio" of one's beliefs about the world, it would have to be explained how to distinguish between an absolute conception and the various non-absolute conceptions using only the terms for primary qualities. The infallibility of beliefs is not being sought, Williams would say, hence the distinction will not be in terms of the supposed infallibility of beliefs forming an absolute conception and the fallibility of beliefs forming the ordinary conception. Perhaps the distinction may be expressed in terms of the possibility of convergence. In the case of an ordinary conception convergence may occur but this agreement would be between enquirers with the same outlook, and there may be another enquirer who does not share that outlook, whereas "the absolute conception will be a conception of the world that might be arrived at by any investigators, even if they were very different from us"12 because convergence has been guided by how things actually are and also because the enquirers share the aim of undercutting every conceivable source of error. The attempt to avoid error would provide legitimacy to the beliefs forming the absolute conception. So the difference between ordinary conceptions using only the terms of primary qualities and the absolute conception would be that in the case of the former sufficient attention may not have been paid to the project of overcoming error, and thus the enquirer does not feel certain about the truth-status of his beliefs.

Even if the motivation behind the search for an absolute conception is simply increasing the truth-ratio of our beliefs why not see this effort as part of the everyday urge to know the world we live in? Why consider the proposed absolute conception to be different from the everyday conception of knowledge thereby suggesting that it is qualitatively superior to ordinary human knowledge? The only resaon for doing this could be that it seeks certainty against doubt, error etc. Thus if the search for certainty is only one approach to acquiring such a conception, as Williams thinks¹³, and if the project can be

successfully completed even without the ambition of trying to set aside limitations that obstruct enquiry the resultant conception would be epistemically different from the ordinary conception of knowledge. It would not be 'absolute' in any sense.

Thus far I have been discussing the role of the notion of certainty in forming an absolute conception. I shall now concern myself with realism which is fundamental to the project of an absolute conception. Like Descartes, Williams is committed to realism, and "to an absolute comception of the world which includes a conception of matter given by a realistic physical science"14. He observes: "It can even be said. I think, that my view which loses touch with realism in these matters is more deeply opposed to the Cartesian outlook than any which retains the realist conception even if that latter abandons all the characteristic Cartesian beliefs in God, in dualism and in the search for certainty"15. Williams shares the realist view that our beliefs about the physical world are caused by "some external permanency, by something upon which our thinking has no effect?16. He talks of the contingencies of the social world¹⁷. The notion of contingency goes well with his version of (ethical) relativism. And this notion may be applied to the physical world also i.e., one can ask, despite being a realist, whether or not the physical world is permanent?

Williams conceives of a world without observers, a world which is unaffected by the peculiarities of the observers and which may be described completely in terms of the primary qualities alone. But are human beings not a part of the real world? If the indeterminacy of the mental forces their exclusion from the object of enquiry, the physicality of the observers warrants their inclusion in it. Williams recognizes the need to extend the conception so as to place consciousness within the world which is to be described. "The experiences themselves, the tastes and interests... do actually exist, are something in the world".

The extended conception would work as a theory of knowledge and of error. As a theory of knowledge it would describe the world without observers, and as a theory of error it would explain how the local representations of the world arise, relate them to each other, and to the world as it is independently of them. Even in the extended conception the role of observers would be discussed only while explaining how the non-absolute conceptions become possible, and not in the description of the world as it actually is. It would still

The Absolute Conception of Reality

not recognize that there is no real world without language¹⁹. The proposed conception would try to establish a separation which is not possible: the world as it really is, being identified with the world without *observers*, and the world with observers identified with 'the world as it seems to us'.

Even if one could think of a world without observers the question of the temporality of the world could definitely arise. One need not suggest that it is the observer who raises such questions because of his reflective nature, and that in a description of the world without observers the question of permanence would not be relevant. For the fact is that whether or not we think of this possibility the world remains a physical, temporal thing which may or may not perish. If it lacks permanence it does so even when we do not question its permanence just as it is in fact extended whether or not we believe that it is extended.

In an account of the world with observers the permanence of the world is a question based upon a fact about the wrold; its temporal nature. And in an account of the world without observers also²⁰ its permanence/impermanence is a possibility which needs to be mentioned. We need to consider this possibility for we are aware of its temporal nature. Since it is not known which of the two possibilities is a fact the idea may appear in the form of a doubt e.g., 'either the wrold is permanent or it is impermanent'. One cannot, in order to end the doubt, say that it is e.g., impermanent because this suggestion would be only a perspective which may be disagreed with. There are two difficulties here.

- (a) Since the absolute description of the world would be a knowledge claim how can it include doubts such as 'either it is p or not P? But the description would have to include it otherwise it would be an incomplete account of facts about the physical world.
- (b) The statement 'either it is p or not p' is not an instance of covergence amongst the enquirers. It is an instance... of something which is doubtful and indefinite. Thus it seems that the conception, even it it could be attempted, would not have a fully determinate content even though it describes the physical which, for Williams, can be an object of determinate knowledge. Questions such as the

8

PALLAVI VAID

question of permanence, would have a place in an absolute conception which is meant to generate knowledge of the physical world.

The upshot of the argument is this: the starting point of the project need not be realism as it is traditionally understood. Being a realist means accepting that there is a world out there independently of all observers, and accepting that there is such a world presupposes having answered the question of permanence in the affirmative. So it is only a realist who can think of the possibility of an absolute conception of reality and in such a conception the dilemma of 'contingency' makes no sense. (An idealist would not embark upon such a project).

This would be the response of a realist like Williams. For Williams, the world as it really is, is not an inaccessible thing-in-itself the nature of which cannot be known. But if it is possible that there is a world which exists even when the individuals in the world do not perceive it and even when they do not exist at all it is equally possible that there is a time when the world itself does not exist. If the 'observers' who are so very real can perish the world which is physically real may also at some point of time cease to exist. This is another version of realism: it rejects the position that no universe can exist apart from our knowledge of it yet it claims that there may be a part of its nature which is inaccessible to us or which cannot be decided beforehand. Thus the question of contingency is still alive for the realist and yet he may want to form an absolute conception of reality.

One may grant that the various enquirers can in principle converge upon a scientific description of the world. Yet some of the enquirers may not be realists in the typical sense and may want the question of contingency to feature in an absolute conception. Since the world-view of the enquirers can differ slightly the content that each may want to give to the proposed conception may also vary i.e. it may not be a consensual account. Unless there is a consensus on the frame work within which the enguiry is conducted the enquirers cannot claim e.g., 'we know this description to be true'21. The use of the word "we" would indicate the presence of general agreement. Hence the starting-point of the enquiry viz., the belief in realism, itself is not unproblematic. The premise from which the attempt to know the world begins, is not a case of achieved convergence, as Williams seems

to think. It is odd that a philosopher who thinks that it would be a mistake to state ethical principles in absolute term and that the contingencies of life need to serve as the backdrop for formulating ethical principles tends to neglect altogether the question of the contingency of the physical world in the attempt to know the world as it actually is. The question of the contingency of the physical world is to be seen not as a metaphysical but as a scientific question, as a part of the enterprise of discovering facts about the world. The nature of the world is a major problem confronting the scientist. Of the two major claims that the realist makes about the world: that there is something external, and that it is permanent, I have argued that accepting realism in the first sense need not involve supporting realism in the second sense. The scientific enquirer engaged in the programme of an absolute conception may question the belief in the permanence of the world and thereby suggest the possibility of distinguishing between (a) relaism which maintains that the world is external to and independent of the thinking mind and (b) realism which presupposes (without examination) this external entity to be permanent also.

PALLAVI VAID

Department of Philosophy, Delhi University, Delhi-110007

NOTES

- Bernard Williams. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985, pp. 138-139.
- Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Projet of Pure Enquiry, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1978, p. 241.
- 3. Ibid., pp. 241-242. Williams writes: "There is every reason to think that such a conception should leave out secondary qualities... In understanding even sketchily, at general and reflective level, why things appear variously coloured to various observers, we shall find that we have left behind any idea that they 'really' have one colour rather than another. In thinking of these explanations, we are in fact using a conception in which colour does not figure at all as a quality of things".
 - 4. Op. cit., p. 211.

10

PALLAVI VAID

- 5. · Op. cit., p. 66.
- 6. Op. cit., p. 244.
- 7. Op. cit., p. 299-300.
- 8. Op. cit., p. 46.
- 9. Op. cit., p. 298.
- 10. Op. cit., p. 298.
- 11. Op. cit., p. 49.
- 12. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Op. cit., p. 139.
- 13. Williams. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enguiry. p. 67.
- 14. Ibid., p. 249.
- 15. Op. cit., p. 249.
- 16. Op. cit., p. 248.
- 17. Williams, Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press. 1981.
- 18. Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. p. 245.
- 19. Cf., Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, Harvard University Press, 1992. He writes: "To try to divide the world into a part that is independent of us and a part that is contributed by us is an old temptation, but giving in to it leads to disaster every time". p. 58.
- 20. Cf., Karl Popper, Ojbective Knowledge, Oxford, 1973, pp. 106-109. Popper enumerates three worlds: the world of physical objects, the world of mental states, and the world of objective contents of thought. Scientific knowledge belongs to the third world—the world of objective theories, problems or arguments. Williams would say that the Popperian first world is a world without observers, and that the world of observers interacts with the first world. Popper speaks of knowledge in the objective sense i.e., knowledge which is independent of anybody's knowledgeclaim, belief or assertion e.g., a scientific problem as such. The nonperspectival knowledge that Williams is interested in, however, would not be knowledge without a knowing-subject. It does involve an enquirer yet is meant to be free of all those personal influences (e.g., one's experience of a secondary quality like 'colour') which may impede proper description of the world. Thus, for Williams, knowledge is not observerless but the reality that such knowledge refers to, is seen to be a reality without observers.
- 21. Cf., G.E. Moore, 'A Defence of Common Sense' in Contemporary, British Philosophy (Second Series), ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: Allen & Unwin), 1925; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1969.

Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXII, No. 4
Oct., 1995

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN'S THOUGHT

The present eassy has a two-fold objective: First, to bring out Teilhard's guiding ideas in a coherent form and thus to establish his metaphysical position, and secondly, to compare and evluate his philosophy with the fundamental thoughts on which it is based. It presupposes that Teilhard is not an academic philosopher and a metaphyscian in the full sense of the term. He is primarily a christian-scientist, guided by a specific vision. Nevertheless as he has certian underlying thoughts, one may try to piece together Teilhard's idea and try to discover whether they are based on certain metaphysical grounds. To this end, let us first of all consider the essential components of his thought.

1. THE ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF HIS THOUGHT

The complexity of Telihard's thought makes the task of summarizing it a difficult one. Nevertheless, it is not all that difficult since he himself summarises his fundamental ideas, under the chapter 'My Fundamental Vision' in his book *Toward the Future*.

What Teilhard, desires is a coherent explanation of the universe, one that will take everything into account. As a result, a materialistic explanation of the world is inadequate because it recognizes only the external (or material) aspect of objects and persons at the expense of their inner aspect. In the same way a spiritual interpretation that concentrates solely on the inner (or spiritual) side of people and events is equally at fault. Put these two aspects together (the external and the internal), a coherent explanation becomes possible. Let us now consider the way in which Teilhard goes about doing this task.

A. The Within and the Without

Teilhard does not restrict his thinking to people. His insistence

is not simply that people have a within (internal aspect) and without (external aspect), but that matter as a whole must be regarded in precisely these terms.2

Working back from man and from man's experience of a within, Teilhard argues that, because man exhibits the phenomenon of consciousness, matter must also be viewed as possessing a form of consciousness. Consciousness, he claims, has a cosmic extension. The very stuff of the universe therefore has a double aspect to its structure; coextensive with a without, there is also a within. According to Teilhard this is a phenomenal view, and for him a phenomenal view is the scientific point of view.

Although everything in the universe has a within and a without, the development of the within with respect to the without values. The within is best developed in man, the most complex entity in the universe, and in order to attempt to explain the relation between the within and the without, Teilhard postulates. a basic law- the law of complexity and consciousness. According to this, consciousness is best developed in the most complex and well-developed organisms, whereas in simple organisms it is rudimentary and poorly organized.3

One further point of importance lies in Teilhard's use of the term 'energy'. In his striving after a coherent explanation of all things, he looks upon all energy as being psychic. He then subdivides it into tangential and radial energy, the former linking a particular element with similar elements, and the latter drawing any given element forward.

B. The Evolutionary Process

Teilhard's view of the world is an evolutionary one. For him, the earth is only a small speck of dust in our galaxy and yet he concentrates very much on it.

i) Orthogenesis

First the earth was without life, then life came with its variety of plants and animals. Finally man appeard.4 "What stands out during evolution is the differentiation of the nervous system. This porvides a direction, and therefore— according to Teilhard proves that evolution has a direction." Therefore, the evolution

that Teilhard is talking about is not a blind evolution, but an evolution with a purpose.

By a process of circular reasoning, the importance of nervous system confirms the importance of consciousness and hence of the within through evolution. The impetus of the world, can now be explained in terms of inner principle, and this becomes the guiding principle behind all evolutionary change. The without of genetic changes is replaced by the within of innate desires. This is Teilhard's Orthogenesis.

ii) Noogenesis

At this point we may well ask what characterizes man? It can no longer be consiciousness, as Teilhard has made this a feature of the whole universe. The answer lies in a highly developed property of consciousness- reflection, which is the power acquired by a consciousness to turn upon itself. "The essential phenomenon in the living world is man (because man is reflective)." Man alone is capable of reflection. He no longer merely knows; he knows that he knows. However, before reflection could become a reality there had to be another critical point, the critical threshold of reflection. This he describes as 'an infinite leap forward', a critical transformation, a mutation from zero to everything.

In the light of this admission we may find ourselves somewhat perplexed as to where his information comes from. We have however only to think of the principles he has already enunciated - pan - psychism (Pan-Consciousness) orthogenesis, critical points and the certainty of evolution. These provide the 'knowledge', even though it is deductive rather then inductive. It is not scientifically acquired, but is a combination of arbitrary first principles.

The instantaneous leaps from instinct to thought constitute the process of hominization. Once thought has appeared on the scene it has to be developed and it is this development of man's thinking power that constitutes the process of noogenesis. Through this the earth gets a new skin, it finds its soul, the noosphere has come into existence.

In Teilhard's eyes these are the processes that have brought man as we now know him into existence. Man should realize

his unique position as the arrow pointing the way to the final unification of the world. He is at head of the whole movement of evolution, and he must accept the facts and face up to his cosmic responsibility. Therefore according to Teilhard, the hope of the world lies in its future, and its future depends upon men doing their utmost, to forward their own evolution. 8a

With man, evolution reaches a higher level of consciousness. Evolution starts directing itself. Yet man must obey certain imperatives. With the limited space at its disposal, mankind inevitably unites. Teilhard considers this unification more inevitable than the revolution of the earth. "Under a planetory pressure that can only increase with the passage of time, it would be easier to halt the revolution of the earth than it would be to prevent the totalization of mankind."

C. The Future-Omega

The arguments so far given by Teilhard provide him with an approach to the future. As evolution is an ascent towards consiciousness, the future of the human race could be in one of two directions- either along a divergent or along a convergent path. A divergent path would laed to a state of diffusion of consciousness, and this Teilhard dismisses. By contrast, convergence must lead towards a definite point or state of integration. This is the direction Teilhard envisages, and the point where all consciousness will converge is termed as the Omega point.

This convergence of consciousness has an inevitable side effect. Time and space are becoming humanized, or rather superhumanized. Consequently, the universal and personal are growing in the same direction and will culminate simultaneously in each other. Omega point, therefore, is not only the future-universal but also the Hyper-personal. In other words, the universe is becoming more and more personalized. This conclusion is exceedingly important for Teilhard as a christian, for it means that from an impersonal beginning, the universal has acquired a personal meaning.

Although omega emerges from the rise of consciousness, it has already emerged. Teilhard arrives at omega through the humanization of time and space, but having reached it, he modifies

his view— Omega, if it is to be omega, must escape from the time and space that produced it. But will Omega ever be reached? Will man destroy himself long before omega point is even in sight? Teilhard is essentially optimistic. Man is irreplaceable. Therefore he must reach the goal. The possibility of failure would be equivalent to the universe committing abortion upon itself, and such a view is absurd.

Omega point is indistinguishable in part at least, from God, hence his use of the term 'God-omega'! This is the end of the world, which itself is the critical point of maturation and escape. It may be achieved, and convergence will then take place in peace. Or it may be refused. This is the final ramification. Teilhard leaves us with this dilemma, although his whole trend is towards optimism and success rather than pessimism and failure.

This concludes the 'Scientific' section of the phenomenon of man as summarised, by him in the book *Toward the Future*. It is then followed by a short discourse on 'The Christian Phenomenon'. In this he links evolution and the general ascent of consciousness with the Lordship of Christ over these processes. God, the centre of centres, coincides with the omega point of evolution. Hence, for the Christian, evolution is a magnificient means of enabling him to feel more at one with God. Christ is the centre of the converging world, and so Christogenesis is the extension of cosmogenesis and noogenesis. Christ invests himself organically with the very majesty of his creation. Teilhard sees in Christ the advance made by God towards mankind to bring it to greater unity and finally to union with himself.

2. THE UNITY OF HIS THOUGHT

Cosmic, Human and Christic

In the light of the above summary, Teilhard's thought can be said to consist of three main components, the cosmic, the human and the Christic, all three being part and parcel of one great whole-his synthesis of the universe. All three are of an evolutionary nature, and so his cosmos is in reality a cosmogenesis and his God 'a God of cosmogenesis, that is God of evolution'. By this he appears to mean that God is an integral part of the evolutionary process, in the sense that God and the evolving

7

1

(

universe are now united with one another. From this it follows that evolution has a Christic centre, 12 mankind's duty being to advance this Christification. Hence the third component, the human, links the cosmic and Christic, constituting as it does the thinking laver (the noosphere) which lies between the living layer (the biosphere) and the ultra-human (omega, Christ or God).

It can be seen that this view of the world would be distorted beyond recognition were any one of the three components to be removed. Not only are they all essential to his vision, but they are reducible to each other, and deducible from each other

3. METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATION OF THE UNITY OF HIS THOUGHT

It is one thing to have a vision. But is quite another and is very important to have a basis for it, which is firmly founded on reason. We might be wondering whether Teilhard's approach to reality, as described above, had not let Teilhard to mere assertions than he could really prove. Let us therefore analyse the metaphysical basis which underlines the unity of his thought.

On studying Teilhard one would certainly see that before being able to construct his system, Teilhard had to postulate a number of more fundamental metaphysical principles. He himself regarded the relation between the one and the many as the central feature of his system. This led him to search for an answer which would give unity to a world of diversity and plurality.13 A synthesis that would lend coherence both to the whole of the universe and to every part of it, from the atoms at one end to God at the other, had to be found.

Such a vision inevitably entailed a rejection of the dualism of the mind and matter, and even of a rigid distinction between God and man. Instead he ranged himself with the monists, for whom the perception of multiplicity must be completed in some form of unity. As Teilhard himself suggested, his metaphysics rightly can be named as a metaphysics of union.

Metaphysics of Union

The essence of this metaphysics of union is nothing but

"to be=to unite oneself, or to unite others (the active form) to be=to be united and unified by another (passive form)." Let us briefly analyse together with Teilhard, the successive phases of this metaphysical union.

First phase: "In a first phase, we have to assume as a prime datum (and in so doing we coincide with classical philosophy) the irreversible and self-sufficient presence of a 'First Being' (our omega point). Otherwise it is impossible (both logically and ontologically) to get any purchase—that is, to take a single step forward." 15

How Teilhard arrived at this ontological principle, that is, God is very interesting. On a purrely phenomenal plane Teilhard was able to put forward a hypothesis regarding the probability of convergence. In order to go further than this, to a hypothesis of actual convergence, information of a different order was required. What was essential for his existential synthesis was the ability to be able to state categorically that we are actually converging towards a supreme centre. He had to be sure that an opening existed, and this was possible only by way of an act of faith based on rational grounds.

Not only must we know that convergence is actually taking place now, we must also be assured of the success of evolution. We must know, not simply that something is at the peak of evolution, but that someone is there. No wonder he chose the figure of the cone on which he could build his total metaphysical outlook. God, or the creator, is seen appoint which has projected a multiplicity of beings, which form the base of the cone. The task of these beings is to return and form a unity with the apex of the cone."

But what if all these views are only an imagination? or a pious faith? Can they be founded on firm reasons?

Teilhard seems to suggest an answer for this, in his book Science and Christ¹⁷ where he sees faith as not primarily an acceptance of God's word, but as the synthetic process which puts things together. Faith thus helongs to the total reflective endeavour of man. Using the image of the cone, Teilhard explains how science, in its analytical effort, is a movement towards

7

0

h

the base of the cone. "In our analytical exploration of the world, we have been moving towards the base of the cone, and that is why the world seemed to slip through our hands."18 Teilhard holds that there are in things principles of unity which explain them much better than the material elements which constitute them. To concentrate on the material elements without paying attention to the principles of unity, which Teilhard calls their souls or spirits, is to leave "the status to study the grain of marble-the sensation of light to retain the vibration of either—the cellular life to fasten into chemical combinations."19 "Reality itself. the supreme thing we were trying to reach, eluded us and with each new analysis continued to move even further away, first as the light moves further away from a person who is chasing its reflection."20So also, in our intellectual endeavour, according to Teilhard, if we try only to analyse, we move away from the real. But, if we add the synthesis of faith, we move closer to the real, because everything finds its reason in a source from which it spring and towards which it returns. So science and faith are not opposed to each other. They, in fact complement. Science moves towards the base of the Cone. "if we are to reach the luminous, solid, absolute zone of the world, what we have to do is not to make our way towards what lies deepest below or further behind but towards what is most interior in the soul and most new in the future."21 Therefore the conclusion that God is at the very heart of evolution is reached not just by faith, but by firm reason, and even through scientific laws and reason.

Second phase: After having affirmed the ontological principle, that is; God as the foundation of his metaphysics of union, Teilhard then proceeds to a second phase, wherein he tries to show how God himself exists only by uniting himself.

But if this initial and final centre is to subsist upon itself in its splendid Isolation, then (in conformity with the 'revealed' datum) we are obliged to represent it to ourselves as, in its triune nature, containing its own self-opposition. Thus, even in the primordial depths, the ontological principle we adopted as the foundation of our metaphysics is seen to be valid and illuminating: in a sense that is strictly true, God exists only by uniting himself- let us see how, is

another sense, he fulfills himself only by uniting.22

The analysis of this phase would surely lead to the conception of the Christian God, who has the trinitarian aspect to unify himself for his own existence. This has its own implications. We have already dealt about this in 'the Future-Omega'.

Third Phase: The third phase is further interesting. To quote Teilhard: "But, what is more, by the very fact that he unifies himself upon himself in order that he may exist, the first being ipso facto stimulates the outbreak of another type of opposition, not in the core of his being but at the very opposite pole from himself." This takes us to the question whether God created the universe freely or out of necessity? Was God forced to create? Creation, according to Teilhard is a need which God wishes to have. And this wish is "just as though God had been unable to resist." Love which is the result of union needs to be expressed. God has indeed concretely expressed his union and love through creation. This takes us to a fourth phase.

Fourth Phase: In the fourth pahse of his metaphysics of union, Teilhard distinguishes the type of understanding that went in classical philosophy from his metaphysics of union. In classical philosophy, the creation or participation is presented as an almost arbitrary act on the part of the first cause. But in the metaphysics of union the creative act takes on a very clearly defined significance and structure. "Being, in someway, the fruit of a reflection of God, no longer in God but outside him, the pleromization (as St. Pual would have called it) that is to say, the realization of participated being through arrangement and totalization—emerges as a sort of echo or symmetrical response to Trinitization....

The following are the conclusions, Teilhard derives from the above phase, which in my opinion are quite reasonable and justifiable.

- a) Though creation can include a limitless phase, yet it can be effected only once.
- b) In order to create God has inevitably to immerse himself in the multiple, so that he may incorporate it in himself.

c) In order to launch an attack on the multiple, God is forced into war with evil, 'the shadow of creation.' For Teilhard, in his modern view of a universe the problem of evil no longer exists. For him Evil is the normal accompaniment of the multiple. It is meant to diminish as we advance towards the apex of the Cone.

Hence we see in a metaphysics of union, the three fundamental, 'mysteries' of christianity stand as its basis.

"No God (up to a certain point...) without creative union.

No Creation without incarnational immersion

No incarnation without redemptive payment."²⁷

CONCLUSION

Teilhard had a very specific aim in interpreting the evolutionary process of the world. The aim is nothing but to culminate it in the figure of universal-Christ. Science and philosophy are only means to that end.

It seems that the great conflict of Teilhard's inner life was to resolve the problem how the man who believes in heaven and the cross can continue to believe seriously in the value of wordly occupations. He was faced with the classical dilemma of the radical dualism of matter and spirit, of body and soul. As has already been pointed out, For Teilhard this was not simply an intellectual difficulty, for him it had profound personal implications, and the answer he arrived at met his deepest mystical aspirations as well as providing the backround to his thinking.

Therefore, His solution lay in seeing the universe, and everything in it, as comprising a single whole. Hence he substituted a monistic approach to reality for a dualistic one. This let him postulate on one hand that Christ can and should transform matter, and on the other that we approach Christ through matter. The evolution of the cosmos, that is cosmogenesis, is the christification of all things as everything moving towards the supreme personal centre which is omega or God. Mysticism is nothing but 'the total and totalizing attitude of a love of evolution' which centres on Christ. Thus we may very well conclude that Teilhard did certainly have a metaphysical foundation which underlines the

Teilhard De Chardin's Thought

unity of his thought, backed up of course by his franstian faith.

Radhakrishnan Institute For ANTHONY SAVARI RAJ L. Advanced Studies in Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras-600005.

REFERENCES

- Teilhard, de Chardin, "My Fundamental Vision". Toward the Future. Trans. Rene Hague (London: Collins. 1975).
- 2. Ibid., p. 167.
- 3. Ibid., p. 171.
- 4. Ibid., p. 175.
- Gareth, Jones. Teilhard de Chardin: An Analysis and Assessment. (London: the Tyndale Press. 1969). p. 21.
- 6. "My Fundamental Vision", in Toward the Future, p. 175.
- 7. Ibid., p. 177.
- 8.a. Ibid., pp. 178-180.
- 8.b. Ibid., p. 182.
- 9. Ibid., p. 188
- 10. Ibid., pp. 188-192.
- J.de Marneffe, Teilhardian Thought: as Methodology for Discernment of Socio-Cultural Options in an Evolutionry world, (Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidaypeeth, 1981). p. 6.
- The quotaions Given are from C. Coe'no & Teilhard de Chardin, p. 369, p. 293, p. 272, as quoted by Gareth Jones.
- 13. Gareth. Jones. Teilhard de Chardian. p. 26.
- 14. "My Fundamental Vision", in Toward the Future, p. 193.
- 15. Ibid., p. 193.
- 16. J. de Marnesse. Teilhardian Thought, p.4.
- 17. Teilhard, de Chardian, "Science and Christ". Science and Christ.

22

ANTHONY SAVARI RAJ L.

Trans. Rene Hague (London: Collins., 1965).

- 18. Ibid., p. 30.
- 19. Ibid., p. 29.
- 20. Ibid., p. 31.
- 21. Ibid., p. 30 (Emphasis in text not kept)
- 22. "My Fundamental Vision" in Toward the Future, p. 194 (emphasis in text not kept).
- 23. Ibid., p. 194.
- 24. Ibid., p. 195.
- 25. Ibid., p. 195.
- 26. Ibid., pp. 195-198.
- 27. Ibid., pp. 195-198.
- 28. Ibid., p. 205.



